Our People > Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Dr. Robert M. Cutler

Senior Editor and Contributor

Robert M. Cutler has written and consulted on Central Asian affairs for over 30 years at all levels. He was a founding member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society’s executive board and founding editor of its Perspectives publication. He has written for Asia Times, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Euractiv, Radio Free Europe, National Post (Toronto), FSU Oil & Gas Monitor, and many other outlets.

He directs the NATO Association of Canada’s Energy Security Program, where he is also senior fellow, and is a practitioner member at the University of Waterloo’s Institute for Complexity and Innovation. Educated at MIT, the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), and the University of Michigan, he was for many years a senior researcher at Carleton University’s Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, and is past chairman of the Montreal Press Club’s Board of Directors.

Articles

Iran

OTS Faces Security Test from Turkey to Central Asia

Iran's widening war has now reached the institutional space linking Turkey, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Turkey said on March 4 that NATO air defenses destroyed an Iranian ballistic missile entering Turkish airspace, while Azerbaijan said the next day that four Iranian drones crossed into Nakhchivan, injuring four people, and damaging civilian infrastructure at the exclave’s airport. Iran denied targeting Nakhchivan; in the Turkish case, the missile’s intended target has not been fully clear in public reporting. Even so, the combined effect was unmistakable. By March 7, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) had become more than a bystander to a Middle Eastern war that had earlier seemed outside its main agenda. This is what gave the OTS foreign ministers’ meeting in Istanbul its significance. The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced on March 6 that the informal meeting of the OTS Council of Foreign Ministers would be held in Istanbul on March 7, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosting. After the meeting, the ministers adopted a joint statement declaring that threats to the security of any OTS member are a matter of concern for the whole organization. That language does not make the OTS a military alliance. It does, however, show the organization moving more openly into collective political-security signaling when member states come under attack. Why Nakhchivan Matters Nakhchivan is central to the logic of this story. The exclave is an integral part of Azerbaijan, but is separated from the rest of the country. It borders Armenia, Iran, and Turkey, making it significant out of proportion to its size. A military strike there is not a routine border incident. It reaches one of the most sensitive nodes in the wider Turkic political space: it is a meeting point for Azerbaijani sovereignty, Turkish strategic concern, and Iranian proximity. Until recently, Nakhchivan’s special status and borders were anchored in the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties, which gave Turkey and Soviet Russia a formal say over the exclave’s autonomy and, it could be argued, its external security. But last year, Baku folded Nakhchivan more tightly into Azerbaijan’s domestic legal order by removing those references (along with other changes) from the constitution of the exclave, which has suddenly become a target in a much wider regional confrontation. Baku’s response to the Iranian attack showed that it saw the incident in political as well as tactical terms. President Ilham Aliyev said Azerbaijan would prepare retaliatory measures. Reuters later reported that Azerbaijan had ordered the evacuation of its diplomats from Iran, citing safety concerns. This is understandable, particularly in light of the January 27, 2023, incident when an armed attacker entered Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran and opened fire, killing the head of the embassy’s security and wounding two other staff. Baku called this a terrorist attack, evacuated most of its diplomatic personnel, and suspended embassy operations. Azerbaijani officials also said the March 5 attack on Nakhchivan violated international law, rejecting any implication that it could have been a technical mishap. The stakes widened further after...

