Russia's War in Ukraine - The Times Of Central Asia

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Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Vance Personally Asked Zelensky to Halt CPC-Linked Tanker Strikes, FT Reports

U.S. Vice President JD Vance personally asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 31 to halt attacks on oil tankers serving the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, the Financial Times reported on August 12. Citing Ukrainian officials and others familiar with the call, the newspaper said Kyiv had agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or non-Russian vessels unless they were under Ukrainian sanctions or carrying Russian oil or other Russian cargo. Ukraine has not struck tankers near the CPC terminal since the July 31 call. Vance’s intervention came after repeated July attacks had disrupted Kazakhstan’s main oil-export route, halted loading several times, and forced producers to cut output. Washington was also concerned that the attacks were destabilizing oil markets and harming U.S. commercial interests. A U.S. official confirmed to the FT that Washington had warned Kyiv against attacks on non-Russian vessels and CPC infrastructure, describing the pipeline as “a vital conduit of Kazakhstan-origin energy for European markets” and an alternative to Russian energy supplies. The latest incidents before the call came on July 30, when two more tankers were attacked. NISSOS SIFNOS was struck while loading Tengizchevroil crude at CPC’s SPM-3 mooring, while MARATHI was attacked while awaiting a berth about six nautical miles offshore, forcing CPC to stop loading again. The Vance-Zelensky call took place the following day. Washington had already warned Kyiv about attacks affecting U.S. and Kazakh economic interests. Ukraine’s ambassador to Washington at the time, Olha Stefanishyna, disclosed in February that the State Department had delivered a formal démarche after an earlier strike on Novorossiysk. On July 23, Representative Bill Huizenga, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, told TCA that Ukraine had an obligation to avoid legitimate allied energy exports and infrastructure, and that further strikes would "not be tolerated." The Wall Street Journal later reported that Chevron CEO Mike Wirth had raised the tanker attacks with Trump administration officials, after which Washington cautioned Ukraine against targeting non-Russian vessels in the Black Sea. By early August, the disruption was showing clearly in export data. Reuters reported on August 7 that CPC loadings in July fell more than 20% behind schedule to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. The reduction amounted to a loss of about 400,000 barrels per day of CPC Blend from international markets in July. Kazakhstan’s oil production fell 14% in July from June. CPC is the dominant route for Kazakhstan’s oil exports and normally handles roughly 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day. The 1,511-kilometer pipeline runs from the Tengiz field through Russia to the Black Sea. Its shareholder structure also gives U.S. companies a substantial direct interest: Chevron owns 15%, while Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company, an ExxonMobil affiliate, owns 7.5%. Responsibility for the individual tanker attacks has remained politically sensitive. Russia has blamed Ukraine. Kyiv has not publicly claimed responsibility for attacks on vessels carrying predominantly Kazakh crude. According to the FT, the July 31 call resulted in a...

Civilian Casualties

Uzbekistan Forms Commission After Nizhnekamsk Drone Strike as Russia Puts Uzbek Death Toll at Eight

Uzbekistan has formed a special commission after its citizens were killed in a drone attack on several locations in the Russian city of Nizhnekamsk on Monday. Russian authorities now say eight Uzbek citizens were among the 13 people killed, one more than Uzbekistan’s consulate in the Russian city of Kazan initially reported. A Tajik citizen was also reported among the dead. Moscow blamed Ukraine for the attack, the latest in a campaign of long-range strikes by the Ukrainian military in the long-running war with Russia. Ukraine has often targeted oil facilities in an attempt to undermine a key source of revenue for Russia, though there were conflicting accounts of what was hit in the Nizhnekamsk attack. Ukraine’s General Staff said it hit an oil refinery and caused a fire, while local Russian officials said residential areas as well as industrial facilities were hit, and a child was among those killed. Uzbekistan’s consulate in Kazan did not name the Uzbek nationals who died in the attack on Monday and did not provide any further personal information. The consulate initially put the Uzbek death toll at seven. Azattyq Asia subsequently reported that Russian authorities put the number at eight. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry said one Tajik citizen was also killed. “Necessary contacts have been established with local responsible authorities, agencies, and investigative bodies to clarify the details of the incident,” the consulate said. “We would like to inform you that the necessary arrangements are being made to repatriate the bodies of the deceased citizens to their homeland after the completion of forensic examinations and the necessary official procedures.” The consulate quoted law enforcement agencies in Tatarstan, the region of Russia where Nizhnekamsk is located, as saying that 13 people were killed and 39 people were injured in the drone strikes. Nizhnekamsk is a major industrial center that lies about 900 kilometers east of Moscow.

