Turkmenistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 408

Caspian Sea

As Two Wars Reach the Caspian, Central Asia’s Middle Corridor Holds

On July 25, two wars met in waters that Central Asian governments had tried to keep apart. Ukraine reported successful long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the targets included vessels involved in carrying military cargo from Iran and a warship. Tehran said an Iranian commercial vessel had been struck, killing one sailor and injuring another, and accused Kyiv of trying to widen the war. It remains unclear whether the vessel identified by Iran was among the targets described by Zelenskyy. Diplomacy produced a limited off-ramp. On July 28, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, that the strike on the Iranian ship was unintended. Both governments said they wanted to avoid further escalation. The call reduced the immediate risk of retaliation, but it did not remove the new danger. The Caspian is now one of the places where Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States intersect. Central Asia is exposed through the infrastructure and trade routes linking them. A “Sea of Peace” Under Pressure Turkmenistan responded to the incident with unusually direct language. Its Foreign Ministry called attacks on vessels in the Caspian “inadmissible” and described the waterway as a “sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness.” Ashgabat did not name Ukraine or endorse Iran’s account. Its restraint was characteristic, but the public criticism was unusual. Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality normally produces guarded statements during external conflicts. The intervention showed that Ashgabat viewed the attack as a challenge to the regional order. Turkmenistan faces Iran across a 1,148-kilometer land border and the southern Caspian. Turkmenbashi port is also central to its plans for a larger role in Eurasian trade. The principle is set out in the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, signed in Aktau in 2018. Its text calls for the peaceful use of the sea, prohibits the use or threat of force, and bars armed forces belonging to non-Caspian states. The convention has not entered into force because Iran has not ratified it. Its provisions were designed to govern relations among the five littoral states. They do not address a long-range strike carried out by a non-littoral state. But modern drones can cross distances that once provided strategic shelter. A landlocked sea can no longer be assumed to sit beyond the reach of surrounding wars. The Iran-Russia Link Ukraine has clear military reasons to look toward the Caspian. Iran has supplied Russia with drone technology used against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The sea also provides a direct commercial route between Iranian ports and Russia’s Volga region. Kyiv now treats vessels on that route carrying military cargo as part of Russia’s military logistics. Iran described the vessel struck on July 25 as civilian. The dispute over the ship’s cargo is central because commercial and military supply chains can overlap. A vessel may be civilian by flag and registration while carrying goods that Ukraine considers part of Russia’s war effort. That uncertainty reaches beyond...

Internet Restrictions

A Signal from Uzbekistan: How Turkmen Border Villages Reach the Outside World

In Diýýar, a village in northern Turkmenistan close enough to catch Uzbekistan’s mobile signal, a foreign SIM card inserted into a small Wi-Fi router can turn a barely functioning 2G connection into usable home internet. In early July, police reportedly entered around ten households in the village, identified Uzbek-connected routers, and confiscated the SIM cards. Similar inspections have been under way across close to 60 settlements in Dashoguz Province, according to Radio Azatlyk, the Turkmen Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The campaign covers parts of Shabat and Görogly districts, including Kirov, Diýýar, Bedirkent, Aýlak, and Nyýazow, in areas where Uzbek mobile signals cross the border. The Internet Across the Border What the authorities are removing is more than a foreign phone number. Residents told Radio Azatlyk that Turkmen Telecom internet is either unavailable or extremely slow in several border villages. TMCell, the mobile brand operated by the state-owned Altyn Asyr network, often provides only 2G service, while home Wi-Fi is unavailable. Households able to obtain an Uzbek SIM card use networks such as Ucell and Uztelecom, placing the card in a router that supplies internet throughout the home. Residents said YouTube and Instagram become accessible through these connections, although TikTok and many foreign websites still require a VPN. One resident described the Uzbek service as “300 times” faster than the Turkmen alternative, a personal estimate rather than a measured comparison. The cards arrive through an informal chain of traders and other residents who regularly cross into Uzbekistan. A Dashoguz source said they sell for around 200 manats and that sellers also help buyers complete the registration. The arrangement depends on geography, personal contacts, and a signal strong enough to reach across the frontier. One local source said many people from Dashoguz work abroad, including in Russia, Poland, and Germany. For households with relatives overseas, a usable connection can provide a direct link beyond the village. It also opens independent news sites and social platforms that remain blocked or unreliable on Turkmen networks. Residents confronted by police sometimes say they use the internet only to pass the time, reportedly hoping to avoid a fine. A Signal Treated as Suspicion The reported consequences vary. Some first-time offenders receive a warning, particularly when they cannot afford a penalty. Others are threatened with fines of up to 50,000 manats or imprisonment. That amount is about $14,300 at Turkmenistan’s official exchange rate and roughly $2,500 using the widely reported informal rate. Residents said officers described the use of foreign telecommunications services as possible espionage on behalf of another country. The reports cite no court case or published provision under which simply possessing an Uzbek SIM card constitutes espionage. The threat itself, however, raises the stakes around an ordinary household connection. Police and security officers reportedly do not use specialist equipment to locate the routers. Local sources said they rely instead on informants in villages, schools, and local administrations. They allegedly gather information through schoolchildren as well. Residents who travel regularly to Uzbekistan, including small...

