Critical Minerals - The Times Of Central Asia

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Critical Minerals

Central Asia Seeks More Local Value From Critical Minerals

Rising demand for critical minerals is drawing Central Asia deeper into global supply chains, but the region’s harder test is not whether it has the deposits. It is whether more value can stay at home. Copper, tungsten, graphite, antimony, rare earths and other metals now sit at the center of battery production, power grids, chips, weapons systems, and renewable energy. Governments across the region want the sector to bring capital, jobs, and technology. The risk is another cycle in which raw materials leave the region, and most of the value is created elsewhere. The scale of the region’s reserves explains why outside interest is rising. An OECD review of critical raw materials in Central Asia says the region holds 39% of global manganese ore reserves, 31% of chromium, 20% of lead, 13% of zinc, 9% of titanium, 6% of aluminum, and 5% each of copper, cobalt, and molybdenum. The same review says Kazakhstan can export 21 of the 34 critical raw materials on the EU list, while Kyrgyzstan has the world’s third-largest antimony reserves, and Uzbekistan has the world’s eleventh-largest copper reserves. Uranium widens the picture: Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer, accounting for 39% of mined uranium supply in 2024, according to the World Nuclear Association. Kazakhstan has moved fastest in turning this base into policy. The prime minister’s office says the country will spend about $500 million over three years on geological exploration and modernizing infrastructure. The plan includes seismic surveys, new data systems, and a geological cluster in Astana. The government wants to raise geological study coverage to 2.2 million square kilometers. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has linked the sector to Kazakhstan’s wider industrial plans. In his 2025 state-of-the-nation address, Tokayev said the mining and metallurgical complex still had “significant growth potential, particularly in the production of high-value-added products.” New discoveries have sharpened that push. Kazakhstan’s industry ministry said in 2025 that geologists had identified the Zhana Kazakhstan rare earth site, with estimated resources of more than 20 million metric tons. The site contains neodymium, cerium, lanthanum, and yttrium. Officials have also cited the Kuirektykol site in the Karaganda Region, where confirmed reserves are estimated at 795,800 tons, with total resources estimated at 935,400 tons. Uzbekistan is making its strongest move in copper and processing capacity. In March, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev launched Copper Concentrator No. 3 at the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex. The $2.7 billion facility is designed to process 60 million tons of ore and produce about 900,000 tons of copper concentrate per year. Once fully operational, it is expected to raise daily concentrate output at Almalyk from 2,400 tons to 5,000 tons. Uzbekistan’s minerals push has also drawn U.S. support. Uzbekistan and the United States signed a memorandum on critical minerals and rare earth supply chains in February, giving Tashkent a clearer place in Washington’s effort to diversify critical minerals supply chains beyond China. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation later signed a Joint Investment Framework with Uzbekistan, stating that this would “promote cooperation...