5 months ago

CA5+UK

Central Asia and Britain Launch CA5+UK Ministerial Track

On February 26, 2026, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in London with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper at Lancaster House for the inaugural “Central Asia–UK” (CA5+UK) ministerial. Official statements described it as the first time since independence that all five Central Asian foreign ministers have met jointly with a UK foreign secretary in a single forum. They also presented the meeting as the start of a structured ministerial channel, intended to convene regularly, that can carry regional priorities while leaving bilateral agendas in place. The United Kingdom is framing the new CA5+UK channel as a replacement for scattered bilateral visits: a single ministerial venue can set shared priorities and route them into investment and services work. For the five Central Asian states, it adds another external track, widening options without forcing institutional choices. Public statements point to a practical agenda focused on trade and investment, transport connectivity, energy transition, and critical minerals, with security present chiefly as background context. The enabling layer of finance, standards, education, and professional services is also included. How the London Program Unrolled On February 25, meetings took place at the British Parliament as part of the London schedule. The five ministers met with House of Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle and held a session with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Central Asia, chaired by Pam Cox. The meetings in Parliament complemented the ministerial session at Lancaster House by widening contact beyond foreign ministries. The discussion emphasized committee-to-committee contacts, visits, and exchange of legislative practice as a complement to intergovernmental diplomacy. Parliamentary relationships and staff channels can carry attention between ministerial sessions, assisting with follow-up after cooperative contacts have been publicly established. They represent a second continuity layer: implementation often turns on routine access and working familiarity rather than on formal statements alone. Between the parliamentary program and the ministerial delegations, they also met with the United Kingdom business community at a reception in London. This was a practical companion to the new format, aiming at the conversion of diplomatic intent into projects that can be financed and executed. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev cogently highlighted the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), which operates under English common law with an independent court and arbitration system and British judges in the AIFC Court. Beyond the plenary session, a ministerial working lunch provided a venue to follow up on such initiatives. Early deliverables were not multilateral but bilateral. Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom signed a strategic roadmap on critical minerals through 2027 and paired it with education moves, including a licensed Coventry University campus in Almaty and plans involving British secondary and higher education institutions. Uzbekistan reported a Memorandum of Understanding on healthcare services that it presented as a platform for building pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, alongside separate discussions with investment and finance counterparts in London. Turkmenistan cited a 2026–2027 cooperation program between foreign ministries, and Tajikistan continued to emphasize investment and cooperation in science and education. CA5+UK Launches with Bilateral Packages...

6 months ago

Iran

Iran Volatility Tests Central Asia’s Overland Corridors

The current escalation around Iran holds the potential for transforming the long-term geopolitical configuration of Eurasia, including Central Asia. In the short and medium term, aside from the security and safety of its citizens, Central Asia's main concern is economic, because it puts stress on overland rail and trucking routes that cross Iranian territory. Central Asian exporters do not ship through the Gulf, so for now the key issue is whether an Iran-crossing land route remains reliable enough, and financeable enough, to serve as a routine outlet for trade. The Iran transit option differs from trans-Caspian reliance on ports and rail interfaces around the Caspian Sea, transiting to onward rail across the South Caucasus and into Europe. The Iran option offers a continuous land arc from Central Asian railheads and road networks into Iran, then onward to Türkiye and connected European rail networks, with the additional possibility of reaching Iran’s southern ports for Indian Ocean-facing trade. Each route has its own chokepoints, paperwork burdens, and exposure to risk premiums. Rail is efficient for bulk and container flows when schedules and documentation are stable. Trucking provides flexibility, short-notice capacity, and last-mile options, but it is more sensitive to security conditions and border clearance delays. Technical capacity at the Iran–Turkmenistan crossings is key. Recent reports of discussions in Sarakhs describe efforts to expand the use of a specialized rail logistics process whereby entire wheel assemblies are replaced on railcars to transition between different track gauges. There is also a need to address customs constraints at Sarakhs and Incheh Borun. Against that operational background, Kazakhstan has signaled diplomatic attention to Gulf partners and Jordan. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has sent messages of support to leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, followed by a similar message to Jordan, and a phone call with Qatar’s emir. The language emphasized solidarity and diplomacy and, in commercial terms, reads as partner-management. It reassures major investors and energy-market counterparts that Kazakhstan is engaged, attentive, and positioning itself for stability rather than escalation. The trans-Iran rail foundation is over a decade old. On December 3, 2014, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran inaugurated the 928-kilometer Uzen–Bereket–Gorgan railway, characterized by RFE/RL (which gave the length as 935 kilometers) as the shortest railway connecting the three states. The International Union of Railways similarly notes the inauguration of the Gorgan–Inche Boroun link on that date as part of the corridor connecting Iran to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Recent reporting suggests renewed efforts to operationalize the Iran option as a westbound channel. Uzbekistan, in cooperation with Türkiye, launched freight rail services along the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye route in 2022. The Organization of Turkic States described a December 2022 event in Tashkent as the first freight train organized from Türkiye to Uzbekistan, which anchors the same basic idea: make westbound rail via Iran more regular and more visible to logistics markets. The point is not that Iran becomes the sole answer, but that Central Asian exporters and transit states have been...

