Our People > Stephen M. Bland

Stephen M. Bland

Managing Editor and Head of Investigations

Stephen M. Bland is a journalist, author, editor, commentator, and researcher specializing in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Prior to joining The Times of Central Asia, he worked for NGOs, think tanks, as the Central Asia expert on a forthcoming documentary series, for the BBC, The Diplomat, EurasiaNet, and numerous other publications.

His award-winning book on Central Asia was published in 2016, and he is currently putting the finishing touches to a book about the Caucasus.

Articles

Regional Ecological Summit

Kazakhstan’s Regional Ecological Summit 2026: What It Is and Why It Matters

Kazakhstan’s Regional Ecological Summit 2026 in Astana on April 22-24 is aiming to turn Central Asia’s environmental strain into a regional political agenda. Organized in partnership with the United Nations, the summit is built around the theme, “Shared Vision for a Resilient Future.” Its stated purpose is to bring together governments, international organizations, lenders, businesses, researchers, and civil society to push for joint and practical responses to climate and ecological pressures across the region. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev first proposed hosting a regional climate summit in Kazakhstan under UN auspices during his 2023 speech at the 78th session of the UN General Assembly. By 2026, that idea had broadened into a wider environmental summit covering climate transition, adaptation, food security, natural resource management, air pollution, waste, finance, and environmental skills. The official key thematic directions show that this is no longer a narrowly framed climate conference. It is being presented as a broader Central Asian platform for ecological cooperation. In Central Asia, ecological stress now shapes core state concerns, from farming and energy to public health and cross-border cooperation. That gives the Astana summit a broader role than a standard environment conference. That shift reflects real regional pressures. Central Asia faces chronic water stress, glacier retreat, desertification, air pollution, and growing strain on ecosystems. The summit’s organizers say the meeting is meant to produce joint solutions rather than another round of abstract pledges. The UN in Kazakhstan says the summit is expected to advance shared regional responses and identify green financing needs, while a second UN page states that one planned outcome is a Joint Declaration by the heads of state of Central Asia, alongside a 2026-2030 Programme of Action developed with the United Nations. Tokayev’s own language explains the summit’s pitch. On August 5, 2025, speaking at the Third United Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries in Awaza, Turkmenistan, he said, “Many developing countries without access to the sea are facing water scarcity, glacier melt, desertification, and other extreme weather events. Addressing these challenges requires coordinated regional efforts and strong international support. At the same time, I believe that measures to combat climate change must remain balanced and inclusive, and respond to the legitimate development needs of countries. To strengthen our joint efforts in addressing climate change, I invite you to the Regional Ecological Summit, which will be held in Astana in partnership with the United Nations.” The wording shows how Kazakhstan wants to frame the event. Central Asia’s environmental problems cross borders, but the response, in Tokayev’s view, must also accommodate growth, infrastructure, and development. That is why the summit is being presented not just as a climate gathering, but as a forum linking ecological policy, investment, technology, and state planning. The EXPO component is part of that design. Government and investment-promotion pages say the parallel exhibition will focus on green technologies, ESG tools, and practical climate solutions, linking diplomacy to project finance and implementation. The summit’s speaker list underlines its international reach. The official RES 2026 page includes...

