• KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00220
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
30 October 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 205

Black Sea Risks Elevate Azerbaijan and Turkey in Kazakhstan’s Export Strategy

Bloomberg reported on August 8 that the Turkish authorities were withholding or delaying transit permission for some vessels bound through the Dardanelles for Novorossiysk. Some applicants were reportedly told that permits were not being issued, while others faced additional review. The practice appeared selective: vessels bound for some other Black Sea destinations continued to transit, while some Ukraine-bound vessels were also reportedly affected. On August 9, however, Turkish officials told Reuters that shipping through the Turkish Straits was proceeding smoothly and described the actions as temporary security measures rather than an ongoing restriction. The reported restrictions followed a sharp increase in attacks on commercial shipping around the Black Sea, including Turkish-linked vessels near Novorossiysk. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry expressed concern after attacks on the Turkish-owned Yaşar and Nadezhda and called on Russia and Ukraine to ensure navigational safety. Novorossiysk is especially important for Kazakhstan, because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal there handles the overwhelming majority of its oil exports. Although the CPC pipeline itself remains operational, the episode showed how quickly traffic serving Kazakhstan’s principal oil-export outlet could face an additional constraint. The events shed light on an export strategy Kazakhstan began developing several years before the current problems. Tokayev’s July 2022 instructions addressed both oil-export diversification through the Trans-Caspian route and alternative transport chains for other cargo. In particular, he called for greater use of Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports and the development of alternative railway routes. Later that year, KazMunayGas (KMG) and SOCAR established a framework for moving Kazakhstani oil from Aktau across the Caspian Sea and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, initially for up to 1.5 million tons annually. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey also adopted a 2022–2027 roadmap to remove bottlenecks along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan continued to develop transport links with Russia and China as it expanded Trans-Caspian routes through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The strategy extended Kazakhstan’s longstanding geopolitical multi-vector policy, which balances relations with partners in multiple directions, into the geoeconomic sphere. Tokayev made the combination explicit in his 2023 State of the Nation address. Relations with Turkey had meanwhile been elevated to an enhanced strategic partnership in May 2022, including transport cooperation and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan deepened their strategic and allied cooperation later that year, likewise emphasizing transport and logistics. Closer ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey widened Kazakhstan’s options without displacing established routes through Russia. The CPC pipeline remains so dominant in Kazakhstan’s oil exports that no other existing route approaches its present scale. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, the Energy Ministry reported the volume moving through the CPC pipeline at 64.8 million tons (the CPC itself reported about 63 million tons), meaning that more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s exported oil depended on the CPC system. Kazakhstan moved only about 1.4 million tons through the Aktau–Baku–Ceyhan (ABC) route in 2024, and about 1.3 million tons in 2025. Diversification cannot at present mean replacing CPC. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline gives Kazakhstani oil a westbound egress...

