Our People > Stephen M. Bland

Stephen M. Bland

Managing Editor and Head of Investigations

Stephen M. Bland is a journalist, author, editor, commentator, and researcher specializing in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Prior to joining The Times of Central Asia, he worked for NGOs, think tanks, as the Central Asia expert on a forthcoming documentary series, for the BBC, The Diplomat, EurasiaNet, and numerous other publications.

His award-winning book on Central Asia was published in 2016, and he is currently putting the finishing touches to a book about the Caucasus.

Articles

Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Security Risks Around Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports Ripple Through European Markets

Europe’s oil market is becoming increasingly exposed to disruption as security risks rise along export routes used by Kazakhstan, which the European Union has long viewed as a reliable alternative to Russian supply. The risks extend far beyond Ukraine itself. “Russia continues escalating its attacks and targeting civilians and civilian infrastructures,” an EU spokesperson told The Times of Central Asia. “Russia’s brutal and unacceptable attacks have left people without hot water, heating and electricity in the current weather conditions. Russia’s war of aggression has also severely impacted Black Sea maritime security, including through its use of shadow fleet vessels to circumvent international sanctions, and the persistent attacks on civilian and port infrastructure in Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine has accepted an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025. It shows that Russia does not want peace. The EU and the entire international community need to put pressure on Russia to stop its war. “Kazakhstan plays a crucial role for Europe’s energy security and has been for years a reliable partner in diversifying energy sources and ensuring a stable supply for European markets. More than 12% of all the oil imported by the EU comes from Kazakhstan, contributing to the diversification of energy sources and reducing dependency on a limited number of suppliers. The continuous and safe functioning of the supply chain is hence key also for Europe. “Maritime safety and security in the Black Sea is a fundamental component of the new EU strategic approach to the region, adopted in May 2025. The Black Sea is a critical connector between Europe, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. Ensuring maritime security and safety in this region is vital not only for the littoral States but also for broader European interests and for many partner countries, as it supports trade flows, sustainable supply chains and enhanced connectivity.” Kazakhstan produced roughly 1.8 million barrels per day in 2024 and exported the bulk of that volume. More than 80% of its crude exports move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, or CPC, which links oil fields in western Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. From there, tankers ship the oil mainly to European refiners. Under normal conditions, the pipeline carries roughly 1.3 million barrels per day, making it one of the most important single supply routes for non-Russian crude entering Europe. Recent events have shown how sensitive European markets are to any disruption along that corridor. On January 14, Bloomberg reported that oil prices in Europe strengthened after shipments of CPC Blend fell short of expectations. Traders cited reduced availability of the light, low-sulfur crude, which is favored by European refiners, forcing buyers to seek alternative grades at higher prices. Despite the recent tightening, traders say the market has so far absorbed disruptions without severe shortages, reflecting high inventories and flexible refinery operations, though that buffer could narrow if attacks persist. That supply pressure followed a series of security incidents in the Black Sea, where commercial shipping and port infrastructure have...