Middle Corridor

Daines’s Tour Signals an Emerging U.S. Caspian Corridor Strategy

Senator Steve Daines’s July 7–9 visit to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan brought three bilateral relationships into a single, compressed Caspian itinerary. In Baku, he met President Ilham Aliyev and senior economic and foreign-policy officials; in Astana, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and representatives of government and business; and in Ashgabat, President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. Although official accounts treated each stop separately, the sequence suggests a regional pattern whose significance exceeds any single announcement. Daines had already supplied the clearest public articulation of the governing logic in his June 11 speech to the Caspian Policy Center’s Trans-Caspian Forum. There he joined Central Asia and the South Caucasus in a discussion about westward connectivity, investment, and supply-chain diversification. Daines identified critical minerals, energy, telecommunications, and physical and digital infrastructure as fields for public and private investment, while calling for TRIPP, a Caspian gas interconnector, and a continuous route from Central Asia to Western markets that avoids Russia and Iran. Together, these sectors give the proposed route both commercial and strategic content, though not the form of a single named program. Read against the June speech, Daines’s itinerary marks an emerging corridor-centered effort aligned with the Trump administration’s broader Caspian engagement, even without a formal declaration of purpose. Azerbaijan Anchors the Corridor’s Western Connections Baku gives the corridor logic its strongest institutional and bilateral footing. Aliyev and Daines discussed Azerbaijan’s geopolitical role, regional peace, and TRIPP’s importance for transport connectivity. Separate meetings with Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Economy Minister Mikayil Jabbarov extended the agenda to economic cooperation. With SOCAR President Rovshan Najaf, Jabbarov and Daines took up the Middle Corridor, energy, transport, digital development, and critical-mineral extraction and processing. Across the meetings, political, commercial, and technical portfolios converged around Azerbaijan’s place at the corridor’s western Caspian egress. The U.S.–Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership Charter, signed in February, places the Middle Corridor alongside energy, trade, transit, digital connectivity, and critical-mineral movement. It identifies Azerbaijan as an energy, transport, trade, and logistics hub for the Caspian region. Working groups regularize cooperation on trade, energy, connectivity, digital development, and security. The charter also calls for project lists and implementation roadmaps within three months of signing and for meetings at least once a year. In June, the first Azerbaijan-U.S. Economic Dialogue began translating that direction into an operational agenda. Government, financial institutions, and private-sector participants met on regional connectivity and transit, energy security, investment, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure. The agenda connected the Middle Corridor and TRIPP with logistics, the Southern Gas Corridor, critical mineral supply chains, transport and energy investment, and the Alat Free Economic Zone. Closing documents covered digital infrastructure, technology transfer, and industrial solutions. The workstreams are clear, but the consolidated project portfolio and its financing have yet to take public form. Azerbaijan’s role also rests on physical infrastructure already in use. The established Middle Corridor crosses Kazakhstan and the Caspian before passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia, then onward toward Türkiye or Europe via the Black Sea. At Alat, 70 kilometers...

Middle East Crisis

U.S. Strikes on Iranian Rail and Coastal Infrastructure Put Central Asia’s Southern Routes Under Pressure

