Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Foreign Investment

Tashkent’s Rise Reshapes Central Asia’s Business Landscape

Tashkent is changing faster than it can adjust to its own growth. The city is already pressing against the limits of its existing airport; a vast new city designed for up to two million people is being built alongside it, and a separate financial jurisdiction drawing on English common law is being created. Uzbekistan is opening up further to foreign investment, and nearly two-thirds of the country’s foreign-invested enterprises are already concentrated in the capital. But being the leading business city in your own country and becoming a regional hub are not the same thing. Tashkent already has strong competitors in Central Asia. Given that competition, it is more useful to examine why companies are choosing Tashkent now and what the city still lacks than to declare it the region’s new business capital. As of July 1, 2026, Uzbekistan had 20,502 operating enterprises with foreign investment. Their number had increased about 1.4 times over five years. China accounted for the largest number, with 6,060 companies, followed by Russia with 3,454, Turkey with 2,293, and Kazakhstan with 1,307. As of June 1, 12,480 of the 19,921 enterprises with foreign investment then operating in Uzbekistan were located in Tashkent. That was almost 63%. Why Tashkent? Part of the answer is obvious: the institutions and services businesses rely on are concentrated there, from government and finance to professional services, technology firms, and skilled workers. That creates a network effect: companies come because partners, clients, and suppliers are already there. But the capital had roughly the same administrative advantages ten years ago without attracting business on anything like the current scale. What changed first was Uzbekistan’s economy itself. After 2016, the country began moving away from its previous closed economic model. One of the first major steps was currency liberalization in 2017. Changes followed in trade, taxation, privatization, and the treatment of foreign investors. The state still plays an enormous role in the economy, but it has become considerably easier for foreign private businesses to operate. Uzbekistan’s GDP grew by 7.7% in 2025. The IMF expects growth of about 6.8% in 2026, while pointing to a longstanding problem: the state’s large footprint in the economy, including major state-owned enterprises and banks, continues to constrain competition and private-sector development. The combination of rapid growth and a gradually more open economy has benefited Tashkent more than any other city in the country. Uzbekistan also has an advantage that cannot be created by government decree. With a population of about 38.5 million, it is Central Asia’s most populous country and has a large domestic consumer base. It is also the region’s only country that borders all four other Central Asian republics. For an international company, Tashkent can serve both as an office for the Uzbek market and as a gateway to neighboring countries. Now, Tashkent is entering territory long occupied by others. For decades, Almaty has concentrated banks, international representative offices, private companies, and professional talent. In 2018, the Astana International Financial Centre began operations, with a...

Sanctions

Kyrgyzstan Sanctions Risks Reshape Business

Kyrgyzstan is stepping up action against companies that could expose its banks and wider economy to Western sanctions. On August 18, the authorities moved to forcibly liquidate another 19 legal entities, while major banks are closing the accounts of dozens of clients deemed too risky. Bishkek has not formally joined Western sanctions against Russia, but those restrictions are increasingly determining whom Kyrgyz businesses can work with and which banks they can use to move money. The names of the 19 companies have not yet been disclosed. The authorities stated that they were selected after reviewing around 40 organizations considered to pose heightened sanctions risks. This is not the first such move. In May, the authorities ordered 50 businesses to cease operations after sanctions risks were identified. Their full names were not made public either. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev said at the time that Western partners provide information about suspicious companies, which Kyrgyz authorities then investigate. He warned that sanctions against Kyrgyzstan itself could disrupt international payments and access to technology. How the Pressure Built Western scrutiny of Kyrgyz companies began well before the current cleanup. In the summer of 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned four companies registered in Kyrgyzstan: RM Design and Development, Progress Lider, GTME Tekhnologii, and Cargoline. Washington said they had supplied Russia with electronics and other restricted goods, while Cargoline had shipped millions of dollars’ worth of foreign-made aviation equipment. The focus later expanded from goods to financial networks. In January 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Keremet Bank, saying it had coordinated with Russian officials and sanctioned lender Promsvyazbank on a scheme to facilitate cross-border transfers. In practice, U.S. sanctions severely restrict a bank’s ability to deal with American companies or use the U.S. financial system. Within days of Keremet Bank’s designation, Visa restricted cards issued by the bank so that they could be used only through Keremet’s own ATMs and payment terminals. In August 2025, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Grinex, Tengricoin, Old Vector, and Capital Bank of Central Asia as part of a crackdown on financial and cryptocurrency networks that London said Russia was using to circumvent Western restrictions. By early 2026, however, the risk was beginning to shift from sanctions against individual Kyrgyz companies and banks to restrictions affecting the country as a whole. During a February meeting with EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan, Amangeldiev discussed financial monitoring, sanctions risks, and greater transparency in foreign trade rather than Kyrgyzstan adopting EU sanctions itself. Bishkek was effectively trying to show that it could tackle sanctions evasion without joining the EU sanctions regime. The prospect of broader measures was already worrying businesses. Askar Sydykov, head of Kyrgyzstan’s International Business Council, said reports that the EU could use its anti-circumvention mechanism against the country were causing serious concern among businesses and government agencies. Those efforts were not enough to prevent broader action. In April, the EU used its anti-circumvention mechanism against Kyrgyzstan for the first time, prohibiting exports to...

