• KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00210
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 395

Opinion: The Amu Darya Stress Test – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Politics of Agricultural Adaptation

Central Asia’s water crisis is usually discussed as a problem of rivers, reservoirs, and diplomacy. But in 2026, the Amu Darya is also becoming something else: a test of state adaptation. The river basin entered the irrigation season under acute pressure. According to data cited by Kabar, the flow of the Amu Darya stood at only 66.8% of its normal level as of February 11, compared with 101.8% a year earlier. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the river’s flow could fall to around 65% of its historical norm, raising risks for food security and agriculture across downstream states. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal is advancing. The canal, one of the Taliban government’s most ambitious infrastructure projects, is designed to divert water from the Amu Darya to irrigate large areas of northern Afghanistan. Carnegie Politika has estimated that, once fully operational by 2028, it could take up to 10 cubic kilometers of water annually from the river. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the implications are direct. Both rely heavily on Amu Darya water. Both inherited agricultural systems shaped by Soviet-era irrigation, cotton production, and centralized planning, and both are now facing a combination of climate stress, upstream extraction, and aging water infrastructure. Yet their responses are increasingly different. The emerging contrast is not simply between two agricultural policies; it is between two institutional logics: adaptation and control. Uzbekistan’s Adjustment Strategy Uzbekistan is one of the most exposed countries in the region. Its population is large, its agriculture remains water-intensive, and some of its most vulnerable regions, including Khorezm and Karakalpakstan, sit near the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. For decades, the old model relied on large-scale irrigation, cotton, rice, and the assumption that water would continue to move through the regional system much as it had before. That assumption is now weakening. Tashkent’s response remains costly and far from complete. Uzbekistan still faces serious water losses, degraded land, salinization, and uneven implementation of reform. But the direction of travel is visible: the state is trying to reduce exposure by changing crops, infrastructure, and diplomatic behavior. Rice is one example. Traditional flooded rice cultivation is extremely water-intensive, and water shortages have already pushed some Uzbek rice farmers away from traditional Amu Darya regions toward areas with more stable access to water. Uzbekistan has also begun experimenting with less water-intensive methods. In Karakalpakstan, UNDP has supported the introduction of upland rice, which can reduce water consumption by up to 40% compared with traditional rice cultivation. Separately, Uzbekistan has announced plans to expand resource-efficient rice cultivation, including drip irrigation and drought-resilient rice varieties. The state is no longer treating the old water-intensive model as untouchable. In 2026, Uzbekistan allocated significant public financing for water-saving technologies. Government-linked reporting has described plans to expand drip irrigation, sprinkler systems, and laser land leveling across hundreds of thousands of hectares, with a broader target of expanding water-saving technologies to 3.5 million hectares by 2028. Laser leveling may sound technical, but its use reflects a shift from simply demanding more...

Turkmenistan’s Digital Push Gains Ground Despite Tight Internet Controls

Turkmenistan remains one of the world's most tightly controlled online environments. Yet its state services portal now advertises more than 500 services, the country has more than 100,000 registered mobile-banking users, and the flagship city of Arkadag has launched a 5G network. The figures are official or state-linked and difficult to verify, and the scale remains modest by regional standards. Taken together, however, they point to a shift: digitalization is beginning to move beyond government rhetoric and into everyday administrative and financial life. A Shift That Is Hard to Measure Turkmenistan's digital transition is difficult to quantify. Official statistics are incomplete and independent checks are rare. That makes smaller, observable indicators - portal use, mobile-banking registrations, network launches, and infrastructure projects - especially useful. According to DataReportal, Turkmenistan had 3.53 million internet users in October 2025, equivalent to 46.1% of the population. Using the same source, internet access stood at 93.4% in Kazakhstan and 89.0% in Uzbekistan. Other estimates put Turkmenistan's rate lower, underscoring the uncertainty around even basic connectivity data. DataReportal also counted 5.24 million active cellular connections, representing 68.5% of the population, although a connection does not necessarily include mobile internet access. Social media use remains far more limited: the same report estimated 388,000 social media user identities in October 2025, or 5.1% of the population. Those figures coexist with severe controls. Human Rights Watch said in its World Report 2026 that internet access remains tightly controlled. The authorities have also seized and dismantled Starlink equipment and intensified internet blocking. However, targeted infrastructure projects are moving ahead. The 5G network launched in Arkadag in 2025 was implemented with Huawei and the Ministry of Communications and, according to official accounts, is intended mainly to support smart-city systems. The ministry says it is also developing a fiber-optic route toward Herat and a submarine cable with Azerbaijan to add international links and transit capacity. E-Government Moves Beyond the Legal Framework Turkmenistan launched its unified public services portal, e.gov.tm, in 2019. The Law 'On Electronic Government' came into force in July 2022, formally setting out how public bodies could provide services through information and communication technologies and exchange data electronically. The portal is available through a website and Android and iOS apps. It allows users to pay utility, communications, and education fees, book tickets, join the electronic queue for migration services, and submit applications to government agencies. Published service counts vary sharply. In April 2025, Orient referred to 46 services; in March 2026, the same publication said the portal offered more than 500. The reports do not explain the rise, but the larger figure appears to use a broader definition that includes informational pages and other functions, not only fully interactive services. In October 2025, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov approved the Concept for the Development of the Digital Economy for 2026-2028. A state program and implementation plan followed in January 2026. The documents call for wider use of digital systems across government and the economy, while separate work with the United Nations Development...

