Our People > Stephen M. Bland

Stephen M. Bland

Managing Editor and Head of Investigations

Stephen M. Bland is a journalist, author, editor, commentator, and researcher specializing in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Prior to joining The Times of Central Asia, he worked for NGOs, think tanks, as the Central Asia expert on a forthcoming documentary series, for the BBC, The Diplomat, EurasiaNet, and numerous other publications.

His award-winning book on Central Asia was published in 2016, and he is currently putting the finishing touches to a book about the Caucasus.

Articles

Film Festival

Eurasian Film Festival in London Showcases Cinema from Central Asia and Beyond

The ninth edition of the ECG Eurasian Film Festival has concluded in London, bringing together films from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the wider post-Soviet space. The festival, held in partnership with the Romford Film Festival, was created to promote Eurasian cinema in the English-speaking world and connect filmmakers from the region with international audiences and industry professionals. It is also listed by FestivalFinder, the European Festivals Association’s platform for film festivals. The festival still gives filmmakers from smaller Eurasian film industries access to London audiences and industry professionals. Too often, movies from across Eurasia are framed through a narrow lens as “regional,” “political,” or useful mainly for their cultural differences. The London program suggests something broader. Its strongest entries were not simply statements about places, but stories about youth, memory, technology, art, identity, and imagination. This year, the top prize went to K-Poper by Iranian director Ebrahim Amini. The film follows a teenage girl who becomes fascinated by a Korean pop star and dreams of traveling to Seoul, despite her mother’s opposition. It is a story rooted in Iran, but its subject is immediately recognizable: pop culture, generational tension, and the private worlds young people build for themselves. Other winners showcased the range of the program. The animation prize went to Swiss photographer Bellopropello for a film about the way smartphones are reshaping human behavior. Best Documentary was awarded to Russian director Vladimir Sumashedov for a film about an artist who tries to confront the violence of World War II through art. The Best Book Trailer award went to Armenian writer Elena Aslanyan’s The Gold of the Aryans. Central Asian works also formed a key part of the selection. The Uzbek film Batyr Zakirov & Frank Sinatra: The Meeting That Could Have Happened... won the Audience Choice Award, imagining a cultural encounter between the Soviet East and American popular music. Kazakhstan was represented by Saule Rysbaeva’s Children, the Seeds of the Future, while Uzbekistan’s Legends of the Great Silk Road revisited the region’s cultural inheritance through animation. The value of festivals like ECG is not only in the awards. It is in giving audiences a chance to see Eurasian cinema as cinema first: varied, ambitious, and fully part of the global film conversation.

1 month ago

EAEU

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....

1 month ago

Fuel prices

Central Asia Feels Fuel Strain as Kazakhstan Prices Edge Higher

Kazakhstan's fuel market is moving into a new phase after the end of the government freeze on AI-92 gasoline and diesel. Pump prices have risen by small amounts so far. Retail prices are rising cautiously amid growing pressure from neighbors where fuel costs more. Kazakhstan still has some of the cheapest gasoline in the region, but that advantage creates a risk: cheap fuel attracts cross-border demand and makes it harder to fund the refining capacity the country says it needs. On October 16, 2025, Kazakhstan's government introduced a moratorium on further increases in AI-92 gasoline and diesel as part of a wider anti-inflation package. The decision also put the Energy Ministry, the competition agency, and regional authorities in charge of keeping supplies stable. The measure came after inflation and tariff reforms had raised concerns about household costs. The freeze ended on April 1, 2026, but by mid-April, the Energy Ministry was still trying to calm expectations. Kazinform cited Vice Minister of Energy Kaiyrkhan Tutkyshbayev on April 14 as saying most prices had risen mainly by one tenge after the moratorium was lifted, and that the state would not allow a sharp jump. The tone matched what drivers were seeing: a controlled rise rather than a sudden reset. The memory of January 2022, when an LPG price jump helped spark unrest, still hangs over fuel policy. The end of the freeze also fed into inflation expectations. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov warned in April that renewed growth in fuel prices and utility tariffs had to be handled cautiously, because a sharp reset could reverse the slowdown in inflation. The National Bank later said reforms in utility tariffs and fuel prices accounted for 32.9% of household inflation expectations in March. That made the fuel moratorium more than a pump-price measure: it was one of the state’s main tools for containing expectations while inflation remained in double digits. An April 9 check by Tengri Auto found that most filling stations in Almaty and the surrounding area were still selling fuel close to the previous price range. Several major networks, however, had already moved AI-92 toward 240 tenge per liter. AI-95, which was not covered by the main freeze, had risen to 328 tenge at one network. A Kazinform market check published on May 25 showed the same gradual pattern. AI-92 was listed at 238-239 tenge per liter in Astana, 238-241 tenge in Almaty, and 224-227 tenge in Shymkent. Diesel stood at 329 tenge in Astana, 330-337 tenge in Almaty, and 332-335 tenge in Shymkent. The figures point to a market that is moving, but still under close control. Fuel is also feeding into Kazakhstan's broader inflation picture. The Bureau of National Statistics put annual inflation at 10.6% in April 2026. Petrol prices were up 16.1% year-on-year and added 0.53 percentage points to annual price growth. Transport as a category added 1.1 percentage points. Fuel is one of the costs households notice most directly, and its effects spread through freight, food distribution, agriculture, taxis,...