6 months ago

russian media

Russia Says TV Host’s Remarks on Central Asia Do Not Reflect State Policy

Russia’s Foreign Ministry moved on January 16 to distance the Kremlin from comments by television host Vladimir Solovyov after his remarks about potential military action in Central Asia provoked backlash across the region. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that comments by television presenters do not represent the official position of the Russian government and that Russia’s foreign policy is articulated only through authorized state channels, with relations with Central Asian countries described as based on partnership and respect for sovereignty. The clarification followed criticism in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan after Solovyov suggested that Moscow could extend its “special military operation” framework beyond Ukraine and into Central Asia. In Kyrgyzstan, public calls emerged to restrict Solovyov’s entry into the country, while officials indicated that the government would respond differently if similar claims were made by Russian state officials rather than a media figure. In Kazakhstan, political commentators warned that rhetoric questioning sovereignty risked damaging relations with Russia, even in the absence of a formal diplomatic protest. Solovyov made the remarks during a January 10 broadcast of his program “Solovyov Live.” During the segment, he described Central Asia as part of Russia’s sphere of influence and argued that international law should not constrain Moscow’s actions in territories it considers strategically important. He drew parallels with Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine and implied that states within Russia’s perceived geopolitical space could be treated differently from countries outside it. The language resonated strongly in Uzbekistan, where academics, analysts, and commentators criticized the implication that sovereignty could be conditional. Public discussion focused on the suggestion that Central Asian states might face pressure based on historical ties rather than be treated as independent actors. Critics described the framing as inconsistent with the principles of statehood established after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. An Uzbek academic later issued a rebuttal rejecting the idea that Central Asia could be treated as a single external “zone” governed by different rules. The response emphasized that regional states have distinct political systems, alliances, and security priorities, and that none had delegated authority over those choices to outside powers. The episode highlighted the influence of Russian political talk shows during wartime. Figures like Solovyov command large domestic audiences and operate in an environment where commentary often overlaps with geopolitical messaging. In Central Asia, such remarks attract close scrutiny regardless of whether they carry formal policy status, particularly when they echo language used by Russian officials in other conflicts. Economic and social ties heighten that sensitivity. Millions of Central Asian citizens work in Russia, and remittances remain a significant factor in several regional economies. Russia also plays a role in regional security arrangements and energy transit routes. Statements implying that sovereignty could be overridden therefore carry weight far beyond television studios. No Central Asian government has announced formal diplomatic measures in response to Solovyov’s remarks, and Moscow’s intervention appears to have contained the immediate fallout. The episode nonetheless shows how rhetoric shaped by the war in Ukraine readily carries...

6 months ago

U.S. Visa Bond

U.S. Expands Visa Bond Policy for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan

The United States has expanded a visa bond policy that increases the upfront cost of short-term travel for citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and dozens of other countries. Under the policy, applicants for B-1 and B-2 business and tourism visas may be required to post bonds of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000. The State Department set out the latest rules and the country list on its visa bond policy page. The program now covers nationals from 38 countries. In Central Asia, it was applied to Turkmenistan on January 1, and is scheduled to extend to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan starting from January 21. The bond is refundable when travelers follow visa terms and leave on time, but it can tie up large sums for the duration of a trip and may put U.S. travel beyond reach for many applicants. Turkmenistan, where emigration is tightly controlled, sees low numbers of its citizens entering the United States. Department of Homeland Security data for Fiscal Year 2024 indicates that the total number of Turkmen nationals issued B-1/B-2 visas to the U.S. was 1,759. Tajikistan, meanwhile, saw 1,772 visas granted, and Kyrgyzstan 9,625. By way of comparison, Saudi Arabia saw over 54,000 visas granted. The expansion has already triggered public pushback in Kyrgyzstan. In a post on X on Thursday, Edil Baisalov, the deputy chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet of Ministers and a prominent ally of President Sadyr Japarov, urged the Kyrgyz authorities to review visa-free access for U.S. citizens. Kyrgyzstan currently allows U.S. travelers to enter without a visa for stays of up to 30 days. “I believe that we should initiate a review of our visa-free regime for U.S. citizens following the new visa requirements announced yesterday by the State Department, under which Kyrgyz citizens are required to pay a visa deposit of up to $15,000 when submitting visa applications,” Baisalov wrote. “Visa policy is a matter of parity and mutual respect. If such high barriers are introduced for our citizens, we cannot pretend that nothing has happened.” Baisalov did not specify precisely what changes Kyrgyzstan might pursue, and any escalation risks provoking a dispute with a far stronger partner. The remarks also come as Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian governments seek closer engagement with President Donald Trump’s administration while managing competing pressures from Russia and China. The measure is a setback for Kyrgyz efforts to ease travel barriers with the United States. Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Zheenbek Kulubaev raised visa issues with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau during a meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September. So far, Tajikistan has not matched Kyrgyzstan’s public stance, with no prominent statement appearing on Tajik government channels addressing the bond requirement or signaling reciprocity. Discussion has instead focused on what the new U.S. rules mean for applicants, the implementation timeline, and the bond amounts that may be set at the interview stage. For Turkmenistan, the requirement adds another hurdle to an already narrow path to U.S. travel. The country’s...