6 months ago

Middle Corridor

The World Bank Backs Kazakhstan’s Rail Shortcut

On February 19, 2026, the World Bank Board approved an $846 million IBRD guarantee to help the state-owned railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) mobilize $1.41 billion in long-term commercial financing. The financing is linked to a KTZ reform program under the umbrella “Transforming Rail Connectivity in Kazakhstan (Middle Corridor Development)” initiative. The purpose is to expand rail connectivity and upgrade logistics on Kazakhstan’s segment of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, Middle Corridor). The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will add a $564 million co-guarantee that shifts the financing away from a classic sovereign-loan model and toward private credit backed by multilateral risk coverage. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) presents this operation as part of a wider World Bank Group approach that pairs corridor capital expenditure with steps to strengthen the operator’s financial sustainability and commercial viability. The operation is structured as a two-part package. First, it finances a new 322.3-kilometer railway on a new segment between Mointy and Kyzylzhar in central Kazakhstan. This segment is meant to remove a major network detour, shorten the TITR route within Kazakhstan by 149 kilometers, ease congestion on heavily used sections, and support double-stack container operations. The line is planned with modern signaling and telecommunications, plus design provisions for later expansion and electrification. Second, it ties the construction to a reform program at KTZ, including tariff reform, exploration of alternative financing mechanisms, stronger financial and environmental management, and preparatory work for a potential initial public offering. The World Bank is structuring delivery through a Multi-Phase Programmatic Approach with the stated aim of tripling freight volumes and halving end-to-end transit times on Kazakhstan’s Middle Corridor segment by 2030. Why This Segment Matters for the Middle Corridor Inside Kazakhstan, the Mointy–Kyzylzhar line is a central connector in the Trans-Kazakhstan east–west trunk carrying traffic from the China-facing gateways at Dostyk and Khorgos toward the Caspian outlets at Aktau and Kuryk. Mointy itself is a pivotal junction where train paths, locomotives, and crews are redistributed across multiple directions; as a result, any congestion there propagates quickly into corridor-wide delays. In early 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev directed acceleration of the Trans-Kazakhstan corridor. KTZ says the expected benefits include decreased pressure on heavily used central segments, fewer locomotive changeovers at key junction points, and, on some routings, the potential to cut more than a day from transit time between the Chinese border and Aktau. The World Bank’s 2023 Middle Corridor study stressed that the corridor’s most durable growth driver is regional trade among the core corridor economies: China–Europe movements remain important, but they compete with multiple alternatives, above all maritime shipping. An infrastructure upgrade adds economic value only if it reduces variability at the handoff points where delays accumulate, including rail-to-port interfaces, Caspian coordination, and national borders. Relieving the domestic bottleneck in Kazakhstan is economically meaningful only insofar as it stabilizes arrival times to Caspian terminals, creates more room for dispatching, and helps logistics providers offer shippers more predictable end-to-end service along the TITR. The emphasis is...

