• KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00224
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
16 November 2026

Viewing results 19 - 24 of 4286

Russian Rail Curbs Put Up to $470 Million in Kazakh Coal Exports at Risk

Transit shipments of Kazakh coal through Russia toward European markets fell by 97% in two months, from 1 million metric tons in August to 30,000 in October 2026, according to figures cited by economist Yernar Serik. Russian Railways approved no requests to ship Kazakh coal to Baltic ports for October or November, despite an agreement that gives qualifying shipments priority. Kazakh economist Yernar Serik estimates that up to 3.5 million metric tons of coal exports, worth $400 million to $470 million, could be at risk by year-end. The problems began in August, when shipments of Kazakh coal through Russia’s Black Sea port of Taman stopped. That left Baltic ports as the main maritime export route for Kazakh suppliers. Serik put September shipments at about 500,000 metric tons. The remaining October shipments went by rail toward Belarus and Poland, bypassing Russia’s Baltic ports. Priority Status That Failed to Secure Shipments In November 2025, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement on rail transit and cargo handling for exports to third countries. Under Russia’s rules on access to railway infrastructure, freight volumes agreed under such treaties qualify for the fourth priority category, a relatively high ranking when the railway allocates capacity. On October 19, Kommersant reported that Russian Railways planned to cut October coal shipments to the Oktyabrskaya Railway in northwestern Russia by 80%. The newspaper obtained minutes of a Russian Transport Ministry meeting at which officials discussed the proposal. Its sources said suspending priority transit for Kazakh coal was also under discussion. Disruptions to shipping through Russia’s Black Sea ports during the war in Ukraine have led exporters to redirect freight to the Baltic, where the rail lines approaching the ports have struggled to absorb the extra traffic. Russian coal producers also face limits. The energy consultancy NEFT Research said the railway capped November coal shipments to Ust-Luga at 55% of the route’s capacity. Russia has announced no formal ban on Kazakh coal transit. Russian Railways has declined to comment on its plans for individual routes. How Much Could Exporters Lose? In 2025, Kazakhstan transported 11.7 million metric tons of coal through Russia to third countries, an increase of 27% from the previous year. The October 19 report put shipments in the first half of 2026 at 6.7 million metric tons, up 34% year over year. According to the pricing agency Argus Media, Kazakhstan shipped 4.7 million metric tons of coal through Ust-Luga and 2.6 million through Taman between January and July. Both ports handled shipments primarily for markets in Europe and Türkiye. Serik calculated the potential shortfall using August’s shipping volume as the monthly benchmark for the rest of the year. He assumed an export price of $115 to $135 per metric ton. The estimate represents the potential value of shipments that may not take place. The actual loss to producers depends in part on how much coal they can sell in other markets and what it costs to reroute it. "In effect, Russia is not directly banning Kazakh coal...

U.S. Financing Uncertainty Emerges for Kazakhstan Tungsten Project

Two U.S. government lenders are not currently pursuing up to $1.6 billion in financing for a major tungsten project in Kazakhstan, raising questions about construction funding for a venture intended to supply critical minerals to American industry and defense. The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) have no current plans to finance the project, according to a November 10 Reuters report. Developer Cove Kaz Capital Group maintains that work is proceeding on schedule and that it has not yet formally applied for construction financing. The proposed financing comprised up to $900 million from EXIM and $700 million from DFC. Both agencies issued preliminary letters of interest, but neither approved a loan. A DFC official told Reuters that the project had not advanced beyond the first stage of the agency’s four-stage review process. Reuters also reported that EXIM has no current plans to provide financing. The development creates uncertainty over a potential source of construction funding, although no previously approved loans have been withdrawn. Cove Says Development Remains on Schedule Cove has disputed suggestions that the lenders’ positions represent a definitive rejection of its financing plans. In a statement reported by Forbes Kazakhstan, the company said the project remains in the engineering and feasibility stage. Its definitive feasibility study is expected to be completed in 2027, after which it intends to seek construction financing. Cove said financing for its current development activities is secured and that it continues to consider commercial lenders, strategic investors, and potential customers as sources of capital. The company also maintained that its discussions with U.S. officials indicated continued support for the project. In its statement to Reuters, Cove said the project had received support under both the Biden and Trump administrations. Kazakhstan’s Position in Critical Minerals The project covers the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan’s Karaganda Region. Cove Kaz acquired a 70% interest in Severniy Katpar LLP in April 2026, while Kazakhstan’s national mining company, Tau-Ken Samruk, retains 30%. The deposits represent a substantial undeveloped tungsten resource. Cove plans to develop mining operations and processing facilities producing ammonium paratungstate, an intermediate material used in manufacturing tungsten products. Tungsten is important to aerospace manufacturing, industrial machinery, and defense equipment. China dominates global production, making alternative supplies a priority for Washington. Kazakhstan is already a significant supplier of critical minerals to American industry. Kazakh-origin uranium accounted for 28% of deliveries to U.S. civilian nuclear power plant operators in 2025, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Kazakhstan also supplies titanium to major aerospace manufacturers, including Boeing and Airbus, as highlighted by Kanat Sharlapayev, chairman of the presidium of Kazakhstan’s Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, at the B20 USA Summit in Washington on November 10. Financing and Political Implications Cove announced on November 2 that it had abandoned its planned merger with Skyline Builders and would instead pursue a direct U.S. stock-market listing during the first half of 2027. The company also announced a $32 million equity investment commitment from...