Women's History

Opinion: A Century Apart, Two Official Visions of Uzbek Womanhood

A century ago, in 1926, the Russian-language Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka published an appeal to the “working women of the Soviet East” written by Clara Zetkin – a Marxist and a women’s rights advocate from Germany. In its appeal for women’s unveiling, it asked where the mullahs had been while women suffered through the “dark past” and promised that Soviet law now shone “bright rays” over a liberated and free Soviet present. It closed not with a tribute to women, but with a slogan: “Forward to socialism! Always ready to fight for world revolution!” There was a significant problem with this text. Literacy among Uzbek women was extremely low, particularly in rural areas, and those who could read generally read Uzbek rather than Russian. Historian Marianne Kamp documents this gap in her book The New Woman in Uzbekistan. The article calling women to political consciousness was, therefore, not directly accessible to the overwhelming majority of its stated audience. That gap is not just a flaw in the propaganda or evidence of its exaggerated reach. Rather, it explains how the propaganda worked. A Russian newspaper speaking to Uzbek women who largely could not read it depended on party cadres, activists, public readings, meetings, and other literate intermediaries who could disseminate the message in Uzbek. It did not address an existing constituency so much as construct one – handing local organisers a model of the politically awakened Soviet woman they were expected to promote in villages where practically no woman could have read the article herself. [caption id="attachment_54189" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Uzbek women in the old city of Tashkent before going out into the street on International Women’s Day, March 8, 1924. Photo: Public domain.[/caption] The “working women of the Soviet East” were therefore both an audience and an emerging political category. That category served a larger claim the Soviet state was making about Central Asia: that the region was “backward” and required revolutionary socialist transformation. In Soviet rhetoric, as in some earlier Russian imperial writing, the condition of women became one of the principal measures by which a society’s level of development was judged. A society’s position on the imagined path from feudalism to modernity could be read from whether its women were veiled or unveiled, secluded or employed, illiterate or educated. Transforming women’s appearance and public role offered the state an especially visible means of demonstrating that Central Asia was leaving its supposedly backward past behind. This does not mean that Soviet female emancipation was merely an empty disguise for imperial domination. Many contemporary works by historians such as Adrienne Edgar, Marianne Kamp, and Shoshana Keller showcase the genuine changes produced by Soviet literacy campaigns, education, employment, family law, and women’s political participation. Soviet gender policy did not simply reproduce the restrained paternalism of the tsarist administration. It attempted, and in many ways succeeded, at a much more radical transformation in the realm of gender politics. What it does complicate is who was doing the defining. It is tempting to read...

Artificial Intelligence

Kazakhstan Navigates Rival U.S. and China AI Frameworks

Kazakhstan has found itself in an unusual position as the technological rivalry between the United States and China intensifies. Within a matter of weeks, Astana first joined the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative and then became a founding member of the Beijing-backed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO). Washington is now preparing to warn countries aligned with its AI strategy that participation in competing frameworks may be incompatible, Reuters has reported. For Kazakhstan, such a choice would be uncomfortable for more than political reasons. The United States is home to many of the world’s leading AI and semiconductor companies and offers access to investment and advanced technology. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has critical mineral reserves that Washington is keen to bring into secure supply chains. China is next door, remains one of Kazakhstan’s leading trading partners, and offers countries without their own advanced technologies broader access to Chinese developments. Zamir Karazhanov, a political scientist and director of the Kemel Arna Public Foundation, believes Kazakhstan is unlikely to abandon cooperation with China on artificial intelligence. Much, he says, will depend on how far Washington is prepared to go and whether technological alignment becomes a condition for continued partnership with the United States. Pax Silica was launched by Washington in late 2025. Despite its name, the initiative goes far beyond silicon and chips. It covers the supply chains and physical infrastructure underpinning AI, including critical minerals, semiconductors, energy, and computing capacity. Kazakhstan officially joined Pax Silica on June 25, 2026, becoming the first Central Asian country to enter the initiative. The accession declaration was signed in Washington by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development Zhaslan Madiyev. For Kazakhstan, participation also has a tangible economic dimension: the country has a substantial mineral resource base needed for high-tech manufacturing. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined why joining Pax Silica could help Kazakhstan attract foreign investment into mining, energy, data centers, and manufacturing for the AI economy. U.S. interest in Kazakhstan’s mineral resources predates Pax Silica. In June, Astana hosted a C5+1 critical minerals dialogue involving representatives of all five Central Asian states and U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, Sergio Gor. The American side spoke openly about expanding cooperation with the region on secure supply chains. But in July, Astana took another step, this time toward Beijing. Kazakhstan became one of 29 founding members of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. The agreement establishing WAICO was signed in Shanghai, where the organization will also be headquartered. Beijing has presented the new organization as a mechanism for international cooperation on AI governance and narrowing the technological gap between countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping has also promoted China’s open-weight AI models as a more accessible alternative for countries that cannot afford or easily access leading proprietary systems. However, Beijing is also considering restrictions on overseas access to some of China’s leading AI models. In July, Xi Jinping pitched WAICO as part of China’s effort to advance its own model of global...