3 weeks ago

Antalya Diplomacy Forum

Central Asia Came to Antalya With a Clearer Voice and a Wider Agenda

The Antalya Diplomacy Forum, from April 17 to 19, brought together heads of state, foreign ministers, and senior officials at a tense moment in international politics. The official theme, “Mapping Tomorrow, Managing Uncertainties,” reflected the backdrop: war in the Middle East, pressure on trade, and growing doubts about the strength of international institutions. Central Asia did not dominate the gathering, but the region was visible across the program and in the meetings around it. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was the highest-profile regional figure in attendance, while Kyrgyzstan sent Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev, Turkmenistan sent Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and Tajikistan sent Deputy Foreign Minister Farrukh Sharifzoda. Uzbekistan was also active through Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov in meetings held during the forum dates. The strongest Central Asian intervention came from Tokayev. Speaking at a panel session, he said the United Nations remains indispensable, but also made clear that its present structure is failing to keep up with current crises. “We must honestly acknowledge that the Security Council is the central element in the reform of the United Nations,” he said. He also warned that many key negotiations now take place outside the UN system, in separate capitals and closed rooms, rather than through the institution that was built for that purpose. Tokayev framed the problem in practical terms rather than abstract ones. He said global leaders must approach peace and security “with a strong sense of responsibility,” adding that “we must act more responsibly and exercise restraint.” Tokayev also said Kazakhstan calls on all countries involved in the Iran conflict to cease hostilities while keeping the focus on the core issue of nuclear proliferation. His language matched the line Astana has tried to hold for years: avoid escalation, preserve room for dialogue, and keep diplomatic channels open. Tokayev went further when he turned to the role of what he called “middle powers,” naming Kazakhstan and Türkiye among the states that, in his view, show a high degree of responsibility in both diplomacy and practice. He said it would “not be an exaggeration to say that today middle powers often demonstrate a greater degree of responsibility than major powers represented in the Security Council, which, regrettably, often obstruct the resolution of key global issues.” That was one of the sharper lines delivered at the summit. It also showed how Kazakhstan now wants to place itself in the world: not as a passive actor caught between larger powers, but as a state that can help steady an increasingly unstable system. Türkiye was central to that framing. At the start of his remarks, Tokayev praised President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s role in the region and said Kazakhstan was looking forward to Erdoğan’s state visit next month. That also reflects a broader trend of closer coordination between Kazakhstan and Türkiye, including in the Trans-Caspian transport route (Middle Corridor) and shifting Caspian dynamics. Uzbekistan approached the summit in Antalya differently. Tashkent did not have a presidential intervention on the main stage, but it used the gathering for...

3 weeks ago

China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

3 weeks ago

Hungary

Central Asia Holds Back on Hungary Election as Orbán Era Ends

Central Asian governments have still yet to issue public statements on Hungary’s election, which brought an end to Viktor Orbán’s 16-year tenure. Hungary’s National Election Office published official updates after the April 12 vote, with Orbán conceding defeat after preliminary results indicated a landslide victory for Péter Magyar’s Tisza party. European leaders responded quickly, but no comparable messages have appeared on the main official channels in Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, or Ashgabat. The absence is not a breach of diplomatic protocol. Governments often wait for formal certification or initial contacts before issuing congratulations after parliamentary elections. Yet Hungary occupies a distinct place in Central Asia’s external relations. It is an observer in the Organization of Turkic States, and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attended the informal OTS summit in Budapest, where Viktor Orbán hosted regional leaders and promoted closer ties. Hungary has presented itself as a bridge between Central Asia and the European Union, with regular high-level exchanges and expanding economic links. Recent precedent underscores the contrast. Following Hungary’s 2022 election, Kazakhstan’s Akorda said Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sent Viktor Orbán a congratulatory telegram on April 4, the day after the vote, and Uzbekistan reported that President Shavkat Mirziyoyev phoned Orbán on April 14, 2022 to offer his congratulations. No similar outreach has been made public so far in 2026. The delay reflects a period of adjustment rather than a clear shift. Orbán’s government had cultivated close personal and political ties with Central Asian leaders, and Budapest played an active role in advancing cooperation through the Turkic framework. A new Hungarian administration may recalibrate those priorities as it seeks to strengthen relations within the EU, creating uncertainty for partners that had relied on Hungary as a consistent advocate in Europe. For now, the silence signals caution. Central Asian governments appear to be waiting for the formal transition in Budapest and for early indications of the new government’s foreign policy. If statements follow in the coming days, the current pause will look procedural. If it continues, it will carry more weight as a sign of recalibration in a relationship that had been unusually close.

4 weeks ago

Iran

Central Asia Recalculates as the Iran War Enters a New Phase

Central Asia’s first response to the Iran war was public and urgent. Governments organized evacuations, welcomed a ceasefire, and watched the Strait of Hormuz because the region’s trade routes, fuel costs, and food prices were already under pressure. The next phase looks different. Following the April 12 collapse of U.S.-Iran talks in Islamabad, Washington moved to block maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. That step does not formally close Hormuz to all shipping, but it pushes the crisis into a more serious phase for any country or company still treating Iran as a viable corridor. That distinction is important in Central Asia because the region does not need a formal legal closure of Hormuz to feel the shock. It only needs insurers, banks, freight forwarders, airlines, and traders to decide that the southern option has become too risky for routine planning. That process was already underway. The route through Iran had come under strain in southern corridor traffic, food systems, and in the wider pricing of regional connectivity. A U.S. move against Iranian ports is likely to reinforce that view. Official statements across Central Asia still reflect the ceasefire moment more than the latest escalation. On April 8, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the truce and said he hoped it would support global trade and prosperity. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire and praised efforts to reduce tensions. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry did the same, calling the truce an “important step toward de-escalating tensions,” and stressing that it should serve as a pathway to a broader political settlement. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed the ceasefire agreement between Iran and the United States. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, had already taken a practical line, saying on March 4 that it was keeping all international checkpoints open and providing passage for foreign citizens, vehicles, and rail stock across the Turkmen-Iranian border. Since then, public messaging has lagged behind the latest escalation. By April 13, Qazinform’s foreign news flow had shifted to the failed Islamabad talks and Trump’s blockade order, while the latest publicly visible official positions elsewhere in the region still reflected the April 8 ceasefire. That does not mean backchannel diplomacy has stopped, but it does suggest that Central Asian governments prefer caution in public as the conflict shifts from direct strikes to pressure on shipping and trade. For the region, the economic logic is now clearer than the politics. Approximately 20% of global oil supplies and one-third of global fertilizer trade move through the Strait of Hormuz, while urea prices surged by almost 46% between February and March 2026. The World Bank’s April Europe and Central Asia Economic Update said growth in the developing economies of Europe and Central Asia is expected to slow to 2.1% in 2026, down from 2.6% in 2025, as the Middle East conflict, wider geopolitical tension, and trade fragmentation weigh on the region. Those pressures were already significant. The collapse of the main post-ceasefire diplomatic effort, followed by oil rising back above $100 a barrel, has made them harder...

