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Archaeology

Possible 2,200-Year-Old Greek Military Camp Found in Uzbekistan

Archaeologists in southern Uzbekistan may have identified an exceptionally rare Hellenistic military camp at a site previously thought to be a small rural settlement. Dating back around 2,200 years, Iskandar Tepa may have functioned as a temporary base for Greco-Bactrian troops and could be the first such camp identified in Central Asia. Alexander the Great conquered Bactria and Sogdiana in the late fourth century B.C., bringing Greek armies deep into Central Asia. After his empire fragmented, Greek-ruled states continued to control parts of the region for centuries. Iskandar Tepa is located in the Sherabad District of Surkhandarya Region, within the ancient borderlands between Bactria and Sogdiana. A Czech-Uzbek archaeological expedition identified the site in 2017. At first, it was interpreted as a Greco-Bactrian settlement, with later research suggesting it may have been a watch post. The mound had no known local name when archaeologists discovered it, so they gave it the working name Iskandar Tepa. Iskandar is the local form of Alexander, making the name equivalent to “Alexander’s Hill.” The latest research suggests the site had a different function altogether. Geophysical surveys and excavations indicate that Iskandar Tepa was probably occupied only briefly, perhaps as a temporary military camp. The findings were published in June 2026 in the Journal of Archaeological Science: Reports. The authors place the site in the Hellenistic period, while Archaeology Magazine dates the proposed military camp to the second century B.C. Iskandar Tepa’s layout supports the military interpretation. The site occupies a naturally protected hilltop. A perimeter ditch about 400 meters long enclosed an area of roughly 1.2 hectares and measured between 4 and 7 meters wide. However, researchers found little evidence of permanent buildings inside the enclosure. That combination is more consistent with a temporary fortified camp than with a permanent settlement. Coins associated with Hellenistic rulers help date the site. Considered alongside the site’s layout and other finds, the coins also support the interpretation that a military unit may once have occupied it. Supplying water to the people stationed there would have been a separate challenge. Archaeologists found large ceramic storage vessels, known as khums, buried in the ground. They also identified what appears to have been a canal, up to 1.1 meters wide, that carried water from several kilometers away. Researchers suggest that the vessels may have been used to store water for a temporary garrison. Geophysical surveys also revealed around 90 elongated pits. Many are interpreted as graves in a burial ground that developed after the main period of occupation at Iskandar Tepa or partly overlapped with it. Temporary military camps from the Hellenistic period are extremely difficult to identify archaeologically because, unlike cities and fortresses, they left relatively few permanent structures. Iskandar Tepa could therefore reveal another side of the Hellenistic presence in Central Asia by showing how relatively small military units stationed far from major urban centers secured water and monitored the surrounding territory. Southern Uzbekistan has also yielded evidence from a much earlier period. In 2025, researchers reported that...

Central Asia - Iran Relations

Opinion: Why Central Asia Cannot Afford to Abandon the Iranian Route

Kazakhstan had barely secured a foothold in Iran’s largest commercial port when renewed military escalation made the southern route risky again. The problem for Central Asia is that Iran is more than a trading partner. For a region without direct access to the open sea, it provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The agreement allocates two years for construction and the following 25 for operation. Astana expects the terminal to provide more direct access to markets in the Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The project almost immediately found itself in a different reality. In July, U.S. strikes hit Iranian railway and coastal infrastructure. The Aq Taqeh Khan bridge on a rail route connecting Iran with Turkmenistan and, further north, with Kazakhstan, was damaged. There was no confirmed halt to Central Asian freight traffic, but military risk was no longer an abstract concern for carriers. That risk has now been compounded by a new U.S. sanctions campaign. On August 24, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent launched what Washington calls Operation Economic Outcast, combining direct sanctions with pressure on Iran’s foreign economic partners. The United States said it would set timelines for other countries to shut down economic activity with Iran, while the scope of secondary sanctions was expanded to cover five areas: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping. Nearly 60 Iran-linked individuals, entities, and vessels were also sanctioned. The United States has not publicly identified which countries could face penalties first. War and sanctions can make the Iranian route more expensive, slower, and more dangerous. They cannot change geography. Iran gives Central Asia overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. From Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, cargo can move onward toward India, the Gulf states, and East Africa. Iran also provides a western overland route toward Turkey. This is one of the fundamental differences between the Iranian route and the Middle Corridor, which crosses the Caspian Sea before continuing through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor requires cargo to move between rail and maritime transport. Iran offers the possibility of a continuous overland chain while also providing access to ports connected to the Indian Ocean. For Kazakhstan, the southern route is already more than a plan. Trade with Iran increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor reached 3.5 million tons, while rail traffic between Kazakhstan and Iran increased by 69%. It is this expanding transport network that is now exposed to greater military and sanctions risks. There is another factor. A free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, entered into force on May 15, 2025. It significantly reduced tariff barriers to trade in goods between the two sides. Uzbekistan offers...

