• KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00215
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
29 August 2026

Viewing results 19 - 24 of 3997

Kyrgyzstan Advances Junda Refinery Modernization Amid Fuel Supply Strain

Kyrgyzstan’s largest oil refinery, Junda in Kara-Balta, is moving to the next stage of a modernization project worth nearly $194 million. The project has taken on added significance amid problems with fuel supplies from Russia, on which Kyrgyzstan remains heavily dependent. On August 25, Ravshanbek Sabirov, head of the National Investment Agency, signed an additional agreement with China’s Central Asia Energy Company. The document allows the next stage of the Junda modernization project to begin. Once upgraded, the refinery is expected to increase petroleum output and produce fuel meeting Euro 5 standards. The official announcement confirms the start of the new phase but does not specify its individual cost. Junda, also known as Zhongda, is located in Kara-Balta, about 60 kilometers west of Bishkek. The refinery is operated by the Kyrgyzstan-registered China Petrol Company Junda, which is 99% owned by China’s Central Asia Energy Company. The remaining 1% is held by Kyrgyzstan-registered Dade Service Company. The refinery, with an annual crude-processing capacity of 800,000 tons, began operating in 2014. Production halted in early 2020, and the plant remained idle for about four years. Before the shutdown, residents of Kara-Balta had repeatedly complained about air pollution and unpleasant odors from the facility. The shutdown lasted about four years, with production resuming in 2024. A new modernization program followed. A 2024 investment agreement initially put the cost of repairs and modernization at $160 million, while the company later cited an investment of more than $167 million. An additional agreement subsequently raised the project figure to $193.75 million. The refinery’s stated processing capacity remains 800,000 tons per year. The project’s timeline, however, remains unclear. An earlier supplementary agreement called for the modernization to be completed by July 31, 2026. That deadline has already passed, yet on August 25 the parties signed another agreement allowing the next phase to begin. The National Investment Agency has not explained whether the original deadline has formally been extended. President Sadyr Japarov has previously given a different target – 2028. He also said the Chinese side had allocated about $500 million for Junda, substantially more than the $193.75 million cited in the investment agreement. It is unclear whether the two figures refer to different stages or scopes of work. Japarov has also spoken about modernizing another refinery, Kyrgyz Petroleum Company in Manas, the city formerly known as Jalal-Abad. For Kyrgyzstan, the issue is not only fuel quality. Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov said in July that Kyrgyzstan consumes around 2 million tons of fuel and lubricants annually and that almost 95% has traditionally come from Russia. More recent government figures put average annual demand at more than 1.5 million tons, while Japarov has said Russia currently accounts for about 90% of consumption. That dependence has become particularly visible this summer. Disruptions at Russian refineries and reduced volumes available for export have pushed prices higher. Ukrainian drone strikes, refinery outages, and strong domestic demand have contributed to fuel shortages in Russia and restrictions on exports to some markets. Rising fuel...

Turkmenistan’s Allayar Shirliev Wins Abu Dhabi Chess Tournament

Allayar Shirliev was a conscripted soldier when he became Turkmenistan’s national chess champion in 2024 and has said he wants to break the world record for playing the most games simultaneously while blindfolded. The 22-year-old Turkmen player has now won a chess tournament in the United Arab Emirates, the Turkmenportal platform and other media reported. Shirliev won the Open A tournament at the 32nd International Chess Festival in Abu Dhabi, which was held from August 15 to August 24. The Open A category is for players with a rating of 2299 and below under the rules of FIDE, the international governing body of chess. The top ten players in the world all have ratings above 2750. Shirliev, whose chess title is candidate master, entered the Abu Dhabi tournament with a classical chess rating of 2184, and his victory is expected to raise his rating by about 40 points when FIDE publishes new figures. He won eight out of a possible nine points in the competition, drawing with two players who have the more advanced international master title, Bashir Eiti of Syria and Richilieu III Salcedo of the Philippines. In a separate category, Uzbek grandmaster Jakhongir Vakhidov won the masters tournament for players with a rating of 2,300 and above in Abu Dhabi. Next month, Uzbekistan will host the FIDE Chess Olympiad in Samarkand, fielding a team led by Javokhir Sindarov, winner of the FIDE Candidates Tournament in April. Born in Ashgabat, Shirliev is eager to push his limits. In April 2021, he played 25 games simultaneously while blindfolded and was planning another 30-game event, state media in Turkmenistan reported.  Then, in July of that year, he played 40 games blindfolded, according to the InAshgabat news site. The world record for simultaneous games while blindfolded is held by Uzbek-born Timur Gareyev, according to Guinness World Records. He played 48 games at the University of Nevada in Las Vegas in 2016. He won 35 games, drew seven, and lost six. Hungarian grandmaster János Flesch played 52 opponents simultaneously while blindfolded in Budapest in 1960. But the performance wasn’t recognized as a world record.

Can Uzbekistan’s Green Transition Offset Its Gas Decline?