Russia's War in Ukraine

How the Russia–Ukraine War Is Reshaping Central Asia’s Geopolitical Balance

More than four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict continues to alter political and economic relations across the former Soviet space. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Uzbek political scientist Mukhtor Nazirov examined Moscow’s evolving regional role, Central Asia’s search for wider external partnerships, and the areas in which Russia remains difficult to replace. “The war changed Russia,” Nazirov said. “It became more closed, more militarized, and its political logic increasingly became military. Central Asian countries suddenly found themselves dealing with a Russia that was no longer the same as it had been before the war.” Before 2022, Russia’s relations with Central Asia rested on long-established political, economic, and security ties. Since the invasion, international isolation and wartime pressures have complicated that relationship. “The war consumed everything,” Nazirov explained. “It influenced not only politics and the economy, but also public thinking, the country’s openness, its ideology, and the overall direction of the state. As Russia changed during the war, its dialogue with Central Asian countries became increasingly difficult.” “Central Asian states gained a moral justification to look for other options,” he said. “Russia is no longer the Russia it used to be.” Russia nevertheless remains deeply embedded in the region’s economy. Infrastructure, logistics networks, export routes, and labor migration still bind Central Asian states to the Russian market. Kazakhstan exports most of its oil through Russia’s Novorossiysk port, while trade from Uzbekistan and other countries continues to rely heavily on northern corridors. Millions of Central Asian citizens also work in Russia. “The economic foundation still exists,” Nazirov told TCA. “Much of Central Asia remains part of an economic structure that was formed during the Soviet period. Infrastructure is shared, and many export routes still pass through Russia.” However, the durability of Moscow’s influence is under closer scrutiny as other powers expand their regional presence. “Political closeness alone is not enough,” Nazirov said. “Any partnership eventually comes down to economics. If Russia wants to remain influential, it must have a strong economic foundation. If it cannot provide that, then others will naturally begin filling the gap.” China and the European Union have expanded their economic engagement as sanctions and wartime demands have constrained Russia. Interest has also grown in the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which offers an alternative to routes through Russia. “The rhetoric surrounding the Middle Corridor became much stronger during the war,” he said. “The project already existed, but the war created momentum.” The EU’s Global Gateway initiative and new connectivity financing have given Central Asian governments additional channels for trade, investment, and transport. “This space is being filled partly by China and partly by the European Union,” he said. “They are proposing alternatives, and naturally Central Asian countries are turning toward those opportunities.” Russia remains the main destination for Central Asian labor migrants, although governments are pursuing employment opportunities in South Korea, Europe, and the Gulf states. “I would not say diversification has already taken place,” Nazirov...

Energy Security

Kazakhstan Weighs Proposal to Process Russian Crude

Kazakhstan is considering a plan to process Russian crude at its refineries, a step Astana says could support plant utilization and domestic fuel supplies but could also raise sanctions-compliance and diplomatic questions, depending on its scale and structure. The Energy Ministry said on July 30 that discussions cover refining oil “of Russian origin,” selling part of the output in Kazakhstan, and exporting part back to Russia. It did not identify the refineries, volumes, counterparties, or commercial terms. The talks come as parts of Russia face fuel shortages following repeated Ukrainian strikes on refineries. Moscow has extended export restrictions on gasoline, diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils until January 31, 2027, although producers regain exemptions for several products from September 1. The two countries already exchange crude, feedstock, and refined products. Russia discussed buying about 50,000 metric tons of Kazakh gasoline in June. Astana said at the time that it had received no formal request and would protect domestic supply. Trade has since moved beyond discussion. Kazakhstan's Condensate refinery is processing Russian naphtha and exported gasoline to Russia for the first time in July. Kazakhstan has a practical industrial case for considering the proposal. Although the ministry has not identified any refinery involved in the talks, the Pavlodar refinery was designed to process West Siberian crude and remains connected to Russian supply routes. The two countries share extensive energy transport systems and coordinate annual fuel balances. The ministry said steady feedstock would support refinery utilization and domestic supply. The wider regional focus on fuel security was evident on July 31, when Tajik President Emomali Rahmon proposed building large oil refineries in Central Asia, prioritizing domestic demand for essential petroleum products. Decades of infrastructure integration also constrain Kazakhstan’s room for maneuver. More than 80% of its oil exports cross Russian territory through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Much of Kazakhstan’s rail trade is tied to Russian networks. These links narrow Kazakhstan’s near-term options and raise the economic cost of abrupt changes to established energy arrangements. The scale and destination of the resulting fuel would determine much of the political meaning. Small volumes sold mainly in Kazakhstan could resemble established regional commerce. A larger export-oriented program supplying Russia during a period of refinery disruption would draw more scrutiny, particularly if it materially eased pressure on Russia’s fuel system. The sensitivity has been heightened by renewed disruption around the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. On July 30, attacks hit NISSOS SIFNOS and MARATHI near the CPC terminal at Novorossiysk. Oil loading stopped only three days after Kazakhstan resumed exports following a week-long disruption. The route is Kazakhstan’s principal oil export artery. The earlier stoppage cut national oil and gas condensate output to about one million barrels per day by July 26, less than half the June average. Russia explicitly blamed Ukraine. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called the July 30 strikes “actions of a terrorist nature” and said they harmed Kazakh and U.S. economic interests. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry confirmed the incidents but did not name an attacker....

