Infrastructure - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 135

Investment Projects

Tashkent Signs $3.5 Billion in China Deals for Infrastructure and Exports

The third Uzbekistan-China Interregional Forum, held in the Chinese city of Xi’an, concluded with Tashkent signing more than $3.5 billion in investment and export agreements with Chinese partners, according to the Tashkent city administration. The agreements include $3.35 billion in investment projects and $156 million in export contracts spanning infrastructure, transport, construction, environmental technology, and industrial production. Officials said the deals are aimed at modernizing the Uzbek capital’s urban infrastructure and improving transport systems, public spaces, environmental services, and industrial capacity. The forum comes as China’s economic role in Uzbekistan continues to expand. According to Uzbekistan’s Dunyo news agency, speakers at the Xi’an forum said bilateral trade reached $18 billion last year, while Chinese investment in Uzbekistan totaled $17 billion. China has become one of Uzbekistan’s most important economic partners, with cooperation expanding from trade and construction into transport, energy, industry, and urban development. Dunyo’s report on the forum also presented the Xi’an meeting as part of a broader push to build direct ties between Uzbek regions and Chinese provinces, rather than limiting cooperation to central government agreements. Among the largest planned projects are a $1 billion initiative to develop Bus Rapid Transit, known as BRT, overpasses, and road infrastructure under the EPC+F financing model, and another $1 billion package focused on transport and social infrastructure projects. Additional agreements include $500 million for modern residential complexes in renovation zones and $400 million for drainage, irrigation, and stormwater systems. The city administration said financing is expected to come from Chinese partners without the direct use of Uzbekistan’s state budget or sovereign guarantees, although repayment would still depend on future municipal revenue streams. The projects are planned under the Engineering, Procurement, Construction, and Financing model, known as EPC+F. The financing structure is significant as many of the largest projects are municipal rather than national in scope. It allows Tashkent to pursue major road, drainage, and transport upgrades while presenting the deals as externally financed. Nevertheless, projects of this type can still create long-term obligations if future city revenues are used to cover repayments. The forum also focused on the development of Tashkent’s Yangi Avlod special industrial zone. Agreements worth $130 million were signed with Chinese companies, including Jwise, Zhongke Honghu, CAS Cloud, and UMGG. The projects are expected to support manufacturing infrastructure, digital management systems, and high-tech industrial production in the capital. Yangi Avlod has been promoted as one of Tashkent’s main industrial expansion sites. According to the zone’s official website, it is located in the Yangihayot district and is planned as a 764.5-hectare industrial area with logistics, warehouse, administrative, and commercial infrastructure. Other agreements include investments in decorative stone manufacturing, ceramic production, and smart waste-sorting equipment. Export contracts signed during the forum included three agreements worth a combined $150 million for jewelry exports, as well as deals covering cotton yarn and silver concentrate supplies. Separately, during the official visit to China, Tashkent Mayor Shavkat Umurzakov met with executives from China Railway Construction Corporation to discuss urban renovation projects, transport infrastructure, and...

