Turkmenistan Features - The Times Of Central Asia

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Iran

Central Asia Recalculates as the Iran War Enters a New Phase

Central Asia’s first response to the Iran war was public and urgent. Governments organized evacuations, welcomed a ceasefire, and watched the Strait of Hormuz because the region’s trade routes, fuel costs, and food prices were already under pressure. The next phase looks different. Following the April 12 collapse of U.S.-Iran talks in Islamabad, Washington moved to block maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. That step does not formally close Hormuz to all shipping, but it pushes the crisis into a more serious phase for any country or company still treating Iran as a viable corridor. That distinction is important in Central Asia because the region does not need a formal legal closure of Hormuz to feel the shock. It only needs insurers, banks, freight forwarders, airlines, and traders to decide that the southern option has become too risky for routine planning. That process was already underway. The route through Iran had come under strain in southern corridor traffic, food systems, and in the wider pricing of regional connectivity. A U.S. move against Iranian ports is likely to reinforce that view. Official statements across Central Asia still reflect the ceasefire moment more than the latest escalation. On April 8, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the truce and said he hoped it would support global trade and prosperity. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire and praised efforts to reduce tensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry did the same, calling the truce an “important step toward de-escalating tensions,” and stressing that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the United States. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, had already taken a practical line, saying on March 4 that it was keeping all international checkpoints open and providing passage for foreign citizens, vehicles, and rail stock across the Turkmen-Iranian border. Since then, public messaging has lagged behind the latest escalation. By April 13, Qazinform’s foreign news flow had shifted to the failed Islamabad talks and Trump’s blockade order, while the latest publicly visible official positions elsewhere in the region still reflected the April 8 ceasefire. That does not mean backchannel diplomacy has stopped, but it does suggest that Central Asian governments prefer caution in public as the conflict shifts from direct strikes to pressure on shipping and trade. For the region, the economic logic is now clearer than the politics. Approximately 20% of global oil supplies and one-third of global fertilizer trade move through the Strait of Hormuz, while urea prices surged by almost 46% between February and March 2026. The World Bank’s April Europe and Central Asia Economic Update said growth in the developing economies of Europe and Central Asia is expected to slow to 2.1% in 2026, down from 2.6% in 2025, as the Middle East conflict, wider geopolitical tension, and trade fragmentation weigh on the region. Those pressures were already significant. The collapse of the main post-ceasefire diplomatic effort, followed by oil rising back above $100 a barrel, has made them harder...

EU-Turkmenistan Relations

Turkmenistan Opens the Door a Little Wider to Europe

Turkmenistan has historically been a difficult partner to deal with. The Turkmen government’s isolationist policies run counter to deep cooperation with any foreign party, but the Turkmen authorities seem to now perceive that these policies are costing them opportunities and revenue. In one of the latest shifts in foreign policy, Turkmenistan appears to be warming up relations with the European Union, though currently, the EU has its own reasons to boost interaction with Turkmenistan. Let’s Meet For decades, the EU and many other countries and international organizations have gone through frustrating efforts to establish a reliable relationship with Turkmenistan. Ashgabat’s form of governance is based on a cult of personality, a supposedly infallible leader capable of protecting the country from the evils of the outside world. The UN recognition in December 1995 of Turkmenistan’s neutrality was used by its government to seal off the country. It would normally be easy for the rest of the world to ignore Turkmenistan. However, Turkmenistan possesses the planet’s fourth-largest proven natural gas reserves, and it is located on what is developing into a key global trade route. On March 20, the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) regional representative for Central Asia, Olivier Kueny, complimented Turkmenistan for its “ambitions in transport and… projects that reduce greenhouse gases.“ Kueny noted that, “with direct access to the Caspian Sea, [Turkmenistan] is a key node” of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (TITR). He hinted the EIB could be interested in investing in Turkmenistan’s “rail, road, rolling stock and port infrastructure [that] could help reduce the cost and time needed to move goods between continents.“ On March 26, Charlotte Adriaen, the head of the EU division for Central Asia and Afghanistan, met in Ashgabat with Turkmenistan’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Myahri Byashimova, to discuss energy cooperation. The two also reviewed EU programs for sustainable energy, trade, and digital connectivity. On the same day, there was also a “New Horizons for Connectivity, Investment and Sustainable Growth” Turkmenistan-EU business forum in Ashgabat. Turkmenistan’s Minister of Finance and Economy, Mammetguly Astanagulov, addressed more than 200 delegates attending the forum, telling them his country is ready to expand trade, transport, and energy cooperation with the EU. Astanagulov noted EU-Turkmenistan trade increased from $1.1 billion in 2024 to $2.1 billion in 2025. EU Ambassador to Turkmenistan Beata Peksa also spoke at the forum. She noted Turkmenistan’s growing role in global transport corridors between Europe and Asia and said the EU is seeking to work more closely with Turkmenistan on improving investment conditions in the country. Peksa also mentioned helping Turkmenistan improve regulatory frameworks and investment in modern technologies to increase efficiency in moving cargo. On April 1, Adriaen met with representatives from Turkmenistan’s State Service of Maritime and River Transportation at the Turkmenbashi International Seaport on the Caspian coast to discuss the port’s role in the TITR and projects at the Balkan shipbuilding yard. And on April 7, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) co-sponsored an “Export Experience Exchange” conference in Ashgabat, the aim...