Fuel Prices

Kyrgyzstan Extends Fuel Subsidies Amid Russian Supply Disruptions

Kyrgyzstan has extended subsidies for fuel importers through the end of 2026. Bishkek is trying to contain prices at the pump as problems in the Russian fuel market push traders to seek supplies elsewhere and make domestic refining more important. On August 26, the Cabinet of Ministers extended a temporary fuel subsidy scheme through December 31.Under the scheme, the state covers part of eligible importers’ fuel and transportation costs when the total exceeds a fixed threshold. The government also raised those fixed prices: from $860 to $960 per metric ton for AI-92 gasoline, from $950 to $1,050 for diesel, and from $575 to $650 for automotive liquefied petroleum gas. The change means importers must now absorb more of the cost themselves before receiving a subsidy. AI-92 is a lower-octane gasoline broadly comparable to regular fuel in the United States. AI-95, closer to the standard unleaded gasoline sold across much of Europe, was included in the original subsidy mechanism introduced in late May, but has now been removed from both the subsidy program and temporary price regulation. The extension keeps government support in place for another three months. On August 25, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Adylbek Kasymaliev said the government had allocated 956.1 million soms, or about $11.4 million, in subsidies to companies importing petroleum products. Kyrgyzstan receives more than 90% of its imported fuel from Russia, where Ukrainian drone attacks and refinery outages have reduced available supplies. Shortages have also emerged on the Russian domestic market, prompting Moscow to tighten restrictions on fuel exports, although supplies under intergovernmental agreements, including Russia’s agreement with Kyrgyzstan, are exempt. On August 25, Reuters, citing three industry sources, reported that Russia was set to extend its ban on diesel exports by producers through September as shortages persisted and several refineries remained idle following repeated Ukrainian drone attacks. Kyrgyzstan felt the effects relatively quickly. Gasoline and diesel prices rose, while some filling stations experienced shortages of AI-95 gasoline, even as the more widely used AI-92 remained available. Fuel traders have already begun buying from farther afield. China is emerging as an alternative source of supply. After talks with Sinopec, a Kyrgyz delegation met with state-owned CNPC on August 19. The discussions focused on procedures for supplying petroleum products to Kyrgyzstan through CNPC-affiliated Kunlun Logistics. Following the talks, Kyrgyz companies signed contracts with CNPC for petroleum product supplies, although volumes, prices, and delivery schedules were not publicly disclosed. The fuel squeeze has also made an existing effort to refine more oil domestically more important. The modernization of the Junda refinery is not a new response to the current shortages: the $193.75 million project was already underway earlier this year and had previously been scheduled for completion by July 31. On August 25, the National Investment Agency signed an additional agreement with Central Asia Energy Company allowing the next stage of modernization of the Junda refinery in Kara-Balta, the country’s largest, to begin. The latest announcement did not give a new completion date. The project...