Alatau City

Kazakhstan Plans to Power New Alatau City With Gas and Renewable Energy

Kazakhstan plans to power the future megacity of Alatau City near Almaty through a combination of gas-fired generation and renewable sources, as authorities seek to address chronic electricity shortages in the country’s south while creating a low-carbon “smart city” model. Deputy Prime Minister Kanat Bozumbayev outlined the government’s energy strategy for the project during a briefing in Astana. According to him, Alatau City’s population could reach between 2.8 million and 3 million people by 2050, roughly equivalent to the current population of Almaty. “We expect that Alatau City will rely primarily on gas generation, given the area’s relatively low population density, along with renewable energy facilities,” Bozumbayev said. The new city is being developed on the site of the village of Zhetygen, approximately 50 kilometers from Almaty. The project will also encompass the settlements of Enbek, Zhanaarna and Kuigan, as well as parts of Konaev and the Talgar district in the Almaty Region. Authorities envision Alatau City as a future hub for technology companies, logistics and export-oriented industry. Under the current concept, the city will be divided into four functional districts: the financial and business-oriented Gate District, the educational and medical Golden District, the industrial Growing District, and the entertainment-focused Green District. The government expects rapid growth in both population and industrial activity to drive a sharp increase in electricity consumption. According to official estimates, electricity demand in Alatau City could reach 1.45 gigawatts by 2030 and rise further to 1.7 gigawatts by 2040. For comparison, Almaty’s electricity consumption in 2024 stood at approximately 982 megawatts. During the initial phase over the next three years, the city is expected to require around 50-100 megawatts of electricity. However, once industrial facilities become operational, demand could rise to between 500 and 1,000 megawatts, Bozumbayev said. Authorities have already prepared an infrastructure plan that includes the construction of transmission lines, substations, and new generating facilities. The government’s emphasis on gas-fired power generation is aimed at reducing southern Kazakhstan’s dependence on electricity transfers from northern Kazakhstan and neighboring countries. According to Bozumbayev, the launch of new power plants in Kyzylorda, Turkestan, and other southern regions should eventually create an electricity surplus in southern Kazakhstan, which currently remains energy deficient. The development of Alatau City is also part of Kazakhstan’s effort to modernize its power system and gradually increase the share of renewable energy in the national mix. In recent years, the country has expanded solar and wind power projects while remaining heavily dependent on coal-fired generation. Alongside energy infrastructure, authorities are promoting Alatau City as a testing ground for advanced transportation technologies. Bozumbayev said preliminary estimates suggest that air taxi rides in the city could cost around $1 per kilometer. “As competition develops in the market, prices could decrease,” the deputy prime minister said. He added that the testing of the air taxi system is expected to be completed by 2026, with commercial services potentially launching in 2027. However, Almaty Region Governor Marat Sultangaziev previously stated that full commercial operation of air taxi services...

Energy Security

Uzbekistan’s Gas Output Falls by 15% as Imports Rise

Uzbekistan’s natural gas production fell by 15% in the first quarter of 2026, adding pressure to an energy system already strained by rising demand, aging infrastructure, and lower hydrocarbon output. The country produced 9.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas in January-March, down from 11.3 billion in the same period last year. The figures are based on data from Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee, which also listed declines in oil, coal, and gas condensate production. Oil output fell to 157,300 tons in the first quarter, compared with 160,800 tons in the same period last year. Coal production declined from 1.2 million tons to 1.1 million tons, while gas condensate output fell even more sharply, dropping from 296,600 tons to 242,300 tons. Motor gasoline production rose to 313,200 tons, while diesel output increased to 280,900 tons. The latest data reflect a longer shift in Uzbekistan’s energy balance. Uzbekistan was long a net gas exporter, supported by large Soviet-era fields, a broad domestic gas network, and access to the Central Asia-China pipeline system. That position has weakened as older fields have declined and domestic use has grown. Uzbekistan now has to cover demand from households, power plants, industry, and transport while trying to modernize the sector. That task is getting harder. The country’s permanent population reached 38.2 million people as of January 1, 2026, according to official statistics, leading to more strain on the grid. Imports have risen sharply to meet these needs. Uzbekistan spent $360.5 million on natural gas imports in the first quarter of 2026, a 2.2-fold increase from the same period last year. Meanwhile, gas export revenues fell to $36.7 million, down from $94.3 million a year earlier. That shift has regional weight. Uzbekistan imports gas from Russia and Turkmenistan. Russian gas reaches Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan, using a Soviet-era pipeline route that once moved gas in the opposite direction. Uzbekistan began receiving Russian gas in 2023, as Moscow sought new markets after losing much of its European gas business. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russian gas exports to Uzbekistan rose by about 30% in 2025, reaching more than 7 billion cubic meters through the Central Asia-Center pipeline system. Tashkent and Moscow have since discussed larger energy supplies. In April, Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin agreed to increase deliveries of Russian oil and gas to Uzbekistan. The talks also covered wider cooperation in energy, industry, transport, and agriculture. More imports can help Uzbekistan avoid shortages, especially in winter, while supporting power generation and reducing pressure on households. But they also bring new costs, with higher imports weighing on the trade balance and increasing reliance on outside suppliers. That is a sensitive issue for a country trying to expand its domestic industry and keep energy prices stable. The government is trying to slow the production decline. Uzbekneftegaz has said that exploration work added 2 billion cubic meters of gas reserves and 40,000 tons of liquid hydrocarbon reserves in the first quarter. The company...

