Features - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 19 - 24 of 2525

Energy Security

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...

Language Policy

Uzbekistan’s Alphabet Reform Revives a 33-Year-Old Debate

Uzbekistan began switching from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet in 1993 and initially planned to complete the transition by 2000. Nearly 33 years later, both scripts are still widely used, and the country is preparing to revise its Latin alphabet again. On July 7, the lower house of Uzbekistan’s parliament approved a bill introducing a new version of the alphabet, with 28 letters and one apostrophe instead of the current 26 letters and three letter combinations, and sent it to the Senate. Literary scholar Dilbar Khaydarova told The Times of Central Asia that a reform originally intended to take seven years has stretched across a generation. She attributes the delay mainly to an inconsistent transition, with schools moving faster than publishers and much of the government. “After 30 or 31 years, these small corrections have prompted another reform,” she said. A Reform That Stretched Across Decades Uzbekistan adopted the law introducing a Latin-based alphabet in 1993. Schools were to use the new script first, while adults were expected to have opportunities to study it at workplaces and institutions. The transition was initially due to be completed by 2000. In 1995, the deadline was extended to 2005 and later postponed to 2010. The original alphabet was revised in 1995, when sh and ch were adopted and ng was listed separately. That revision also introduced the forms o‘ and g‘, establishing an alphabet of 26 letters and three letter combinations. Two Alphabets for One Country Schools switched to Latin, while Cyrillic remained common in government and the publishing industry. The media also continued using the script for years, and the Soviet-educated generation remained active in public institutions after 1993. As a result, children learned to write in Latin but continued to encounter Cyrillic in publications and official documents. The same script remained in use when they entered the workplace. “Even if we became literate in Latin, we also developed the ability to read and write in Cyrillic,” Khaydarova said. “Because the situation required it.” She describes this as the coexistence of “two policies or practices that did not correspond to each other.” This mismatch, she believes, largely explains why the transition has lasted for decades. That pattern persists, with some major publications using Latin while others continue publishing in Cyrillic. Khaydarova says the difference does not necessarily reflect opposition to the reform because publishers must consider their audiences’ habits. The Cost of the New Alphabet Implementing the revised alphabet will involve costs beyond school textbooks. Since 1993, Uzbekistan has accumulated a vast body of material in both Cyrillic and the current version of Latin. For publishers, this raises questions about whether existing publications should be converted to the revised script and who will pay for the work. “If they lose a significant share of their audience, there will be serious financial risks in the future,” Khaydarova said. Khaydarova believes the state will have to bear some of the cost by supporting publishers that convert existing materials to the revised script. “The more sources of...

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Currency

Kazakh Tenge Rises as Foreign Investors Buy Government Debt

Kazakhstan’s tenge has strengthened by 9.7% against the dollar since the start of 2026, making it the best-performing currency across Europe and Asia, according to the Financial Times. The newspaper points to an influx of foreign capital into Kazakhstan’s government debt: nonresident holdings of tenge-denominated bonds have risen from roughly $2 billion to $5 billion over the past year. The appreciation has come despite serious disruptions to Kazakhstan’s oil exports through Russia. Kazakh data show that foreign interest in government securities did not begin this summer. In July alone, nonresidents increased their holdings by 92.2 billion tenge, about $195 million, to 2.6 trillion tenge, or roughly $5.5 billion. Since the start of the year, their portfolio has grown by 32.9%, while their share of the market has risen from 6.2% to 7.2%. The Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan (AFK) attributes the interest to high real interest rates and relative macroeconomic stability. Why Foreign Investors Are Buying Kazakh Debt During 2025, nonresident holdings of Kazakh government securities rose from roughly 1.1 trillion tenge, about $2.3 billion, to 2 trillion tenge, about $4.2 billion. Growth continued this year. In June alone, foreign investors added 185.1 billion tenge, about $390 million, bringing their total holdings to 2.5 trillion tenge, roughly $5.3 billion. Their share of the market increased from 6.2% to 6.9% by then. The reason for the interest is fairly straightforward: Kazakhstan offers high yields while maintaining an investment-grade credit rating. The base rate remained at 18% through the spring. The National Bank cut it to 17% in June and announced a further cut to 16.75% on July 24. Annual inflation, meanwhile, declined for a ninth consecutive month and stood at 10.3% in June. For foreign investors, the combination of high interest rates and a strengthening tenge creates an opportunity to earn both on bond yields and currency appreciation. For the tenge itself, the same transaction works in reverse: before buying a Kazakh security, a foreign investor has to acquire the national currency. In June, AFK analysts cited nonresident transactions among the factors supporting the tenge, alongside foreign-currency sales by exporters, state-controlled companies, and the National Bank. Market Access Is Becoming Easier High yields alone do not explain the growing interest. Kazakhstan is also trying to make its domestic debt market easier for international investors to access. A primary dealer system has been operating since May 4. Five banks were granted primary dealer status and are expected to support the government securities market, including buying and selling bonds in the secondary market. In April, the National Bank announced that Euroclear had begun a project to make Kazakhstan’s government bonds eligible for settlement through its international system. A direct link with the local market infrastructure is planned for 2027. For foreign investors, this would make it possible to trade Kazakh government debt through a familiar global settlement system, alongside the existing Clearstream channel. Kazakhstan is also seeking eventual inclusion of its tenge-denominated government bonds in JPMorgan’s GBI-EM, one of the main international indexes for emerging-market government...