Uzbekistan faces a widening energy gap. Natural gas production peaked in 2008 and, after a partial recovery in the late 2010s, has fallen sharply. Official figures show output dropped from 61.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2018 to 41.5 bcm in 2024. Production fell another 15% year on year in the first quarter of 2026. The gap is already being filled from abroad. Russian gas deliveries rose 15% in 2025 to nearly 6.5 bcm, while Uzbekistan also imports gas from Turkmenistan. Renewable electricity cannot replace every household or industrial use of gas. It can reduce the volume burned in power stations, leaving more domestic fuel available elsewhere. Declining output is already changing Uzbekistan’s external position. The country, once a net gas exporter, became a net importer in 2023. Imports help protect households and factories from shortages, but they add costs and increase exposure to Russian and Turkmen supplies. Renewable generation therefore serves an energy security purpose even before its climate benefits are counted. Natural gas remains the central concern. In its 2022 review, the International Energy Agency said it provided about 85% of Uzbekistan’s total energy and electricity supplies. The government expected gas demand to rise by 30% to 65 bcm by 2030, while electricity demand would roughly double. The IEA also warned that reserves would last fewer than 20 years at the production rate then prevailing. This was a reserve-to-production estimate, not a fixed depletion date. New discoveries or investment could extend it. Lower consumption would do the same. The government has responded with a rapid renewable buildout. In 2025, solar and wind plants generated more than 10.5 billion kWh of electricity. Renewable generation, including hydropower, reached 16.8 billion kWh. The Ministry of Energy said this saved about 3.2 bcm of natural gas. That saving was equivalent to roughly half the volume Russia supplied during the year. It shows that renewables already ease the shortage. Yet 3.2 bcm remains far below the roughly 20 bcm fall in annual gas production since 2018. On current figures, the green transition is slowing the impact of the decline, not yet offsetting it. The buildout forms part of Uzbekistan’s 2019 Green Economy Transition Strategy. Renewable projects bring foreign investment and create opportunities for domestic suppliers. In December 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said local companies had supplied $700 million of materials and electrical equipment while also providing services to energy projects. Renewable generation also limits import demand by reducing the gas burned in power stations. Large projects depend heavily on decisions by the state. Procurement and land allocation affect who receives contracts. Grid access and investment approvals shape how quickly plants are completed. RFE/RL has documented concerns over opaque subcontracting in Uzbekistan’s solar sector. Its 2024 investigation found that two subcontractors on the Sherabad project were absent from publicly available documents. One company had been incorporated only two days after construction began. A founder denied accusations of corruption, while principal contractor Masdar did not respond to questions. The investigation did not establish that the...

AIFC Interview: Central Asia Investment, Middle Corridor and ESG

The Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) positions itself as a platform for international investment in Kazakhstan and across Central Asia. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Zhanbolat Kakishev, Chief Product Officer at the AIFC Authority, discussed competition for investment, financing for the Middle Corridor, investor protection, ESG, and currency risks. Kakishev said the AIFC ecosystem has attracted $26.3 billion in investment to Kazakhstan and registered more than 6,000 companies from 90 countries. TCA: How does the AIFC assess the current investment climate in Central Asia amid the fragmentation of global markets, and what share of foreign direct investment into the region does the centre aim to attract in the coming years? Zhanbolat Kakishev: We assess Central Asia’s investment climate as resilient and gradually strengthening despite the fragmentation of global markets. Moreover, the restructuring of global supply chains and investors’ search for new sources of growth are creating additional opportunities for the region. International investor interest in Central Asia already rests on a solid foundation. According to UNCTAD, by the end of 2025, the stock of foreign direct investment in the region had reached approximately $235.5 billion, of which $156.4 billion was in Kazakhstan. The region combines a substantial resource base, a growing domestic market, and a strategic position between Europe and Asia. It also has significant investment potential in areas including transport and logistics, energy, critical minerals, digitalisation, and financial services. The AIFC does not set a target in the form of a fixed share of total FDI flowing into Central Asia. Our task today is to continue improving the AIFC ecosystem, its infrastructure, and the conditions that allow international capital to enter Kazakhstan effectively, as well as to participate in regional projects. To date, $26.3 billion in investment has been attracted to Kazakhstan through the AIFC ecosystem. More than 6,000 companies from 90 countries are registered in the Centre’s jurisdiction. For us, however, it is not only the volume of capital attracted that matters, but also its quality — long-term investment that contributes to economic diversification, private-sector development, and the further integration of Kazakhstan and Central Asia into global capital markets. TCA: Given the growing interest in the Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, what investment instruments does the AIFC offer to finance major infrastructure and logistics projects in the region? Zhanbolat Kakishev: The AIFC provides comprehensive legal and financial infrastructure for structuring and attracting financing for major infrastructure and logistics projects, including those along the Middle Corridor. Depending on the structure of a project, special-purpose vehicles or companies (SPVs/SPCs), joint ventures, and investment funds can be used to pool capital from strategic, institutional, and private investors. Through the Astana International Exchange (AIX), projects can also raise debt and equity financing, including through conventional, green, and sustainability bonds, as well as Islamic finance instruments such as sukuk. For large infrastructure projects, the ability to combine different sources of capital is particularly important. These can include financing from international financial institutions and banks, funds from strategic...