China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Enters Active Construction Phase

Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway has entered an active phase, following a meeting between the Kyrgyz government and representatives of the company implementing the project. According to the project company, preparation of the main design materials has been completed, while refinement and approval of the technical documentation are ongoing. At the same time, large-scale work has begun at construction sites. More than 5,000 people and approximately 5,600 units of specialized equipment are currently involved in the project. Tunnel excavation, earthworks, and bridge construction are underway, with total earthworks exceeding 3.5 million cubic meters. Erlist Akunbekov, Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan and the official overseeing the project, highlighted the importance of strict compliance with environmental standards and safety requirements. He added that the government would provide the necessary support and coordination to ensure timely completion. Kyrgyz authorities view the railway as a strategic infrastructure project. The new transport corridor is expected to provide the country with direct access to international markets and strengthen its role in regional logistics. One of the key challenges during the design phase was the difference in railway track gauge. China uses the 1,435 mm standard, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan use 1,520 mm. As a result, a compromise has been reached: part of the railway in Kyrgyzstan will be built to the Chinese standard, with a transshipment hub created to ensure connectivity. Economically, the project is expected to boost exports, primarily agricultural products, to China, the Middle East, and Europe. At present, a significant portion of cargo is transported by road through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with onward routes to the Azov and Black Seas, as well as via China to Pakistan and India. The launch of rail services is expected to reduce logistics costs and improve the competitiveness of Kyrgyz products in foreign markets.

Space

Kazakhstan Navigates a Fragmented Global Space Race

The United States, China, Russia, and Europe are pursuing different models of space strategy, ranging from institutional leadership to technological autonomy. At the same time, the number of middle powers that view space as a tool for economic development and the strengthening of sovereignty is growing. In this context, a multi-level system is emerging in which the architecture of near-Earth space is becoming an element of the global balance of power. For Kazakhstan, these changes are of direct importance. The country possesses a unique infrastructure asset, the Baikonur Cosmodrome, and is gradually developing its own satellite and manufacturing capabilities. However, amid the fragmentation of the global space order, the question of strategic choice is becoming increasingly pressing. Will Kazakhstan remain primarily an infrastructure hub, or will it build a sustainable national model for participation in the evolving space architecture? Models of Space Strategies The United States remains the world’s leading space power in terms of funding and launch frequency. Total government space spending, including allocations for NASA, the U.S. Space Force, and intelligence programmes, reached a record $79.7 billion in 2024 out of approximately $135 billion in global government space spending. A defining feature of the U.S. model is the close integration between government institutions and the private sector. Companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin have become integral to national strategy, helping to reduce launch costs and accelerate innovation. A central component of the current phase is the Artemis lunar programme. The Artemis II mission is planned to conduct a crewed flyby of the Moon, while Artemis III is intended to return humans to the lunar surface using a landing system being developed by SpaceX. China’s space strategy is built on the concept of long-term technological sovereignty and the phased expansion of its presence in space. Deployment began in 2021, and the three-module Tiangong space station was completed in 2022. Chinese astronauts now conduct scientific experiments and test technologies for long-duration missions in low Earth orbit. In lunar exploration, China is implementing a step-by-step research programme that includes returning soil samples and advancing plans for an international lunar research station. The Tianwen-1 Mars mission, which included the landing of the Zhurong rover, demonstrated the country’s capacity to carry out complex interplanetary operations independently. Amid sanctions pressure and reduced international cooperation, Russia’s space strategy is focused on ensuring independent access to space, maintaining orbital infrastructure, and preserving key capabilities in human spaceflight. Despite ongoing uncertainty over its long-term involvement, Russia continues to participate in the International Space Station programme, conducting regular crewed launches and sending Progress cargo spacecraft. At the same time, work is underway on the planned Russian Orbital Station (ROS), with initial deployment planned for the late 2020s. The project is viewed as an important step in preparing for future missions, including potential lunar initiatives. Europe’s space strategy emphasises strategic autonomy alongside broad international cooperation. In addition to traditional Ariane and Vega launch vehicles, European countries are investing in commercial startups such as Isar Aerospace and Orbex, which...