Middle Corridor - The Times Of Central Asia

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Transport Digitalization

Kazakhstan Rolls Out AI Tools Across Its Transport Networks

Kazakhstan is turning to artificial intelligence to help decide where its airlines should fly and which roads need repair, while other systems aim to move freight across its borders faster. The projects are part of a series of government digital systems intended to increase the country’s role as a regional transport hub. Air One of the most prominent projects is Echelon Alpha. The platform analyzes passenger demand and competition between aviation hubs to assess the economics of individual routes. It has already identified around 30 promising routes that could generate additional direct or transit passenger traffic for Kazakhstan. The full list has not been made public, although its developers have cited a potential Hyderabad–Astana–Moscow connection as an example of a route modeled by the system. Kazakhstan’s favorable location between China and Europe does not automatically turn Astana and Almaty into international aviation hubs. They have to compete for transit traffic with airports in Baku and Istanbul, as well as those in the Gulf states. According to Kazakhstan’s Transport Ministry, the model processed data covering around 200 million flights over the past five years, along with approximately 170 airline reports. It also combines geomarketing data with information from open and commercial sources. Its claimed forecasting accuracy is up to 90%. “Echelon Alpha uses artificial intelligence to analyze market dynamics in real time and provide a basis for fast, accurate solutions,” said Echelon Alpha founder Rakhman Asambayev in an interview with Forbes Kazakhstan. The system assesses the commercial viability of new routes and their potential effect on the economy. Its developers estimate that the proposed network could have an annual economic impact of around $153 million, although the figure has not been independently verified. Kazakhstan is also introducing biometric Q-Gate terminals at its airports. They verify passport data against facial biometrics in 15 to 50 seconds, four to five times faster than standard checks, according to government estimates. Road Launched around two months ago, e-Joldar uses AI to track road conditions and repair spending, while also collecting data on the quality of construction materials. More than 25,000 miles of national roads have already been digitized. By the end of the year, monitoring is expected to cover the country’s entire road network of around 115,000 miles. Smart Cargo may have a more immediate effect on international freight operators. The platform combines data from 58 information systems in a single digital portal. Authorities say operators can access cargo information through a QR code. AI checks documentation and identifies the necessary permits, while the platform helps determine routes and tracks shipments. The government says Smart Cargo has increased border-crossing speeds by 30% and cut carrier waiting times by a factor of 10. These figures are based on government estimates. Rail On the rail network, digitalization is being paired with major capacity expansion as Kazakhstan pursues its transit ambitions, including through the Middle Corridor. KinetiX performs contactless diagnostics of rolling stock. Government figures indicate that it has reduced technical inspection times by 30% and manual measurements...

Foreign Policy

Kazakhstan Updates Its Foreign Policy Concept in a More Difficult Era

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has approved targeted amendments to the document that sets the principles and priorities for Kazakhstan’s dealings with the outside world. The changes align the doctrine with Kazakhstan’s new constitutional order, remove its remaining provisions tied to Nazarbayev’s formal role, and come at a time when multi-vector diplomacy has become far more demanding than it was in 2020. The amendments to the Foreign Policy Concept for 2020–2030, signed on August 14, attracted attention after KazTAG reported on them. Kazinform subsequently highlighted changes concerning the protection of citizens abroad, public understanding of foreign policy and the new Kurultai. A Foreign Policy Concept is Kazakhstan’s overarching diplomatic doctrine. It sets the principles, priorities and responsibilities intended to guide state policy through 2030. The August changes are limited in length. They remove its remaining references to Nursultan Nazarbayev’s formal role, bring the document into the Kurultai era, and give the Astana International Forum formal recognition in the doctrine. Other language now attracting attention is older. Sovereignty, protection of citizens, and resilience to negative external influence were already in the 2020 document. The difference is the world in which Kazakhstan now has to apply them. From Personal Legacy to Institutional Continuity The first principle in the 2020 concept referred to continuity with the foreign policy course of the First President and Elbasy, Nursultan Nazarbayev. The new wording promises “continuity of the foreign policy course at a new stage of the country’s development.” The revised text no longer names Nazarbayev or uses the Elbasy title. The amendments also remove a provision that gave the First President a lifelong right to address the public and state bodies on major foreign policy questions. The Constitutional Law on the First President was repealed in 2023, and the concept no longer lists it among its legal foundations. This follows a process that began years ago. The special legal provisions associated with the Elbasy framework have been repealed, while Tokayev has continued to acknowledge Nazarbayev’s place in the history of independent Kazakhstan. Tokayev was also closely involved in the foreign policy he inherited. He served twice as foreign minister, as prime minister, and later as director-general of the United Nations Office at Geneva. The revised concept places foreign policy continuity on an institutional rather than personal basis. Adapting the Foreign Policy Concept to the New Constitution Kazakhstan’s new Constitution came into force on July 1, replacing the Senate and Mazhilis with a unicameral Kurultai. The first election to the 145-seat body is scheduled for August 23. The old concept described the foreign policy functions of the bicameral parliament. The amended version now identifies the Kurultai as Kazakhstan’s highest representative body exercising legislative power. Signed nine days before the election, the change places the foreign policy doctrine inside the wider constitutional transition and removes references to institutions that no longer exist. The revision also fits Tokayev’s broader effort to move Kazakhstan beyond a political system shaped by the formal privileges of its first president and towards one intended to...