SCO Summit

Xi Jinping Heads to Bishkek as Kyrgyzstan Prepares to Host 21 Heads of State

Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek and make a state visit to Kyrgyzstan, Beijing has confirmed. The trip, which also includes a state visit to Egypt, will run from August 30 to September 3. The formal meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State is scheduled for September 1. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in Kyrgyzstan during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. Xi had long been expected to be among the leaders traveling to the Kyrgyz capital, but the formal confirmation turns attention from the guest list to the business that may be conducted around the main session. For Kyrgyzstan, the most consequential part of the visit may come in Xi's talks with President Sadyr Japarov rather than in the summit hall. The Times of Central Asia will be reporting from Bishkek as the delegations arrive, and from the opening ceremony of the World Nomad Games on August 31. Several visiting heads of state are expected to attend the ceremony, which will bring summit diplomacy and Kyrgyzstan’s biggest cultural showcase together on the eve of the SCO meeting. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has already confirmed that he will be there. The spectacle will be considerable, but the substance is likely to emerge in the bilateral meetings, signed agreements, and final documents released around the September 1 summit. The State Visit and the Railway The state visit format gives Xi and Japarov a bilateral program alongside the summit. The most prominent economic issue is likely to be the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, a project discussed for decades that is now under construction across some of Kyrgyzstan's most difficult terrain. The Kyrgyz authorities put the railway’s construction cost at about $4.7 billion. China holds 51% of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Company LLC, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. Roughly half of the cost is being financed through a 35-year Chinese loan to the company. The summit could bring clearer evidence of how quickly construction is progressing. Any new financing, contracts, or cross-border arrangements would be more significant than another general statement of political support. The railway also places Kyrgyzstan inside a larger shift in regional trade. Commerce between China and the five Central Asian states passed $100 billion in 2025. Bishkek wants a larger share of that traffic and more of the value created along transit routes. Xi's visit offers Japarov an opportunity to press the case for logistics hubs, local employment and supporting roads rather than transit alone. The Documents Behind the Ceremony The SCO's national coordinators have been finalizing the outcome documents in the weeks leading up to the summit. Under Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, the SCO has emphasized regional stability and economic cooperation, alongside digital transformation, cyber threats, environmental policy, and cultural exchange. SCO decisions require consensus, which tends to soften disagreements in final communiqués. Any agreements that specify funding, deadlines, or responsibility would give the Bishkek package more weight. Bilateral Meetings Around the Summit The summit will bring...

Fuel Crisis

Russia Fuel Crisis Pushes Central Asia to Seek Alternatives

Disruptions at Russian oil refineries are beginning to reshape Central Asia’s established fuel supply routes. Kyrgyzstan is arranging supplies from China; Tajikistan has requested large volumes of crude oil and fuel from Iran, while Kazakhstan plans to more than double its refining capacity and eventually sell more petroleum products to its neighbors. Kyrgyzstan: The China Route Becomes a Real Option Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have felt the impact of Russia’s disruptions more acutely than other Central Asian countries. Both have limited domestic oil production and depend heavily on imported fuel. Galiya Ibragimova, a Central Asia expert with Carnegie Politika, told Al Jazeera that the two countries had been hit hardest in the region and said the search for new suppliers would continue, although alternative fuel would most likely be more expensive. For Kyrgyzstan, the Russian supply model had long been the most convenient. As a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Kyrgyzstan can import agreed quantities of Russian fuel duty-free each year. For 2026, Moscow has agreed to supply around 1.5 million tonnes – roughly equivalent to Kyrgyzstan’s total annual demand for petroleum products. More than 90% of Kyrgyzstan's imported fuel comes from Russia. This summer, that system began to falter. On August 12, Kanatbek Eshatov, head of Kyrgyzstan’s Oil Traders Association, said Russian refineries were offering virtually no additional volumes. Fuel was already arriving from Belarus, Azerbaijan, Turkey, one European country, and other markets. Eshatov did not expect the situation with Russian supplies to improve before October. Bishkek has also negotiated directly with China’s largest oil companies. Following talks with Sinopec, a Kyrgyz delegation met CNPC management on August 19. Kyrgyz companies signed contracts with CNPC for petroleum product supplies through Kunlun Logistics, according to Kyrgyz state news agency Kabar. Volumes and prices have not been disclosed. China is unlikely to displace Russia quickly on price. There is no direct rail connection between China and Kyrgyzstan, while road transport across the mountainous border is more expensive. But direct contacts with Sinopec and CNPC are giving Kyrgyz traders a supply channel that until recently was barely used. Another option is to refine more oil domestically. The country’s largest refinery, Junda in Kara-Balta, is moving to the next stage of a modernization project valued at $193.75 million. The plant is expected to increase petroleum product output and move to Euro 5 fuel standards. Kyrgyzstan does not produce enough crude to keep the refinery running at capacity, however, so it would still need to import much of the oil it refines. Bishkek is therefore keeping Russian finished fuel [bit technical] in the mix while purchasing petroleum products from other markets. It is also looking to refine imported crude domestically. Tajikistan: Iranian Crude Rather Than Just Another Gasoline Supplier Dushanbe has chosen a larger-scale option. During talks with Iran, Tajikistan requested 2.55 million tonnes of crude oil and petroleum products: 2 million tonnes of crude, 300,000 tonnes of diesel, 150,000 tonnes of gasoline, and 100,000 tonnes of jet fuel. Tajikistan’s Transport Ministry announced the...