Camel Farming

Camel Farming Expands Across Central Asia as Climate Pressures Mount

Camels are gaining renewed economic importance in Central Asia as farmers seek new markets for their milk and governments look for livestock better suited to increasingly dry conditions. In Kazakhstan, camel numbers are rising and producers are developing markets for shubat, a fermented camel milk drink, and powdered camel milk. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, has begun working with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to develop camel husbandry in arid areas. Kazakhstan has more than 322,000 camels, according to government figures for 2026, an increase of 2.4% from the previous year. Most are raised in the vast arid lands in the west and south of the country. Camels are also an important part of Turkmenistan’s livestock sector. The herd numbered about 345,000 animals in 2020. Bactrian camels have traditionally dominated Kazakhstan’s camel herd. They can withstand sharp fluctuations between extreme heat and severe cold. Over the past two decades, Kazakhstan has also seen an increase in one-humped Arvana camels, a breed of Turkmen origin known for high milk productivity. In Turkmenistan, the Arvana is the mainstay of the industry. These camels can produce milk even when grazing on sparse desert pastures, feeding on salt-tolerant vegetation and bitter wormwood that are of little use to many other types of livestock. Milk Brings in the Money Milk offers camel farmers a product that can be sold throughout the year and increasingly processed into higher-value goods. A female Kazakh Bactrian camel can produce up to about 1,750 liters of milk annually, although yields vary considerably between breeds and farming systems. The main product on the domestic market is shubat, but larger producers have also begun processing camel milk for markets far beyond the communities where it is produced. One of the most prominent examples is Daulet-Beket LLP in the Almaty region. When a camel-milk processing plant opened there in 2021, the farm had around 5,000 camels and was producing up to five tons of shubat a day. The plant was designed to produce as much as 30 tons of powdered camel milk a month, with products being shipped to Russia and China. Smaller farms show how strong local demand can also sustain the industry. The Suleymanov family in the Almaty region started with two camels. By the time they were profiled in 2021, their herd had grown to around 70 animals. Sixteen were being milked each day, producing 52 to 53 liters. The family said customers frequently bought their shubat before it even reached Almaty. Camel Farming in Turkmenistan Turkmen state media has also highlighted privately run camel farms. A 2024 report said farmer Serdarkuli Berdyliev in Ahal province kept 320 camels, including 140 females. Average milk yields were around six liters a day. Information about private agriculture in Turkmenistan largely comes through tightly controlled state media. Camel milk production continues to feature in official coverage alongside the country’s long-established herding traditions. Camel wool remains a marketable product, although its market is much smaller than that for milk. In Turkmenistan, it...

Astana Finance Days 2026

Astana Finance Days 2026 to Draw Global Investors to Kazakhstan

Astana will host the ninth Astana Finance Days on September 9–10. This year, organizers expect more than 5,500 participants from over 80 countries, and the geography of the guests reflects the markets Kazakhstan has increasingly looked to for capital: the United States and Europe, China and Hong Kong, the Gulf states, and its Central Asian neighbors. The announced speakers include representatives of BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, Brookfield, FTSE Russell, Bloomberg, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and China International Capital Corporation. Representatives of Binance, Mastercard, and Telegram/TON are also expected. Kazakhstan will be represented by National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov, Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development Zhaslan Madiyev, Freedom Holding Corp. CEO Timur Turlov, and others. This year’s agenda reflects the region’s continuing search for new sources of financing: capital markets, investment products, financing for the real economy, regulation, financial technology, and cross-border investment. The forum will be held under the theme “Delivering Impact. Capital in Action.” Astana Finance Days was launched in 2018 alongside the establishment of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC). The first forum was closely linked to the creation of Kazakhstan’s new financial hub, but the range of participants has expanded considerably over the past eight years. Last year, AFD attracted more than 5,500 participants from 82 countries. They included representatives of investment firms managing approximately $1.5 trillion in combined assets. Over two days, the forum hosted 40 events featuring 160 speakers, while the Astana International Exchange announced four listings and seven agreements were signed. China and Hong Kong stand out in the 2026 guest list. Representatives of the Hong Kong Investment Corporation, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Exchange, and CICC are expected in Astana. BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, and Brookfield are also represented. Kazakhstan has increasingly sought investment from the West, China, and the Middle East, so the range of institutions represented may be more significant than the overall attendance figure. There is another reason AFD goes beyond a conventional financial conference. The AIFC was established as a separate jurisdiction with its own court, regulator, and legal framework based on the principles of English common law. Kazakhstan designed it to make it easier for foreign businesses to enter the local market and raise capital. Thousands of companies from dozens of countries are now registered with the AIFC, and Astana Finance Days has effectively become an annual meeting point between businesses operating within this system and potential investors and new partners. Investment will not be the only subject under discussion in September. The program includes digital asset regulation, new financial technologies, capital markets, and corporate financing. A separate AFD Exhibition will bring together banks, asset managers, investment firms, and fintech projects. The Times of Central Asia is a media partner of Astana Finance Days 2026. Special coverage coming soon.