6 months ago

Critical Minerals

Uzbekistan Joins a U.S. Critical Minerals Implementation Track

On February 4, 2026, in Washington, D.C., Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau signed an intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on securing supply chains for critical minerals and rare earth elements, spanning both mining and processing. A further agreement signed on February 19 brought implementation and financing to the foreground. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) signed “heads of terms” (i.e., commercial principles and essential terms of a proposed future agreement) for a Joint Investment Framework and outlined a proposed joint holding company. An agreement to establish an “investment platform” was exchanged in the presence of Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. These agreements are not a single mining deal. They combine a political instrument with a financing-and-structuring track that is intended to yield a small set of projects that can be financed and built, and they treat processing capacity and supporting infrastructure not as optional add-ons but as core deliverables. They also provide a path for early projects to full review and financing while connecting them to longer-term offtake structures that match Washington’s newer supply-shock tools, including “Project Vault.” What the MoU Changes The MoU’s immediate purpose is to align government priorities for critical minerals across the value chain while setting expectations that will later shape which financing and partners are feasible. The press agency of Uzbekistan’s foreign ministry emphasized “responsible partnership” and “long-term development” as part of the public framing, placing governance and reputational risk on the same plane as the geological givens. The MoU also leaves several items deliberately unresolved in public form. These include project annexes, deposit designations, and operational timelines. That document design-choice pushes the next phase of bilateral cooperation into working-level scoping and sequencing, where only a small number of candidate projects can be advanced into full review. At the ministerial-level meeting, Washington clarified why it was framed as supply-chain security rather than commodity trade. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that critical minerals are inputs for infrastructure, industry, and defense, while Vice President J.D. Vance stressed the expansion of production across partner networks. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, this framing is part of a broader repositioning of U.S. engagement in Central Asia, where diplomatic formats are increasingly paired with mechanisms intended to generate trackable transactions and private-sector follow-through. For Uzbekistan, what is attractive about this cooperation is the potential to convert resource endowment into a lever for industrial development, rather than treating extraction as the endpoint. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has publicly valued the country’s underground wealth at roughly $3 trillion. He has linked rising global demand for technological minerals to the case for higher value-added activity around strategic reserves, including lithium and tungsten. The same logic supports a commercially open posture. For Tashkent’s other investors, buyers, and processing partners, Uzbekistan’s diversification toward U.S.-linked capital signals non-exclusivity. Turning the MoU Into Projects The next phase is practical. A candidate project will advance only if investors and public lenders can transparently evaluate its licensing and...

6 months ago

Power Struggle

Japarov Breaks the Kyrgyz Tandem

When Kamchybek Tashiyev returned to Bishkek from medical travel abroad after losing his post as Chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), as well as the deputy chairmanship of the Cabinet of Ministers, he returned to a system already being disassembled. Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov dismissed him on February 10, ending a five-year arrangement in which the presidency and the security apparatus were closely fused. The decision deliberately dismantled the governing tandem that had defined Kyrgyzstan’s power structure since 2020. The immediate question was whether this was a closing of an episode or the opening of a new one. The first wave of moves suggests the latter: a transition toward a more personalized presidency, with the internal-security bloc fractured and its succession logic unsettled. Japarov publicly framed the decision as preempting an institutional split. He explicitly pointed to parliamentary groupings that began sorting deputies into “pro-president” versus “pro-general” camps. Russian-language coverage has tended to present the episode as an effort to end a dual-power configuration, not merely to remove one official. This narrative implies that the state’s operative center of gravity had already begun drifting away from predictable office-holding and toward informal allegiance tests. Once such a dynamic becomes evident, according to such a telling, the preservation of regime coherence often requires rapid, coercive re-centering. Domestic Political Configurations The first domestic signal was indeed speed. Along with Tashiyev, senior security officials were removed, and an acting head was installed pending parliamentary procedures. The point here was not just about personnel but about the timing: the presidency moved first, then moved again, so that no alternative pole could consolidate inside the security institutions. If the system had been built around a Japarov–Tashiyev tandem, then the immediate dismantling of Tashiyev’s proximate layers was also a message to the broader stakeholder society that the presidency would decide who inherits the southern security networks and clan linkages. Japarov was clearly conveying a signal of dominance that ruled out negotiation. A second signal came through parliament. Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu resigned shortly after the dismissal, amid reporting that he was politically close to Tashiyev and vulnerable once the security bloc shifted. Russian reporting treated the speaker’s resignation as part of the same chain reaction set off by the February 10 decree. This was part of a pattern whereby institutional actors in Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics reorient quickly toward whoever appears to be winning in the short term. Loyalty is anticipatory because the penalty for backing the wrong camp can arrive through law enforcement, prosecutorial pressure, or reputational destruction. A third signal emerged through the revived early-election debate. The open-letter campaign and talk about a “snap election” did not arise in a vacuum; it built on a preexisting argument about constitutional timing and mandate renewal. That development provided a political vocabulary for testing whether the tandem’s first stage had ended. The credible possibility of early elections has destabilized patronage, compelling every member of the political class at every level to recalculate expectations. Every political actor...