1 month ago

Water Security

Dushanbe Water Talks Put Tajikistan’s Climate Diplomacy in Focus

Conference-related events began in Dushanbe on Monday, May 25, as Tajikistan hosts the Fourth High-Level International Conference on the International Decade for Action “Water for Sustainable Development,” 2018-2028. The week gives Tajikistan a fresh stage for a role it has built for years: using water, climate risk, and glacier protection as its clearest route into global diplomacy. President Emomali Rahmon gave the week an early political signal when he met three senior U.N. officials in Dushanbe: Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana, U.N. Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of ESCAP; Retno Marsudi, U.N. Under-Secretary-General and Special Envoy on Water; and Tshilidzi Marwala, Rector of the United Nations University and U.N. Under-Secretary-General. Their arrival tied the conference directly to the Dushanbe Water Process, a platform Tajikistan has used to keep water on the international agenda. The Tajik presidential press service said 14 U.N. resolutions on water resources have been adopted at Tajikistan’s initiative. For a small, mountainous country with limited geopolitical weight, that record has become a useful diplomatic asset. Tajikistan can convene governments, U.N. agencies, development banks, and water experts around a topic shaped by its geography. The conference runs from May 25 to 28, with Monday set aside for forums, side events, and regional consultations. The main high-level sessions are set to take place on May 26 and 27 at the Kohi Somon Complex, followed by field visits on May 28. Asia-Plus reported that more than 2,500 participants were expected, including representatives from 31 countries and 33 international organizations and financial institutions. The agenda links Tajikistan’s national concerns to a wider U.N. timetable. The Dushanbe events are designed as a preparatory step before the 2026 United Nations Water Conference, now scheduled for December 8-10 in Abu Dhabi, and co-hosted by the United Arab Emirates and Senegal. Tajik officials are also presenting the process as a bridge towards 2028, when the Water Action Decade reaches its final year. Tajikistan has spent more than two decades building this diplomatic niche. The International Decade for Action “Water for Sustainable Development,” 2018-2028 began on World Water Day in 2018 and ends on World Water Day in 2028. The Dushanbe Water Process was then shaped as a regular follow-up platform, including for voluntary commitments made under the U.N. Water Action Agenda. That structure has given Tajikistan repeated opportunities to host, frame, and guide discussion rather than appear only as a country seeking aid. Tajikistan’s glaciers, rivers, hydropower system, and mountain communities all face pressure from climate change. The U.N. glaciers initiative has put new attention on glacier retreat, and Tajikistan has pushed glacier preservation as part of its global water agenda. In Central Asia, melting glaciers and shifting river flows affect more than one country; they shape energy supply, irrigation, disaster risk, and food security. Water also connects Tajikistan to its neighbors. The region’s major rivers cross borders, and upstream water use affects downstream farms and cities. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan hold much of the mountain headwater geography, while Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan depend heavily on reliable flows for...