C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...

Iran

The Iran War Is Repricing Central Asia’s Connectivity

Europe’s aviation regulator has extended its current conflict-zone bulletin for the Middle East and Persian Gulf through April 10 and continues to advise operators to avoid Iranian and adjacent airspace at all altitudes. Reuters reported soon after that the squeeze on normal flight paths was pushing more traffic into narrower routes, notably over Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The Strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, has not returned to normal commercial use. A limited number of exempted vessels have crossed, but passage remains selective, politicized, and uncertain rather than routine. The question, consequently, is no longer only whether Central Asia has alternatives to single-route dependence but whether those alternatives remain commercially usable, taking into account the increased risk, delay, insurance, fuel burn, and congestion. What has changed is the cost of maintaining reliable connectivity. The Cost of Reliability The Iran conflict imposes higher operating costs on the wider Eurasian air corridor that is now taking displaced traffic. EUROCONTROL estimates that about 1,150 flights a day continue to be affected by re-routing linked to the Middle East crisis. These add roughly 206,000 kilometers of flying and 602 tons of extra fuel burn per day. Maritime trends are similar. In March, war-risk premiums in or near the Gulf had risen more than tenfold in some cases, with hull war premiums moving from about 0.25% of vessel value to as much as 3%. Air-freight rates on some routes rose by as much as 70% as shippers redirected urgent cargo away from disrupted sea lanes and restricted airspace. Higher surcharges and narrower margins for operational error can make routes lose commercial value even if they remain formally open. The wider macroeconomic setting has also made resilience more expensive. Higher oil prices make every detour costlier, raising freight charges, power costs, and production costs across the region’s trading partners. Even where Central Asian cargo does not move through Iranian waters, the same pattern is still present. Asian policymakers were already confronting a combined oil-price and currency shock at a moment when roughly 80% of the oil shipped through Hormuz normally goes to Asia. The World Bank’s March food and nutrition security update notes that around 20% of global oil supplies and about one-third of global fertilizer trade transit the Strait of Hormuz. Urea prices, for example, surged by nearly 46% month on month between February and March 2026. Importers in Central Asia, as well as in Europe and the South Caucasus, remain under pressure from higher household food costs and tighter producer margins. The price of resilience is now showing up in increased costs for farm inputs, food costs, and household budgets. How the Burden Falls Kazakhstan remains the best placed in the region to absorb the shift. The CPC pipeline still carries about 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports; oil income contributes 52% of the state budget. Earlier disruptions had constrained Kazakhstan to reroute 300,000 tons of crude, and the country continues to rely on supplementary outlets such as Ust-Luga, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and China when its main...