6 months ago

Z5+1

Germany Builds a Z5+1 in Central Asia

Germany’s meeting on February 11 with the five Central Asian foreign ministers in Berlin formalized the Z5+1 (“Z” for “Zentralasien”) format as a standing work channel. It joins other “plus-one” formats now crowding Central Asia that function as instruments of influence. The United States is using C5+1 to push a more deliverables-oriented agenda, including critical raw materials, and China has institutionalized leader-level summitry with accompanying treaties, grants, and transport-centered integration. The EU has elevated its relationship to a strategic partnership and is putting Global Gateway branding behind connectivity and investment. Germany’s Z5+1 is best understood as Europe’s effort to add a practical, tool-driven channel that can move faster than EU consensus in some domains while still feeding EU programming rather than competing with it. The concluding Berlin Declaration reads like a program sheet with named instruments, sector priorities, and established a direct link to the EU’s broader “Team Europe” posture through the participation of EU Special Representative Eduards Stiprais. Germany’s Z5+1 fits this competitive field as a European execution lane that can move projects forward with German instruments while staying aligned with EU programs. Berlin Defines the Tools The Z5+1 meeting in Berlin drew on a sequence that Germany has been building since its 2023 “Strategic Regional Partnership” and subsequent summits in Berlin (2023) and Astana (2024), with an explicit emphasis on Central Asian regional cooperation as a counterpart to bilateral ties. The Berlin meeting, therefore, did not attempt to invent a new regional architecture but rather added a stable ministerial format for pushing forward project lists, regulatory expectations, and finance conditions between higher-level meetings. In Berlin, Germany committed €2.7 million to a cooperation platform for the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor: a small sum by infrastructure standards, but targeted at unglamorous coordination like data-sharing, planning discipline, and institutional continuity, i.e., standards and transborder management regimes where corridor initiatives often stall. This profile complements the EU-backed Trans-Caspian Coordination Platform track, which is explicitly tied to a wider €10 billion commitment announced at the January 2024 Global Gateway investors forum for EU–Central Asia transport connectivity. and which has addressed the corridor less as a construction problem than as a finance-and-sequencing problem. Berlin also explicitly supported the commercial participation of German rail and logistics firms in transport and consulting projects, aligning with the intent to keep firm-level engagement attached to ministerial diplomacy. The declaration references export credits and investment guarantees, and links them to business-environment expectations. On the same day, the German Eastern Business Association convened a “Wirtschaftsgespräch” (economics talk) in the Foreign Office with the Central Asian delegations. There, the region was framed as strategically significant for Germany’s diversification agenda, and it was signaled that an autumn leaders’ summit is already in view. Germany’s public accounting of its regional engagement in Central Asia stresses its already-deep base of activity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular, including dozens of projects and multi-billion-euro volumes. The energy transition was mentioned, as the Berlin Declaration points to renewables, hydrogen, and climate programming that Germany is already funding...

