Russia's War in Ukraine - The Times Of Central Asia

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Russia's War in Ukraine

Tajik Prisoners in Russia Say They Face Pressure to Fight in Ukraine

Tajik citizens imprisoned in the Russian city of Volgograd say they are being put under pressure to sign military contracts and fight in Ukraine, allegations which the Russian prison authorities have rejected. The prisoners are asking Tajikistan to facilitate their transfer home. Two inmates contacted Radio Ozodi, the Tajik service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, on October 29. They said about 150 prisoners from Central Asia were facing pressure, including approximately 60 Tajik citizens. The outlet said it knew the men's identities but had withheld them for their safety. The men said that despite difficulties, they had obtained a mobile phone, contacted Tajikistan's embassy in Moscow, and hoped to complete their prison sentences in Tajikistan rather than face military service. “We want to go home. We are ready to serve our sentences there,” one prisoner said, even offering to work without pay on Tajikistan's Rogun hydropower project if that would secure his return. “Here they are taking us to our deaths,” he added. The inmates said Central Asian prisoners were being held in blocks with particularly harsh conditions. They described facilities used for inmates considered dangerous and claimed many convictions were based on false accusations. More seriously, the men alleged that over 100 Central Asian inmates had left one Volgograd prison for the Ukraine war during the previous year. They said about 40 were Tajik citizens and claimed none of those sent had survived. There is no independent confirmation of those figures, the alleged deaths or the circumstances in which the men entered military service. The original report did not identify the prison by name. On October 31, the Federal Penitentiary Service's Volgograd regional directorate issued a denial, stating that claims Tajik inmates were being pressured to sign military contracts “do not correspond to reality.” The outlet said its calls to Tajikistan's embassy on October 30 went unanswered. Earlier Warnings from Volgograd The latest allegations follow an earlier warning from the same Russian city. In April 2025, relatives said eight Tajik prisoners had been taken from Correctional Colony No. 26, apparently for deployment to Ukraine. Another inmate at that facility described attempts to secure military contracts. “First they try to persuade us, then they start threatening us,” he said. He alleged that prisoners who refused were put in punishment cells and denied calls or visits. Russia has recruited prisoners for its war since the invasion began in February 2022. The Wagner private military group initially conducted much of that recruitment before the Defense Ministry took a larger role. Changes to Russian legislation in 2023 and 2024 expanded opportunities for convicted people and criminal defendants to sign military contracts to gain relief from criminal prosecution or punishment under specified circumstances. An August 2026 UK government assessment summarized reports of coercion in Russian detention facilities, including beatings and threats. A Request to Serve Sentences at Home The prisoners are not asking for their convictions to be overturned, but to serve out the remainder of their terms in Tajikistan, beyond the reach of...

Russia's War in Ukraine

Ukraine Says More Than 20,400 Central Asians Signed Russian Army Contracts

More than 20,400 Central Asian citizens have signed contracts with Russia’s armed forces since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, according to the Ukrainian government’s “I Want to Live” project. The new figures come as families in Kazakhstan secure the return of young men who say they went to Russia for civilian work and were forced into military service. The project’s October figures identify 8,207 Uzbek citizens and 5,308 Tajiks, together accounting for about two-thirds of the regional total. Kazakhstan accounts for 3,819. A further 2,219 are from Kyrgyzstan, and 884 from Turkmenistan. The count covers identified contract signers as of October 1, rather than the number currently fighting, and excludes ethnic Central Asians with Russian citizenship. The figures have not been independently verified. “I Want to Live” is a Ukrainian state project that helps Russian servicemen surrender. For some Kazakh families, the immediate struggle has been to get their sons out of the Russian army. Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. As TCA reported, he and other young Kazakh men later appeared in appeals for help, with some wearing Russian uniforms in or near the combat zone. On October 7, relatives went to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry in Astana to demand help bringing the men home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied them, said he knew of at least 21 cases. Families said their relatives had accepted civilian jobs before being pressured to sign military contracts. Keldibek has now returned to Kazakhstan. His sister told RFE/RL’s Kazakh service that he arrived in Shymkent on the evening of October 21. She said others were still waiting to return. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry had earlier asked Moscow to help repatriate the men and opened a hotline for their families. Their accounts fit a pattern documented by the International Federation for Human Rights. Its April study found that migrants in Russia had been offered military contracts as an alternative to detention or deportation. Others were recruited abroad with promises of civilian work, only to find themselves sent to the front. “Many of these men knew in some capacity what they were signing up for. But some were also deceived or coerced,” FIDH President Alexis Deswaef said. The war has also drawn Central Asians to Ukraine’s defense. TCA’s earlier reporting on both sides described volunteers who regarded Ukraine as home and saw Russia’s invasion as a threat to their families. Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin joined Ukraine’s armed forces in 2021 after settling there. In a 2022 interview, he told Ukrainska Pravda: “I had two children in Ukraine, and for the first time I started to think that they might be in danger.” Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency has warned citizens that offers of work or help with immigration papers can lead to recruitment into armed conflicts. It has also reminded them that joining foreign armed forces can bring criminal liability at home. For other families, there has been no homecoming. Kiril Nysanbaev went to Russia for work after completing his military...

