Turkmenistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Neutrality

Turkmenistan’s Neutrality: Diplomatic Space, Economic Limits

Permanent neutrality has shaped Turkmenistan’s foreign policy for more than three decades. It has given Ashgabat a distinct diplomatic identity and helped it maintain relations with competing regional powers. Its economic benefits, however, have been more limited. On December 12, 1995, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution without a vote that recognized and supported Turkmenistan’s declared permanent neutrality. The Assembly adopted a further resolution in 2015 and reaffirmed its support for a third time on March 21, 2025. The UN reinforced a policy declared by Ashgabat. It did not create the status or guarantee Turkmenistan influence beyond its borders. The strongest evidence of neutrality’s diplomatic value came during the civil war in Tajikistan. Turkmenistan hosted UN-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks in Ashgabat during the 1990s. The negotiations contributed to the process that produced the 1997 peace agreement. Hosting those talks did not make Turkmenistan the principal mediator. The UN and regional governments played larger roles. Ashgabat nevertheless provided a venue considered acceptable by the opposing sides. Turkmenistan has followed a similar policy toward Afghanistan. It has maintained contacts with successive authorities in Kabul while supplying electricity and pursuing transport and energy projects across the border. Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, Ashgabat has continued its economic engagement without making its relationship dependent on formal political alignment. Neutrality helps Turkmenistan keep diplomatic channels open, but it is not the only explanation for this policy. The two countries share a long border, and Afghanistan is central to several planned export and transit routes. Energy provides a clearer measure of what neutrality can and cannot deliver. Turkmenistan has sought buyers in Russia, China, Iran, Türkiye, South Asia, and Europe. Its ability to reach those markets has depended mainly on pipelines, financing, and relations with transit countries. China became Turkmenistan’s main gas customer after the Central Asia-China pipeline opened in 2009. By 2026, Turkmenistan was exporting around 30 billion cubic meters of gas to China each year. A new agreement signed in April 2026 to expand the Galkynysh gas field could support another 10 billion cubic meters of annual production, further deepening the energy relationship with Beijing. Turkmenistan’s experience with other buyers has been less stable. Russia’s Gazprom stopped purchasing Turkmen gas in 2016 before resuming much smaller imports in 2019. Supplies to Iran ended in 2017 during a dispute over unpaid bills. Ashgabat secured a modest new outlet in March 2025, when Turkmen gas began flowing to Türkiye under a swap arrangement through Iran. The one-year agreement covered about 1.3 billion cubic meters, with officials discussing possible annual supplies of up to 2 billion cubic meters. The Türkiye deal showed that Ashgabat could find new customers, but the volume remained small beside exports to China. The route also depended on Iranian infrastructure. Turkmenistan’s larger diversification projects remain incomplete. Construction has advanced on the Afghan section of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline, known as TAPI. Turkmen officials expect the first Afghan section to reach Herat by the end of 2026, but plans for extending...

U.S. Visa Bond

U.S. Makes Visa Bond Program Permanent, Raises Maximum to $20,000

The United States has made its Visa Bond Program permanent, raising the maximum refundable deposit to $20,000 for certain business and tourist visa applicants from 50 countries, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The final rule took effect on August 3, replacing a 12-month pilot launched in August 2025. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain outside the program. The requirement applies to B-1 business visas, B-2 tourist visas and combined B-1/B-2 visas. Applicants from covered countries who are otherwise eligible for a visa must generally post a bond of $10,000, $15,000 or $20,000, with the amount determined by a consular officer. Officers are expected to set most bonds at $15,000. The amount may be reduced to $10,000 when an applicant’s circumstances justify a lower deposit or increased to $20,000 when officials believe a larger bond is needed to ensure that the traveler leaves the country on time. The bond is returned when the traveler complies with the terms of the visa and leaves the United States within the permitted period. It can also be refunded if the visa holder does not travel before the visa expires or is denied admission at the border. No interest is paid on the deposit, and posting a bond does not guarantee that a visa will be issued. Travelers who post a bond must enter and ultimately leave the United States through commercial airports, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection preclearance locations abroad. They cannot use land or sea crossings for their initial entry or final departure. Turkmenistan has been covered by the policy since January 1, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were added on January 21. The Times of Central Asia reported the regional expansion at the time. The broader list includes 50 countries, 30 of them in Africa, as well as countries in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The current program began as a pilot on August 20, 2025, initially covering Malawi and Zambia. Under the pilot, bonds were set at $5,000, $10,000 or $15,000. The permanent version removes the $5,000 option and increases the maximum deposit by $5,000. The $20,000 maximum will be adjusted for inflation beginning on October 1, 2027, and every seven years thereafter. An earlier visa bond pilot was announced in 2020 during Donald Trump’s first administration, but it was not implemented because international travel had fallen sharply during the Covid-19 pandemic. The State Department said the policy is intended to address visa overstays, inadequate information sharing, weaknesses in identity and criminal-record verification, and concerns over screening and the security of travel documents. Countries can be added to the list on a rolling basis, while removals can take effect immediately. According to the department, the 50 countries currently covered recorded 45,488 overstays during the 2024 fiscal year. Fewer than 50 overstays were recorded during the first ten months of the pilot, while visa issuance to nationals of the listed countries fell by 83% compared with the same period a year earlier. The department said some eligible applicants appeared to have...

