Kazakhstan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...

Perceptions

Opinion: Central Asia Through Western Eyes – Misconceptions Among Young People

Do you know where Kazakhstan is? Although the question is straightforward, it often causes hesitation on a university campus in Washington, D.C. Some students gesture uncertainly toward Eastern Europe. Others guess the Middle East. Some admit they have never heard of it, often with a nervous laugh. Central Asia remains one of the least understood parts of the world for many young people in the West. It is often defined more by pop culture, history, and imagination than by its diverse reality. “I honestly thought Kazakhstan was somewhere near Afghanistan,” said Michael, a student from Georgetown University. “I didn’t realize it was its own region.” Such knowledge gaps are not unusual. Central Asia is rarely mentioned in Western education systems or media coverage, despite its size, strategic significance, and rich cultural heritage. As a result, assumptions often take the place of understanding and tend to follow similar patterns, which over time may shape Western attitudes toward the region. A Region Reduced to Stereotypes When Western students are asked what comes to mind when they think about Central Asia, their responses often follow a familiar pattern: deserts, nomads, the Soviet Union, and sometimes confusion with other regions. Emily, a student from American University, remarked, “I picture a lot of sand and heat, and perhaps those who ride horses?” Although this image is partial, it is not entirely inaccurate, as the region’s customs and natural surroundings do contribute to its character. However, contemporary cities, academic institutions, businesses, and the region’s cultural diversity are largely absent from these perceptions. Perceptions have also been shaped by pop culture. For some, Kazakhstan is associated less with geography or history than with Borat, the fictional journalist from a Hollywood comedy. Despite being widely recognized as satire, the persona has nevertheless made a lasting impression on viewers unfamiliar with the region. As Sacha Baron Cohen explained, Kazakhstan was chosen precisely because it was largely unknown to Western audiences. According to his explanation, he selected the country because “no one had heard anything about it,” making it a blank canvas onto which Western attitudes about backwardness could be projected. None of the scenes depicting Borat’s “home village” were filmed in Kazakhstan; they were shot in rural Romania. The language Borat speaks is not Kazakh, and the customs he describes bear no relation to everyday life in Kazakhstan. Daniel, a student from George Mason University, asked, half-jokingly, “Is that where Borat is from?” These examples illustrate how humor and media can fill gaps in knowledge. When Kazakhstan first appeared in popular Western media, it was often portrayed through harsh stereotypes, introducing global audiences to a country still defining its image. Between Curiosity and Ignorance However, alongside these misconceptions, there is also genuine interest. “I had no idea it was so multicultural,” said Emma, a student from American University. “We never really learned about it.” This response points to a broader issue: Central Asia is often misunderstood not only because of misinformation, but because of its limited visibility in the...

Islamic State – Khorasan

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

Constitution

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Referendum – Strategic Reset or Institutional Consolidation?

Kazakhstan will hold a nationwide referendum on March 15 to adopt an entirely new constitution – an initiative President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev describes as a decisive break from the country’s super-presidential legacy. The draft, published on February 12 after deliberations by a Constitutional Commission, proposes far-reaching institutional reforms. Among the most notable changes are the replacement of the bicameral parliament with a unicameral body known as the Kurultai; the reinstatement of a vice presidency; and the constitutionalization of commitments to digital transformation, economic modernization, and strengthened sovereignty. The government presents the reform as a necessary modernization of the state in response to global turbulence. Yet the scope and timing of the proposal indicate that the referendum is as much about strategic recalibration as it is about institutional redesign. The Accelerated Timeline The speed of the process has drawn considerable attention. In September 2025, Tokayev advised against rushing constitutional reform and suggested that 2027 would allow sufficient time for public consultation. However, by February 2026, the referendum had been scheduled for mid-March. This abrupt shift suggests a deliberate political calculation rather than simple administrative urgency. One factor under discussion is the legal effect of adopting a wholly new constitution. While reforms in 2022 limited presidents to a single seven-year term, the introduction of a new constitutional order could create ambiguity regarding the continuity of those limits. Even if not explicitly intended as a reset mechanism, such a transformation inevitably introduces flexibility into questions of tenure and succession. Geopolitical pressures also help explain the acceleration. Tokayev has pointed to profound changes in global trade, security alignments, and technological competition. In a world increasingly shaped by sanctions regimes and geoeconomic fragmentation, Kazakhstan seeks to project institutional coherence and responsiveness. Constitutional reform, in this sense, becomes a signal of adaptive capacity. At the same time, the draft completes the political transition that began after the unrest of January 2022. Although earlier amendments removed former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s constitutional privileges, the 1995 framework remained largely intact. The new proposal replaces that structure altogether, extinguishing residual legal ties to the Nazarbayev era and consolidating a distinct political phase under Tokayev’s leadership. Sovereignty as Constitutional Doctrine A defining feature of the draft is the elevation of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and the unitary nature of the state to foundational, effectively immutable principles. This language carries clear geopolitical resonance, particularly in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Kazakhstan continues to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, the constitutional entrenchment of territorial integrity reinforces the state’s insistence on inviolable borders. The draft also expands restrictions on foreign financing of political parties and introduces stricter transparency rules for foreign-funded non-governmental organizations. These provisions reflect a doctrine of symmetrical distance: limiting political influence from any external actor, whether Russia, Western governments, or other international stakeholders. The emphasis is not ideological alignment but institutional insulation. Language and Identity: Managed Ambiguity The most domestically sensitive amendment concerns the status of Russian. The draft alters the phrasing from Russian being used “on an equal...