6 months ago

TRIPP

TRIPP and the Middle Corridor After Vance

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s Armenia and Azerbaijan tour is being sold as a “peace dividend” for the South Caucasus, but for Central Asia, the significance is the infrastructure potential of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Vance’s trip is another move in positioning the new Caucasus transit route for the Middle Corridor. His visit necessarily focuses on the Armenia–Azerbaijan fix, but recent diplomatic context makes clear that it is at least equally a Central Asia to Europe proposition. Current constraints on Trans-Caspian connectivity have been the shortage of dependable shipping capacity across the Caspian, port access, and border processing times. As the European Commission pointed out last week, traffic has surged since 2022, but the next jump depends on targeted investment and practical fixes along the route. The Middle Corridor’s Central Asian Axis through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Kazakhstan’s recent moves treat the bottlenecks as practical engineering and scheduling problems. The dredging project at Kuryk aims to deepen the port approach channel to five meters to support year-round navigation. Work is scheduled for early 2026 and backed by ERSAI Caspian Contractor LLC, a joint venture between Saipem and the Kazakhstan-based business group ERC Holdings. ERSAI is a major industrial port and fabrication yard operator specializing in offshore construction, logistics, and port services in the Caspian Sea. The dredging project is tied to broader terminal and shipyard expansion designed to create a key industrial hub. Shipping capacity is the other half of that story. A plan reported late last year envisages six ferries on the Kuryk–Alat line, with the first two entering service in the first half of 2026 and additional vessels added through 2028. Even if timelines slip, the point is to create a predictable schedule. Uzbekistan’s connectivity push has been running on two tracks at once: east to west via the Caspian, and southward toward ports beyond Central Asia. In Washington, a delegation from Tashkent, led by Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov, a week ago signed a memorandum with the United States on critical minerals and rare earths. This move treats extraction and processing as a supply-chain partnership rather than a one-off investment pitch. At the same time, Uzbekistan has been pushing rule-making with corridor partners, not waiting for outsiders to do it. On February 10, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia signed a protocol covering digitalization and freight development along the Middle Corridor, including shared methods for tracking delays and pinch points. This is in line with the necessary streamlining of paperwork. TRIPP as the South Caucasus Link for Central Asia TRIPP is meant to make the Caucasus segment less fragile by adding a second path, other than the recently renovated and expanded Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway route. The U.S-backing and institutional presence are meant to create confidence and reliability. Armenia’s own published implementation framework describes a TRIPP Development Company with an initial 49-year development term and a proposed 74% U.S. share, while stating that Armenian sovereignty, law enforcement, customs, and taxation authority remain intact. This satisfies domestic Armenian...

6 months ago

Parliamentary Reform

Kazakhstan’s Draft Constitution and the Reordering of State Authority

Kazakhstan’s current constitutional reform is no longer limited to parliamentary redesign. A draft updated basic law has been released for public discussion, and it presents the effort as a review of the state’s political architecture culminating in a nationwide referendum. The draft is described as the product of months of work initiated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, with large-scale changes proposed for the country’s political system. A replacement-style text, an explicit state-architecture rationale, and a referendum endpoint together signal a reform agenda that reaches beyond legislative mechanics to the overall distribution of authority, the protection of fundamental rights, and strengthening of the rule of law. Kazakhstan’s current constitution was adopted by referendum in August 1995, replacing the January 1993 basic law. It has been amended repeatedly, including significant revisions in 1998, 2007, 2011, and 2022. The 2022 referendum package was a particularly extensive set of amendments. It presented a model of a presidential republic with a strong parliament, redistributed selected powers from the presidency to parliament, and created new parliamentary mechanisms. It also strengthened the ombudsman, enabled direct citizen appeals to the Constitutional Court, established a commissioner framework for socially vulnerable categories, established a ban on the death penalty, and set a single seven-year presidential term without the possibility of reelection. From Proposal to Draft Basic Law The current draft emerged from a process launched under Tokayev in late 2025. In September 2025, he proposed moving to a unicameral parliament, which set the reform’s initial direction. A working group was established in October 2025 to develop proposals, and in January 2026, a commission was formed to carry the work forward. The commission was chaired by Elvira Azimova, head of the Constitutional Court of Kazakhstan, linking the drafting process to the institution that reviews the basic law. The commission’s work moved beyond incremental amendments. It reviewed proposals affecting seventy-seven constitutional articles, about 84% of the current text, and that breadth drove the decision to prepare a fundamentally new basic law rather than another package of revisions. Rewriting most of the operative text shifts the reform from a parliamentary adjustment to a redesign of the state’s governing framework. The resulting draft is structured as a replacement-style document, with an updated preamble and a reorganization into eleven sections and ninety-five articles. The institutional centerpiece of the draft is a shift from a two-chamber parliament to a single chamber and to proportional representation for electing deputies. The proposed supreme legislative body, the Kurultai, would have 145 deputies, slightly fewer than the combined 148 members of the current Mazhilis and Senate of Kazakhstan. The draft also grants the Kurultai expanded powers, pairing structural consolidation with a change in how legislative authority is organized, including oversight, political accountability, and approval of key state appointments and conciliation procedures. Alongside the proposed legislature, the draft creates a national dialogue platform, the People's Council of Kazakhstan, described as the highest advisory body representing citizens’ interests and granted the right of legislative initiative. This adds a second channel for agenda-setting with...