Migrants in Russia

They Went to Russia for Work and Ended Up at War: How Central Asians Enter the Russian Military

Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. Relatives of other young Kazakh men say they had taken jobs at a sausage factory and a poultry farm. But according to reports aired in early October on Kazakhstan’s KTK television channel, the men later ended up in or near the combat zone in Ukraine. Some appeared in videos wearing Russian military uniforms and asked Kazakhstan to help bring them home. On October 7, relatives of Kazakh citizens who had reportedly ended up in Russia’s military visited the Foreign Ministry in Astana to seek help bringing them home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied the families, said his list had grown from eight to 21 people as more relatives contacted him. The same day, ministry spokesperson Zhanbolat Ussenov said officials were checking appeals and would send Russia a list of citizens after verification. Negotiations over their return were underway, he said. Exactly how the men ended up in the Russian military remains unclear. One family said their relative had already been wounded, while KTK reported that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the military contracts have not been independently established. For now, much of what is known comes from the men themselves and their relatives. Their stories raise a broader question that neither Moscow nor the capitals of Central Asia have fully answered: how many people from the region have ended up in the Russian military, and under what circumstances did they get there? Nearly 13,000, According to a Ukrainian Database Russia does not publish comprehensive statistics on foreign contract soldiers. Central Asian governments have only fragmented data from criminal cases, consular appeals, and reports from relatives. The most detailed country-by-country breakdown comes from the Ukrainian government project I Want to Live. By May 2026, the project said it had identified 12,919 citizens of the five Central Asian states who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense: 4,955 citizens of Uzbekistan, 3,489 of Tajikistan, 2,420 of Kazakhstan, 1,474 of Kyrgyzstan, and 581 of Turkmenistan. These figures cannot be regarded as complete or independently verified. I Want to Live operates within Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Ukraine is a party to the war. In addition, 12,919 is a cumulative figure, not the number of Central Asians currently at the front. Some may have been killed or captured, completed their service, returned home, or obtained Russian citizenship. Another major estimate comes from the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Truth Hounds, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. Their report estimates that Russia recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries after February 2022. More than 10,000 of them, according to the study, came from Central Asia. The study is based on open sources, consultations with Ukrainian authorities and experts, and interviews with 16 prisoners of war and former Russian servicemen. There are no comparable publicly available Russian statistics, meaning it is impossible to...

Ukrainian childen

Ukrainian Woman Detained in Astana at Russia’s Request

Ukrainian citizen Lyubov Rozhanska has been detained at Astana airport at Russia’s request in connection with a criminal case over an alleged attempt to abduct a child, Deutsche Welle (DW) reported. She had flown from Istanbul to collect her grandson. Ukraine has called for her release and opposed her possible transfer to Russia. Rozhanska was detained on October 1 while passing through border control. She is currently being held in a pretrial detention facility in Astana, her Kazakhstan-based lawyer Riza Nurbayeva told DW. A court is expected to consider whether she should remain in custody. According to Nurbayeva and Russian lawyer Alexei Pryanishnikov, the criminal case against Rozhanska concerns her grandson, who was born in 2018. Ukraine’s ambassador to Kazakhstan, Viktor Maiko, described the actions of the Russian security services as an “outright provocation.” “The embassy is already working with our Kazakh colleagues to secure Ms. Rozhanska’s release as quickly as possible. We categorically oppose the unfounded demands of the Federal Security Service to deport her to Russia, where there is a real threat to her health and life,” Maiko said in a statement issued by the Ukrainian Embassy in Kazakhstan on October 2. The Russian authorities have not publicly responded to the ambassador’s statement. The case stems from a dispute over where the child should live. In 2021, his mother, Alla Andreeva, traveled with him from Odesa to Russia’s Kaliningrad region. In 2022, they obtained Russian citizenship. In March 2025, Ukraine’s Supreme Court ruled that the boy should live with his father in Odesa. In the summer of 2026, according to the defense, relatives of the mother’s second husband offered to hand the child over to his father and grandmother. A meeting was arranged in Astana, where Rozhanska traveled from Turkey. By then, Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, was already investigating a criminal case against her, opened in 2023, according to Nurbayeva. By August 27, the Central District Court of Kaliningrad had authorized Rozhanska’s detention. Nurbayeva said Rozhanska was unaware of the criminal proceedings and had never previously traveled to Russia. The defense believes the circumstances surrounding the trip to Kazakhstan were deliberately arranged to facilitate Rozhanska’s detention. There has been no confirmation of this account from the authorities in Kazakhstan or Russia. Maiko linked the case to the transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia and Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. This case concerns a child whose mother took him to Russia in 2021, before the full-scale invasion. Moscow denies abducting children and says they were moved from combat zones for their safety.