U.S. strikes on Iranian rail and coastal infrastructure have put Central Asia's southern transport plans under new pressure. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have spent years building routes through Iran to reach the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and markets beyond Russia. Public statements so far do not show a confirmed halt in Central Asian freight, but bridge damage near Iran's border with Turkmenistan and strikes along Iran's southern coast have made the security picture more concrete. Reports and a video posted on July 9 showed damage to the Aq Taqeh Khan railway bridge, on Iran's rail link to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, after overnight U.S. strikes. Reuters said it verified the location by matching the bridge, riverbank, road, fields, and nearby town with satellite imagery, and found no earlier versions of the video online. Iran's Revolutionary Guard-linked Neynava Corps in Golestan said the area around the Aq Taqeh Khan railway bridge in Aq Qala County was targeted by U.S. cruise missiles early on July 9, with no casualties reported. The bridge sits on the Gorgan-Incheh Borun railway line, which reaches the Incheh Borun border crossing with Turkmenistan and links onward to Kazakhstan. Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways, Jabar-Ali Zakeri, said engineers had rebuilt one damaged track on the Mashhad route and returned it to service in less than 15 hours, according to Fars News Agency. He said work on a second damaged line was continuing and was expected to finish within hours. That statement concerned the Mashhad route, however, and does not confirm the status of the Gorgan-Incheh Borun line. The route sits inside a wider transport effort that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, China, and Russia have all tried to expand. TCA has previously reported on a 2024 test container train on the China-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran route, which ran from Xi'an to Tehran. It carried 45 forty-foot containers loaded with auto parts and cut the China-Iran delivery time to 15 days. The Gorgan-Incheh Borun railroad was inaugurated in December 2014, linking Iran to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan along the eastern side of the Caspian Sea. The wider Uzen-Bereket-Gorgan route runs for more than 900 kilometers from western Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan into northern Iran. It connects Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan’s rail networks to Iran’s system and onward to the Persian Gulf and Asian markets. The U.S. military has framed the latest strikes as a response to Iranian attacks on commercial shipping. U.S. Central Command said on July 8 that its forces had struck about 90 Iranian military targets, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance assets, missile and drone storage sites, naval capabilities, and military logistics infrastructure along Iran's coastline. CENTCOM said the operation was designed “to further degrade Iran's ability to attack commercial shipping and innocent civilian mariners in the Strait of Hormuz.” The coastal security picture also impacts Kazakhstan through Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year Build-Operate-Transfer agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal there. The Kazakh embassy in Tehran said the deal...

Wages

Turkmenistan’s Wage Puzzle: Official Salaries Rise, but Transparency Remains Elusive

In most Central Asian countries, checking the average salary is as simple as visiting the national statistics agency’s website. In Turkmenistan, however, wage data remain largely inaccessible. The State Statistics Committee does not publish salary figures online, and its annual statistical yearbooks are available only in printed form inside the country. Nevertheless, occasional official figures emerge, offering a glimpse into a labor market that differs markedly from those of its regional neighbors. As of January 1, 2025, Turkmenistan’s monthly minimum wage stands at 1,410 manats, equivalent to approximately $403 at the official exchange rate. An increase was introduced by presidential decree in July 2024 as part of a nationwide 10% rise in wages, pensions, and social benefits. The minimum wage was about $366 in 2024, and roughly $331 in 2023 at the official exchange rate. Unlike neighboring economies, where wages are increasingly shaped by labor-market conditions, inflation, and private-sector demand, Turkmenistan’s minimum wage is established exclusively by presidential decree and applies uniformly across all sectors, occupations, and age groups. The centralized system leaves little room for market-based wage formation. Although comprehensive official wage statistics remain unavailable, one rare set of figures attributed to the State Statistics Committee was published in 2017. According to those figures, the country’s highest-paid employees worked in the Merchant Marine Fleet, earning 2,387.6 manats per month, or about $682 at the official exchange rate then in use. They were followed by the National Space Agency under the President of Turkmenistan, at 1,909.9 manats, or about $546, and the state-owned Turkmenneft oil company, at 1,861.4 manats, or about $532. The lowest salaries were reportedly paid to employees of the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations. The ranking, although dated, is revealing. Rather than finance or technology, which dominate wage tables in many countries, Turkmenistan’s highest-paid sectors in that snapshot were closely tied to state prestige projects and strategic natural-resource industries. A key factor complicating any assessment of income is the country’s dual exchange-rate system. The official rate has long been fixed at about 3.5 manats per U.S. dollar, which is used to calculate salaries in dollar terms for international reporting. However, the parallel market rate is substantially weaker, reducing the real international purchasing power of household incomes. Consequently, official salary figures converted into dollars should be interpreted with caution because they do not necessarily reflect the exchange rate available to ordinary citizens. The gap between official wages and actual living costs also appears significant. While the government continues to subsidize basic food staples such as bread and flour, shortages have often forced households to buy goods in private markets at much higher prices. Free natural gas and water supplies ended in 2019, and utility costs have gradually increased since then, despite continuing subsidies. Public cost-of-living data should be treated carefully, but they point in the same direction. The user-submitted database Numbeo estimates monthly costs for a single person in Ashgabat at about 6,475 manats before rent, more than four times the official minimum wage. Regional comparisons...

South Caucasus

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...