Critical Minerals

Central Asia Enters the Minerals Race

Central Asia is entering the critical minerals race at a time when deposits alone no longer confer strategic advantage. The Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress, scheduled for June 11–12 at Hilton Astana, gives the issue operational form: supply chains, investment, and commercial projects. U.S. Under Secretary Jacob Helberg will participate there and in the preceding C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue on June 10–11. The Astana agenda also puts Central Asia’s role in global supply chains directly into view. The test is how quickly governments, investors, and industrial buyers can finance, process, move, and purchase minerals before they are locked into industrial supply chains. The G7 is moving in the same direction, but through institutional design rather than industrial action. The group is discussing a permanent critical minerals secretariat to maintain continuity across changing G7 presidencies, possibly at either the International Energy Agency or the OECD. The proposal acknowledges a real deficiency in Western coordination, but it also reveals the larger problem: continuity is useful only if it becomes execution. At the same time, reports have circulated about disagreements over stockpiling and leadership, including European resistance to both a single shared stockpile and a U.S.-led structure. For Central Asia, the practical question is not institutional architecture alone, but whether such coordination produces finance, processing capacity, and long-term offtake. The June dialogue in Astana is part of a wider C5+1 movement from diplomacy toward operational cooperation. Its participants are trying to convert the platform from a talk shop into a vehicle for business transactions. As TCA has reported, U.S. engagement in the region is increasingly tied to business mechanisms, export-credit support, and project finance. Kazakhstan has already moved into this framework track. Kazakhstan and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on critical minerals cooperation during Tokayev’s November 2025 visit to Washington, and the agreement took immediate shape through the Tau-Ken Samruk–Cove Capital tungsten project. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry later described the MOU as the first agreement of its kind in Central Asia, providing for processing capacity in Kazakhstan, technology transfer, and expanded access for Kazakh products to the U.S. market. In February 2026, Uzbekistan followed with its own U.S. critical minerals track: TCA reported that Tashkent signed a critical minerals MOU on February 4, and that DFC heads of terms for a Joint Investment Framework followed on February 19. Central Asian governments are not passive terrain for outside competition. Kazakhstan, with Central Asia’s most developed mining and metallurgical base, and Uzbekistan, with a rapidly expanding minerals program, are using minerals competition to attract capital and build processing capacity. They are seeking to diversify partners and move beyond dependence on raw material exports. The regional objective is industrial upgrading while preserving room for maneuver between China, Russia, the United States, Europe, and other partners. The minerals question cannot be separated from the larger Eurasian setting. Central Asia is trying to widen its own field of choice before its options are narrowed by what Hudson Institute senior fellow Ken Moriyasu called, in comments to...

CA5+UK

Opinion: UK’s C6 Engagement and the Opportunity for British Geostrategic Renewal

Along with Nicholas Spykman, Sir Halford Mackinder is one of the most pre-eminent thinkers in the field of geopolitics. Whilst today geopolitics is a term used interchangeably with “world affairs,” “international relations,” and “foreign policy,” Spykman and Mackinder used the phrase to describe the narrow academic study of how geography influences international relations and the conduct of states. In the 1904 paper, The Geographical Pivot of History, Mackinder theorized that the key to controlling the balance of power in the world rested in a “heartland” of Eurasia, comprising Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Mackinder described the heartland region as the “pivot region” for regional and global hegemony. The word “pivot” has recently been popularized in international relations, with examples including President Obama’s pivot to the Pacific and Britain’s Indo-Pacific pivot in the 2021 Integrated Review. In 1997, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski built on Mackinder’s ideas in his work, The Grand Chessboard. Brzezinski defined a geopolitical pivot as being “determined by their geography, which in some cases gives them a special role either in defining access to important areas or in denying resources to a significant player. In some cases, a geopolitical pivot may act as a defensive shield for a vital state or even a region.” To Mackinder and Brzezinski, Central Asia was a crucial geostrategic pivot. Central Asia - comprising the five states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, collectively termed the C5 - is located between China, Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Thus, the near abroad of the region is defined by conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Iran and Israel/U.S., and between Taliban-run Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pragmatic engagement is a necessity for the C5 but has not stopped them from pursuing greater diversification in security and economic arrangements, and they remain committed to U.S.-led diplomatic initiatives. Faced with a regionally assertive superpower in China, risks created by Russia’s war in Ukraine, theocratic Iran, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, Central Asia has continued to show its desire to build and deepen its economic and security partnerships from beyond traditional powers – such as China and Russia – to states in the Gulf, the Caucasus, Western Europe, and elsewhere. The United Kingdom has emerged as a new and important partner. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns in the Central Asian states about its regional revisionism, territorial ambitions, and Putin’s reconstruction of the Soviet Union. In 2014, Putin credited Nursultan Nazarbayev with having “created a state in a territory that had never had a state before,” adding that “the Kazakhs never had any statehood.” The remarks sparked anger in Kazakhstan and fed concern about Moscow’s view of post-Soviet sovereignty. Finally, Putin said that it would be best for Kazakhstan to “remain in the greater Russian world.” In The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski predicted that “Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians.” Central Asia has been a...