1 month ago

Sanctions

Kyrgyzstan Orders 50 Companies to Cease Activity Over Sanctions Risks

Kyrgyzstan has ordered 50 companies to cease activity after state agencies flagged them for sanctions risks, as Bishkek faces growing pressure over Russia-linked trade and payment channels. The move follows months of pressure from Western governments, which say some routes through Central Asia can be used to bypass sanctions imposed over the war in Ukraine. The Ministry of Justice did not name the companies, their owners, or their sectors. It also did not say whether any of them had direct links to Russia. The list was prepared by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce and other state bodies after checks into possible attempts to evade sanctions restrictions. The order was issued under an interagency mechanism for identifying dishonest participants in foreign economic activity and transactions with increased sanctions risks. The mechanism allows state bodies to use a simplified procedure to terminate the activity of legal entities after a formal submission. The Justice Ministry linked the move to efforts to protect the national economy from possible secondary sanctions. The European Union adopted its 20th sanctions package against Russia on April 23, less than a month before the Ministry of Justice order. The package added measures on energy, finance, trade, and crypto channels. It also used the EU’s anti-circumvention tool against Kyrgyzstan for the first time. Under that measure, the EU banned exports of computer numerical control machines and radios to Kyrgyzstan when there is a high risk that the goods will be re-exported to Russia. The Council of the EU said trade data showed a sharp rise in re-exports of common high-priority items through Kyrgyzstan to Russia. The EU treats the goods as sensitive because they can support industrial production, communications, and military-linked supply chains. The financial aspect of the sanctions has also reached Kyrgyzstan. The EU said it was targeting four financial institutions in third countries for circumventing sanctions or connecting to Russia’s financial messaging system. Local media identified Keremet Bank and Capital Bank as the Kyrgyz banks included in the package. The EU also designated a Kyrgyz entity that operates a platform where significant amounts of the A7A5 stablecoin are traded. Local outlets identified the entity as TengriCoin, registered in Bishkek, and linked it to the Meer platform. The pressure on Kyrgyz banks and crypto companies has been growing. The U.S. Treasury designated Keremet Bank in January 2025, saying the bank had coordinated with Russian officials and Promsvyazbank, a sanctioned Russian state defense lender, to support cross-border transfers. In August 2025, the UK government sanctioned Capital Bank of Central Asia, its director Kantemir Chalbayev, Grinex, Meer, TengriCoin, Old Vector, and other targets linked to Russian payment and crypto channels. London said the ruble-backed A7A5 token had moved $9.3 billion on a dedicated crypto exchange in four months. Kyrgyz officials have rejected the broader claim that the country helps Russia evade sanctions. The Foreign Ministry said on April 28 that Kyrgyzstan acts within national laws and its international obligations. It said Bishkek had supplied the requested documents to European partners...