19th Century Photographs of Central Asia on Display in Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan’s Museum of Fine Arts is showcasing the work of Paul Nadar, a French photographer who documented daily life, ancient ruins and a Russian imperial railway during a three-month trip in Central Asia in the late 19th century. People in traditional dress are seen in some of the photos in the museum exhibition, offering a glimpse of local society at a time when much of Central Asia was unfamiliar to many in Western Europe. One image shows a solitary figure beside the railway in the Karakum Desert, an expanse that covers much of modern Turkmenistan. Others depict people on horseback. Simple dwellings and a railway bridge over water are shown. There are also photos of the ruins of a mosque, mausoleums, the citadel gate and other places in Merv, an oasis city on the Silk Road whose history stretches back several thousand years. Today, the remnants of Merv are in Turkmenistan and are on UNESCO’s world heritage list. Paul Nadar, son of a prominent photographer widely known by the pseudonym Nadar, traveled in the region in 1890, according to the exhibition titled “Journey Through Turkmen Lands.” “He was gathering materials for the First International Exhibition dedicated to the development of the Trans-Caspian Railway, which was scheduled to open in Tashkent,” reported Turkmenistan: Golden Age, a state media outlet. At that time, the publication said, the railway “symbolized modernization and the opening of Central Asia to Europe.” The railway primarily served Russian imperial interests. The Russian military built it in the late 19th century as it solidified control in Central Asia, roughly following old Silk Road trade routes. Today, those routes are the basis for east-west transport channels associated with the developing Middle Corridor network. Paul Nadar used Kodak and Nadar Express Détective instant cameras to take over 1,800 photographs during his trip in the Turkistan region of the Russian empire, in what are today Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, according to the Getty philanthropic institution, which has an album of photos from the trip. It said photos from Nadar’s journey were shown not only at the Tashkent exhibition in 1890, but also at several World’s Fairs during that decade. The images were available for purchase at Nadar’s studio in Paris, Getty said. The photo exhibition in Ashgabat, which includes only a portion of Nadar’s work in Central Asia, opened last week and runs until June 23. It was organized with the help of the French embassy and cultural center in Ashgabat.

U.S.-Iran Framework Could Reopen Central Asia’s Southern Route

The United States and Iran said on June 15 that they had reached a framework to end their war, halt the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports, and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The sides said a memorandum of understanding could be signed on June 19 in Switzerland. The exact terms were not immediately known, with Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief left for later talks. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said the pact called for “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” Trump posted, on Truth Social, “Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” Brent crude fell by more than 4% in early trading, and Asian stock markets advanced. Reuters later said shippers remained cautious after one LNG tanker passed through Hormuz on June 15. A reopened strait would not restore normal traffic immediately, with freight flows depending on mine clearance, insurance rules, port inspections, and shipping guidance for vessels entering the area. Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian state to publicly welcome the latest announcement. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev praised the political will of the parties, saying they had helped “restore trust and mutually acceptable solutions.” Azerbaijan also issued a supporting statement praising Pakistan’s mediation and saying further talks could support “lasting peace and stability.” Central Asian governments had previously welcomed the U.S.-Iran ceasefire in April, with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan calling for de-escalation and diplomacy. For Central Asia, oil prices are only part of the story. The larger question is whether de-escalation can reopen practical access to southern trade routes, ports, and markets beyond the Caspian. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the region has paid closer attention to alternatives to routes through Russia. Iran offers one of its shortest paths to the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, Türkiye, and India. But sanctions, banking risk, war insurance, and U.S. policy shifts have kept that path fragile. Chabahar is the clearest example. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year contract with Iran to develop and operate the port on the Gulf of Oman. India’s shipping minister, Sarbananda Sonowal, called Chabahar “a vital trade artery connecting India with Afghanistan and Central Asian Countries.” The port allows Indian cargo to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia without crossing Pakistan, and gives Central Asian exporters another route toward India and the Indian Ocean. The sanctions picture remains uncertain. On October 30, 2025, Washington granted India a six-month waiver that allowed operations at Chabahar to continue. No public replacement had been announced by June 15. The new framework could make another waiver easier to justify, but banks and insurers will wait for signed text, U.S. guidance, and proof that Hormuz and Iranian ports are safe. Reuters cited a senior Iranian official who said the draft framework included no new U.S. sanctions before a final deal, a temporary oil sanctions waiver, and the release of $25 billion in frozen Iranian assets. The same source said Iran would refrain from further enrichment and...

