Turkmenistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Methane Emissions

Turkmenistan Methane Emissions Under Scrutiny After 192 UN Alerts

UN satellite monitoring has identified Turkmenistan as one of the world’s most serious methane hotspots, with 192 alerts for the country issued over the past year. Three of the six largest leaks detected globally by the system over the past six months were in Turkmenistan, as were nine of the top 50. Eight major leaks have since been stopped after repairs. For Ashgabat, however, the issue is also taking on commercial significance: new EU rules are gradually linking access for imported gas to the European market with its methane footprint. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has confirmed eight cases in which major methane leaks in Turkmenistan were stopped after operators took action. The first two were recorded in November 2024, with further cases confirmed at several oil and gas sites over the following year. In February 2026, two leaks were stopped at Dauletabad, one of Turkmenistan’s largest gas fields. The latest confirmed case dates to March, in Lebap Province, one of the country’s main gas-producing regions. The leaks are detected by the UN's Methane Alert and Response System (MARS), which uses data from more than 30 satellite instruments. After detecting a major methane plume, MARS provides the information to the government or facility operator and then uses satellite observations to determine whether the emissions have stopped. Meghan Demeter, program manager for MARS at UNEP’s International Methane Emissions Observatory, called the first repairs an “incredible first step.” In comments to The Guardian on August 31, she stressed that significantly more work remains to be done, saying the repairs did not yet represent a breakthrough in the overall scale of Turkmenistan’s emissions. The scale of the problem is also reflected in data from the International Energy Agency (IEA). In its Global Methane Tracker 2026, Turkmenistan and Venezuela have by far the highest methane emissions intensities from upstream oil and gas production among major producers. The gap between the best and worst performers is more than 100-fold. Methane intensity measures emissions relative to the amount of fuel produced, allowing producers of different sizes to be compared. According to the IEA, large emissions events visible from satellites are particularly common in Turkmenistan: the country accounts for more than a third of all oil- and gas-related MARS observations in Eurasia. Satellite studies point to a worsening trend in recent years. One found that super-emitter activity on Turkmenistan’s western coast increased by about 8% annually between 2020 and 2023. The IEA’s own analysis shows that emissions from super-emitter events across Turkmenistan grew by more than 15% a year on average over the same period. The study of the western coast also estimated that methane emissions there rose by around 7% annually between 2020 and 2023, broadly in line with growth in natural gas production. Methane has a much stronger short-term warming effect than carbon dioxide. At the same time, it is the main component of natural gas, meaning leaks also represent a loss of fuel that could otherwise be sold. The IEA notes that high emissions intensity...

World Nomad Games

World Nomad Games Return Home as Kyrgyzstan Welcomes World Leaders

Few periods since independence have put Kyrgyzstan so squarely in the international spotlight. On August 31, the country marked 35 years of independence, opened the sixth World Nomad Games, and prepared to host a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit that has brought more than a dozen foreign leaders to Bishkek. The Games themselves were back where they began. Kyrgyzstan launched the World Nomad Games in 2014 and staged the first three editions at Cholpon Ata before the event moved to Turkey in 2022 and Kazakhstan in 2024. This year's Games run through September 6, with The Times of Central Asia reporting from Bishkek and Issyk-Kul throughout the week in our special coverage. The opening took place at the new Bishkek Arena, rising out of the dust on the southwestern edge of the capital near the foothills of the Kyrgyz Ala-Too Range. Around 30,000 spectators attended the ceremony. The stadium will eventually hold more than 51,000, but it is not formally due to open until October 5. The Games opened while work on the arena was still underway, with parts of the building still looking unfinished. In the weeks before the ceremony, horses had circled the arena floor during rehearsals while drilling continued around them. By the time the spectators arrived, the construction site had become the biggest show in town. Before the politics and pageantry, there was pop. Kyrgyzstan put many of its best-known performers on stage in a concert that at times had a distinctly Eurovision feel. Energetic hosts introduced a succession of singers and rappers while tightly choreographed dancers moved between traditional dress and contemporary styling. The lineup included Bayastan, Malika Dina, Erlan Andashev, Begish, and others, but veteran singer Baktiyar Toktorov received the loudest reaction. When he launched into "Yza," known almost universally by its "Bui-Bui" refrain, spectators rose from their seats and sang with him. Even some of the security guards joined in. The refrain does not demand many words, but almost everybody in the arena seemed to know them. The new stadium also showed some early teething problems, with concession stands running out of bottled water and food as crowds built. After the concert, the momentum disappeared. The audience waited for around 90 minutes while footage of arriving dignitaries played on the giant screens. The reason for the pause soon became clear, as one motorcade after another delivered guests for the formal ceremony. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko were among those in the stands. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan also attended, along with leaders and senior officials from elsewhere in Asia, the Caucasus, and Africa. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres was among the international guests. One expected heavyweight was missing. Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Bishkek for a state visit and the SCO summit, had been due to attend the opening. Presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov said Xi had stayed away because of the deadly flooding and landslides in...