Oil Exports

Push for Kazakhstan Oil Exports Diversification as CPC Disruptions Expose Capacity Gap

Kazakhstan has spent years looking for more ways to export its oil without relying so heavily on Russia. This summer has shown how difficult that remains. Shipments to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline have been suspended since May, disruptions on the Black Sea in July forced Tengiz to more than halve production, and now Russia is rerouting Kazakh crude from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk to free Baltic capacity for its own oil. The shift comes as exports from Russia’s western ports ran 15% below plan in the first half of August, with Novorossiysk shipments of Russian Urals and Kazakh KEBCO falling to around 400,000 barrels per day. At least two cargoes of Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude scheduled for loading at Ust-Luga in late August will instead be shipped through the Black Sea. No KEBCO loadings are currently planned at the Baltic port in September. The move will free up about 100,000 barrels per day of export capacity at Ust-Luga for Russian crude. Kazakh producers support the arrangement because shipments through Novorossiysk are currently more profitable. From a commercial standpoint, the decision is understandable. But Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk give Kazakhstan access to two different seas while remaining Russian ports. And Novorossiysk, where the KEBCO cargoes are now being redirected, had itself suspended crude loadings only a few days earlier. On August 14, loadings at the Sheskharis terminal, Novorossiysk port’s main oil-export facility, were halted following a drone attack. The facility handles around 700,000 barrels per day and loads Russian Urals and Siberian Light as well as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO. Operations resumed on August 16, and one of the first tankers to load was carrying Kazakh crude. Another 80,000-ton KEBCO cargo was due to begin loading on August 18. Kazakhstan’s far larger vulnerability, however, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Its marine terminal near Novorossiysk is separate from Sheskharis. In 2025, the country exported 78.7 million metric tons of oil, of which 64.8 million tons were shipped through CPC. Volumes through the pipeline rose by 18% compared with 2024, largely as production increased following the Tengiz expansion. The July disruptions showed how quickly problems on that route can affect production inside Kazakhstan. After drone attacks near the CPC terminal forced restrictions on loadings, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production fell by about 21% by July 22 to roughly 1.63 million barrels per day, from a July average of 2.07 million barrels per day. Tengiz output dropped from a July average of around 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000. A few days later, the situation deteriorated further. On July 26, Kazakhstan produced around 1 million barrels per day of oil and gas condensate, down from an average of 2.16 million barrels per day in June. Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak all had to reduce production. On July 27, CPC resumed loadings after a week-long suspension. CPC accounts for more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, so replacing it quickly with other routes is impossible. The pipeline typically carries around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day....

Environmental Safeguards

Pasture Gives Way to Solar Power in Uzbekistan as Audit Remains Unpublished

Each spring, nine households grazed livestock on a stretch of desert pasture in Uzbekistan’s Bukhara Region. The land is now the site of the Nur Bukhara solar and battery plant, but an audit intended to show whether promised livelihood protections worked remains unpublished. Seven of the households came from the nearby settlement of Kirilishon and used the state-owned pasture without permits or formal agreements. A herder and his partner, identified publicly only as H1 and H2, grazed animals there through a short-term agreement with Alat Qorakolchilik LLC, a local livestock company holding a sublease on the land. The nine households included 43 people. The plant began operating in September 2025 and was inaugurated that December. The Uzbek government awarded the project to Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based renewable energy developer that built the facility and now operates it. Nur Bukhara combines a 250-megawatt solar plant with a 63-megawatt battery system capable of storing 126 megawatt-hours of electricity. Masdar says it can supply more than 55,000 homes, while the World Bank described it as Central Asia’s first utility-scale renewable energy project to combine solar generation with battery storage. During a consultation on May 7, 2023, Kirilishon residents asked for the solar plant to be moved. If construction went ahead, they wanted replacement grazing land near the village and priority consideration for project jobs. H1 and H2 had a documented right to use the pasture, while the seven Kirilishon households did not. However, the safeguards required by Nur Bukhara’s international lenders covered both formal and informal users whose livelihoods would be disrupted by the project. Masdar commissioned a livelihood restoration plan setting out the assistance the households were to receive before construction cut off access to the site. It identified about 260 hectares of replacement pasture, equivalent to one square mile, for H1 and H2. Alat Qorakolchilik also identified approximately 1,000 hectares, or 3.9 square miles, of additional land available to herders. The seven informal households were to be allowed to use replacement pasture without obtaining formal agreements. The larger tract was not described as land reserved exclusively for those households. The published map did not record which final area each household would receive. The livelihood measures also included priority access to project employment and additional support for households considered vulnerable. In an official statement to The Times of Central Asia, a Masdar spokesperson said replacement grazing arrangements were provided before access to the project site was restricted, “maintaining equivalent grazing conditions,” and that “several members of affected households obtained project-related employment opportunities.” The statement cited monitoring by international lenders and an independent third-party review, with the completion audit finalized in September 2025. It reported no related complaints from affected households through the project’s grievance mechanism. The completion audit was not included with Masdar’s response. As of August 20, 2026, it was also absent from Masdar’s Nur Bukhara page and the International Finance Corporation’s project disclosure. Simonyan Consulting, which says it was engaged by the project company to conduct the audit, lists the assignment as “2025–ongoing.” Without the audit,...