6 months ago

Cryptocurrency

Turkmenistan Opens Door to Crypto Mining, Keeps Firm Grip on Exchanges

Turkmenistan has taken a rare step toward opening a tightly controlled economy by legalizing cryptocurrency mining and the operation of crypto exchanges under a new “Law on Virtual Assets”. First reported by The Times of Central Asia in early December 2025, the law came into effect on January 1, 2026, creating a state-run licensing system overseen by the Central Bank of Turkmenistan, while keeping strict limits on how crypto can be used inside the country. The legal change, signed by President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, brings “virtual assets” under civil law, meaning that crypto is treated as property, rather than money. Under the framework, cryptocurrencies are not recognized as legal tender and cannot be treated as a currency or security for domestic payments. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the law covers the creation, storage, issuance, and circulation of virtual assets. It also states that the government is not responsible for losses incurred through crypto platforms or for drops in asset value. Mining rights are available to individual entrepreneurs and legal entities that register electronically with the central bank, and the law explicitly bans “hidden mining” that uses someone else’s computing resources without permission. For exchanges and related service providers, the licensing requirements are central. Licensed firms can offer exchange, transfer, storage, and management services, and conduct initial offerings, but they must follow customer identification rules aligned with anti-money-laundering controls. The law also places strict limits on who can operate crypto exchanges inside Turkmenistan. Individuals and legal entities registered in offshore jurisdictions are barred from establishing exchanges, and founders with offshore bank accounts are disqualified from obtaining licenses, reinforcing a framework designed to keep ownership and control within a tightly regulated domestic system. Advertising restrictions further underscore the government’s cautious approach. Crypto service providers are prohibited from making promises of profitability or offering inducements to attract customers. Promotional materials must include explicit warnings that virtual assets are not state-backed and may lose value, reflecting official concerns over speculation and consumer risk. The shift is widely seen as significant for one of the world’s most closed economies, though structural constraints remain. Turkmenistan’s heavily regulated internet environment poses a challenge for both trading platforms and large-scale exchange operations, particularly those requiring uninterrupted access to global networks. The move also fits within a broader effort to reduce reliance on gas exports by cautiously diversifying the economy. The commercial question now is whether legal clarity and access to low-cost electricity can outweigh these limitations. The model combines ultra-cheap energy with a license-driven regulatory system, a structure that may attract some miners while deterring firms that depend on flexible compliance regimes or unrestricted connectivity. Across Central Asia, governments have taken divergent approaches to regulating digital assets. Kazakhstan has experimented with special regulatory zones and later expanded oversight nationwide. Turkmenistan’s approach is more centralized, creating a narrow legal pathway that keeps regulatory authority concentrated with the state and the central bank. The government has signaled incremental openness in other areas, including the introduction of electronic...

6 months ago

Nuclear Energy

U.S. and Kazakhstan Expand Civil Nuclear Cooperation With Focus on Small Modular Reactors

The United States and Kazakhstan have expanded cooperation on civil nuclear energy, placing small modular reactors at the center of a new phase in bilateral engagement. In late December 2025, the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan announced two initiatives under the U.S. State Department’s Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology program, known as FIRST. The measures focus on workforce training and technical evaluation as Kazakhstan prepares to reintroduce nuclear power generation. Kazakhstan is the first country in Central Asia to participate in the FIRST program, which was launched by the U.S. State Department in 2021 to help partner countries prepare regulatory frameworks, workforce capacity, and infrastructure for advanced nuclear technologies. The first initiative provides for the installation of a classroom-based SMR (small modular reactor) simulator at the Kazakhstan Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty. The simulator is intended to train specialists in reactor operations, safety systems, and emergency response. On January 6, 2026, the American Nuclear Society reported that the simulator will be supplied by U.S. companies Holtec International and WSC Inc., a simulation technology company that operates as part of the Curtiss-Wright group. The project is designed to build domestic technical capacity prior to licensing or construction decisions. The International Science and Technology Center is supporting implementation in Kazakhstan. The second initiative is a feasibility study examining which U.S.-designed SMRs could be technically and economically suitable for Kazakhstan. According to the American Nuclear Society, the study is being conducted under FIRST, with U.S. engineering firm Sargent & Lundy. The assessment is expected to cover grid integration, siting considerations, cooling requirements, and indicative deployment timelines. The study does not authorize construction or commit Kazakhstan to a specific reactor technology; rather, the feasibility study is intended to produce a shortlist of U.S. SMR designs that could be compatible with Kazakhstan’s grid, geography, and projected electricity demand. These initiatives follow Kazakhstan’s decision to return to nuclear power. On October 6, 2024, voters approved the construction of nuclear power plants in a national referendum. Official results published by the Central Referendum Commission showed 71.12% voting in favor, with turnout at 63.66%. Kazakhstan has not generated nuclear electricity since the BN-350 fast reactor at Aktau was shut down in 1999. Government energy planners have warned that Kazakhstan faces growing electricity shortfalls as early as the mid-2020s, driven by aging coal plants and rising consumption. Kazakhstan’s interest in nuclear energy reflects structural pressures in the power sector. Coal-fired plants still supply most electricity, particularly in northern regions, but much of that capacity is aging. Electricity demand continues to rise alongside industrial output and urban growth, while the government has set targets to reduce emissions intensity. Nuclear power is being positioned as a source of stable, low-carbon baseload generation that can complement renewable energy. Kazakhstan also occupies a central position in the global nuclear fuel market. The country accounts for about 40% of global uranium mine production and holds roughly 14% of identified recoverable uranium resources. Despite that role, the country has relied...