TAPI Gas Pipeline

TAPI Pipeline Moves Closer to First Gas Sales in Afghanistan

After decades of delays, the TAPI gas pipeline has moved closer than ever to actual gas sales – but first to the smallest of its intended markets. Turkmenistan is preparing to supply gas to Afghanistan’s Herat province, while the timeline for extending the pipeline to Pakistan and India remains uncertain. On August 10, state-owned Turkmengaz and Afghan Gas signed a memorandum covering the purchase of gas through TAPI. The document does not itself set a price or supply volume, but it brings closer the prospect that Afghanistan could become the first TAPI customer actually to receive gas. Afghanistan was already part of TAPI’s original customer base. Afghan Gas and Turkmengaz signed a gas sale-and-purchase agreement in 2013. What has changed is that the pipeline is now approaching a market it can physically serve. On August 27, Herat Governor Islam Jar said the local section of TAPI was expected to be commissioned within two months. Turkmenistan has not announced an equally specific date for the start of commercial gas supplies. TAPI was conceived as an approximately 1,800-kilometer pipeline running from Turkmenistan’s giant Galkynysh gas field through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian border. Its planned capacity is 33 billion cubic meters of gas a year. At full capacity, Pakistan and India are each allocated 14 billion cubic meters of gas a year, while Afghanistan is allocated 5 billion. But after decades of planning, the pipeline has still not reached its principal intended customers. Construction of the 153-kilometer section from the Turkmen border toward Herat began in September 2024. Earlier this year, Turkmenistan said it expected to complete the section by the end of 2026, but no timetable has been announced for extending the pipeline farther south. According to the Afghan side, 116 kilometers of pipeline had been laid by early August. The August agreement also envisages the infrastructure needed to use the gas locally. Turkmen and Afghan officials have agreed to develop infrastructure in Herat to supply gas to industrial facilities, power plants, and households. The volumes involved would be modest compared with the roughly 30 billion cubic meters of gas Turkmenistan exports to China each year. But even limited sales through TAPI would give Ashgabat another export outlet. In February, Turkmenistan's still-influential former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov described diversification of gas exports as one of the country’s main priorities. For TAPI itself, however, the first gas sales could matter even if the volumes are modest. Writing for The Times of Central Asia, Central Asia analyst Bruce Pannier noted that amid strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as between Pakistan and India, completion of the entire TAPI pipeline remains a distant prospect. He argued that supplying Herat alone could demonstrate to potential investors that the pipeline actually works. The memorandum signed on August 10 has offered little clarity on price, volumes and start dates. Afghanistan has separately proposed negotiating a long-term contract and pricing formula, while the gas distribution network in Herat still needs to be developed. The governor’s statement that the...

Natural Gas

Turkmenistan Gas Exports: Could Tajikistan Become a New Market?