4 weeks ago

Justice

Riot in Tajik Prison Leaves Several Inmates Dead

On February 3, a riot broke out in Tajikistan's Vahdat Penitentiary No. 3/2, 15 miles from Dushanbe, resulting in the deaths of several prisoners. According to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Justice, the incident occurred when nine inmates - convicted over links to Islamic State and the Jihadi Salafi movement - launched an armed attack on prison staff using improvised weapons. “As a result of the attack, three guards were seriously injured,” the ministry’s statement said. The prisoners, armed with makeshift knives, refused to comply with prison authorities and attempted to kill security personnel in an escape attempt. According to the authorities, the prison guards responded with firearms, killing three of the attackers and detaining the others. The injured staff members received medical treatment and were reported to be in stable condition. Authorities also confirmed that security at the facility has been fully restored. While official reports initially listed three inmate fatalities, some sources suggest that the actual number of prisoner deaths may be higher. Condemning the treatment of detainees by officials at the prison, the Civil Committee for the Rescue of Hostages and Political Prisoners of Tajikistan (CCHP) stated that “at least 10 prisoners were killed and a number were injured as a result of guards shooting at prisoners.” Despite reports that the detainees had briefly raised the Islamic State flag over the prison, CCHP claimed that those killed were political prisoners who had no connection to ISIS or any other banned group. History of Prison Riots in Tajikistan This is not the first violent uprising within Tajikistan’s penitentiary system. In May 2019, inmates in the same facility armed with knives took three staff members hostage and killed them. They also executed five fellow prisoners before security forces suppressed the riot. Among those killed was Behruz Halimov, son of Gulmurod Halimov, a former Tajik special forces officer who later joined ISIS. The riot left 29 prisoners dead, and Tajikistan’s Supreme Court subsequently increased the sentences of 28 convicts involved in the incident. ISIS claimed responsibility for the riot. In November 2018, a similar riot occurred in a high-security prison in Khujand, where 21 inmates and two prison staff members were killed. Five guards were also injured. Following an investigation, 33 prisoners stood trial, and nine prison officials, including the warden, received prison sentences for negligence. Broader Security Concerns In recent years, Tajikistan has witnessed numerous escape attempts from detention facilities, though nearly all have ended in failure. Most escape organizers have either been killed during apprehension or recaptured. These recurring incidents highlight ongoing security challenges within the country’s prison system and underscore the need for further reforms to prevent future outbreaks of violence.