Kazakhstan Detains Heads of Samruk-Kazyna and National Railways in Corruption Probe

Kazakhstan's National Security Committee (KNB) has confirmed the detention of the heads of the state-owned Samruk-Kazyna sovereign wealth fund and the national railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ). Nurlan Zhakupov and Yelzhas Otynshiyev are suspected of involvement in a corruption-related offense. Both organizations play a central role in Kazakhstan's economy: the fund manages some of the country's largest state-owned assets, while KTZ operates its railway network, including freight transit between China and Europe. According to the KNB, which announced the detentions on November 12, the two executives were taken into custody the previous day during an operation conducted by the KNB's Anti-Corruption Service. Other individuals were also detained. The agency said investigative procedures were underway but declined to disclose details of the alleged offense, citing Article 201 of Kazakhstan's Criminal Procedure Code, which restricts the disclosure of information from pretrial investigations. The KNB said its anti-corruption efforts were continuing in accordance with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s instructions and the government’s “Law and Order” principle. Nurlan Zhakupov had headed Samruk-Kazyna since April 2023. The sovereign wealth fund holds assets in the oil and gas, energy, transportation, and telecommunications sectors. Its portfolio includes the national oil and gas company KazMunayGas, uranium producer Kazatomprom, KTZ, and other major Kazakh enterprises. In March 2025, Zhakupov briefed President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on the fund's investment portfolio, which comprised 130 projects worth more than $100 billion. Yelzhas Otynshiyev became head of KTZ on July 20, 2026. He previously held senior positions at Samruk-Kazyna, overseeing strategy and asset management. The fund is the railway company's sole shareholder. KTZ manages Kazakhstan's mainline railway network and is involved in developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor. The route connects China with European markets through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, allowing freight to bypass Russia. The company is also preparing for an initial public offering (IPO), which would open it to private investors. Otynshiyev's detention coincided with the introduction of new Stadler passenger railcars into service. On November 11, the first train equipped with the new cars departed Astana for Almaty after repeated launch delays. The operator received the first 51 cars in December 2025, but technical issues, including concerns about the braking system, delayed their entry into service. According to KTZ, Stadler Kazakhstan will compensate the railway company for additional costs arising from the delay. The contract calls for the delivery of 557 railcars by 2030. The next service using the new cars is scheduled for November 13 on the Astana–Semey route. Kazakhstan's Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov had previously criticized Samruk-Kazyna's management on November 4 for delays in implementing investment projects. However, the KNB has not suggested that either the investment-project delays or the Stadler contract is connected to the investigation. As of November 12, law enforcement authorities had not disclosed the specific nature of the alleged corruption offense or announced formal charges against Zhakupov and Otynshiyev. Their detention does not constitute a finding of guilt. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that,...