Turkmenistan has the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, but most of its gas exports still go to China. Ashgabat has spent years seeking other markets and is again looking to potential customers elsewhere in Central Asia. Uzbekistan already buys Turkmen gas, while Tajikistan remains a potential customer. The prospect drew renewed attention after Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin visited Turkmenistan on August 20–21. During meetings with President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, the two sides discussed trade, transport, energy, and other areas of cooperation. The published accounts of the talks, however, made no mention of new gas supplies. The Idea Dates Back to 2023 At an August 2023 summit in Ashgabat, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan agreed to cooperate on supplies of natural gas, oil, petroleum products, and electricity. They instructed their energy ministries to discuss joint projects. After the summit, Meredov identified Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as priority markets in the region. At the time, Turkmenistan said it planned to increase gas production by at least 60 billion cubic meters in the coming years, citing further development of Galkynysh, one of the world’s largest gas fields. State-owned Turkmengaz and UzGasTrade subsequently agreed on annual supplies of up to 2 billion cubic meters under a short-term contract and discussed a longer-term arrangement. The contract came as Uzbekistan became a net importer after decades as a gas exporter, with domestic production declining and demand rising. Output fell further in 2025 and the first half of 2026. Any Turkmen gas bound for Tajikistan would have to pass through Uzbekistan because the two countries do not share a border. Tajikistan already imported around 267 million cubic meters of Uzbek gas in 2024, but Turkmen supplies would require a separate commercial arrangement. No prices, volumes, or timetable have been announced, leaving the plan on paper. A Small Market, but a Short Route Tajikistan cannot replace China as a market for Turkmen gas. Hydropower provides almost all of its electricity, and its potential demand for imported gas is far smaller than China’s. In February, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan’s former president and current chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, described diversifying gas exports as one of the country’s main priorities. Turkmenistan’s landlocked position leaves it dependent on where its pipelines lead. The main route runs east through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, carrying around 30 billion cubic meters of gas to China each year via the Central Asia–China pipeline. That reliance may deepen after China National Petroleum Corporation reached an agreement with Turkmenistan in April to develop the fourth phase of Galkynysh. The $5.1 billion project is expected to add 10 billion cubic meters of annual gas-processing capacity. Bigger Alternatives Are Moving Slowly The best-known alternative is the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Although construction began on its Afghan section in 2024 after decades of discussion, the pipeline remains far from delivering gas to Pakistan or India. By August 2026, Afghan authorities said 116 kilometers had been laid. Afghanistan’s role could expand from transit country to gas buyer....

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Opinion

Turkmenistan and the New Geopolitics of Silicon

Central Asia is not foreign to the emerging geopolitics of silicon and artificial intelligence (AI). Kazakhstan especially has made itself noticed, joining the US-led Pax Silica initiative in June and the Chinese-led World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in July. Kazakhstan is the only country participating in both initiatives, which is characteristic of Astana’s multi-vector diplomacy. Whilst other Central Asian states have joined WAICO, Turkmenistan, consistent with its permanent neutrality stance, has joined neither. Neutrality, however, does not prevent economic participation, and a case has to be made for Turkmenistan. Two Frameworks for International Cooperation Although both initiatives respond to the same underlying reality - the growing strategic importance of artificial intelligence - they differ in scope and emphasis. Pax Silica is built around the material and economic foundations of AI, focusing on securing and coordinating the physical supply chains that make computation possible and aiming implicitly to reduce reliance on China. WAICO, by contrast, is centered on the political and normative dimension of AI, prioritizing governance, safety standards, and international coordination, where Beijing could push its rhetoric in favour of open-source artificial intelligence as a model for AI development. Taken together, they reflect two complementary but distinct ways of structuring the emerging AI order: one rooted in industrial capacity and supply-chain control, the other in multilateral rules. On that matter, Turkmenistan's possible relevance does not lie in software, semiconductor fabrication or AI regulation, but much further upstream: silicon metallurgy. From Gas to Silicon Silicon is abundant in nature, but transforming it into industrial materials is an energy-intensive process. Quartz or quartzite is used to produce both silicon ferroalloys and silicon metal. Ferrosilicon is principally consumed by the iron and steel industries, where it serves as a deoxidizing and alloying agent. Silicon metal, meanwhile, is used in aluminum alloys and chemical production, while a small share is further purified into the extremely high-purity silicon required by the semiconductor industry. Ferrosilicon should not be presented as a material that goes directly into AI chips. But establishing competitive ferrosilicon production can constitute a first industrial step into the broader family of silicon metallurgy. And Turkmenistan has already begun considering precisely that. In 2020, the Turkmen authorities reported that the Ministry of Industry was studying the production of metallurgical-grade silicon using local resources. Practical tests had already been conducted using quartz sand, metal mixtures and petroleum coke, while the government presented the development of domestic mineral resources as part of a broader strategy of industrialization and export diversification. The ambition became more concrete in January 2024. Turkmenistan's Ministry of Industry and Construction Production launched an international tender for a feasibility study for a ferroalloy plant intended to manufacture ferrosilicon, silicon carbide, and technical silicon. A 2024 feasibility study for such a project envisions a plant in Balkan Velayat capable of producing 15,000 tons of FeSi75 ferrosilicon annually. The proposed complex would operate two 12,500 kVA furnaces. Rather than depending exclusively on domestic raw materials, the study envisages sourcing quartzite from nearby Iran and...