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Railway Economics

Opinion: China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway: Turning Transit Into Local Benefits

At the eighth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan on October 8, 2026, Azerbaijan joined the forum as a full member after three years of participation as a guest of honor. President Ilham Aliyev stated that “Transport is one of the primary areas of cooperation between Central Asia and Azerbaijan”. Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for comprehensive infrastructure along the routes, with logistics hubs and service centers supporting production facilities and industrial zones to generate economic activity around the transport corridors. Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is among Uzbekistan’s transport priorities and is important for Kyrgyzstan, making this “integrated transport corridor development” approach particularly relevant. Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway (also known as the Kashgar-Torugart-Makmal-Jalal-Abad-Andijan railway) has been underway since December 2024. Public discussion of the project focuses mainly on shorter routes linking China and Central Asia with the Middle East and Europe, and on the line’s design carrying capacity. However, growth in transit traffic does not in itself guarantee economic benefits for the Naryn and Jalal-Abad regions of Kyrgyzstan or the Andijan region of Uzbekistan. Local economic impact depends on whether freight services and tariff policy allow small shippers to use the railway’s stations. Border delays can limit those benefits, as can a lack of storage and processing infrastructure nearby. What the Project Involves The intergovernmental agreement on the implementation of the project was signed by China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on June 6, 2024. The joint project company was registered in July 2024, the investment agreement was signed on December 20, 2024, and construction officially began on December 27, 2024, in Jalal-Abad. According to the Ministry of Transport of Uzbekistan, the total length of the line is 532.53 km; 20 stations are planned, including two border stations, one transshipment station, four intermediate stations, and 13 passing loops. The Makmal transshipment station will be the transfer point between China’s 1,435 mm track gauge and the 1,520 mm gauge used in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. From Torugart to Makmal, the 165.5 km section will use the Chinese gauge. The 146.26 km section from Makmal to Jalal-Abad will use the wider gauge, connecting to the existing network toward Andijan. At Makmal, containers will be sorted and transferred between trains. Wagons can instead have their wheel assemblies changed to run on the other gauge. Freight trains will be assembled or split up at the station, which will also have facilities to weigh wagons and cargo. The parties estimate the cost of the project at USD 4.7 billion. Under the loan agreement signed on December 16, 2025, about USD 2.3 billion is provided by a syndicate of Chinese banks as a 35-year loan to the project company. Another USD 2.3 billion or so forms the project company’s charter capital. China holds 51% of the shares, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. As of October 2026, construction is underway along the entire length of the route. In September 2026, the project company reported the completion of the first tunnel...

AI Training

Women in Tech Uzbekistan Forum Highlights Growing Demand for AI Skills

Uzbekistan is attracting foreign technology companies, expanding IT education, and training young people to work with artificial intelligence. But employers’ needs are changing faster than educational programs can adapt. Just a few years ago, companies were looking for programmers, then cloud technology specialists. Now they need developers capable of building AI systems and autonomous digital agents. Against this backdrop, discussions in Tashkent are focusing on how to increase women’s participation in the technology industry and enable them not only to learn new tools but also to develop their own products. These issues took center stage at the Women in Tech Leadership Forum, held on October 13 at Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Digital Technologies. The event brought together approximately 300 representatives of government agencies, international organizations, technology companies, and the business community. It was organized by the ministry and Women in Tech Uzbekistan, the national chapter of an international organization working to expand women’s participation in technology. [caption id="attachment_58421" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Kamola Sobirova, an adviser to Uzbekistan’s Minister of Digital Technologies[/caption] Employers Need More Than Programmers Kamola Sobirova, an adviser to Uzbekistan’s Minister of Digital Technologies, explained in an exclusive interview with The Times of Central Asia how international companies’ requirements for local specialists have changed. “A few years ago, there was high demand for programmers. A year or two later, companies started asking us for cloud technology specialists. Then artificial intelligence emerged, and companies needed AI architects and prompt engineers,” Sobirova said. According to Sobirova, employers are now looking for specialists who can develop AI agents – software systems capable of independently carrying out sequences of tasks using artificial intelligence. “We cannot afford to stand still because technology continues to evolve. We must train specialists with up-to-date skills and create the right conditions for them,” she said. Uzbekistan previously ran the One Million Uzbek Coders program and has since launched the Five Million AI Leaders initiative. These programs are designed to provide large-scale training in digital skills, including programming and working with artificial intelligence. AI and the future of women’s work The question of whether AI will eliminate jobs was also raised during the interview. Sobirova rejected the idea that the main effect of AI would simply be widespread job losses. “There is a trend that everyone thinks AI will take over many professions and replace them, or that artificial intelligence has arrived and we will lose our jobs, but it is not like that,” she said. “Artificial intelligence will take the jobs of people who do not have artificial intelligence skills.” She argued that AI should increasingly be viewed as a tool that allows people to work more efficiently rather than simply as a replacement for workers. “Life has become much faster, and in this process artificial intelligence can help us become full users of AI and optimize our work,” Sobirova said. She also said the same principle applies to journalism and other media-related work, where AI can be used to support different parts of the workflow. “Coursera [an online...