Middle Corridor

Kazakhstan Middle Corridor Railway Cuts Detour, but Caspian Bottlenecks Remain

Kazakhstan expects to complete the roughly 323-kilometer Moyynty-Kyzylzhar railway across the Karaganda and Ulytau regions of central Kazakhstan by the end of 2026. The new line will shorten the Middle Corridor by 149 kilometers and ease congestion on the existing route via Zharyk. Kazakhstan Temir Zholy said in July that 202.5 kilometers of track had been laid. For the China-Europe route, however, the next test is the Caspian Sea. Containers must be transferred from trains at ports in Kazakhstan to ships bound for Azerbaijan, then returned to rail. The speed and regularity of these transfers will determine whether the hours saved within Kazakhstan translate into shorter delivery times. What the New Line Changes Moyynty-Kyzylzhar will give transit trains a more direct route from the Chinese border toward the Caspian and ease pressure on the Moyynty-Zharyk section, where east-west freight competes with domestic traffic. The project is designed to accommodate double-stack container trains and includes provisions for future expansion and electrification. The World Bank projects that capacity on the section will rise from 14 to 28 pairs of freight trains per day, while transit time via the new route is targeted to fall from eight hours to six by 2031. In February, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee intended to mobilize $1.41 billion in commercial financing for the project. Across Kazakhstan, the time savings will be more modest. Transit from Dostyk, on the Chinese border, to Aktau is expected to fall from about 72 hours to 68 hours by 2031. Farther west, the country is also modernizing the Shalkar-Beineu and Beineu-Mangystau sections leading toward the Caspian ports. The Caspian Remains a Bottleneck The European Union (EU) aims to reduce transit time along the Trans-Caspian route to no more than 15 days. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has estimated that the route has the potential to move cargo between China and Europe in around 18 days, but infrastructure and connectivity constraints have produced transit times ranging from 14 to 60 days. For shippers, reliability is as important as speed. Freight Is Growing Faster Than Caspian Capacity Pressure on the Caspian section is already increasing. In 2025, Kazmortransflot carried 59,400 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) on the Aktau-Baku-Aktau feeder route, more than 15% above the 2024 level of 51,400 TEU. In May 2026, container traffic between Aktau and Azerbaijan reached a company record of 7,451 TEU. Kazakhstan is expanding its port infrastructure as well. The EBRD and the EU are financing upgrades at Aktau, including two dedicated container berths and new handling equipment. The project is expected to double the port’s container-handling capacity. Caspian fleet capacity is another constraint as rail freight grows. Falling Caspian Sea levels are also limiting how fully some vessels can be loaded. From an Alternative to Russia to a Commercial Route After 2022, geopolitics increased demand for the Middle Corridor. It offered Europe a route to Central Asia and China that bypasses Russia, while providing Kazakhstan with another connection to European markets. The corridor increasingly has to compete on commercial terms....

Oil Exports

Push for Kazakhstan Oil Exports Diversification as CPC Disruptions Expose Capacity Gap