Mining

Astana Mining Congress to Highlight Kazakhstan’s Role in Critical Minerals

The 16th International Mining and Metallurgy Congress and Exhibition, Astana Mining & Metallurgy (AMM) 2026, will take place on June 11-12 at the Hilton Astana, bringing together mining and metals companies, investors, technology suppliers, government officials, and industry experts. The forum comes as Kazakhstan is trying to strengthen its position in the global critical minerals race. The country already has a large extractive base, but officials and industry groups are increasingly focused on processing, technology, and investment partnerships rather than raw-material exports alone. Kazakhstan’s appeal lies not only in the size of its mineral base, but also in the timing. The U.S. Department of Commerce says the country has substantial reserves of rare earth elements, copper, lithium, tungsten, tantalum, and other materials used in clean energy, advanced manufacturing, and defense technologies. The European Union has also signed a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan on raw materials, batteries, and renewable hydrogen, underscoring Astana’s growing role in efforts to diversify supply chains away from dominant producers. According to Kazakhstan's Bureau of National Statistics, the country's industrial production index reached 107.5% in 2025. Mining and quarrying grew by 9.4%, driven by higher production of coal, crude oil, natural gas, and other minerals. Organizers said the wider mining and metallurgical complex, including related industries such as mechanical engineering, logistics, energy, and industrial services, may account for up to a quarter of Kazakhstan's economy. Against that backdrop, they said the sector needs new investment, technological solutions, and expanded international partnerships. Alongside the congress, an international specialized exhibition dedicated to mining and metallurgical technologies will be held. The exhibition will feature solutions for geological exploration, extraction and processing of raw materials, industrial automation, and workplace safety. Companies from Germany, Kazakhstan, Canada, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Finland, France, the Czech Republic, and Sweden are expected to participate. National delegations from Canada, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Sweden are also expected to attend. Among the new participants announced by organizers are INCO Engineering, ABP Engineering, David Brown Santasalo, and Actuator Service. Last year's event attracted about 2,900 industry professionals, while 50 companies participated in the exhibition. The business program will be held under the slogan “From the Depths of the Earth to the Heights of Intelligence,” with a focus on digitalization and technological transformation in the industry. The first day will include a plenary session on global partnerships in mining and metallurgy, as well as panel discussions on international metals trade, the investment climate, taxation, and critical minerals. Particular attention will be paid to copper's role as a strategic metal. Copper is central to electrification, grid expansion, and data infrastructure, making it one of the metals most closely tied to the energy transition. The critical minerals component gives the event a wider geopolitical significance. Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry said in April that Astana had invited the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg to participate in AMM and the first C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, both scheduled for June in Astana. The C5+1 format brings together the...

Strategic Partnership

Britain Expands Central Asia Ties as Kazakhstan Ratifies Strategic Partnership Deal

Last week, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a law ratifying a strategic partnership and cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom. With that move, Central Asia’s largest economy added Britain to its growing list of strategic partners, reinforcing Astana’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy. For London, meanwhile, the agreement marked another milestone in what some analysts have framed as a renewed contest for influence in Central Asia, an area where Britain has sought to strengthen its position over the past five years. Kazakhstan already counts Russia, China, the United States, several European Union states including Italy, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, as well as Turkey, Azerbaijan and its Central Asian neighbors among its strategic partners. Britain has now joined that group as it seeks to revive its historical influence in the region. That broader contest is often described through the language of a “New Great Game,” a phrase that draws on an older imperial rivalry. The term “Great Game” emerged in the 19th century to describe the geopolitical rivalry between the British and Russian Empires across Central and South Asia. The phrase was popularized by British officer, spy, and diplomat Arthur Conolly, who compared the complex web of political intrigues to a vast strategic board game stretching across half a continent. Since 2022, observers say London has intensified its engagement in this geopolitical competition, aimed partly at limiting Russian and Chinese dominance in Central Asia. At stake are key sectors such as critical minerals, including rare earths, as well as logistics corridors, particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor. In December 2023, the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee published a report titled Countries at the Crossroads: UK Engagement in Central Asia. The report criticized what it described as ineffective engagement by British ministers with the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. One of the report’s central recommendations was that London should more actively counter Russian influence in the region. In recent years, British embassies across Central Asia have established offices linked to the UK’s international development structures, expanding engagement with local civil society groups. Through the British Council, London has also expanded its soft power initiatives, financing programs such as Creative Central Asia and Creative Spark. More than 60 universities have joined these programs, with participation exceeding 65,000 people. Britain also continues to operate the Chevening scholarship program, under which young political and public sector figures from Central Asia study in the UK before often returning to influential positions in their home countries. For Kazakhstan’s ambitious younger generation, Britain’s appeal may also be reinforced by symbolic success stories. On May 8, the same day Tokayev signed the strategic partnership into law, Kazakhstan-born Sanjar Abishev was elected to Westminster City Council, representing London’s prestigious St James’s district. Abishev’s election drew attention in Kazakhstan as a symbolic example of the country’s growing diaspora presence in Britain. Little is publicly known about Abishev, though one detail stands out: he entered politics only in 2022 after previously running a...