1 year ago

Aktau Plane Crash

Aliyev Takes Aim at Russia in Azerbaijan Airlines Crash

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has intensified his criticism of Russia, accusing it of a “cover-up” over the Azerbaijan Airlines plane which crashed near the Kazakh city of Aktau on December 25. During a televised address, Aliyev expressed Azerbaijan’s “surprise, regret, and righteous indignation” over what he described as “absurd” explanations for the crash. Departing from protocol, Aliyev delivered his address in Russian, a poignant choice that heightened the gravity of his message. “I can confidently say that the guilt for the deaths of Azerbaijani citizens in this accident lies with the representatives of the Russian Federation,” Aliyev stated. “We demand justice, we demand punishment of the guilty, we demand complete transparency and humane treatment… If the city of Grozny had taken timely measures to close Russian airspace over its territory, if all the rules of ground services had been observed, and if there had been coordination between the armed forces and civil services of the Russian Federation, then this tragedy would not have happened.” On Monday, Aliyev met with the two surviving flight attendants and the families of other crew members who perished, describing them as “heroes”. The Flight Recorders In a related development, Brazil has concluded its analysis of the black boxes from Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243. The Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center (CENIPA) confirmed that the findings were handed over to Kazakhstan’s Aviation Accident Investigation Department in line with international protocols for aircraft accident investigations. These results will contribute to the final report on the incident. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia (TCA), the incident led the Commission on Aviation Incident Investigation, headed by Kazakhstan’s Minister of Transport, Marat Karabayev, to decide to send the flight recorders to Brazil’s CENIPA. The investigation was conducted by three Brazilian specialists in collaboration with Azerbaijani and Russian experts. Chronology of the Crash The incident occurred on December 25, when an Embraer 190 aircraft operated by Azerbaijan Airlines crashed near Aktau on Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea coast. The plane was flying between Baku, Azerbaijan, and Grozny, Russia. Of the 67 people on board, 38 were killed, and 29 were injured. The passengers included 37 Azerbaijani citizens, 6 Kazakhs, 3 Kyrgyz, and 16 Russians. On December 26, video footage showing small holes in the fuselage wreckage sparked speculation about possible external damage. Aviation and military analysts suggested the holes might have been caused by air defense systems, given reports from the Chechen authorities about the shooting down of Ukrainian drones in the area. This raised concerns about the potential for misidentification. [caption id="attachment_27352" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Chechen Pantsir Missile Launcher; image: Vitaly V. Kuzmin[/caption] When asked about the possibility of external fire, Kazakh Minister Marat Bozumbayev emphasized that conclusions would only be drawn after all available evidence had been examined. International Collaboration The Azerbaijani government rejected the idea of a Russian-led investigation, opting instead for an international team of experts, including representatives from Embraer. The black boxes were sent to CENIPA on December 29. The crash also prompted a temporary suspension...

1 year ago

Geopolitics

Navigating Energy and Diplomacy: Putin’s Visit to Kazakhstan

The Kremlin has confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit Kazakhstan on November 27 at the invitation of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The visit is expected to focus on several key issues, with the construction of Kazakhstan's first nuclear power plant likely to be high on the agenda. As part of the visit, the two leaders will participate in the 20th Forum of Inter-regional Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia via video conference. Additionally, Putin will attend the regular session of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Collective Security Council, chaired by President Tokayev, on November 28. The meeting will involve heads of state from Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov. The agenda includes discussions on regional and international security, with a program to strengthen Tajik-Afghan border security set to be adopted. Notably, given its currently tumultuous relationship with Russia in the wake of Azerbaijan's invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia will not participate, with its Foreign Minister, Ararat Mirzoyan having opted out of attending. Focus on Nuclear Power and the Role of a Consortium Experts believe that Putin’s visit will include discussions on nuclear energy. This aligns with recent remarks by Kazakh Energy Minister Almasadam Satkaliyev, who stated that Kazakhstan is open to discussing nuclear power plant construction with Russia, among other potential partners. Satkaliyev emphasized that energy issues remain a cornerstone of international cooperation, and Kazakhstan has established an intergovernmental commission to evaluate proposals from various vendors on a competitive basis. Kazakhstan’s First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar has highlighted the importance of forming an international consortium for the project. Speaking in September, Sklyar noted that political risks and safety concerns would be addressed during the process. He also emphasized the need to incorporate cutting-edge technologies from global leaders in the nuclear energy sector. On November 14, Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov met with Alexei Likhachev, Director General of the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom. The meeting focused on cooperation in nuclear energy, quantum technologies, digitization, and the development of human resources. Rosatom, a diversified company involved in engineering and construction, currently has 39 nuclear power units in various stages of development across ten countries. Public Support and Future Plans The potential construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan has garnered significant public support. In an October 2024 referendum, 71.2% of Kazakh voters approved the initiative. Commenting on the result, Tokayev suggested that an international consortium involving global companies with advanced technologies would be the best approach for the project. Kazakhstan’s energy landscape is characterized by a reliance on aging thermal power plants, which are increasingly unable to meet the demands of a growing population and economy, with electricity shortages projected to worsen, particularly in the rapidly developing southern regions. The construction of a nuclear power plant, therefore, is seen as a crucial step toward alleviating these shortages, reducing dependence on overpriced imports from Russia, and achieving carbon neutrality goals. The construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant presents both...