Official Visit

Tokayev in Berlin: Ukraine, Putin, and Germany’s Growing Economic Interest in Kazakhstan

The war in Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia, energy, and Germany’s growing interest in Central Asia’s raw materials were all on the agenda during Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Berlin on September 29. The Kazakh president again called for a freeze on hostilities in Ukraine before moving toward diplomacy, while emphasizing Kazakhstan’s close ties with Russia. Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Moscow had so far shown no willingness to engage in substantive peace talks. The two sides also discussed increasing supplies of Kazakh oil, critical minerals, German investment, and transport routes between Asia and Europe. After the meeting, Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the two leaders had discussed Russia and its war against Ukraine “very intensively.” Berlin’s position is that Moscow must end the war and enter serious negotiations involving Ukraine and European states. “The aim of such peace negotiations must be a sovereign Ukraine in a secure Europe,” Merz said. Until Russia is ready for such a peace, he added, Germany will continue to support Kyiv. Reiterating his position, Tokayev advocated a different sequence. He said he did not consider a rapid end to the war realistic under current conditions and called for first freezing hostilities in Ukraine and then moving toward diplomacy and negotiations. The Kazakh president also reaffirmed his commitment to the UN Charter and respect for the territorial integrity of states, while stressing his respect for the Ukrainian people, their culture, history, traditions, and language. A similar position was set out in a joint declaration by Tokayev and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The two expressed support for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine in accordance with the UN Charter and underscored their respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of states. At the press conference with Merz, however, Tokayev also emphasized Kazakhstan’s close relationship with Moscow. He said he had “very good contact” with Putin, and described the Russian president as an “outstanding political figure.” Tokayev also explained Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia in geographical and demographic terms. The two countries share a border of more than 7,500 kilometers, and Kazakhstan has a large ethnic Russian population. “Whatever may happen on the territory of Ukraine, we never forget that both Russia and Ukraine are our good friends,” Tokayev said. Merz thanked Kazakhstan for helping prevent the circumvention of sanctions against Russia, describing this as “work for peace.” Kazakhstan has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, but has repeatedly said it will not allow its territory to be used to circumvent them. For the European Union, controls on re-exports through third countries have taken on greater importance since 2022, as Russia’s trade with several Central Asian states increased sharply. Oil featured prominently in the economic discussions. Merz said Germany was interested in receiving more crude from Kazakhstan to replace Russian oil. “We are looking for ways to diversify our supply relationships, and Kazakhstan is an important building block in this region of the world,” the chancellor said. Kazakhstan began supplying crude to the PCK refinery in Schwedt in...

UN General Assembly

Central Asia at the UN: Iran Threats and Sanctions Disputes

U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to “annihilate” Iran brought the vulnerability of Central Asia’s southern trade routes into focus as the UN General Assembly’s general debate opened in New York. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov challenged unilateral sanctions, while diplomacy over Ukraine raised the prospect of a halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. For landlocked Central Asia, these developments carry consequences far beyond the speeches. Iranian ports provide access to overseas markets, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan rely heavily on fuel from Russian refineries, and restrictions on international payments can complicate commerce even where transport links remain intact. Iran and Access to the Sea Addressing the General Assembly on September 22, Trump presented a choice between reaching an agreement with Tehran and carrying out his threat to “annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly.” He also predicted that an agreement could follow the U.S. midterm elections, while defending U.S. military action against Iran. [caption id="attachment_56719" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: UN[/caption] That framing leaves Central Asian countries facing costs regardless of their position on Tehran. Iran provides overland connections to ports serving the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Damage to Iranian infrastructure can therefore disrupt trade between Central Asia and countries that are not parties to the conflict. Uzbekistan’s exposure illustrates the distinction. According to its Ministry of Economy and Finance, goods worth $3.9 billion entered Uzbekistan through Iran in 2025. That represented about 9% of total imports, including approximately $1 billion in technological equipment. Uzbek exports transiting Iran were worth another $1.4 billion. Those figures measure transit, not simply purchases from Iranian suppliers. Pressure intended to isolate Tehran can also obstruct Uzbekistan’s access to equipment and customers elsewhere. Kazakhstan has also sought a larger southern outlet. A 27-year agreement provides for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade says the project would expand access to Gulf markets and destinations in Asia and East Africa. The risks differ by port. Bandar Abbas faces the Strait of Hormuz, while Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Both depend on Iranian infrastructure and remain exposed to the wider conflict and sanctions environment. Developing alternative routes does not make these southern connections dispensable. Nor is exposure uniform. Kazakh officials have emphasized the limited existing role of Persian Gulf shipments in the country’s logistics. For Astana, the threat concerns future diversification as well as current trade. For Uzbekistan, the transit figures show a substantial flow already at risk. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has sought 2.55 million tons of Iranian crude oil and fuel following shortages in Russian supplies. Its search for an alternative leaves Dushanbe exposed to two conflicts, with attacks on Russian refineries disrupting its established supplier, and the conflict involving Iran threatening a potential replacement. Japarov Challenges Sanctions In his General Assembly address, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov argued that unilateral sanctions harm smaller developing states and can become instruments of political pressure. “The right to impose sanctions against a particular state should, in our view,...