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Energy

Kazakhstan Mini-Refineries Eye Russia After Rail Export Restriction Lifted

Kazakhstan has lifted a railway export restriction on petroleum products from mini-refineries. For small plants, many of which operate well below capacity, the decision restores an opportunity to sell their products outside the country. Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), the national railway company, revoked the restriction following an August 7 decision by the country’s Chief Transport Prosecutor’s Office. The timing is notable: after a series of strikes on its refineries, Russia is facing fuel shortages and has already begun importing gasoline from abroad, including Kazakhstan. Other restrictions on fuel exports from Kazakhstan remain in force, so the KTZ decision does not fully reopen gasoline and diesel exports. Some fuels remain subject to separate bans, and exports to Russia are treated differently from shipments outside the Eurasian Economic Union. What Mini-Refineries Produce The number of mini-refineries actually operating in Kazakhstan depends on how such facilities are defined. Official documents have referred to roughly 30 small petroleum-product producers. More recent industry data provide a clearer picture: more than 30 mini-refineries are registered, with declared crude-processing capacity of about 4.5 million metric tons a year. Of these, 22 are considered operational, with a combined capacity of about 2 million tons. Actual processing is considerably lower, having increased from roughly 400,000 to 800,000 tons annually over the past five years. These are not smaller versions of Kazakhstan’s major refineries in Atyrau, Pavlodar, and Shymkent. Most mini-refineries lack equipment for deep refining, so their output is simpler. Their main products include fuel oil, heating and marine fuels, naphtha, and other distillates. In 2023, mini-refineries processed 895,000 tons of feedstock and produced 346,000 tons of fuel oil, 145,000 tons of diesel fuel, and 171,000 tons of bitumen. Much of this output was not intended for Kazakhstan’s motorists. Mini-refineries produce semi-finished products, including straight-run fuel oil with a relatively high share of light fractions that can be processed further. Their opportunities on the domestic market are also limited by product quality: Kazakhstan has required K4 and K5 motor-fuel standards since 2018, while official assessments say mini-refineries generally lack the equipment to produce fuel above the K3 standard. Restoring export opportunities could therefore have a tangible economic effect for these businesses. The plants have spare capacity but insufficient domestic demand for much of their current product range. Rail exports once again give them a way to look for buyers outside Kazakhstan. And that inevitably raises the question of Russia. Russia Is Looking Abroad for Fuel There is no direct evidence that KTZ lifted the restriction specifically because of the Russian market. Neither the Kazakh authorities nor the railway company has made such a connection. But the decision comes at a convenient time for potential Russian buyers. Ukrainian drone strikes and unplanned refinery outages have reduced Russian gasoline production and contributed to domestic shortages. Moscow has responded by restricting fuel exports and increasing imports from abroad. Russia has already turned to several suppliers. In July, Belarus shipped a record 212,000 tons of gasoline to Russia, while Moscow has also begun...

Power Outage

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Dispute Cause After Regional Power Failure Hits Almaty

A major power failure affected parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on August 14. In Almaty, electricity went out at 2:38 p.m. local time in four districts, disrupting transport and traffic in Kazakhstan’s largest city. Traffic lights stopped working and some businesses closed. The metro suspended service, and passengers still underground were evacuated. At several busy intersections, motorists and delivery couriers began directing traffic themselves. In Kyrgyzstan, outages affected parts of Bishkek and Issyk-Kul Region. “An accident in the power system of a neighboring country affected the Central Asian power grid. As a result, power supply disruptions were observed in the Surkhandarya region and several other regions,” Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry said. In Tajikistan, electricity went out in Dushanbe at about 3 p.m. and in numerous other cities and districts. Later that day, the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources said it had formed a working group to determine the cause. The ministry also denied reports of an accident at the Nurek Hydropower Plant. The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) later issued a preliminary account attributing the blackout to an emergency at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant. “Due to the emergency shutdown of two hydropower units with a combined capacity of 600 megawatts at the Toktogul HPP in the Kyrgyz Republic, there was a power surge on the North-South transit line, causing an overload and its disconnection by emergency protection systems. As a result, Kazakhstan’s southern zone was separated from the country’s unified power system,” KEGOC explained. Kyrgyz energy officials offered a different account. They said an external outage occurred at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time on a high-voltage transmission line connecting northern and southern Kazakhstan. The disturbance split the Central Asian grid into isolated sections, leaving Kyrgyzstan temporarily operating autonomously while automatic protection safeguarded equipment. Both accounts illustrate the interdependence of the Central Asian Power System (CAPS). The Soviet-era network connected the region’s electricity systems across borders that were then internal. It was part of a regional water-and-energy arrangement in which hydropower releases from upstream republics supported irrigation downstream. Cross-border power exchanges declined after the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1999, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed a parallel-operation agreement. Turkmenistan disconnected from CAPS in 2003, while Tajikistan was disconnected from Uzbekistan in December 2009. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an electricity-trade agreement in March 2018. The southwestern section of Tajikistan’s grid reconnected to CAPS in June 2024, but the northern connection was still under development in July 2026. Turkmenistan remains outside the system. In an assessment published on August 16, Zhakyp Khairushev, chairman of the Public Council under Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, called the incident a serious test of the country’s southern power system. He said emergency protection contained the disruption and allowed electricity to be restored in stages. Power restrictions in Kazakhstan were lifted by 5 p.m., but Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continued to disagree over where the failure began.