Freedom in the World

Central Asia Pushes Back on “Not Free” Label as Debate Over Rankings Grows

According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2026 report, all five countries in Central Asia are classified as “Not Free.” Nevertheless, governments in the region are increasingly questioning the impartiality of such assessments. At the same time, some regional experts point to ongoing political and economic reforms as signs that the region is making progress. A “Not Free” Region In its report released on March 19, 2026, Freedom House classifies all five Central Asian states as "Not Free." The designation is based on Freedom House’s assessment of political rights and civil liberties. According to the report’s authors, the ranking reflects pressure on independent media, tightening control over civil society, and the absence of genuine political competition. Kazakhstan received 23 points out of 100. The report highlights restrictions on opposition groups and civil society activists, pressure on independent journalism, and tightly managed elections that do not ensure genuine political competition. Kyrgyzstan, long considered the most politically open country in the region, scored 25 out of 100 and was also classified as “Not Free.” The organization says the score fell by one point from the previous year, reflecting continued pressure on independent media, the designation of several outlets as ‘extremist,’ and criminal cases against journalists, alongside concerns about election integrity. Uzbekistan scored 12 out of 100. Freedom House points to the concentration of power in the executive branch, the absence of a genuine parliamentary opposition, and severe restrictions on independent human rights defenders and journalists. Since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in 2016, Uzbekistan has pursued a series of controlled political and economic reforms aimed at opening the country after decades of isolation. These have included currency liberalization, efforts to end the use of forced labor in the cotton sector, and steps to ease restrictions on business and foreign investment. While critics say political liberalization remains limited, supporters argue the reforms mark a significant shift from the policies of the previous era. Tajikistan received just 5 points. The report highlights the long rule of President Emomali Rahmon, the elimination of legal opposition, systematic persecution of its members and their families, and a de facto lack of electoral competition. Turkmenistan recorded one of the lowest scores globally, with just 1 point. The report describes the country as one of the most repressive in the world, citing total state control over political life and the media, the absence of opposition participation in elections, and harsh punishment for dissent. Turkmenistan remains one of the most closed countries in the world, with extremely limited access for foreign media and independent observers. Political life is tightly controlled, and reliable information about internal developments is scarce. While the authorities have signaled gradual generational change following the 2022 transfer of power to President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, there has been little visible shift in the country’s political system. Impartiality in Doubt? Trust in international assessments has also been affected by developments in U.S. foreign aid policy and a wider shift in global perceptions about the appropriateness of Western-linked organizations categorising...

India

India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World

A widening conflict in West Asia is forcing India and Central Asia to reassess trade routes, diplomacy, and regional security, with key projects such as Iran’s Chabahar port now facing growing uncertainty. These risks framed discussions in New Delhi on March 25–26, where experts gathered under the banner of “India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World,” with The Times of Central Asia in attendance. The conference unfolded against the backdrop of two active Eurasian wars—the Russo-Ukrainian and the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict. Central Asian and Indian participants agreed that the West Asian crisis is widening, putting not only ports and logistics routes but also economies across the globe under serious threat. India's Chabahar link to Afghanistan and Central Asia is now a high-risk, uncertain investment, weakening overall continental strategic thinking across Eurasia, including efforts to consolidate new trans-Caspian trade corridors. If the conflict cripples or destroys Chabahar, years of progress, hard-won partnerships, and millions in strategic investment would be erased. On the sidelines, some participants suggested that India could help cool what's becoming a dangerously global conflict. Unbeknownst to them, India had already held an all-party meeting on March 25 on the West Asia crisis. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's message: India will not mediate. The revelation surprised some participants—others, not at all. In any event, Central Asian states, in principle, have backed any diplomatic push for peace. With West Asia in turmoil and platitudes in abundance, conference participants emphasized the need to rethink geopolitics, trade, security, and cultural ties beyond stale frameworks at a time of conflict. Four themes defined the Central and South Asian moment: the dangers of bloc politics, even as regional organizations continue to evolve and expand their influence, the ascendancy of national interests over external pressure, and the emergence of a firm refusal to pick sides in the midst of frictions between competing global pressures. Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma, a member of the India Central Asia Foundation, stated: “The conference provided an important platform to move beyond theoretical discussion and toward practical engagement. With Central Asia’s ambassadors to India present, we focused on exploring concrete mechanisms to promote peace through sustained diplomatic efforts. Despite the proximity of the conflict in West Asia to both Central Asia and India, participants expressed confidence that dialogue and restraint – buttressed by trade and investment – will ultimately guide outcomes, with particular concern for civilians and those enduring hardship. Notably, the crisis did not overshadow the conference’s primary agenda or its scholarly contributions. Overall, the gathering can be seen as a constructive step in reinforcing diplomatic initiatives dedicated to peace and stability in a conflict-affected region.” The conference witnessed the release of three significant publications on India–Central Asia relations: India – Kazakhstan Partnership in a Changing Geopolitical Order (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi, Lalit Aggarwal, Kuralay Baizakova), Manas: Kirgiz Vir Gatha Kavya by Ramakant Dwivedi & Hemchandra Pandey and India and Central, East and Southeast Asia: Enhancing the Partnership (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi & Lalit Aggarwal). [caption id="attachment_46364" align="aligncenter" width="1379"]...