2 months ago

Critical Minerals

Central Asia Seeks More Local Value From Critical Minerals

Rising demand for critical minerals is drawing Central Asia deeper into global supply chains, but the region’s harder test is not whether it has the deposits. It is whether more value can stay at home. Copper, tungsten, graphite, antimony, rare earths and other metals now sit at the center of battery production, power grids, chips, weapons systems, and renewable energy. Governments across the region want the sector to bring capital, jobs, and technology. The risk is another cycle in which raw materials leave the region, and most of the value is created elsewhere. The scale of the region’s reserves explains why outside interest is rising. An OECD review of critical raw materials in Central Asia says the region holds 39% of global manganese ore reserves, 31% of chromium, 20% of lead, 13% of zinc, 9% of titanium, 6% of aluminum, and 5% each of copper, cobalt, and molybdenum. The same review says Kazakhstan can export 21 of the 34 critical raw materials on the EU list, while Kyrgyzstan has the world’s third-largest antimony reserves, and Uzbekistan has the world’s eleventh-largest copper reserves. Uranium widens the picture: Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer, accounting for 39% of mined uranium supply in 2024, according to the World Nuclear Association. Kazakhstan has moved fastest in turning this base into policy. The prime minister’s office says the country will spend about $500 million over three years on geological exploration and modernizing infrastructure. The plan includes seismic surveys, new data systems, and a geological cluster in Astana. The government wants to raise geological study coverage to 2.2 million square kilometers. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has linked the sector to Kazakhstan’s wider industrial plans. In his 2025 state-of-the-nation address, Tokayev said the mining and metallurgical complex still had “significant growth potential, particularly in the production of high-value-added products.” New discoveries have sharpened that push. Kazakhstan’s industry ministry said in 2025 that geologists had identified the Zhana Kazakhstan rare earth site, with estimated resources of more than 20 million metric tons. The site contains neodymium, cerium, lanthanum, and yttrium. Officials have also cited the Kuirektykol site in the Karaganda Region, where confirmed reserves are estimated at 795,800 tons, with total resources estimated at 935,400 tons. Uzbekistan is making its strongest move in copper and processing capacity. In March, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev launched Copper Concentrator No. 3 at the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex. The $2.7 billion facility is designed to process 60 million tons of ore and produce about 900,000 tons of copper concentrate per year. Once fully operational, it is expected to raise daily concentrate output at Almalyk from 2,400 tons to 5,000 tons. Uzbekistan’s minerals push has also drawn U.S. support. Uzbekistan and the United States signed a memorandum on critical minerals and rare earth supply chains in February, giving Tashkent a clearer place in Washington’s effort to diversify critical minerals supply chains beyond China. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation later signed a Joint Investment Framework with Uzbekistan, stating that this would “promote cooperation...

2 months ago

State Visit

Erdoğan Visit Puts Trade, Transit, and Turkic Economic Integration at Center of Kazakhstan’s OTS Push

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Kazakhstan comes as Astana is trying to give the Organization of Turkic States a more practical economic role, linking trade, investment, transport, digital development, and business financing across the Turkic world. The visit centered on three connected events: Erdoğan’s official visit to Astana, the sixth meeting of the Kazakhstan-Turkey High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, and the informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States in Turkistan. Erdoğan arrived in Astana ahead of talks with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, while Turkish media reported that the agenda included transport links through the Middle Corridor, Caspian transit routes, energy security, logistics, defense industry cooperation, trade and investment. The visit also carried strong symbolic staging. According to Akorda, Erdoğan’s aircraft was escorted by Kazakh Air Defense fighter jets after entering Kazakhstan’s airspace. At Astana airport, he was greeted by an honor guard, children waving the flags of Kazakhstan and Turkey, and military helicopters displaying the national symbols of both countries. Erdoğan later said the welcome had brought his delegation “enormous joy,” adding, “We certainly will not forget this.” [caption id="attachment_48862" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Kazakh aircraft fly over Astana during the ceremonial welcome for Erdoğan. Image: Akorda[/caption] The OTS summit is being hosted by Kazakhstan on May 15 in Turkistan under the theme “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” According to the organization, the summit is intended to advance cooperation on artificial intelligence, digital innovation, emerging technologies, public services, sustainable economic growth, and regional connectivity. The digital theme reflects Kazakhstan’s effort to give the OTS a more practical economic role, beyond its cultural and diplomatic foundations. Ahead of the summit, Astana hosted a business forum on May 13 under the title “Economic Integration and Cooperation of the OTS Countries: New Opportunities in Industry, Agro-Industrial Complex, Logistics and Digitalization.” Kazakhstan’s prime minister’s office said the forum brought together state bodies, financial institutions, chambers of commerce, international organizations, and business representatives from OTS countries. Kanat Sharlapayev, chairman of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Turkic States and of the presidium of Kazakhstan’s Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, urged Turkic countries to move toward deeper industrial and digital integration. He said the task was to create a unified digital environment, reduce the distance between producers and consumers, increase transparency, and speed up transactions. The forum also discussed plans for joint industrial facilities and manufacturing zones along transport corridors, an idea that would push OTS cooperation beyond transit toward processing and value-added production. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin used the forum to frame OTS cooperation as one of Kazakhstan’s foreign economic priorities. He said the OTS countries form a market of more than 170 million people and have significant industrial, transport, agricultural, and human potential. He also said the main task was to move from declarations to joint projects, new production, technology alliances, and mutual investment. Silk Way TV reported that Murat Karimsakov, chairman of the Kazakh Chamber of International Commerce, said trade turnover among OTS countries increased...

