Infrastructure - The Times Of Central Asia

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Energy Security

Uzbekistan’s Gas Output Falls by 15% as Imports Rise

Uzbekistan’s natural gas production fell by 15% in the first quarter of 2026, adding pressure to an energy system already strained by rising demand, aging infrastructure, and lower hydrocarbon output. The country produced 9.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas in January-March, down from 11.3 billion in the same period last year. The figures are based on data from Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee, which also listed declines in oil, coal, and gas condensate production. Oil output fell to 157,300 tons in the first quarter, compared with 160,800 tons in the same period last year. Coal production declined from 1.2 million tons to 1.1 million tons, while gas condensate output fell even more sharply, dropping from 296,600 tons to 242,300 tons. Motor gasoline production rose to 313,200 tons, while diesel output increased to 280,900 tons. The latest data reflect a longer shift in Uzbekistan’s energy balance. Uzbekistan was long a net gas exporter, supported by large Soviet-era fields, a broad domestic gas network, and access to the Central Asia-China pipeline system. That position has weakened as older fields have declined and domestic use has grown. Uzbekistan now has to cover demand from households, power plants, industry, and transport while trying to modernize the sector. That task is getting harder. The country’s permanent population reached 38.2 million people as of January 1, 2026, according to official statistics, leading to more strain on the grid. Imports have risen sharply to meet these needs. Uzbekistan spent $360.5 million on natural gas imports in the first quarter of 2026, a 2.2-fold increase from the same period last year. Meanwhile, gas export revenues fell to $36.7 million, down from $94.3 million a year earlier. That shift has regional weight. Uzbekistan imports gas from Russia and Turkmenistan. Russian gas reaches Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan, using a Soviet-era pipeline route that once moved gas in the opposite direction. Uzbekistan began receiving Russian gas in 2023, as Moscow sought new markets after losing much of its European gas business. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russian gas exports to Uzbekistan rose by about 30% in 2025, reaching more than 7 billion cubic meters through the Central Asia-Center pipeline system. Tashkent and Moscow have since discussed larger energy supplies. In April, Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin agreed to increase deliveries of Russian oil and gas to Uzbekistan. The talks also covered wider cooperation in energy, industry, transport, and agriculture. More imports can help Uzbekistan avoid shortages, especially in winter, while supporting power generation and reducing pressure on households. But they also bring new costs, with higher imports weighing on the trade balance and increasing reliance on outside suppliers. That is a sensitive issue for a country trying to expand its domestic industry and keep energy prices stable. The government is trying to slow the production decline. Uzbekneftegaz has said that exploration work added 2 billion cubic meters of gas reserves and 40,000 tons of liquid hydrocarbon reserves in the first quarter. The company...

China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Enters Active Construction Phase

Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway has entered an active phase, following a meeting between the Kyrgyz government and representatives of the company implementing the project. According to the project company, preparation of the main design materials has been completed, while refinement and approval of the technical documentation are ongoing. At the same time, large-scale work has begun at construction sites. More than 5,000 people and approximately 5,600 units of specialized equipment are currently involved in the project. Tunnel excavation, earthworks, and bridge construction are underway, with total earthworks exceeding 3.5 million cubic meters. Erlist Akunbekov, Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan and the official overseeing the project, highlighted the importance of strict compliance with environmental standards and safety requirements. He added that the government would provide the necessary support and coordination to ensure timely completion. Kyrgyz authorities view the railway as a strategic infrastructure project. The new transport corridor is expected to provide the country with direct access to international markets and strengthen its role in regional logistics. One of the key challenges during the design phase was the difference in railway track gauge. China uses the 1,435 mm standard, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan use 1,520 mm. As a result, a compromise has been reached: part of the railway in Kyrgyzstan will be built to the Chinese standard, with a transshipment hub created to ensure connectivity. Economically, the project is expected to boost exports, primarily agricultural products, to China, the Middle East, and Europe. At present, a significant portion of cargo is transported by road through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with onward routes to the Azov and Black Seas, as well as via China to Pakistan and India. The launch of rail services is expected to reduce logistics costs and improve the competitiveness of Kyrgyz products in foreign markets.

Space

Kazakhstan Navigates a Fragmented Global Space Race

The United States, China, Russia, and Europe are pursuing different models of space strategy, ranging from institutional leadership to technological autonomy. At the same time, the number of middle powers that view space as a tool for economic development and the strengthening of sovereignty is growing. In this context, a multi-level system is emerging in which the architecture of near-Earth space is becoming an element of the global balance of power. For Kazakhstan, these changes are of direct importance. The country possesses a unique infrastructure asset, the Baikonur Cosmodrome, and is gradually developing its own satellite and manufacturing capabilities. However, amid the fragmentation of the global space order, the question of strategic choice is becoming increasingly pressing. Will Kazakhstan remain primarily an infrastructure hub, or will it build a sustainable national model for participation in the evolving space architecture? Models of Space Strategies The United States remains the world’s leading space power in terms of funding and launch frequency. Total government space spending, including allocations for NASA, the U.S. Space Force, and intelligence programmes, reached a record $79.7 billion in 2024 out of approximately $135 billion in global government space spending. A defining feature of the U.S. model is the close integration between government institutions and the private sector. Companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin have become integral to national strategy, helping to reduce launch costs and accelerate innovation. A central component of the current phase is the Artemis lunar programme. The Artemis II mission is planned to conduct a crewed flyby of the Moon, while Artemis III is intended to return humans to the lunar surface using a landing system being developed by SpaceX. China’s space strategy is built on the concept of long-term technological sovereignty and the phased expansion of its presence in space. Deployment began in 2021, and the three-module Tiangong space station was completed in 2022. Chinese astronauts now conduct scientific experiments and test technologies for long-duration missions in low Earth orbit. In lunar exploration, China is implementing a step-by-step research programme that includes returning soil samples and advancing plans for an international lunar research station. The Tianwen-1 Mars mission, which included the landing of the Zhurong rover, demonstrated the country’s capacity to carry out complex interplanetary operations independently. Amid sanctions pressure and reduced international cooperation, Russia’s space strategy is focused on ensuring independent access to space, maintaining orbital infrastructure, and preserving key capabilities in human spaceflight. Despite ongoing uncertainty over its long-term involvement, Russia continues to participate in the International Space Station programme, conducting regular crewed launches and sending Progress cargo spacecraft. At the same time, work is underway on the planned Russian Orbital Station (ROS), with initial deployment planned for the late 2020s. The project is viewed as an important step in preparing for future missions, including potential lunar initiatives. Europe’s space strategy emphasises strategic autonomy alongside broad international cooperation. In addition to traditional Ariane and Vega launch vehicles, European countries are investing in commercial startups such as Isar Aerospace and Orbex, which...