Small Businesses

Almaty Facade Renovations Leave Small Businesses in the Dust

When Gaukhar Osmonalieva rented a space in central Almaty for a pet grooming salon and coffee shop, renovations to the building’s facade were already underway. She was assured the work would be finished soon. Her business opened in August, but instead of a busy street and an outdoor terrace, she found herself surrounded by scaffolding, a torn-up sidewalk, and constant dust. By mid-October, construction was still underway, and the customers she had hoped to attract by choosing the location were coming less frequently. “At one point, the construction workers dug up the entire road, and foot traffic dropped noticeably. We chose this location because it was convenient and had heavy pedestrian traffic, but those are precisely the advantages we have now practically lost,” Osmonalieva told The Times of Central Asia. Almaty is Kazakhstan’s largest city and commercial hub. In 2026, the city launched a large-scale renovation of residential building facades, many dating back to the Soviet era. The original program covered 176 buildings in three central districts – Almaly, Bostandyk, and Medeu. More than 25.8 billion tenge (approximately $57 million) was allocated for the work. Many of the buildings house cafes, shops, and small businesses on their ground floors. [caption id="attachment_58399" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Classes continue as normal at a language school on Abay Avenue as restoration goes on outside.[/caption] City officials promised to update the facades while preserving the buildings’ architectural features. But questions about how the work was organized emerged as early as spring. Local news outlet Vlast found that construction had begun at some sites in March, before public tenders were announced and contracts signed. Under the tender terms, renovating a single building was supposed to take three to five months. By August, only nine of the 178 buildings listed in updated district administration figures had been fully renovated. Authorities in Bostandyk expected to complete most of the work by September, while those in Almaty targeted October. Osmonalieva was initially told the renovations would take three weeks, then that they would be completed by September. After complaining via e-Otinish, Kazakhstan’s government complaints platform, she was given a new deadline: October 15. “But today is already October 12, and judging by the condition of the facade, I wouldn’t say even half the work has been done,” she said. According to Osmonalieva, there are often only three or four construction workers on the building. Tools are left near the entrance, while workers cut cladding materials beside the salon, filling the area with dust. [caption id="attachment_58396" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] A coffee shop on Kunaev Street, with construction materials stacked outside.[/caption] The coffee shop has suffered most. Osmonalieva had planned to open an outdoor terrace, a popular feature in Almaty, where warm weather lasts for several months. But scaffolding made it impossible to set up tables outside. “As a result, we missed the entire season. This had a significant impact on the coffee shop: demand was lower than expected, and we couldn’t reach our planned targets,” she said. The construction has created additional...

Global Power Rankings

Kazakhstan Ranks 34th, Uzbekistan 71st Among World’s Most Powerful Countries

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were the only Central Asian countries included in World Population Review’s 2026 ranking of the world’s 100 most powerful countries, placing 34th and 71st, respectively. Kazakhstan ranked immediately ahead of Egypt (35th), and also placed above the United Arab Emirates (37th), South Africa (38th), Norway (39th), Saudi Arabia (40th), Pakistan (42nd), and Iran (46th). Among former Soviet republics, Russia ranked higher, in 11th place, while Ukraine came in 51st and Belarus 57th. Uzbekistan placed below Cambodia (69th) and Oman (70th), but ahead of Sri Lanka (72nd), Estonia (75th), Kenya (77th), Algeria (79th), and Armenia (80th). World Population Review attributes the ranking to the Best Countries study by U.S. News & World Report. The assessment considers perceptions of countries’ economic and political influence, military strength, international alliances, and leadership. Kazakhstan’s international standing is supported by its established energy and mining industries and extensive diplomatic relationships. The country is the world’s largest uranium producer, accounting for approximately 40% of global mine output in 2025. It also exported 78.7 million tons of oil that year, supplying international energy markets through an extensive network of pipelines and commercial partnerships. Its multivector foreign policy has allowed Astana to maintain relationships with Russia and China while expanding economic and political cooperation with the United States, Europe, and other partners. Kazakhstan’s uranium industry illustrates this approach, with established customers and industrial partnerships spanning several competing geopolitical blocs. Kazakhstan’s existing railway network, connections with China, and Caspian ports also support its role in international trade between Asia and Europe. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor, carried approximately 4.1 million tons of freight in 2025, including around 77,000 twenty-foot equivalent units of container traffic. Uzbekistan’s $147 billion economy in 2025 was larger than those of Oman ($110 billion), Sri Lanka ($109 billion), and Kenya ($136 billion), all ranked in the same range. Algeria, despite an economy approaching $287 billion and its role as a major natural gas supplier to Europe, ranked eight places below Uzbekistan. Beyond economic size, Uzbekistan has an established position in global mineral markets. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, it was the world’s fifth-largest uranium producer and ninth-largest gold producer in 2024, accounting for 6.6% and 3.9% of global output, respectively. These industries provide an important source of international economic engagement, alongside a domestic market of approximately 39 million people. The ranking’s top 10 were China, the United States, India, Germany, Japan, South Korea, France, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Italy. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan did not appear among the 100 countries listed.