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Critical Minerals Promise Is Running Out of Time

Kazakhstan has long been defined by what lies beneath its soil. Oil, uranium, copper, zinc, lead, chromium, gold, and other minerals have shaped the country’s post-Soviet economy and supplied the budget, export revenues, and industrial base that supported three decades of state-building. That model is now entering a more complex phase. In the first quarter of 2026, Kazakhstan’s industrial output slipped as mining and quarrying fell by 11.4%, with crude oil production down 19.8%, natural gas output down 20%, and other mineral extraction down 15.1%, according to figures reported from the Bureau of National Statistics. The oil decline also reflected specific disruptions. Kazakhstan’s energy minister said oil and gas condensate production fell 20% year-on-year in the first quarter, while production at Tengiz had only recently resumed after an outage linked to a fire at a power unit. Reuters reported that the field’s restart was gradual. Those short-term shocks should not be confused with the whole story. They expose a deeper vulnerability: Kazakhstan has been highly successful at extracting known deposits, but far less successful at replacing them. The World Bank’s mining sector diagnostic put the problem plainly. Kazakhstan is underexplored, greenfield exploration has been almost non-existent for about 30 years, and much of the geological data inherited from the Soviet period is incomplete or outdated. This is not a story of geology alone. It is a story of institutions, incentives, and time. Deposits deplete whether governments plan for it or not. The difference between a mature resource economy and a vulnerable one is whether exploration, processing, regulation, and regional diversification keep pace with extraction. The Arithmetic of Depletion Kazakhstan still has one of the strongest mineral endowments in Eurasia. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has described rare and rare-earth metals as having “essentially become new oil,” and told the government to expand geological and geophysical exploration from 1.5 million square kilometers to at least 2.2 million by 2026, according to Akorda. OECD analysis published in 2026 underlines why the stakes are high. Kazakhstan’s metals mining sector accounted for 12.1% of GDP in 2024. The country is the world’s largest uranium producer, can currently export 21 of the 34 critical raw materials on the European Union’s official list, and has some of the world’s largest reserves of chromium, zinc, and lead. Yet reserve strength on paper does not remove the operational pressure at existing mines. In 2022, Kazakhstan’s prime minister warned that reserve growth for many minerals had not been compensated and that major metal deposits in eastern Kazakhstan, including Orlovskoye, Maleyevskoye, Tishinskoye, and Ridder-Sokolnoye, could be mined out within the next decade, according to the government’s own account of its 2023-2027 geology concept. Gold shows a similar tension between headline potential and mine-level pressure. Industry reporting has linked a fall in Kazakhstan’s 2025 mining output targets partly to changes at Vasilkovskoye, one of the country’s largest gold deposits, where operations are shifting from open-pit to underground mining as easily accessible ore becomes harder to extract. MINEX Forum reported that the transition reduced...