6 months ago

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Kazakhstan Opens Criminal Probe Over Calls to Attack CPC Oil Pipeline

Kazakhstan has opened a criminal investigation into public statements that authorities say encouraged attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for the country’s crude oil, after months of disruption at the system’s Black Sea terminal turned a foreign security risk into a domestic legal and political issue. Prosecutor General Berik Asylov confirmed the case in a written reply to a parliamentary inquiry on January 6. "On December 17, 2025, the Astana City Police Department launched a pre-trial investigation under Part 1 of Article 174 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (incitement of social, national, tribal, racial, class, or religious discord) into negative public comments regarding damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium," the Prosecutor General stated. The authorities have yet to name suspects, publish the posts under review, or announce any arrests. The file remains at the evidence-gathering stage, and prosecutors have left open whether any charges will ultimately be filed under Article 174, or reclassified under other provisions once investigators assess the intent and impact. The probe follows a request by Mazhilis deputy, Aidos Sarym, who said that some social media commentary crossed from opinion into encouragement of harm to strategic infrastructure, endorsed attacks on the CPC, and urged further strikes on critical sites. The political sensitivity is rooted in the 1,500-kilometer pipeline’s central role in Kazakhstan’s economy. CPC carries crude from western Kazakhstan to a marine terminal near Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, where the oil is loaded onto tankers for delivery to global markets. The pipeline is owned by a consortium that includes Kazakhstan, Russia, and several international energy companies. The system dominates Kazakhstan’s oil export economy. More than 80% of the country’s crude oil exports move through the CPC route, which also carries more than 1% of global oil supplies, making it a pressure point for both markets and state revenue when operations are disrupted. The investigation follows a period of repeated disruption at the Novorossiysk terminal in late 2025, after a naval drone strike damaged one of the offshore loading points used to transfer oil from the pipeline to tankers. The damage forced operators to suspend loadings and move vessels away while inspections and repairs were carried out, sharply reducing export capacity. The CPC relies on single-point moorings positioned at sea to load crude onto tankers, a critical constraint on the entire system; when one goes offline, capacity drops quickly. The pipeline cannot store large volumes, forcing upstream producers to cut or slow output. By late December, the impact was visible in Kazakhstan’s production figures. Oil output fell by about 6% during the month after the late November strike constrained exports. Production at the Tengiz oilfield, the country’s largest, dropped by roughly 10%. Exports of CPC Blend crude fell to about 1.08 million barrels per day in December, the lowest level in more than a year, as the terminal operated with only one functioning mooring while others remained offline due to damage and maintenance. Operational pressures continued as...