Russia Tries to Keep the CSTO Relevant in Central Asia

Russia used the November 11 CSTO summit in Moscow to promote closer military cooperation with allies increasingly looking elsewhere for partners. Plans to develop the collective aviation force and supply equipment for Tajikistan's Afghan border would keep their militaries working with Russia, but Armenia's estrangement shows how far confidence in Russian protection has fallen. The summit barred Armenia from voting and appointing representatives to senior posts in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced the restrictions, citing its failure to meet its membership obligations. Armenia remains a member, but has withheld contributions and frozen participation after accusing the alliance of failing to defend it. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan continue to participate. They still want military training, cooperation against terrorism, and help securing the region's southern border with Afghanistan. Moscow can offer those services, even as the Ukraine war damages its standing and China, Europe, and the U.S. expand their economic presence. At the previous summit in Bishkek, Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian weapons and closer military integration. The Moscow meeting continued that effort. Equipment and joint operations keep Russia involved in its neighbors' defense planning, while agreed declarations allow it to claim diplomatic support beyond Belarus. The Damage in Armenia Armenia's break with Moscow developed through successive security failures. The CSTO provided no military assistance after Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian territory in 2022, leading Yerevan to freeze its participation in 2024. The dispute over unpaid contributions followed the loss of confidence in the alliance, rather than causing it. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict deepened that rupture. Russian peacekeepers deployed after the 2020 war did not prevent Azerbaijan's September 2023 offensive. More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled, leaving Moscow's claim to be a reliable protector badly damaged. Nagorno-Karabakh was internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory and fell outside the CSTO's collective-defense guarantee. Russia's peacekeeping mission there was separate from the alliance. But that distinction offered little reassurance to an Armenian government that had already failed to obtain military assistance after attacks on Armenia itself. Kazakhstan has a different experience. During the January 2022 unrest, CSTO troops guarded key facilities. Moscow can therefore point to an actual deployment when arguing that membership remains useful, though Armenia's experience makes it harder to promise that help will arrive whenever another member requests it. The Border Program in Tajikistan Tajikistan takes over the CSTO chairmanship in January 2027, and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon used the summit to call for closer attention to carrying out existing commitments. Strengthening the organization should rest on “mutual trust, consideration of the interests of member states and consistent fulfillment of commitments undertaken,” Rahmon said. The Afghan border program has taken years to negotiate. The CSTO decided to develop it in 2013, but leaders approved it only in November 2024. Its published timetable assigned preparations to 2025, priority deliveries to 2026–2027, and further reinforcement through 2029. The border equipment program was still awaiting financing arrangements in April. On October 21, Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said Tajikistan had selected suppliers and...

Kazakhstan Highlights Mining and Processing Strengths at Washington B20 Summit

Kazakhstan already produces materials central to U.S. critical minerals supply chains, from uranium used by American nuclear power plants to titanium supplied to major aerospace manufacturers, Kanat Sharlapayev told the B20 USA Summit in Washington on November 10. “We’re not just resource-rich; we’re a processing country,” said Sharlapayev, chairman of the presidium of Kazakhstan’s Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs. Sharlapayev identified four advantages for attracting U.S. investment: substantial mineral resources, investor protections, established transport infrastructure, and a skilled domestic workforce. The discussion, moderated by Jennifer Miel, vice president for the Middle East, Central Asia and Türkiye at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, also featured Vinay Chawla, the U.S. State Department’s Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs, and Andrew Wilson, executive director of the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). Kazakhstan is a major producer of uranium, copper, zinc, lead, and ferroalloys. Sharlapayev highlighted the country's importance to the U.S. nuclear fuel supply, saying that approximately a quarter of the uranium supplied to the United States comes from Kazakhstan. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Kazakh-origin uranium accounted for 28% of deliveries purchased by American civilian nuclear power plant operators in 2025, second only to Canada, as previously reported by The Times of Central Asia. Kazakhstan also accounts for approximately 20% of the global aerospace titanium market, according to the Kazakh government. Its Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant is an approved supplier to manufacturers including Boeing, Airbus, Safran, and Rolls-Royce. Sharlapayev also cited the country's capabilities in producing high-purity manganese sulfate, a material used in battery manufacturing. At a separate Kazakhstan–U.S. business roundtable on November 9, Sharlapayev cited PepsiCo and Wabtec as examples of manufacturing investment extending beyond the country's traditional commodity industries. Kazakhstan's Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code, adopted in 2017, introduced a licensing system influenced by Western Australian practices. Sharlapayev emphasized the importance of protecting companies' exploration rights as they move toward developing the deposits they discover. Sharlapayev said 23,000 kilometers of railway lines crisscross Kazakhstan, giving mining operations access to established transport routes for moving extracted minerals to processing facilities and export markets. He also said Kazakhstan produces approximately 3,000 geologists and mining engineers annually, a substantial number for a country of roughly 20 million people. Kazakhstan's mines are staffed overwhelmingly by local professionals, with very few expatriates, he added. Financing Mining and Processing Projects Chawla acknowledged Kazakhstan’s existing mining rules, while emphasizing the importance of “contracts that are honored, predictable licensing, and rules that don’t change after the money arrives” for investment across Central Asia. He argued that capital was not necessarily the main obstacle to developing critical minerals projects. Reliable pricing and long-term purchasing commitments were also needed to make investments commercially viable. Chawla said the United States supports processing in Central Asia and suggested that guaranteed payments for processing capacity could help make projects bankable. He cited the $1.8 billion Orion Critical Mineral Consortium, backed by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Orion Resource Partners, and Abu Dhabi's ADQ. The consortium targets mineral...