C5+1 Diplomacy

C5+1 and the Forgotten Geography of Central Asia

In modern diplomacy, Central Asia usually means five post-Soviet states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. But how fixed are the region’s boundaries, and who gets to define them? Should Central Asia be understood as the five states that have emerged as a distinct political space? A broader historical and cultural region that includes Afghanistan, parts of Iran, western China, and Mongolia? Or an even more fluid system of economic, transportation, and strategic ties? New details about the origins of the C5+1 format involving the United States bring us back to precisely this question. Frederick Starr, one of the most consistent proponents of the Greater Central Asia concept, recently wrote that including Afghanistan was considered during early discussions of the American regional mechanism. In that case, the formula could have been C6+1. What makes this episode interesting is not that Afghanistan supposedly almost became the “sixth country of Central Asia.” More importantly, even before C5+1 was launched in 2015, there were different ways of understanding the region: political, historical and civilizational, and strategic. Those differences persist today, while closer relations with Afghanistan and Azerbaijan have once again raised questions about Central Asia’s boundaries. Political Central Asia and the C5 Politically, the definition is relatively clear. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan gradually developed from a geographical grouping into a distinct political category. C5+1 reflects precisely this logic. The joint declaration adopted in Samarkand on November 1, 2015, established regular cooperation between the United States and the five Central Asian states. Afghanistan was part of the regional agenda but was not included in the format itself. The “five plus an external partner” model has since proliferated. Germany uses the Z5+1 formula, from the German Zentralasien. Similar regional mechanisms operate with Japan, South Korea, the European Union, China, India, Russia, Italy, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other partners. The proliferation of these formats reflects the extent to which external partners increasingly treat the C5 as a regional actor in its own right, while the five countries themselves are also increasingly acting in that capacity. But political Central Asia is not the only way to view the region. As part of UNESCO’s multivolume History of Civilizations of Central Asia project, the region was understood much more broadly. This historical and cultural space included not only the five former Soviet republics but also Afghanistan, northeastern Iran, Pakistan, northern India, western China, and Mongolia. UNESCO specifically noted that these were not rigid political boundaries but an area shaped by long-standing cultural and historical ties. This does not offer a “correct” alternative map. Rather, it shows that the region’s political, historical, and civilizational boundaries do not necessarily coincide. It was against this background that Starr proposed the concept of Greater Central Asia in 2005. This represented a third, strategic way of viewing the region. His idea was less about redrawing the geographical map than about changing American policy. In Starr’s view, the five post-Soviet republics and Afghanistan should be...

Political Parties

Tokayev Dissolves Kazakhstan Local Councils Ruling Party Merger

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a decree on October 12 terminating the powers of maslikhats, the country’s local representative assemblies. Snap elections must now be held by December 12. The move follows a decision in June 2026 to merge the Amanat party into the newly established pro-presidential Adilet party, which won August’s parliamentary elections. Most incumbent local deputies, however, were elected in 2023 under the Amanat banner, raising questions about their mandates as the party is absorbed into Adilet. Why Questions About Legitimacy Arose Tokayev first raised the prospect of early elections on September 24, speaking at the inaugural session of the Halyq Kenesi, or People’s Council of Kazakhstan. “The overwhelming majority of maslikhat deputies were elected from the Amanat party. That party no longer operates independently, having merged with the Adilet party,” Tokayev explained. He said the merger would soon raise questions about the legitimacy of much of the country’s local representative bodies once the legal procedures were completed. Under Kazakh law, deputies can lose their seats if the party through which they were elected ceases to exist. However, the decision to merge the parties did not, by itself, end their mandates. From Nur Otan to Adilet Amanat was previously known as Nur Otan and had been the main political support base of Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Founded in 1999, the party underwent several name changes. The most recent came in March 2022, following the January unrest, when mass protests escalated into the largest political crisis in Kazakhstan’s post-independence history. Amanat voted on June 12 to join Adilet, which approved the merger two days later. The new organization inherited its regional branches, administrative apparatus, and extensive network of activists. Adilet itself had been registered only on June 1, just weeks before the merger. Adilet was headed by Aibek Dadebay, who had previously led President Tokayev’s administration. Following the August parliamentary elections, he became chairman of the Kurultai, Kazakhstan’s new unicameral parliament. In the August 23 elections, Adilet won 71.17% of the vote and 110 of the 145 parliamentary seats. Four other parties crossed the 5% electoral threshold but secured only 35 seats between them. Maslikhats and the New Parliamentary System Maslikhats are elected at the regional, city, and district levels. They approve local budgets, review territorial development programs, and hear reports from executive officials. In cases provided for by law, deputies may initiate a vote of no confidence in an akim, the head of a local administration. Kazakhstan, however, remains a unitary state with a strong presidential chain of command. The heads of regions and major cities are appointed by the president. Following constitutional reform, the Senate and Mazhilis were replaced by the unicameral Kurultai. On October 7, its deputies voted to establish a Council for Cooperation with Maslikhats. According to deputy Amirbek Ospanbekov, local representative bodies work directly with residents, understand regional conditions, and encounter the practical consequences of laws passed by parliament. The council is expected to involve maslikhat representatives in drafting legislation and gathering information...