GDP

Turkmenistan Reports 6.3% GDP Growth for the First Half of 2026

Turkmenistan's economy grew by 6.3% in the first six months of 2026 compared with the same period last year, according to Turkmen state media. Among Central Asian countries that had published first-half figures, Turkmenistan's reported growth rate was higher than Kazakhstan's but lower than those of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. By the end of the first half of 2026, Kazakhstan's economy had grown by 4.1%. Kyrgyzstan's economy expanded by 11.9%, reaching 960 billion som ($11 billion), with construction posting the fastest growth at 69.6%. Tajikistan reported growth of 8.2%, while Uzbekistan reported GDP growth of 8.5%. Turkmenistan's official figures should be treated with caution. The International Monetary Fund projects growth of about 2.4% for 2026 and says it uses its own GDP estimates because the official narrative is difficult to reconcile with other available data. Official data shows growth of 10.4% in transport and communications, 8.5% in trade, 8.4% in services, 6.7% in construction, 2.7% in industry, and 2% in agriculture. Retail trade turnover increased by 10.1%, while foreign trade turnover rose by 7.5%. The fuel and energy sector continues to play a central role in Turkmenistan's economy. The country possesses some of the world's largest natural gas reserves, and hydrocarbon production and exports remain its principal source of foreign currency earnings and a defining feature of the national economy. Construction is another major pillar, driven largely by state spending. Capital investment totaled 18.6 billion manats ($5.3 billion) in the first half of 2026, up 4.3% year on year and equivalent to 16.5% of GDP. Of this, 45.1% went to production facilities and 54.9% to social and cultural buildings. The government is also seeking to produce more construction materials and other goods domestically, reducing the need for imports. For the remainder of the year, the government says it will focus on completing ongoing construction projects, increasing capacity utilization at industrial plants, maintaining the stability of the manat, developing the tax system, preparing next year's state budget, and improving the use of budget funds. Earlier, The Times of Central Asia reported that Turkmenistan sees the proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor as a key route for diversifying its natural gas exports to Europe, as Ashgabat seeks to reduce its dependence on a limited number of export markets.

Regional Cooperation

Central Asia and Azerbaijan: What the Region’s Leaders Agreed at Issyk-Kul

The Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, briefly became Central Asia’s political capital as it hosted a series of high-level meetings, including bilateral talks between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Only a few years ago, such a format would have seemed unlikely. Today, however, regional leaders are discussing joint railway projects, energy security, transport corridors, investment, and foreign-policy coordination rather than managing old disputes. The agreements reached in Cholpon-Ata suggest that the consultative format is gradually evolving from a platform for political dialogue into a mechanism for practical regional cooperation. From Conflict to Alliance Ahead of the informal multilateral meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held bilateral talks that set the tone for the broader regional meeting. Relations between the two countries now stand in sharp contrast to the situation sixteen years ago. Following the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, relations between Bishkek and Tashkent entered one of their most difficult periods since independence. The agenda between the two neighbors has since changed dramatically. Speaking in Cholpon-Ata, Mirziyoyev said relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had reached “a historic peak.” Bilateral trade has increased almost tenfold in recent years, reaching $1.2 billion last year. The two countries now have around 450 joint ventures, operate a joint Development Fund to support cooperative projects, and have established 15 air routes and five bus services linking their cities. Mirziyoyev described the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway as one of the most important joint initiatives between the two countries, arguing that the project would reshape transport links across Eurasia. “This railway will fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape. Those who understand what it took to make this happen know what a major achievement it is,” Mirziyoyev said. The talks concluded with the signing of a Treaty on Allied Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two sides also exchanged several bilateral documents, including agreements covering sections of their common border and the joint use of the Chashma spring. A Broader Regional Agenda While the Japarov-Mirziyoyev talks focused primarily on bilateral relations, the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan broadened the discussion to regional integration, transport connectivity, energy security, and foreign-policy coordination. Opening the meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said one of the clearest results of closer regional cooperation had been the Central Asian countries’ growing support for one another on the international stage. As an example, he cited the region’s joint support for Kyrgyzstan’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term. Japarov also revived the idea of introducing a single tourist visa for foreign visitors traveling across Central Asia, proposing that the region’s foreign ministries intensify consultations on the initiative. Azerbaijan’s participation as a full member gave the meeting additional significance. Baku joined the consultative format as a...