Japan Sets Sights on Deeper Economic Ties with Kyrgyzstan

In an interview with AKI.TV, Japan’s Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, Ryuichi Hirano, said that Japan intends to move its longstanding relationship with Kyrgyzstan toward a broader economic partnership based on shared interests. Ambassador Hirano pointed to Kyrgyzstan’s growing economic and diplomatic weight. “I know that Kyrgyzstan’s economy is growing rapidly. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan is strengthening its presence in the international community, particularly as a prospective new member of the UN Security Council,” he said. Kyrgyzstan was elected to a non-permanent Security Council seat on June 3, 2026 for the 2027–2028 term, and will serve on the Council for the first time. Economic data for Kyrgyzstan has been robust in recent years. Official figures put Kyrgyzstan’s real GDP growth at about 11.1% in 2025, the second consecutive year above 11% and well above the 2025 forecasts of the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank. Ambassador Hirano stressed the need for more reciprocal cooperation. “I believe we already have a solid foundation for developing our bilateral relations on a mutually beneficial basis, and I would like to do my part to advance them,” he said. President Sadyr Japarov’s visit to Japan gave fresh impetus to deepening bilateral relations. On December 20, 2025, he met Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and the two leaders signed a joint statement on the further development of relations through mutually beneficial cooperation. In the interview, Ambassador Hirano said he attended the meeting and described it as productive and positive. The statement builds on the 2023 Joint Statement on Friendship and Comprehensive Partnership in the New Era, signed during Japarov’s November 2023 visit to Japan. The agenda has since shifted toward trade, investment, and commercial opportunities. Japan’s recorded exports to Kyrgyzstan reached ¥13.01 billion (US$82.1 million) in 2025, while imports from Kyrgyzstan totaled ¥79.2 million (US$ 505,000). Bilateral trade therefore remains small and heavily weighted toward Japanese exports, which leaves considerable room for diversification and growth, especially on the Kyrgyz side. Five areas stand out for the emerging partnership: critical minerals, including antimony and silicon; energy, especially hydropower and renewable electricity; transport infrastructure; agriculture and food processing; and digital technologies, satellite applications and education. Transport connectivity also has a regional dimension. The Tokyo Declaration adopted at the Central Asia plus Japan summit in December 2025 made stronger links between Central Asia and international markets a priority, including support for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Kyrgyzstan’s role in the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, with tunnels now under construction, could strengthen its position not only in trade between China, Central Asia and Europe, but also in trade with Japan. While not mentioned directly by Ambassador Hirano, stronger institutional groundwork is also being laid. Japan and Kyrgyzstan signed a new double-taxation agreement on December 19, 2025. It entered into force on July 26, 2026, although most of its provisions apply from January 1, 2027. At their December meeting, the two leaders also agreed to establish an intergovernmental commission on trade, economy, culture and human exchange. They said they wanted to conclude a...