2 months ago

Energy Security

Kazakhstan Targets 2027 Exit From Routine Russian Electricity Imports

Kazakhstan wants to stop buying electricity from Russia by 2027. The challenge is whether it can do so while keeping homes warm, mines running, and fast-growing regions supplied when demand peaks. The target is a test of whether the country can close a power deficit caused by years of underinvestment, rising demand, aging thermal plants, and uneven regional supply. The goal was restated this month by Deputy Energy Minister Sungat Yessimkhanov, who said Kazakhstan expects to reduce its electricity shortfall this year and bring it down to zero in 2027. The pledge builds on earlier government comments that Kazakhstan would cut imports as new domestic capacity comes online. In February 2025, Yessimkhanov told Kazinform that Kazakhstan planned to reduce electricity imports from Russia and could stop buying foreign electricity once planned capacity was commissioned in 2027. The gap is small on paper, but it carries political weight. Kazakhstan may be energy-rich, but its electricity system has been running short. The country produces coal, oil, gas, uranium, and growing volumes of renewable power, yet it still relies on imports from Russia to cover gaps between generation and consumption. In 2025, Kazakhstan generated 123.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity and consumed 124.6 billion kilowatt-hours, according to a January government meeting on new capacity. Installed capacity rose from 25.3 gigawatts to 26.7 gigawatts, but demand still exceeded domestic generation. Data from KEGOC, Kazakhstan’s national grid operator, shows how narrow the margin has become. In 2025, the gap between production and consumption was 1.4956 billion kilowatt-hours. KEGOC said the shortfall was covered by supplies from the Russian energy system. Kazakhstan received 4.6388 billion kilowatt-hours from Russia and sent 2.1595 billion kilowatt-hours back. That left a net power flow from Russia of 2.4793 billion kilowatt-hours, down from 3.4111 billion kilowatt-hours in 2024. The planned 2027 shift does not mean Kazakhstan will disconnect from Russia’s grid. The objective also fits a wider pattern in Astana’s energy policy: not breaking with Russia, but reducing the number of areas in which Russia is the default route, supplier, or emergency backstop. In oil and trade, Astana has been trying to expand alternatives to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route through Russia, including through the Middle Corridor. In electricity, the logic is narrower but similar. Ending Russian power imports would not make Kazakhstan energy-independent, but it would turn one more Russian-linked dependency from a structural need into a contingency option. Kazakh energy analyst Zhakyp Khairushev made this distinction in comments to LS, stating that Kazakhstan has a real chance to reach annual self-balance in 2027, but a stable surplus will be harder. The key issue is not only installed capacity, but available capacity during peak hours, winter demand spikes, and repair periods. A megawatt of wind or solar power does not play the same role as a megawatt of coal, gas, or flexible generation during a cold evening. Kazakhstan’s deficit is not only about total output; it is also about where electricity is produced, when it is available, and whether the grid...