7 months ago

Official Visit

Kazakhstan and Israel Deepen Cooperation in Astana

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s official visit to Astana on January 27, 2026, was the first by an Israeli foreign minister to Kazakhstan in 16 years, and it yielded a package of institutional and economic steps. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev received Sa’ar and Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev, holding talks that both sides framed as elevating cooperation to a new level. The two foreign ministries signed documents on diplomatic training and public diplomacy, and agreed to pursue visa-free travel for holders of ordinary passports. A Kazakhstan–Israel business forum convened in parallel, with January–November 2025 trade of about US$162.4 million cited as the baseline for expansion. The visit’s value lay in its forward-looking measures to deepen cooperation. The sides agreed to convene the Kazakhstan–Israel Joint Economic Commission at a ministerial level. This move creates a regular venue where sector priorities can be translated into specific workstreams. The Kazakhstan–Israel business forum was framed as the practical feeder for that process, as both sides publicly identified a project map running from high-tech agriculture and water-resource management through digital technologies (including artificial intelligence) to infrastructure and logistics, energy efficiency and renewables, and healthcare and pharmaceuticals. In parallel, the two foreign ministries’ political consultations, in their twelfth round, covered wider international and regional agendas, including Middle East confidence-building and peaceful-settlement initiatives. Regularizing Cooperation Channels The documents signed in Astana were narrow-gauge instruments designed to regularize contacts. The memorandum on diplomatic training provides for structured interaction in the preparation of diplomatic personnel. What this means in practice is that exchanges between the two foreign-policy services will be routinized through their training institutions rather than on an ad hoc basis. The memorandum on public diplomacy set a framework for coordinated outreach, providing an agreed approach to presenting their cooperation. Taken together, these instruments are the administrative layer that will operationalize joint political intent. The visa initiative was narrowly framed as a statement of intent to conclude a visa-exemption agreement for holders of ordinary passports, not as an agreement already in force. In practice, such a regime would lead to higher tourism flows and denser business travel. The latter development would widen the base of commercial contacts, which could in turn be carried into ministerial-level economic follow-up. The visa track is thus an enabling measure for the economic agenda. At the leadership level, Sa’ar publicly invited President Tokayev to visit Israel. This move signals an intent to sustain momentum beyond merely ministerial channels. The visit coincided with International Holocaust Remembrance Day in Kazakhstan, and Sa’ar participated in a state ceremony in Astana connected to the commemoration. The ceremony included senior officials and diplomatic representatives, with official messaging from Tokayev to Israel’s president on the occasion. The civic and humanitarian nature of this event complemented a visit that otherwise concentrated on governance mechanisms, economic priorities, and institutionalizing diplomatic follow-through. First Steps Toward Joint Projects Beyond merely listing priority sectors, the business forum also surfaced first-step commercial and quasi-commercial documents providing a basis for follow-through. Kazakhstan’s investment agency reported three signed items:...

7 months ago

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