ILO Reports Rise in Child Labor in Turkmenistan’s Cotton Fields

The International Labour Organization has reported a rise in child labor during Turkmenistan’s 2025 cotton harvest, despite improvements in some working conditions and continued cooperation with the government. The findings were published in the ILO’s second consecutive assessment of labor conditions during the country’s cotton campaign. The monitoring mission was conducted between August 28 and November 4, 2025, across all five regions of Turkmenistan. Observers interviewed 1,611 cotton pickers, 458 farmers, and 1,415 public-sector employees, as well as local officials and farm managers. Children were not interviewed for safety reasons, meaning conclusions regarding child labor were based on direct observations by monitors and testimony from adult respondents. One of the report’s most significant findings was a sharp increase in reports and observations of children in cotton fields. The share of cotton pickers reporting the presence of children in the fields rose to 20% in 2025 from 11% a year earlier. Among public-sector employees surveyed, the figure increased from 14% to 18%, while among farmers it rose from 17% to 34%. ILO monitors themselves encountered children during 38% of field visits, compared with 23% in the previous year’s assessment. The highest incidence was recorded in Dashoguz Region, where children were observed on 59% of surveyed fields. Comparable figures were 41% in Mary Region, 28% in Lebap Region and 25% in Ahal Region. The report also documented increased interference by local officials in monitoring activities. Attempts to influence inspections were recorded during 35% of field visits in 2025, up from 23% in 2024. Interference was also reported during 34% of inspections involving public institutions. In Dashoguz Region, officials were present during interviews with public-sector employees in 62% of cases, according to the report. The use of public-sector workers during the cotton harvest also continued. Twelve percent of surveyed government employees said they participated in cotton picking, while around one in five of those respondents said they had been sent to the fields by employers, officials, or farming associations. Fifteen percent of farmers reported seeing public-sector employees or military personnel working in the fields. The report found that concerns about negative consequences for refusing cotton work also increased. Fifteen percent of pickers reported fearing repercussions, compared with 12% a year earlier. Nearly one-quarter of surveyed public-sector employees expressed similar concerns. Respondents cited fears of losing social benefits, employment, income, or social standing within their communities. Meanwhile, the ILO reported improvements in several labor indicators. The share of workers earning below the official minimum wage fell from 29% to 13%, while average pay increased from 4.6 cents to 4.9 cents per kilogram of cotton harvested. Access to drinking water and food also improved. However, significant challenges remain. Only 7% of cotton pickers had written employment contracts, down from 22% in 2024. More than half of workers lacked at least one required piece of protective equipment, while 11% reported health problems during the harvest. The ILO noted that cooperation with the Turkmen government has resulted in some reforms, including amendments to the Labor Code that...

From Culture to Critical Minerals: C5+1 Opens Busy U.S. Week in Central Asia

The United States and Central Asia moved another part of the C5+1 agenda into a working-level form on June 5, when culture officials from the five Central Asian states and Washington met in Tashkent. The meeting came just days before a separate C5+1 critical minerals session in Astana, giving the week a wider agenda: cultural heritage, public diplomacy, mining, investment, and supply chains are now moving forward in the same regional format. The Tashkent meeting brought together Uzbekistan's Minister of Culture Ozodbek Nazarbekov, Kazakhstan's Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balayeva, Kyrgyzstan's Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy Mirbek Mambetaliev, Tajikistan's Minister of Culture Matluba Sattoriyon, Turkmenistan's Deputy Minister of Culture Gurbanmurad Miradaliev, and Sarah Rogers, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The agenda covered cultural and humanitarian cooperation, joint cultural projects, creative exchanges, and the protection and promotion of cultural heritage. Participants discussed a permanent C5+1 Working Group on Culture, a C5+1 Culture and Innovation Forum, closer cooperation in the creative industries, and more places for Central Asian cultural professionals in U.S. education and exchange programs. Uzbekistan also proposed joint English for Culture centers with U.S. partners at cultural education institutions. In practical terms, that could mean joint training for museum staff, touring exhibitions, film and music exchanges, English-language programs for curators and cultural managers, and U.S.-backed workshops for people working in heritage, tourism, and the creative industries. For Uzbekistan, the proposed centers would give the agenda a physical base inside cultural education institutions rather than leaving it at the level of declarations. The meeting ended with a protocol, which reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the cultural heritage agenda adopted after the Washington summit in November 2025. The International Institute for Central Asia said it covered cooperation through joint events and festivals in art, literature, theater, cinema, and music. Kazakhstan's side also tied the discussion to museum partnerships, digitization of heritage, professional exchanges, tourism routes, and digital projects. The Tashkent talks grew out of the C5+1 leaders’ meeting in Washington, where culture joined a wider list of priorities. That summit marked ten years of U.S. engagement with the region through the format, which began in 2015 and has since expanded from foreign-minister meetings to expert groups and presidential-level summits. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the November 2025 summit shifted the format from broad diplomacy toward deliverable agreements, with critical minerals, aviation, supply chains, and business ties among the main areas of focus. Culture fits into that agenda, as Central Asian governments see heritage, tourism, film, music, museums, and the creative industries as economic sectors as well as identity markers. For the United States, public diplomacy gives Washington a way to stay active in the region outside security and energy talks. It also gives the C5+1 a soft-power layer, using language programs, museum links, heritage projects, and creative exchanges to build influence without framing the relationship only around security or resources. Heritage protection has a security side as well. Trafficking...