GDP Forecast

Kazakhstan Forecasts GDP Growth Above 5% in 2027–2029

Kazakhstan’s government has approved a socioeconomic development forecast and draft republican budget for 2027–2029, projecting average annual real GDP growth above 5% as manufacturing, agriculture, construction, transport, and other non-oil sectors expand. The forecast was prepared with reference to the global economic outlook and conditions in external markets. The accompanying draft budget, approved at the same government meeting chaired by Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov, will be submitted to the Kurultai for consideration. Under the government’s baseline scenario, real GDP is projected to grow by 5.3% in 2027, 5.5% in 2028, and 5.4% in 2029. Nominal GDP is expected to rise from KZT 199.3 trillion in 2027 to KZT 245 trillion in 2029, an increase of almost 23%. Non-oil sectors are expected to provide the main impetus for expansion. Manufacturing output is forecast to grow by an average of 5.9% a year, substantially faster than the 2% projected for mining. Metallurgy, mechanical engineering, construction materials, chemicals, and food production are expected to make the largest contributions. Oil exports and the broader mining sector will remain central to the economy and public finances, but the forecast assumes that manufacturing and other non-oil activities will account for a larger share of new output. TCA reported in July that Kazakhstan’s economy expanded by 4.1% in the first half of 2026 despite an 8.4% decline in oil production. The non-oil economy grew by more than 5%, with manufacturing, construction, trade, and transport accounting for more than 80% of overall growth. Manufacturing output increased by 9.8%. Agriculture is expected to expand by at least 5% annually. Construction is projected to remain among the fastest-growing sectors, increasing by 16% in 2027 and 17.3% in 2029. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin said the expansion would be supported by transport and logistics, energy, and water projects, together with the modernization of housing, utilities, and social infrastructure. The services sector is also expected to maintain strong momentum. Trade is forecast to expand by an average of 5.7% annually, information and communications by 9.2%, and transport and warehousing by 10.4%. The transport forecast builds on rapid expansion along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor. Annual freight volumes through Kazakhstan have risen from 0.8 million to 4.5 million tons over seven years, while delivery times fell from approximately 28–32 days to 13–17 days. The route still carries substantially less cargo than established northern corridors, and participating countries continue to work on remaining bottlenecks. Infrastructure spending is a central element of the draft budget, but Bektenov said it must be accompanied by stronger financial discipline. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s instructions, accelerated construction of infrastructure and social facilities has been designated as a principal budget priority. Government bodies were told to meet the approved economic targets, while administrators of budget programs were directed to increase the return on every tenge spent. The headline budget deficit is forecast to fall from 2.3% of GDP in 2027 to just 0.4% in 2029. However, the non-oil deficit, which measures the...