1 year ago

Crime

Russian Journalist Inessa Papernaya Found Dead in Tashkent Hotel

Russian journalist Inessa Papernaya, known for her work with lenta.ru and profile.ru, was tragically found dead in a hotel in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on October 20. It has been reported that Papernaya was in Uzbekistan on vacation, and was staying at the Karaman Palace Hotel with a companion, Maxim Radchenko, with whom she was in a long-term relationship, and whom she had traveled with in order to meet his relatives. According to reports, hotel staff knocked on the door of her room that evening while delivering a package. After receiving no response, they entered the room and discovered the bodies of Papernaya and Radchenko. An Uzbek citizen was subsequently found dead in the bathroom of another room in the hotel. Preliminary reports attributed the cause of the deaths to poisoning of “unknown origin,” with early suggestions being propagated that gas seeped into the room through the ventilation system after the hotel’s pool was cleaned on October 19-20, leading to the tragic incident. Following the discovery, authorities sealed off the Karaman Palace Hotel. The General Prosecutor’s Office of Uzbekistan has launched an investigation under Article 186 of the Uzbek Criminal Code, which covers the provision of unsafe services, and a forensic examination has been ordered to determine the precise cause of death. Relatives of Radchenko have disputed what they have described as several different versions of the deaths which have been put forward. According to Radchenko's sister, the family were initially told that "he had an epileptic seizure; she ran up to him, slipped, fell, hit herself and died. This is some kind of TV series: how do you fall? What nonsense... Then there was a version about drugs, since their bodies were in the bathroom, that meant they were drug addicts." In a further twist challenging the official narrative regarding gas seepage related to the pool being cleaned, Radchenko's sister has categorically stated that "there is no pool there." Meanwhile, no websites advertising rooms at the Karaman Palace make any mention of a pool, with some stating outright that this facility is not available. Hayat Shamsutdinov, press secretary of the General Prosecutor’s Office of Uzbekistan, has confirmed that the bodies will be transported to Moscow for a joint cremation to be held on October 25.

2 years ago

Migrants

Migrants in the Crossfire: Russia’s Recruitment for Ukraine War Sparks Tensions

Russia’s ongoing “special military operation” in Ukraine has increased the demand for additional forces, and, in response, Russia is increasingly viewing the use of migrants as a good solution to the situation. As of September 1, 2024, official figures state that 3,985,000 citizens of Central Asian countries lived in Russia. Uzbekistan leads the way with over 1,792,000 migrants, followed by Tajikistan with more than 1,231,000, Kazakhstan with 606,900, Kyrgyzstan with 262,800, and Turkmenistan with 92,000. Some Central Asian migrants have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to participate in the war, motivated mainly by financial incentives. However, economic reasons are not the only factor driving them to war. People from Central Asian countries who have received citizenship are also being threatened with imprisonment for failing to join the war effort. TCA has previously reported on efforts by officials to recruit young men detained at the Sakharovo immigration processing center to join the Russian army and fight in Ukraine. In addition, a decree issued by Vladimir Putin has simplified the process for foreigners who join the military to gain Russian citizenship. In contrast, Central Asian governments have looked to discourage their citizens from engaging in the conflict. For example, Uzbekistan has warned that any citizen involved in the Russia-Ukraine war will face legal consequences. In October 2023, an Uzbek citizen who fought in Ukraine for financial reasons was sentenced to three years in prison by a Uzbek court. The defendant had returned to Uzbekistan after being wounded in the conflict, and authorities discovered military documents and proof of his Russian citizenship during their investigation. By September 2024, a growing number of Central Asians had perished in the war, including 47 Uzbeks, 51 Tajiks, and 26 Kyrgyz nationals. In Kazakhstan, since 2014, following the start of the war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, criminal liability was been introduced for citizens who participate in armed conflicts abroad. A person who commits such an offense can be punished with imprisonment for up to 12 years, face the confiscation of property, and be deprived of their citizenship. For example, in November of last year, a 34-year-old man from Kazakhstan was imprisoned for six years and eight months for participating in the war in Ukraine. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have also applied measures involving the deprivation of liberty their citizens who participate in the war. Tajikistan’s economy significantly depends on remittances from labor migrants in Russia, which account for approximately one-third of its GDP. Despite the war in Ukraine, over 1.7 million Tajik citizens sought work in Russia in the first half of 2022. However, reports indicate that many Tajik migrants are being sent to Ukraine against their will, raising concerns. The situation further deteriorated after a terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in February 2024. Tajik nationals were among the primary suspects, leading to a shift in Russia’s attitude towards Central Asian migrants. Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister, Sirojiddin Muhriddin, expressed concerns over the violations of Tajik citizens’ rights in some CIS countries, calling for a...

2 years ago