Syria

Syria After Assad: What the New Regional Order Means for Central Asia

The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 fundamentally reshaped Syria’s regional position. The collapse of the old power structure weakened Iran’s entrenched military and economic networks and left Russia’s previously secured foothold uncertain. As Damascus enters a new political phase, external actors are recalibrating their strategies in a landscape that looks markedly different from that of the past decade. For Central Asian governments, the shift is not merely regional. Syria is becoming a testing ground for how mid-sized states navigate post-conflict environments shaped by larger powers, and a potential arena for economic and diplomatic outreach. As influence is redistributed and new investment and trade corridors are reconsidered, decisions taken in Damascus will increasingly intersect with Central Asia’s own foreign policy and economic calculations. In this emerging landscape, a power vacuum is being filled by states seeking to advance their interests. From the earliest days of Syria’s post-Assad transition, Turkey has been particularly active. As part of its declared comprehensive support for the new Syrian authorities, Ankara has taken steps to consolidate its position in the Syrian Arab Republic. Turkey is actively participating in infrastructure reconstruction, investing in economic projects, and expanding military-technical cooperation with Damascus. In August 2025, Syria and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement covering areas including counterterrorism training, cybersecurity, demining, military engineering, logistics, and enhanced coordination between their armed forces. That same month, the two sides agreed to establish an intergovernmental business council under the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board to promote trade and investment cooperation between public and private companies. Turkish exports to Syria reached $3 billion in 2025, reflecting the rapid expansion of Ankara’s economic presence. For Central Asia, Ankara’s activism carries particular weight. Turkey has simultaneously deepened its political, economic, and security cooperation across the Turkic world, meaning its posture in Syria intersects with its broader regional strategy. A central element of Turkey’s Syria policy remains the issue of refugee returns. However, the prospect of large-scale repatriation is complicated by several factors, notably the long-term presence of around 2.5 million Syrian displaced persons in Turkish society and the absence of stable socio-economic conditions in Syria to support reintegration. Over more than a decade of conflict, a generation of Syrians has grown up in Turkey, many of whom are deeply embedded in the country’s social and economic life. Turkey’s obligations under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, including the principle of non-refoulement, further constrain policy options. Taken together, these factors make large-scale return unlikely until Syria achieves sustained political stabilization and adequate living conditions. In the longer term, Turkey’s objective of neutralizing what it describes as the Kurdish threat emanating from Syrian territory will continue to shape its strategy. Israel has also intensified its military and political engagement since the change of power in Damascus. It has taken steps to establish control over areas adjacent to the Golan Heights and to create a buffer zone, arguing that such measures are necessary to safeguard national security against potential terrorist threats. Israeli officials...

Hydropower

Kazakhstan Intends to Triple Its Hydropower Capacity by 2030

Kazakhstan plans to significantly expand its hydropower capacity over the next five years. By the end of 2030, the country intends to commission new hydropower plants with a combined capacity of approximately 660 MW, nearly tripling the sector’s current installed capacity, according to the Ministry of Energy. At present, 43 hydropower facilities operate in Kazakhstan with a total installed capacity of 313 MW. The implementation of agreements already concluded is expected to raise this figure to nearly 1 GW, substantially increasing the contribution of hydropower to the national energy mix. In 2025, an additional project was added to the portfolio: the 26 MW Korinskaya HPP-2 was commissioned in the Jetisu Region. By the end of the year, total electricity generation from renewable energy sources reached 8.621 billion kWh, of which 1.196 billion kWh was produced by small and medium-sized hydropower plants. Kazakhstan continues to rely on an auction mechanism to attract investment and enhance transparency in the renewable energy sector. In 2025, 500 MW of capacity designated specifically for hydropower projects was offered through competitive auctions. According to the Ministry of Energy, this approach helps reduce project costs and foster a stable investment environment. The highest concentration of renewable energy facilities, including hydropower plants, is located in the southern and southeastern regions, Zhambyl, Almaty, and Jetisu regions. These areas benefit from significant river potential and established infrastructure capable of supporting further generation growth. The ministry states that implementation of the planned projects will diversify Kazakhstan’s energy mix, supply remote areas with stable green electricity, reduce pressure on the main transmission grids, and enhance overall system reliability. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, renewable energy accounted for 7% of Kazakhstan’s national energy mix by the end of 2025.