2 months ago

Victory day

No Tanks on Red Square as Moscow’s Victory Day Pull Fades in Central Asia

Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9 is set to be more restrained this year, with tanks, armored vehicles, and missile systems absent from Red Square for the first time in nearly two decades. The Russian Defense Ministry cited the “current operational situation,” while the Kremlin blamed what it called Ukrainian “terrorist activity.” Russia also reported drone attacks aimed at Moscow in the days before the ceremony, and security around President Vladimir Putin has been tightened. The reduced scale of the parade carries a resonance beyond Russia. Victory Day remains one of the most emotionally charged dates in the post-Soviet calendar, including in Central Asia, where families still remember relatives who fought, died, or labored during World War II. But across the region, the holiday has increasingly been placed inside national calendars rather than left as part of Russia’s political script. The contrast with last year is sharp. In 2025, Moscow marked the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat with its largest Victory Day parade since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Chinese troops marched on Red Square, Xi Jinping sat beside Putin, and foreign leaders attended from across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet space. Tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, drones, and other military hardware rolled through the square. This year’s guest list is more limited. The Kremlin’s initial list of foreign delegations included leaders and senior figures from Belarus, Laos, Malaysia, Slovakia, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. Attendance has also been hard to read. Earlier reports said Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov were expected in Moscow, while the Kremlin’s initial published list of foreign guests did not include any Central Asian presidents. On May 8, however, Kazakh and Uzbek media reported that Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev were traveling to Moscow for Victory Day events. The late confirmations complicate the picture, but they do not restore the full regional show of unity seen in the last two years, when all five Central Asian presidents were present at the Moscow parade. It does suggest, however, that Moscow’s political ownership of the date is less automatic than it once was. Victory Day, which commemorates the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in what Russia calls the Great Patriotic War, has long been one of the main rituals of modern Russian power. It draws large television audiences, fills public space with military symbolism, and presents the Kremlin as the guardian of a sacred national memory. The holiday speaks of sacrifice and family loss, but also of nationalism and state control over history. Putin has used that language repeatedly. On May 9, 2024, after appearing on Red Square in snowfall, he said Russia was going through a “difficult, milestone period,” and warned: “We will not allow anyone to threaten us. Our strategic forces are always in combat readiness.” In 2025, he used the 80th anniversary parade to link Soviet wartime memory to Russia’s current war, saying...

2 months ago

Energy Security

Uzbekistan’s Gas Output Falls by 15% as Imports Rise

Uzbekistan’s natural gas production fell by 15% in the first quarter of 2026, adding pressure to an energy system already strained by rising demand, aging infrastructure, and lower hydrocarbon output. The country produced 9.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas in January-March, down from 11.3 billion in the same period last year. The figures are based on data from Uzbekistan’s National Statistics Committee, which also listed declines in oil, coal, and gas condensate production. Oil output fell to 157,300 tons in the first quarter, compared with 160,800 tons in the same period last year. Coal production declined from 1.2 million tons to 1.1 million tons, while gas condensate output fell even more sharply, dropping from 296,600 tons to 242,300 tons. Motor gasoline production rose to 313,200 tons, while diesel output increased to 280,900 tons. The latest data reflect a longer shift in Uzbekistan’s energy balance. Uzbekistan was long a net gas exporter, supported by large Soviet-era fields, a broad domestic gas network, and access to the Central Asia-China pipeline system. That position has weakened as older fields have declined and domestic use has grown. Uzbekistan now has to cover demand from households, power plants, industry, and transport while trying to modernize the sector. That task is getting harder. The country’s permanent population reached 38.2 million people as of January 1, 2026, according to official statistics, leading to more strain on the grid. Imports have risen sharply to meet these needs. Uzbekistan spent $360.5 million on natural gas imports in the first quarter of 2026, a 2.2-fold increase from the same period last year. Meanwhile, gas export revenues fell to $36.7 million, down from $94.3 million a year earlier. That shift has regional weight. Uzbekistan imports gas from Russia and Turkmenistan. Russian gas reaches Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan, using a Soviet-era pipeline route that once moved gas in the opposite direction. Uzbekistan began receiving Russian gas in 2023, as Moscow sought new markets after losing much of its European gas business. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russian gas exports to Uzbekistan rose by about 30% in 2025, reaching more than 7 billion cubic meters through the Central Asia-Center pipeline system. Tashkent and Moscow have since discussed larger energy supplies. In April, Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin agreed to increase deliveries of Russian oil and gas to Uzbekistan. The talks also covered wider cooperation in energy, industry, transport, and agriculture. More imports can help Uzbekistan avoid shortages, especially in winter, while supporting power generation and reducing pressure on households. But they also bring new costs, with higher imports weighing on the trade balance and increasing reliance on outside suppliers. That is a sensitive issue for a country trying to expand its domestic industry and keep energy prices stable. The government is trying to slow the production decline. Uzbekneftegaz has said that exploration work added 2 billion cubic meters of gas reserves and 40,000 tons of liquid hydrocarbon reserves in the first quarter. The company...

2 months ago

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