6 months ago

Reforms

Uzbekistan Has “Only Just Begun” Reforms, Says Saida Mirziyoyeva

Saida Mirziyoyeva has said that the country’s reform agenda remains at an early stage, arguing that the scale of change should be measured in years rather than months. In her first major interview since becoming Head of the Presidential Administration, Mirziyoyeva said Uzbekistan had “only just begun” large-scale reforms. Expectations of rapid results, she warned, often overlook structural limits, including weak infrastructure, uneven regional development, and tight public finances. Mirziyoyeva spoke about decision-making inside the presidential system and outlined what she described as the administration’s main policy priorities, including water management, education, healthcare, the business climate, and reform of the judicial and legal system. “Our goal is to improve people’s lives,” she stated, emphasizing that improvements in courts and law enforcement were essential for other reforms to succeed. Without legal guarantees, she argued, investment and social policy changes would fail to deliver lasting results. She said the reforms now underway are intended to address long-standing systemic problems rather than produce quick political gains, and rejected the idea that reform momentum has slowed, arguing that many of the most complex changes require time and careful implementation to succeed. Water management featured prominently in her remarks. Mirziyoyeva described it as one of Uzbekistan’s most urgent challenges, pointing to climate pressures, ageing infrastructure, and rising demand. Education and healthcare were also presented as priorities, with reforms focused on improving quality and access rather than simply expanding state programs. The judicial system, however, emerged as the central theme. Mirziyoyeva said that without independent and predictable courts, reforms in other areas would not deliver lasting results. Legal uncertainty, she said, discourages investment and undermines public trust, making the rule of law essential for both economic reform and the protection of citizens’ rights. Mirziyoyeva also addressed the business environment, arguing that excessive regulation and administrative pressure continue to constrain private enterprise. The state, she said, should act as a partner to entrepreneurs rather than an obstacle, and reforms should create conditions in which businesses can operate transparently and competitively. Mirziyoyeva described her role as focused on coordination and execution rather than public visibility. The task of the Presidential Administration, she said, is to ensure that decisions taken at the top translate into practical change on the ground. Public service, she added, should be judged by outcomes, not rhetoric. The interview comes more than nine years after President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in December 2016 and launched a reform agenda that marked a break with the isolationist policies of his predecessor. Early measures included the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market in September 2017, easing trade restrictions, and reducing state control over prices. International financial institutions have described Uzbekistan’s economic transition as ambitious, while noting that progress has been uneven. Political reform has proceeded more cautiously. In its 2024 Nations in Transit assessment, Freedom House classified Uzbekistan as a consolidated authoritarian system, citing restrictions on opposition activity and independent media. Against that backdrop, Mirziyoyeva said reforms should be judged by tangible outcomes rather than timelines. Reliable access...

6 months ago

Geopolitics

2025: The Year Central Asia Stepped Onto the Global Stage

For much of the post-Soviet era, Central Asia occupied a peripheral place in global affairs. It mattered to its immediate neighbors, but rarely shaped wider debates. In 2025, that changed in visible ways. The region became harder to ignore, largely not because of ideology or alignments, but because of assets that the world increasingly needs: energy, minerals, transit routes, and political access across Eurasia. One of the clearest signs came in April, when the European Union and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in Samarkand for their first summit at the head-of-state level. The meeting concluded with a joint declaration upgrading relations to a strategic partnership, with a focus on transport connectivity, energy security, and critical raw materials. The document marked a shift in how Brussels views Central Asia, moving beyond development assistance toward geopolitical cooperation, as outlined in the official EU–Central Asia summit joint declaration. European interest is rooted in necessity. Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced EU governments to rethink energy imports, supply chains, and overland trade routes. Central Asia sits astride the most viable alternatives that bypass Russian territory. It also holds resources essential to Europe’s green transition, including uranium and a range of industrial metals. The region’s leaders spent much of the year framing their diplomacy around these tangible advantages, rather than abstract political alignments. The United States followed a similar track. Through the C5+1 format, Washington deepened engagement with all five Central Asian states, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation and supply-chain resilience. A key element has been the Critical Minerals Dialogue, launched to connect Central Asian producers with Western markets. This initiative formed part of a broader U.S. effort to diversify access to strategic materials and reduce dependence on Russia and China. Russia remained a central but changing presence in Central Asia throughout 2025. Economic ties, labor migration, and shared infrastructure ensured that Moscow continued to matter across the region. At the same time, however, Russia’s war in Ukraine constrained its ability to act as the dominant external power it once was. Central Asian governments maintained pragmatic relations with Moscow, but they increasingly treated Russia as one partner among several rather than the default reference point. Trade continued, security cooperation persisted, and political dialogue remained active, yet the balance shifted toward hedging rather than dependence. Uranium sits at the center of this shift, with the United States having banned imports of certain Russian uranium products under federal law, with waivers set to expire no earlier than January 1, 2028. As Washington restructures its nuclear fuel supply chain, Central Asia’s role has grown sharply. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2024 Uranium Marketing Annual Report, Kazakhstan supplied 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. reactor operators, while Uzbekistan accounted for about 9%. Canada and Australia remain major suppliers, but the Central Asian share is now strategic rather than marginal. That economic weight translated into political visibility. In December, U.S. President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend...