Power Grid

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Give Conflicting Accounts of Four-Country Blackout

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have given differing accounts of what triggered the August 14 blackout that cut electricity across swathes of Central Asia. Three days later, the initiating event remains unresolved, and the times released by the two sides do not fit neatly into the same sequence. Kazakhstan’s national grid operator KEGOC says two hydrogenerators at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant, with a combined capacity of 600 MW, disconnected at 2:37 p.m. Kazakhstan time. KEGOC said the sudden loss of generation overloaded the North-East-South transit corridor, separating southern Kazakhstan from the rest of the national grid and the interconnected systems of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. A special commission is investigating the causes. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s National Electric Grid has given a different chronology. It said that at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time, an external disconnection occurred on a high-voltage line linking the northern and southern parts of Kazakhstan’s power system. The Central Asian network then split into an isolated section, and Kyrgyzstan temporarily operated separately while automatic protection systems worked to protect equipment. The one-hour difference between the countries’ clocks makes the discrepancy clearer. Kazakhstan has used UTC+5 nationwide since 2024, while Kyrgyzstan uses UTC+6. That puts Kyrgyzstan’s reported line disconnection at 2:34 p.m. Kazakhstan time, three minutes before KEGOC’s stated 2:37 p.m. Toktogul shutdown. The two times may describe different stages of a fast-moving cascade, but they do not establish the same starting point. A third timestamp complicates the sequence. Alatau Zharyq Company said three 500 kV KEGOC transmission lines shut down at 2:38 p.m., and that those lines triggered automatic load-shedding and frequency protection in Almaty and the surrounding region. Taken together, the public statements leave a sequence of 2:34 p.m., 2:37 p.m., and 2:38 p.m. that investigators will need to reconcile. TCA reporters in Almaty and Bishkek experienced power cuts, while local media reported outages in Dushanbe, Khujand, and southern parts of Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan, the disturbance affected consumers in the Zhambyl, Turkistan, Kyzylorda, Zhetysu, and Almaty regions, with further restrictions in Karaganda, Ulytau, and Abai. KEGOC said supplies were restored across the affected regions later that afternoon. The four-country impact reflects how tightly the systems are connected. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan operate in parallel through the Central Asian power system. Cross-border links allow operators to share electricity and reserve capacity, but also mean that a sudden loss of generation or a major transmission line can be felt beyond one national grid before protection systems isolate the disturbance. Central Asia has been here before. In January 2022, a major blackout hit southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The event also involved a sharp imbalance on the regional network and the separation of Kazakhstan’s northern and southern grids. Its precise starting point was disputed in the immediate aftermath. The regional grid dates to the Soviet period. Uzbekistan later withdrew from the old electricity ring, leaving Tajikistan largely isolated for years. Regional links have since been rebuilt; Tajikistan began reconnecting to the unified system in 2024. An Asian Development Bank project is adding...

Psychology

Psychologists in Kyrgyzstan Face New Regulation Push

Parents in Kyrgyzstan have been contacting member of parliament Elvira Surabaldieva with a basic question: the person counseling their child online calls themselves a psychologist, but are they actually qualified? There is currently no unified system through which families can check. The authorities now want to establish uniform rules for psychologists for the first time. The bill is being prepared by member of parliament Elvira Surabaldieva. The initiative followed requests from parents and other citizens who wanted to verify the qualifications of people offering psychological services online. According to Surabaldieva, some begin providing consultations after two- or three-month courses, while consultations can cost between 3,000 and 10,000 som ($34-$114) per session. Social media has made it considerably easier to enter the psychological services market. To a potential client, a polished page and thousands of followers can appear as convincing as professional qualifications. There is often no straightforward way to verify a consultant’s education and experience before the first session. Work with children is particularly sensitive. Surabaldieva said parents had approached her specifically because their children were receiving online consultations and they wanted to know whether the practitioners involved were properly qualified. The bill proposes establishing the professional status of psychologists in law. Exactly what education will be required remains under discussion. The working group is considering conventional psychology degrees as well as possible routes for people with qualifications in other fields who subsequently receive additional psychology training. Surabaldieva has argued, however, that completing several short-term courses alone should not be enough to qualify someone as a professional psychologist. The second proposal is a unified registry. Before seeking a consultation, clients would be able to check a specialist’s education, qualifications, and professional experience. But that raises another question: who should decide who is qualified to practice? An interagency working group began a clause-by-clause review of the legislation in Bishkek in early August. One option under discussion would give professional bodies a role in assessing applicants. Surabaldieva supports keeping the registry under state oversight rather than transferring that authority to private professional associations. The proposal would therefore give the state a new role in determining who can present themselves as a qualified psychologist. So far, however, there appears to have been little public discussion of whether tighter requirements could reduce the number of practitioners or increase the cost of consultations. Another point of debate concerns people with years of practical experience whose education may not meet the future requirements. That is particularly important because some state institutions already employ psychologists whose original training was in fields such as education or social work. The working group is considering a transition period of two or three years, giving experienced practitioners time to meet the new standards rather than forcing them to leave the profession immediately. Kyrgyzstan is not alone in facing this problem. A 2025 conference abstract published by European Psychiatry describes inadequate regulation of psychological services in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, which has allowed underqualified practitioners, often with only short-term training, to advertise themselves as...

Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization...

Sadyr Japarov

Japarov Says Tashiyev Was His Planned Successor as Prosecutors Seek Nine-Year Terms

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov says he once planned to leave office in 2027 and support Kamchybek Tashiyev as his successor, before deciding that his longtime political partner was not ready for the presidency. The disclosure comes as prosecutors are asking an appeals court to impose nine-year prison terms on Tashiyev and seven other defendants in the “Letter of 75” case. Japarov set out the abandoned succession plan in an interview with journalist Ali Toktakunov released on August 13. He said he had expected to complete the six-year term he won in 2021, then leave politics if Tashiyev was ready to take over. “Kamchy would become president, and I would retire. I had such a plan,” Japarov said. The president said he had told Tashiyev about the plan roughly a year earlier and urged him to prepare for the presidency by imposing more discipline on the people around him. Japarov said he later concluded that Tashiyev was not ready. He cited the conduct of some of Tashiyev’s staff and associates, the appearance of the “Letter of 75,” and signs that parliament was being divided between supporters of the president and supporters of “the general,” a reference to Tashiyev. Japarov said he summoned Tashiyev and told him: “This won’t do. You cannot split people.” He said he informed Tashiyev that he would be removed from office, but claimed he was still prepared to allow him to contest the presidential election without obstruction. That account adds a succession dispute to the explanation Japarov gave when he dismissed Tashiyev on February 10 as chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) and deputy chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers. At the time, the presidency said the decision was needed to “prevent a split in society” and state institutions. Senior GKNB officials were removed soon afterward, the border service was taken out of the hands of the committee, and parliamentary speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu resigned. Japarov has now drawn a sharp distinction between his personal relationship with Tashiyev and their political future. In another part of the interview, he said the two had been friends since 2005, and their families had been close. “He will remain my friend, but I have no plans to appoint him to any position,” Japarov said. He credited Tashiyev with making a major contribution during his five years at the GKNB, but said he should rest and consider where he had made mistakes. Japarov also confirmed for the first time himself that he intends to seek another term. “I intend to run for another term and continue my work,” he said, according to Reuters. His spokesman had said in 2024 that Japarov planned to run again, but the president had not previously made a public declaration of his own. He said a second term was needed to complete reforms already under way. Japarov also promised that rivals would be free to challenge him. “The road is open. Whoever wants to run, let them run,” he said, adding that there...