e-Commerce

Wildberries Kazakhstan Sellers Count Losses After Ukraine Strikes

Over the past month, Ukrainian forces have carried out a series of strikes on the facilities of Russia's largest online marketplace, Wildberries. As with previous attacks on Russia's energy infrastructure, including that of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the consequences are again being felt by citizens and businesses in neighboring countries, highlighting the extent to which the war's economic effects now extend far beyond the battlefield. Since July 18, Ukrainian strikes have hit Wildberries logistics facilities in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Crimea, as well as in Tver and Tambov Oblasts. According to the Russian business daily Kommersant, the attacks damaged logistics facilities representing more than 10% of Wildberries’ total warehouse floor space, with a combined area exceeding 550,000 square meters. Alongside Wildberries, another major Russian marketplace, Ozon, also operates in Kazakhstan. Its logistics network has so far not been affected by similar attacks. Together, the two companies account for more than 85% of Kazakhstan’s cross-border online marketplace segment, according to data presented in June by Mazhilis deputy Aituar Koshmambetov during parliamentary discussions on the development of e-commerce. E-commerce has become one of Kazakhstan’s fastest-growing sectors, expanding roughly fivefold since 2020. The market was valued at $6.7 billion in 2025, and the government aims to increase that figure to $19.5 billion by 2029. Against that backdrop, Kazakh sellers were always likely to be affected sooner or later. On Tuesday, Kazakhstan’s National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, Atameken, said it had begun collecting information on Kazakh businesses affected by the attacks on Wildberries facilities in Russia. According to preliminary estimates by the Ecommerce-KZ Association, more than 100 member companies suffered losses as a result of fires at the marketplace’s logistics centers. Their combined losses exceed $2.1 million. Following an request from Atameken to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration, the ministry has approached Russian authorities and the Wildberries for further information. For neighboring Kyrgyzstan, the situation surrounding Wildberries has proved even more painful. Compensation for lost goods is now being discussed at the level of the country’s economy minister, who is negotiating with the marketplace’s management. Much of Kyrgyzstan’s garment industry and trading sector now depend on Wildberries. According to the country’s association of garment manufacturers, individual producers have suffered losses ranging from 1 million to 100 million Kyrgyz soms, or approximately $11,400 to $1.14 million. While businesses in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are counting their losses, Wildberries itself appears to be reconsidering its logistics strategy. According to a report in Kommersant, the company has begun searching for vacant warehouse space in Kazakhstan and is prepared to lease virtually all of the country’s available modern warehouse capacity. According to NF Group, only 5.8% of Kazakhstan's modern warehouse space was vacant at the end of 2025. Stanislav Akhmedzyanov, managing partner at IBC Global, said the Kazakh market has no single warehouse facility of 100,000 square meters, which is reportedly the amount of space Wildberries requires. As of the end of June 2026, only 130,000 square meters of warehouse space remained available across the country, scattered...

Caspian Sea

As Two Wars Reach the Caspian, Central Asia’s Middle Corridor Holds

On July 25, two wars met in waters that Central Asian governments had tried to keep apart. Ukraine reported successful long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the targets included vessels involved in carrying military cargo from Iran and a warship. Tehran said an Iranian commercial vessel had been struck, killing one sailor and injuring another, and accused Kyiv of trying to widen the war. It remains unclear whether the vessel identified by Iran was among the targets described by Zelenskyy. Diplomacy produced a limited off-ramp. On July 28, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, that the strike on the Iranian ship was unintended. Both governments said they wanted to avoid further escalation. The call reduced the immediate risk of retaliation, but it did not remove the new danger. The Caspian is now one of the places where Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States intersect. Central Asia is exposed through the infrastructure and trade routes linking them. A “Sea of Peace” Under Pressure Turkmenistan responded to the incident with unusually direct language. Its Foreign Ministry called attacks on vessels in the Caspian “inadmissible” and described the waterway as a “sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness.” Ashgabat did not name Ukraine or endorse Iran’s account. Its restraint was characteristic, but the public criticism was unusual. Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality normally produces guarded statements during external conflicts. The intervention showed that Ashgabat viewed the attack as a challenge to the regional order. Turkmenistan faces Iran across a 1,148-kilometer land border and the southern Caspian. Turkmenbashi port is also central to its plans for a larger role in Eurasian trade. The principle is set out in the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, signed in Aktau in 2018. Its text calls for the peaceful use of the sea, prohibits the use or threat of force, and bars armed forces belonging to non-Caspian states. The convention has not entered into force because Iran has not ratified it. Its provisions were designed to govern relations among the five littoral states. They do not address a long-range strike carried out by a non-littoral state. But modern drones can cross distances that once provided strategic shelter. A landlocked sea can no longer be assumed to sit beyond the reach of surrounding wars. The Iran-Russia Link Ukraine has clear military reasons to look toward the Caspian. Iran has supplied Russia with drone technology used against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The sea also provides a direct commercial route between Iranian ports and Russia’s Volga region. Kyiv now treats vessels on that route carrying military cargo as part of Russia’s military logistics. Iran described the vessel struck on July 25 as civilian. The dispute over the ship’s cargo is central because commercial and military supply chains can overlap. A vessel may be civilian by flag and registration while carrying goods that Ukraine considers part of Russia’s war effort. That uncertainty reaches beyond...