6 months ago

Party Politics

Japarov Signs Decree Stripping Ex-Leader Atambayev of State Honors

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov has signed a decree revoking state awards previously granted to former President Almazbek Atambayev, including the title Hero of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Order of Manas (Second Class), the Order of Danaker, and the Dank medal. The order follows a decision by Bishkek’s Pervomaisky District Court, and authorities have been instructed to confiscate the medals and transfer them to the state awards fund, according to reports citing the presidential press service. Atambayev, who led Kyrgyzstan from 2011 to 2017, has been at the center of long-running criminal and political disputes since leaving office. His fallout with successor, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, culminated in the 2019 Koi-Tash confrontation, when security forces tried to detain him at his residence outside Bishkek, and the clashes left a security officer dead. That episode became part of later court proceedings and deepened the elite polarization in Kyrgyz politics. The immediate legal basis for stripping the awards is tied to a 2025 court verdict. In June, the Pervomaisky District Court sentenced Atambayev in absentia to more than eleven years in prison on charges of corruption and participating in mass unrest, along with confiscation of property and deprivation of state awards. Atambayev has remained abroad since he left Kyrgyzstan for medical treatment, and did not return for the trial proceedings. The latest decision formalizes the court-ordered loss of honors and triggers the administrative step of retrieving medals and certificates, but it does not add a new criminal penalty beyond the existing sentence. The move is also political. State awards carry symbolic weight in Kyrgyzstan, and revocation is rare for former heads of state. By linking the decision explicitly to a court verdict, Japarov’s administration is framing it as enforcement rather than a discretionary act. For Atambayev’s supporters, it is likely to be read as another escalation in a feud that has shaped Kyrgyz politics for years.

6 months ago

Aviation Ban

Kyrgyzstan Signals Possible End to EU Aviation Ban

Kyrgyzstan says it is close to ending a near two-decade ban that has kept its airlines off European routes, after President Sadyr Japarov said the country has reached a “critical point” in efforts to leave the European Union’s air safety blacklist. The comments come as Kyrgyz officials push for international recognition of reforms in aviation oversight and airport infrastructure. Japarov said Kyrgyzstan has been developing civil aviation “on its own initiative,” investing “billions of soms,” buying aircraft for domestic and international routes, and building new airports. He described the effort as a state priority and added: “Kyrgyzstan has reached a critical point in its exit from the European Union’s ‘blacklist’… with God’s help, the skies of Europe will open to Kyrgyzstan.” The EU Air Safety List is the bloc’s mechanism for restricting airlines that, in the EU’s assessment, do not meet international safety standards. Airlines on the list are banned from operating “to, in and from the EU,” and the EU can also apply restrictions to all carriers certified in a country if national oversight is deemed inadequate, according to the European Commission’s official Q&A on the EU Air Safety List. Updates are prepared with support from the EU Air Safety Committee and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and are based on standards set through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Commission says. Kyrgyz airlines have been on the EU list since 2006. The EU’s most recent comprehensive update, published on December 8, 2025, still includes Kyrgyzstan among the countries whose airlines are banned because of “a lack of safety oversight by the aviation authorities,” according to the Commission’s December 2025 materials and the linked EU Air Safety List documentation. Kyrgyz airlines would be allowed to apply for operations linked to the European Union if the country is removed from the EU Air Safety List. Any carrier seeking to fly to, from, or within the EU needs to meet European safety requirements, including obtaining Third Country Operator authorization from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, according to the European Commission’s air safety rules. Kyrgyzstan’s public messaging has framed the potential removal as an economic lever, with Japarov stating it would support tourism, attract investment, and improve the country’s international image. It could also lead to more direct scheduled flights between Kyrgyzstan and EU destinations, rather than relying on connections via third countries. The EU has not announced a decision to remove Kyrgyzstan, and any change would require a formal update to the list after technical review. Past EU updates show that changes can cut both ways. In June 2025, for example, the Commission added all carriers certified in Suriname and Tanzania after identifying serious shortcomings in national oversight, in an official announcement on its Mobility and Transport site. For now, Japarov’s statement signals confidence that Kyrgyzstan believes it has supplied the documentation and reforms the EU expects. Whether that will translate into removal will depend on the EU’s technical findings and the next formal update cycle of...

6 months ago

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