Kazakhstan has spent years looking for more ways to export its oil without relying so heavily on Russia. This summer has shown how difficult that remains. Shipments to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline have been suspended since May, disruptions on the Black Sea in July forced Tengiz to more than halve production, and now Russia is rerouting Kazakh crude from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk to free Baltic capacity for its own oil. The shift comes as exports from Russia’s western ports ran 15% below plan in the first half of August, with Novorossiysk shipments of Russian Urals and Kazakh KEBCO falling to around 400,000 barrels per day. At least two cargoes of Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude scheduled for loading at Ust-Luga in late August will instead be shipped through the Black Sea. No KEBCO loadings are currently planned at the Baltic port in September. The move will free up about 100,000 barrels per day of export capacity at Ust-Luga for Russian crude. Kazakh producers support the arrangement because shipments through Novorossiysk are currently more profitable. From a commercial standpoint, the decision is understandable. But Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk give Kazakhstan access to two different seas while remaining Russian ports. And Novorossiysk, where the KEBCO cargoes are now being redirected, had itself suspended crude loadings only a few days earlier. On August 14, loadings at the Sheskharis terminal, Novorossiysk port’s main oil-export facility, were halted following a drone attack. The facility handles around 700,000 barrels per day and loads Russian Urals and Siberian Light as well as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO. Operations resumed on August 16, and one of the first tankers to load was carrying Kazakh crude. Another 80,000-ton KEBCO cargo was due to begin loading on August 18. Kazakhstan’s far larger vulnerability, however, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Its marine terminal near Novorossiysk is separate from Sheskharis. In 2025, the country exported 78.7 million metric tons of oil, of which 64.8 million tons were shipped through CPC. Volumes through the pipeline rose by 18% compared with 2024, largely as production increased following the Tengiz expansion. The July disruptions showed how quickly problems on that route can affect production inside Kazakhstan. After drone attacks near the CPC terminal forced restrictions on loadings, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production fell by about 21% by July 22 to roughly 1.63 million barrels per day, from a July average of 2.07 million barrels per day. Tengiz output dropped from a July average of around 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000. A few days later, the situation deteriorated further. On July 26, Kazakhstan produced around 1 million barrels per day of oil and gas condensate, down from an average of 2.16 million barrels per day in June. Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak all had to reduce production. On July 27, CPC resumed loadings after a week-long suspension. CPC accounts for more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, so replacing it quickly with other routes is impossible. The pipeline typically carries around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day....

Middle Corridor

Insider’s View: Why Uzbekistan’s Caspian Push Might Be Beneficial for Georgia

Over the past year, Georgia has shifted its focus towards Central Asia, establishing strategic partnerships with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The country has long-term plans for the region in several development areas, including trade and transport logistics. However, the current phase of Georgian–Central Asian relations is not solely based on economic pragmatism. It should also be viewed as a means of preserving sovereignty in the face of global challenges that are catalyzing the old-world order to collapse. In this context, strategic connectivity can be defined as a vital component of small states’ long-term stability and security, placing it on a par with defense capabilities. By intensifying political and economic ties with Tbilisi, Tashkent is seeking to reinforce the Western orientation of its foreign policy. This is necessary to successfully balance between the major powers and minimize the risk of becoming overly dependent on neighboring Russia or China, for example. However, this move should not be perceived as a counter to the geopolitical ambitions of non-regional actors in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is devoid of political overtones and reflects the parties’ desire to strengthen their sovereignty based on shared economic interests and opportunities. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) is the key driver in this dynamic, and its significance extends far beyond transport connectivity. It is a mutually beneficial initiative whose ultimate goal is to ensure regional stability and sustainable economic growth. Thus, Uzbekistan gains an alternative route to the European Union market — the country’s third-largest trading partner — via the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi on the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, the Trans-Caspian route provides Georgia with access to the rapidly growing markets of East and South Asia via Uzbekistan and neighboring countries. The new transit corridor concepts promoted by Uzbekistan in the context of the expanding Central Asian partnership deserve special attention. Tashkent and Tbilisi have enormous potential to develop transport cooperation by establishing intercontinental logistics chains: China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey/EU, and India–Pakistan–Afghanistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan–Azerbaijan–Georgia–EU. Both projects involve connecting the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway and the Trans-Afghan Railway Corridor (the Kabul Corridor), which are an absolute priority for Uzbekistan, with the Middle Corridor. This will significantly increase the republic’s exports of transport services by attracting additional transit flows from the South Caucasus, Turkey and Europe, while also expanding the freight base for the aforementioned railway corridors. The issue of jointly promoting new trade routes along the east-west and north-south axes (from Europe to China and India, respectively) through Uzbekistan requires ongoing expert discussion to amplify its relevance. To fully realize its own transit potential, it is insufficient for Uzbekistan to focus solely on the infrastructure development of the Middle Corridor. This is because, even after the launch of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, the country’s ability to attract additional transit cargo flows would remain very limited due to Kazakhstan’s dominance in rail transport between the EU, Central Asia, and China via the Caspian Sea. For Uzbekistan, it is far more important to extend the Middle Corridor to China and India. This would...

Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization...