Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Digital Governance

How Digital Public Services Are Changing Daily Life in Central Asia

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have moved from queues at public service centers to passports in mobile apps in just a few years, compressing a transition that took many countries decades. Behind the impressive figures, however, are questions the region is still trying to answer. Not so long ago, obtaining a certificate in Central Asia meant a trip to a government office, a queue, and a stack of papers. Today, a resident of Almaty can renew a driver’s license by phone, an entrepreneur in Tashkent can register a company without leaving the office, and a doctor in Bishkek can issue an electronic sick leave certificate. The digitalization of public services has moved beyond strategic documents and become part of everyday life for tens of millions of people. The scale of change is reflected in international assessments. In the United Nations E-Government Development Index (EGDI) for 2024, Asia showed the fastest growth of any region. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan all improved their positions, each at its own pace, and each with its own model. Kazakhstan: From eGov to a Platform State Kazakhstan remains one of the region’s leaders in digital governance. In the 2024 EGDI ranking, the country rose to 24th place globally, ahead of a number of developed economies. Today, around 90% of more than 1,300 public services are available online, while the eGov.kz portal and eGov Mobile app offer access to a growing range of services. The figures speak for themselves. According to Kazakhstan’s e-government portal, citizens received more than 25.7 million services through eGov.kz in 2025, while the eGov Mobile audience exceeded 11.7 million users. The “Digital Documents” section is especially popular: the app provides access to 39 types of documents, from identity cards to driver’s licenses and student IDs. The expansion has continued. In 2025, Kazakhstan launched eGovBusiness, a single-window service for entrepreneurs that allows them to register companies, apply for subsidies, and check risks. The authorities have also moved to consolidate fragmented government apps into the unified eGov and Aitu platforms. The next frontier is artificial intelligence. In 2025, Kazakhstan established the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development. Through the National AI Platform, the country is developing sovereign infrastructure intended to support the use of generative AI in government and keep citizens’ data within national systems. Uzbekistan: The Fastest Leap Forward If Kazakhstan sets the regional benchmark, Uzbekistan has shown some of the fastest momentum. Over six years, the country climbed 24 positions in the EGDI ranking, from 87th place in 2018 to 63rd in 2024, and entered the category of countries with a “very high” level of e-government development for the first time. At the center of this transformation is the unified portal my.gov.uz, through which citizens and businesses access public services. More than 760 services are available on the platform, while the mobile app offers more than 540. In the first half of 2025 alone, more than 16 million services were provided through the system. The direction is set by the Digital Uzbekistan 2030...

Armenia

Pashinyan Victory Points to New Transport Options for Central Asia

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev congratulated Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on June 8 after Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won Armenia’s parliamentary election. The message came through Akorda. Tokayev said the vote, in the preliminary view of most international observers, was open, followed Armenian election law, and allowed citizens to express their will. Armenia’s Central Electoral Commission has released preliminary results from all 2,005 polling stations, giving Civil Contract 727,160 votes, or 49.81%. Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia bloc took 23.29%, while former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance took 9.94%. Turnout stood at 59%. Pashinyan is on course to form another government, but doesn’t have the two-thirds strength needed to change the constitution without a referendum. That limits his room for maneuver on a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan, since Baku still wants Yerevan to alter constitutional language it sees as a claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. [caption id="attachment_50178" align="aligncenter" width="1535"] A stall in Tsaghkadzor, Armenia, selling Nikol Pashinyan paraphernalia. Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Kazakhstan has built a close political track with Armenia over the past two years. In November 2025, Tokayev and Pashinyan elevated ties to a strategic partnership during Pashinyan’s official visit to Kazakhstan. The two sides discussed trade, transport, agriculture, digitalization, education, and culture. Armenian government readouts from the visit also linked Kazakh wheat shipments to regional route openings through the South Caucasus. This is the practical Central Asian stake in Pashinyan’s victory: a durable Armenia-Azerbaijan peace settlement would add another layer to westward routes from the Caspian. In October 2025, Azerbaijan removed all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev told Tokayev in Astana that a shipment of Kazakh grain through Azerbaijan to Armenia was the first such consignment since transit stopped in the late Soviet period. Kazakhstan already uses the Caspian and South Caucasus to reach Turkey and Europe, but that network depends on a limited number of crossings, ports, and rail links. If Armenia and Azerbaijan reopen transport ties, Astana gains another way to reduce chokepoints and strengthen its position. Pashinyan’s victory also sends a political signal. The vote tested whether Russian pressure could set the limits of Armenia’s domestic politics. International observers said the June 7 election offered voters a genuine choice in a well-run process. They also cited pressure from abroad through trade restrictions and security threats aimed at pushing voters toward the opposition. The same assessment warned of uneven campaign opportunities and perceptions of selective justice inside Armenia. However, Pashinyan still won in a “landslide” despite years of public anger over the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, a split with old security partners, and strong pressure from opposition groups with better ties to Moscow. The two main pro-Russian opposition forces won a combined 31%. The election came against a backdrop of Armenia’s break with Russian security organizations. When Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 as Russian peacekeepers stayed on the sidelines in the breakaway territory’s dormant airport, Armenia concluded that Moscow would not protect it. In February 2024, Pashinyan said...

EU Sanctions

EU Sanctions Seminar in Bishkek Puts Kyrgyzstan’s Russia Trade Under Scrutiny

The European Union held a full-day sanctions seminar in Bishkek on June 9, aimed at Kyrgyz companies, banks, logistics operators and virtual-asset businesses. The session comes less than seven weeks after Brussels used its anti-circumvention tool against Kyrgyzstan for the first time. The EU Delegation to the Kyrgyz Republic said the seminar was designed to raise awareness of EU sanctions, explain their application, and improve cooperation to prevent circumvention. The published agenda set out a program covering the EU sanctions system, financial restrictions, dual-use trade controls, penalties, trade-flow risks, and practical compliance. It also included question-and-answer sessions on financial sanctions and dual-use goods. The Kyrgyz Chamber of Commerce and Industry said the event would cover sanctions policy. Trainers were expected to come from the European Commission, EU member states, international law firms, banks, logistics companies, technology firms, and the virtual-asset sector. The timing gives an otherwise technical seminar a political edge. On April 23, the Council of the EU adopted its 20th sanctions package against Russia. Brussels banned the export of computer numerical control machines and radios to Kyrgyzstan, where there is a high risk that the products could be re-exported to Russia. The Council said trade data showed a significant rise in the re-export of common high-priority items. Those narrow categories carry large compliance risk. They include machine tools, electronics, radio equipment and other components that can support military production, drones, communications systems, and advanced industrial supply chains. The EU is not attempting to stop Kyrgyz trade with Russia; it is trying to close routes for goods that European regulators say should not reach Russia through third countries. Kyrgyzstan has drawn closer EU scrutiny since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. A member of the Eurasian Economic Union, goods can enter Kyrgyzstan, clear customs, and then move through regional trade channels. That role has supported growth in Kyrgyzstan, but has placed freight forwarders, importers and banks under closer foreign review. The concern had been building before the April decision. During a February visit to Bishkek, EU sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan discussed Kyrgyz banks, cryptocurrency and sensitive imports with Kyrgyz officials. Local coverage said the EU was watching about 80 dual-use product categories shipped from Europe to Kyrgyzstan. Around 50 had been found directly in Russian weapons, while 30 more were described as economically critical industrial items used in their production. The April package also increased pressure on Kyrgyz financial channels. The EU placed a transaction ban on 20 Russian banks and targeted four financial institutions in third countries. Keremet Bank and Capital Bank were among the affected Kyrgyz lenders. The EU also designated a Kyrgyz entity operating a platform where large volumes of the government-backed A7A5 stablecoin are traded. Virtual assets remain one of the most sensitive areas. On June 3, Kyrgyzstan’s financial-market regulator revoked the license of CJSC TengriCoin as a virtual-asset trading operator. The regulator cited systematic legal violations, failure to comply with official requirements, and failure to submit required reports. It also reminded market participants...

Court Cases

Kazakhstan Justice Reform Sees Citizens Winning More Cases Against State Bodies

In a boost for proponents of justice reform in Kazakhstan, citizens and businesses are now winning more than half of administrative court cases against government agencies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said, citing what he described as the growing impact of the country’s administrative justice reforms. Speaking at an Astana forum entitled Administrative Justice and Its Role in Ensuring the Rule of Law, Tokayev said the introduction of administrative courts had significantly improved citizens’ ability to challenge government decisions and defend their rights. “It must be acknowledged that in the past it was far more difficult for citizens to challenge the actions of government agencies and protect their rights,” he said. “With the introduction of administrative justice, the situation has changed fundamentally.” In a separate statement, Supreme Court Chairman Aslambek Mergaliyev, noted that the share of cases won by citizens and businesses against state bodies has risen from 15% to nearly 60% over the past five years. “Behind these figures are removed administrative barriers and restored rights for individual citizens, entrepreneurs and investors,” Mergaliyev told participants at the forum. The president noted that under the current system, government bodies are legally required to demonstrate the legality of their decisions and actions, while courts place greater emphasis on evidence gathering and procedural fairness. Tokayev said those changes had helped challenge the longstanding perception that courts usually side with the authorities. “This is a concrete result of administrative justice reforms,” he said. According to Supreme Court Chairman Aslambek Mergaliyev, citizens’ success rate in administrative cases has risen from 15% to nearly 60% over the past five years. Tokayev said Kazakhstan’s next objective is to move beyond resolving disputes after they arise and instead focus on managing legal and administrative risks before conflicts reach the courts. As part of that effort, he highlighted the government’s use of the eOtinish digital platform, which allows citizens and legal entities to submit complaints, appeals, information requests and suggestions to state bodies electronically. According to the president, nearly 16 million submissions have been filed through the platform over the past five years. He said authorities must now ensure greater consistency in administrative decisions at both national and local levels to prevent recurring disputes over the same issues. Tokayev paid particular attention to investor-related disputes, noting that courts rule in favor of investors in up to 80% of such cases. “In meetings with domestic and foreign investors, I consistently stress that the government and business community must engage constructively, openly discuss problems and jointly seek solutions,” he said. At the same time, he added that any compromise reached between officials and investors must remain fully consistent with the law. The remarks come as Kazakhstan seeks to link legal reform more closely to its investment agenda. The government has set a target of attracting $62.7 billion in total investment in 2026, including $25.5 billion in foreign capital, while also transferring the investment ombudsman role to the Prosecutor General and creating a Committee for the Protection of Investors’ Rights. That said, the administrative...

C5+1

From Culture to Critical Minerals: C5+1 Opens Busy U.S. Week in Central Asia

The United States and Central Asia moved another part of the C5+1 agenda into a working-level form on June 5, when culture officials from the five Central Asian states and Washington met in Tashkent. The meeting came just days before a separate C5+1 critical minerals session in Astana, giving the week a wider agenda: cultural heritage, public diplomacy, mining, investment, and supply chains are now moving forward in the same regional format. The Tashkent meeting brought together Uzbekistan's Minister of Culture Ozodbek Nazarbekov, Kazakhstan's Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balayeva, Kyrgyzstan's Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy Mirbek Mambetaliev, Tajikistan's Minister of Culture Matluba Sattoriyon, Turkmenistan's Deputy Minister of Culture Gurbanmurad Miradaliev, and Sarah Rogers, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The agenda covered cultural and humanitarian cooperation, joint cultural projects, creative exchanges, and the protection and promotion of cultural heritage. Participants discussed a permanent C5+1 Working Group on Culture, a C5+1 Culture and Innovation Forum, closer cooperation in the creative industries, and more places for Central Asian cultural professionals in U.S. education and exchange programs. Uzbekistan also proposed joint English for Culture centers with U.S. partners at cultural education institutions. In practical terms, that could mean joint training for museum staff, touring exhibitions, film and music exchanges, English-language programs for curators and cultural managers, and U.S.-backed workshops for people working in heritage, tourism, and the creative industries. For Uzbekistan, the proposed centers would give the agenda a physical base inside cultural education institutions rather than leaving it at the level of declarations. The meeting ended with a protocol, which reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the cultural heritage agenda adopted after the Washington summit in November 2025. The International Institute for Central Asia said it covered cooperation through joint events and festivals in art, literature, theater, cinema, and music. Kazakhstan's side also tied the discussion to museum partnerships, digitization of heritage, professional exchanges, tourism routes, and digital projects. The Tashkent talks grew out of the C5+1 leaders’ meeting in Washington, where culture joined a wider list of priorities. That summit marked ten years of U.S. engagement with the region through the format, which began in 2015 and has since expanded from foreign-minister meetings to expert groups and presidential-level summits. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the November 2025 summit shifted the format from broad diplomacy toward deliverable agreements, with critical minerals, aviation, supply chains, and business ties among the main areas of focus. Culture fits into that agenda, as Central Asian governments see heritage, tourism, film, music, museums, and the creative industries as economic sectors as well as identity markers. For the United States, public diplomacy gives Washington a way to stay active in the region outside security and energy talks. It also gives the C5+1 a soft-power layer, using language programs, museum links, heritage projects, and creative exchanges to build influence without framing the relationship only around security or resources. Heritage protection has a security side as well. Trafficking...

Water Security

Megaprojects Instead of Quotas: How Central Asia’s Water Diplomacy Is Changing

Central Asia’s water politics are moving beyond Soviet-era quotas. As glaciers in the Tien Shan retreat and climate pressure increases, river management has become a question of energy security, food production, and regional stability. The Soviet-era system of river-water allocation has reached its limits, forcing Central Asian states to look beyond traditional negotiations and toward joint ownership of strategic water infrastructure. Even as regional governments learn to cooperate more closely, a new challenge is emerging on Central Asia’s southern frontier, one that could disrupt the region’s hydrological balance. The Illusion of Control Formally, Central Asia’s water resources are governed through a network of interstate institutions. The principal mechanisms are the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). On paper, the system appears effective. Twice a year, ahead of the spring-summer irrigation season and the autumn-winter period, representatives of the region’s countries meet to approve water-withdrawal quotas from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. At the end of 2025, for example, officials meeting in Ashgabat agreed on water allocations for 2026, setting total withdrawals from the Amu Darya at nearly 55.4 billion cubic meters. This framework has helped prevent open interstate conflicts by providing a permanent forum for dialogue. However, its foundation remains the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which essentially preserved a Soviet-era quota system designed for a single centrally planned state rather than a group of independent countries with competing interests. The greatest weakness of the system is the absence of any meaningful enforcement mechanism. If one country exceeds its agreed allocation during a drought year, there are no legal or economic penalties. Disputes are instead resolved through emergency negotiations between ministries or, in some cases, direct interventions by heads of state. A system dependent on political goodwill and personal relationships is increasingly fragile in an era of climate stress. Turning Water Disputes Into Joint Investments As the quota system shows signs of strain, Central Asian countries have begun experimenting with a more pragmatic approach: shared ownership of infrastructure. The central paradox of the Syr Darya basin is that upstream and downstream countries need water at different times of the year. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the river’s headwaters, require releases in the winter to generate electricity and heat their cities. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, need that same water in summer to irrigate millions of hectares of farmland. Winter releases often flow downstream when demand is low, while shortages emerge during the peak agricultural season. The proposed solution is the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant on Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn River, a project now estimated to cost around $4.2 billion. What makes the project unusual is its ownership structure. Under a 2024 agreement, Kyrgyzstan will hold a 34% stake, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will each own 33%. By investing billions of dollars in infrastructure located outside their territory, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are effectively purchasing seats at the decision-making table. As shareholders, they gain a direct role in determining reservoir operations, helping ensure water is...