Caspian Sea

As Two Wars Reach the Caspian, Central Asia’s Middle Corridor Holds

On July 25, two wars met in waters that Central Asian governments had tried to keep apart. Ukraine reported successful long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the targets included vessels involved in carrying military cargo from Iran and a warship. Tehran said an Iranian commercial vessel had been struck, killing one sailor and injuring another, and accused Kyiv of trying to widen the war. It remains unclear whether the vessel identified by Iran was among the targets described by Zelenskyy. Diplomacy produced a limited off-ramp. On July 28, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, that the strike on the Iranian ship was unintended. Both governments said they wanted to avoid further escalation. The call reduced the immediate risk of retaliation, but it did not remove the new danger. The Caspian is now one of the places where Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States intersect. Central Asia is exposed through the infrastructure and trade routes linking them. A “Sea of Peace” Under Pressure Turkmenistan responded to the incident with unusually direct language. Its Foreign Ministry called attacks on vessels in the Caspian “inadmissible” and described the waterway as a “sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness.” Ashgabat did not name Ukraine or endorse Iran’s account. Its restraint was characteristic, but the public criticism was unusual. Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality normally produces guarded statements during external conflicts. The intervention showed that Ashgabat viewed the attack as a challenge to the regional order. Turkmenistan faces Iran across a 1,148-kilometer land border and the southern Caspian. Turkmenbashi port is also central to its plans for a larger role in Eurasian trade. The principle is set out in the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, signed in Aktau in 2018. Its text calls for the peaceful use of the sea, prohibits the use or threat of force, and bars armed forces belonging to non-Caspian states. The convention has not entered into force because Iran has not ratified it. Its provisions were designed to govern relations among the five littoral states. They do not address a long-range strike carried out by a non-littoral state. But modern drones can cross distances that once provided strategic shelter. A landlocked sea can no longer be assumed to sit beyond the reach of surrounding wars. The Iran-Russia Link Ukraine has clear military reasons to look toward the Caspian. Iran has supplied Russia with drone technology used against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The sea also provides a direct commercial route between Iranian ports and Russia’s Volga region. Kyiv now treats vessels on that route carrying military cargo as part of Russia’s military logistics. Iran described the vessel struck on July 25 as civilian. The dispute over the ship’s cargo is central because commercial and military supply chains can overlap. A vessel may be civilian by flag and registration while carrying goods that Ukraine considers part of Russia’s war effort. That uncertainty reaches beyond...

Internet Restrictions

A Signal from Uzbekistan: How Turkmen Border Villages Reach the Outside World

In Diýýar, a village in northern Turkmenistan close enough to catch Uzbekistan’s mobile signal, a foreign SIM card inserted into a small Wi-Fi router can turn a barely functioning 2G connection into usable home internet. In early July, police reportedly entered around ten households in the village, identified Uzbek-connected routers, and confiscated the SIM cards. Similar inspections have been under way across close to 60 settlements in Dashoguz Province, according to Radio Azatlyk, the Turkmen Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The campaign covers parts of Shabat and Görogly districts, including Kirov, Diýýar, Bedirkent, Aýlak, and Nyýazow, in areas where Uzbek mobile signals cross the border. The Internet Across the Border What the authorities are removing is more than a foreign phone number. Residents told Radio Azatlyk that Turkmen Telecom internet is either unavailable or extremely slow in several border villages. TMCell, the mobile brand operated by the state-owned Altyn Asyr network, often provides only 2G service, while home Wi-Fi is unavailable. Households able to obtain an Uzbek SIM card use networks such as Ucell and Uztelecom, placing the card in a router that supplies internet throughout the home. Residents said YouTube and Instagram become accessible through these connections, although TikTok and many foreign websites still require a VPN. One resident described the Uzbek service as “300 times” faster than the Turkmen alternative, a personal estimate rather than a measured comparison. The cards arrive through an informal chain of traders and other residents who regularly cross into Uzbekistan. A Dashoguz source said they sell for around 200 manats and that sellers also help buyers complete the registration. The arrangement depends on geography, personal contacts, and a signal strong enough to reach across the frontier. One local source said many people from Dashoguz work abroad, including in Russia, Poland, and Germany. For households with relatives overseas, a usable connection can provide a direct link beyond the village. It also opens independent news sites and social platforms that remain blocked or unreliable on Turkmen networks. Residents confronted by police sometimes say they use the internet only to pass the time, reportedly hoping to avoid a fine. A Signal Treated as Suspicion The reported consequences vary. Some first-time offenders receive a warning, particularly when they cannot afford a penalty. Others are threatened with fines of up to 50,000 manats or imprisonment. That amount is about $14,300 at Turkmenistan’s official exchange rate and roughly $2,500 using the widely reported informal rate. Residents said officers described the use of foreign telecommunications services as possible espionage on behalf of another country. The reports cite no court case or published provision under which simply possessing an Uzbek SIM card constitutes espionage. The threat itself, however, raises the stakes around an ordinary household connection. Police and security officers reportedly do not use specialist equipment to locate the routers. Local sources said they rely instead on informants in villages, schools, and local administrations. They allegedly gather information through schoolchildren as well. Residents who travel regularly to Uzbekistan, including small...