After CPC Disruptions, Kazakhstan Wants to Refine More Oil at Home

Kazakhstan wants to more than double its oil refining capacity and sell more petrol and diesel to neighboring countries. The case for reducing its reliance on crude exports has gained urgency. Disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) this year have already forced the country to cut its 2026 oil production forecast by 2 million tonnes. Kazakhstan produced 99.6 million tonnes of oil in 2025 but refined only 18.4 million tonnes. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said at a briefing on August 25 that refining capacity is planned to increase to 40 million tonnes. “We want to bring this ratio, as in other developed countries that are also producers, to one to two or one to three,” Akkenzhenov said. According to him, Kazakhstan eventually expects to supply neighboring countries with motor fuel and expand its export potential. This does not mean abandoning crude oil exports: even after refining capacity reaches 40 million tonnes, a significant share of production will continue to be exported. Astana is instead seeking to shift the balance toward finished products. The oil refining industry development concept runs through 2040. According to the Energy Ministry, Kazakhstan’s refineries processed 18.4 million tonnes of oil in 2025 and produced 15.47 million tonnes of petroleum products. The concept adopted in 2025 envisaged refining rising to 39.2 million tonnes a year by 2040. The government has since accelerated the timetable, targeting 40 million tonnes of annual capacity by 2033. Average refining depth at the country’s three main refineries reached 90% in 2025 and is targeted to rise to 94%. To achieve this, Kazakhstan is preparing to build a fourth major refinery with capacity of up to 10 million tonnes a year. Possible locations include the Mangystau, Atyrau and Turkestan regions, as well as Ulytau, with the authorities expecting to select a site by the end of the year. The new plant could begin operating by 2033, with the Energy Ministry expecting its launch to fully cover domestic demand for jet fuel and allow Kazakhstan to expand exports of K5-standard petroleum products, broadly equivalent to Europe’s Euro 5 standard. Problems with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Kazakhstan’s main route for getting oil to the global market, have strengthened the case for diversifying the way Kazakhstan uses and exports its oil. The pipeline runs through Russia to a Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, meaning disruptions there can quickly affect production in Kazakhstan. On August 25, Akkenzhenov said the country’s oil production forecast for 2026 had been cut from 98 million to 96 million tonnes. He estimated production losses resulting from attacks on CPC infrastructure at around 3.5 million tonnes. The authorities are trying to compensate for part of the lost volumes by rescheduling major maintenance at large oil fields. Astana is also looking for additional routes to global markets. Akkenzhenov identified Baku-Supsa, the pipeline running from Azerbaijan to Georgia’s Black Sea coast, as one option, saying it could carry around 5 million tonnes a year. The route has seen only limited use since 2022, although...

What Building Central Asian Supply Chains Taught Me About AI

I took over spare-parts supply at BPK Auto in Ust-Kamenogorsk in the mid-2000s, at the age of 25, moving from selling cars. The company was the general dealer for VAZ in Kazakhstan, assembled Niva models in the city, and was taking on Skoda, Chevrolet, and Kia while building service centers across the country to meet the expectations of those brands for a dealer. My job was to keep parts flowing to all of it. Several thousand vehicles came through in a month, and a single car contains something like 50,000 separate part numbers. The service teams wanted as many of those as possible sitting on the shelves. From where they stood, that made sense, because they were judged on whether a mechanic could start a repair the same day, whether a customer complained, and an ISO audit was running over the service operation at the same time. From the procurement side, the arithmetic looked different. Some parts cost two or three thousand dollars and were fitted once or twice a year, and holding them across four model lines tied up a large share of the company's working capital. I built the forecast in spreadsheets and checked it against actual sales once the month closed in 1C. To run it, I needed the service side's own records: how many vehicles of each type they had seen, and what had been repaired. I asked for them for months. They would not release them. Some of that was habit; a warehouse full of everything being what a well-run operation had looked like for the previous 40 years. More of it sat in how the two departments were counted. My result was recorded the moment the parts moved into the service center. Theirs was recorded much later, when the car left the workshop. Nobody was measured by the number that would have made the forecast work. The forecasting was the straightforward part of that job. The difficult part was building an operation in which people shared the information behind the forecast and were expected to act on its findings. Why a Better Model Would Not Have Changed the Outcome Put one of today's AI demand-forecasting systems into that same warehouse and very little changes. The forecast would be far better than anything I produced by hand. It would still depend on service records that nobody was willing to release, and where records did exist, it would be reading entries written up at the end of a long shift. It could not grant the purchasing manager authority to reorder against it, nor could it alter the measures by which the service department was judged. Better intelligence does not repair the path between operational data and operational action. Every party you add to that path lengthens it. A distribution network across Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan can run from a manufacturer to over 45,000 small retail outlets, served through more than 18 distribution centers, with 1,391 field staff taking and checking orders on the ground. An order begins...