Afghanistan

Opinion: Afghanistan and Central Asia – Security Without Illusions

Over the past year, Afghanistan has become neither markedly more stable nor dramatically more dangerous, despite how it is often portrayed in public discourse. There has been neither the collapse that many feared, nor the breakthrough that some had hoped for. Instead, a relatively unchanged but fragile status quo has persisted, one that Central Asian countries confront daily. For the C5 countries, Afghanistan is increasingly less a topic of speculative discussion and more a persistent factor in their immediate reality. It is no longer just an object of foreign policy, but a constant variable impacting security, trade, humanitarian issues, and regional stability. As such, many of last year’s forecasts have become outdated, based as they were on assumptions of dramatic change, whereas the reality has proven far more inertial. Illusion #1: Afghanistan Can Be Ignored The belief that Afghanistan can be temporarily “put on the back burner” is rooted in the assumption that a lack of public dialogue or political statements equates to a lack of interaction. But the actions of Central Asian states show that ignoring Afghanistan is not a viable option, even when countries intentionally avoid politicizing relations. Turkmenistan offers a clear example. Ashgabat has maintained stable trade, economic, and infrastructure ties with Afghanistan for years, all with minimal foreign policy rhetoric. Energy supplies, cross-border trade, and logistical cooperation have continued despite political and financial constraints, and regardless of international debates over the legitimacy of the Afghan authorities. This quiet pragmatism stands in contrast to both isolationist strategies and symbolic or ideological engagement. Turkmenistan may avoid making public declarations about its relationship with Afghanistan, but it nonetheless maintains robust cooperation. This calculated calmness reduces risks without signaling disengagement. Importantly, this approach does not eliminate structural asymmetries or deeper vulnerabilities. But it dispels the illusion that distancing reduces risk. On the contrary, sustained economic and logistical ties foster predictability, without which attempts to “ignore” a neighboring country become a form of strategic blindness. In this sense, Turkmenistan’s experience affirms a broader regional truth: Afghanistan cannot be removed from Central Asia’s geopolitical equation by simply looking away. It must be engaged pragmatically or dealt with later, in potentially more destabilizing forms. Illusion #2: Security Is Achieved Through Isolation Closely related to the first is the illusion that security can be ensured by building walls. Security in Afghanistan, and in the broader Afghan-Pakistani zone, is often seen as an external issue, something that can be kept out by sealing borders or minimizing engagement. Yet in practice, security is determined less by geography and more by the nature of involvement. This is reflected in the recent decision by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to participate in U.S. President Donald Trump's “Board of Peace” initiative. While the initiative focuses on resolving crises outside Central Asia, both countries have framed their participation as essential to their own national and regional security interests. As Abdulaziz Kamilov, advisor to the President of Uzbekistan, explained, Tashkent’s involvement stems from three factors: its own security needs, its foreign policy principles,...

Pakistan

Opinion: The New Silk Road to the Sea – Connecting Central Asia to Karachi and Gwadar

A historic shift is quietly but decisively reshaping the economic geography of Eurasia. On 5 February 2026, Pakistan and Kazakhstan agreed to elevate their bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership during the state visit of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Pakistan— the first such visit by a Kazakh head of state in 23 years. This moment marked far more than a diplomatic renewal; it signaled a potential turning point in regional connectivity, one that could unlock long-suppressed economic potential across Central Asia and South Asia by overcoming longstanding geographical and logistical barriers. For decades, Central Asia’s landlocked status has imposed structural constraints on its economic growth. High transit costs, dependence on distant or politically sensitive routes, and extended distances to global markets have eroded competitiveness and limited diversification. These challenges were not the result of a lack of resources or ambition, but of geography itself. However, geography need no longer be destiny. Through strategic foresight—particularly under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev—Kazakhstan and the wider Central Asian region have begun to convert constraint into opportunity by redefining connectivity. President Tokayev has consistently emphasized connectivity as the cornerstone of Kazakhstan’s long-term economic and strategic vision. During his engagements with Pakistan’s leadership, he demonstrated a clear understanding that sustainable prosperity for Central Asia depends on reliable, cost-effective access to warm-water ports. This conviction underpinned the decision to elevate Pakistan–Kazakhstan relations to a Strategic Partnership, recognizing Pakistan not merely as a bilateral partner, but as a gateway to global markets via the Arabian Sea. From a financial and logistical perspective, the implications are profound. Karachi and Gwadar are among the closest seaports to much of Central Asia, significantly closer than many traditional routes to global markets. Every additional kilometer of overland transit results in higher freight costs, longer delivery times, and reduced margins. By connecting Central Asia to Pakistani ports, Kazakhstan and its neighbors stand to substantially lower transportation costs, enhance export competitiveness, and attract greater foreign investment into manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and value-added industries. The most immediate and strategically sound connectivity model emerging from this partnership bypasses the troubled terrain of Afghanistan, long viewed as a chokepoint for regional trade. Under this framework, goods could move seamlessly from Karachi through Pakistan’s railway network to Haripur, then onward via the Karakoram Highway into China. From there, the cargo would seamlessly integrate with the China–Kazakhstan railway system through the established Dostyk–Alashankou corridor. This route is not theoretical; it builds on existing infrastructure, proven logistics, and political stability across all participating states. Financially, this corridor offers predictability—an essential ingredient for trade and investment. Reduced insurance premiums, fewer delays, and stable regulatory environments translate into lower transaction costs. For Central Asian exporters, particularly Kazakhstan, this means improved access to South Asian, Middle Eastern, and African markets. For Pakistan, it positions Karachi and Gwadar as indispensable nodes in Eurasian supply chains, generating port revenues, transit earnings, employment, and industrial growth. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s leadership has demonstrated pragmatic flexibility by supporting additional connectivity options. Regional discussions have included the possibility...