Iran Moves to Ratify Caspian Sea Agreement Amid Tensions

Iran wants its parliament to ratify a long-delayed agreement among the littoral states of the Caspian Sea that it says could facilitate economic cooperation. The initiative comes as tensions between Iran and the United States remain high, increasing pressure on the Iranian economy. The Iranian government’s plan to submit the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea for ratification in the parliament “follows changes in the security environment” around the sea, according to Kazem Gharibabadi, deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs. Gharibabadi was quoted in an interview published by the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency, or IRNA, on Saturday. The IRNA report did not go into detail about those security changes, but Iran had blamed Ukraine for a Caspian Sea attack last month that it said resulted in an explosion on an Iranian commercial vessel, killing one sailor and injuring another. Ukraine has acknowledged conducting long-range strikes in the Caspian, saying it was targeting vessels transporting military cargo linked to Iran, an ally of Russia. The Iranian move in the parliament, which is dominated by conservatives, comes ahead of Iran´s reported plan to host a meeting of the Caspian littoral states next week. In 2018, the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea was signed in Aktau, Kazakhstan, by Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. The convention includes security provisions, including a ban on the presence of armed forces from non-littoral states. It also aims to assign territorial waters and regulate access to resources, including fisheries and offshore oil. However, some details were not clarified and, unlike the other countries, Iran´s parliament did not ratify the deal. Some critics in Iran had argued that the convention left the country at a disadvantage. Iran’s recent decision to urgently submit the convention to its parliament “comes amid public debate over the convention’s provisions, Iran’s rights and interests in the Caspian, and questions surrounding the country’s share of the sea,” IRNA reported. It quoted Gharibabadi as saying that, in addition to Caspian security concerns, there is a need to increase economic cooperation among the littoral states and resolve legal issues concerning the sea. Some Iranian commentators say Iran is under pressure to make concessions and could end up compromising the country’s rights in the Caspian. In the IRNA interview, Gharibabadi sought to downplay criticism, saying Iranian parliamentary ratification would have “no impact on the delimitation of the seabed and subsoil of the body of water,” and that those issues would have to be resolved through negotiations among states with adjacent Caspian coastlines. “By ratifying the Convention, Tehran could gain certain advantages, including legal certainty regarding the Caspian Sea and the preservation of its partnership with Moscow, which is pushing for the issue to be resolved. At the same time, the potential costs for Iran appear more significant,” said the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a research center in Armenia, a South Caucasus country that could be affected by developments in the Caspian Sea. The center’s analysis this month...

Aral–Caspian Highway Project Advances Kazakhstan’s Bid for Eurasian Logistics Leadership

Kazakhstan has begun building an 800-kilometer highway that will give freight moving east and west a shorter road connection to the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk. The government says the project could cut nearly 1,000 kilometers and up to three days from journeys between Europe and China, while improving Kazakhstan’s access to European and regional markets. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev launched construction of the Beineu–Saksaulsk highway on August 3, and ordered its completion by 2029. He proposed calling it the Aral–Caspian Highway because it will run from Saksaulsk, near the Aral Sea, west to Beineu and the road network serving Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports. At Saksaulsk, three routes meet. The Kyzylorda road runs southeast to the Western Europe–Western China highway. The Ulgaysyn road continues northwest toward Aktobe. The new highway will run west to Beineu, from where roads lead to Aktau and Kuryk. The result is a more direct connection between southern Kazakhstan, the Aktobe corridor, and the Caspian coast, as outlined in the government’s wider road program. The government is reconstructing and expanding the Kyzylorda–Saksaulsk and Ulgaysyn–Saksaulsk sections alongside the new highway. The three projects cover a combined 1,574 kilometers. The authorities expect annual freight volumes along the routes to rise 2.5-fold to 13.2 million tons and say construction will create more than 10,000 jobs. Tokayev described the change as adding “horizontal connections” to Kazakhstan’s historically “vertical transportation networks.” His stated goal is to transform Kazakhstan into “one of the leading logistics hubs connecting Europe and Asia.” The road will feed into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor. Goods can move west from Kazakhstan across the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, or east along the same route into Central and East Asia. The corridor gives European companies another path into Central Asian markets and gives Kazakhstan additional options for reaching Europe. The corridor is often presented as a China–Europe land-bridge, but the World Bank’s analysis expects most of its future traffic to be generated within the corridor region. Its modeling projects trade between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and the European Union to rise by 28% by 2030, while intercontinental freight remains below 40% of total volume. The commercial case therefore includes Kazakh exports moving west, European goods moving east, and regional cargo that never travels the full distance between Europe and China. Europe is already supporting parts of the network. The EU’s €30 million Trans-Caspian transport program backs preparatory work for the modernization of the Beineu–Saksaulsk road and improvements at Aktau. In June, Kazakhstan and European partners announced $462 million in transport agreements, including financing for the Aktobe–Ulgaysyn road and cooperation with A.P. Moller-Maersk on container shipping along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan also enters the competition with infrastructure already in use. It has a direct border with China, established railways carrying freight across the country, and operating Caspian ports. Uzbekistan is advancing the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and other routes, but The Times of Central Asia has previously reported that Kazakhstan retains the stronger position for now because several of...

Central Asia and Azerbaijan: What the Region’s Leaders Agreed at Issyk-Kul

The Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, briefly became Central Asia’s political capital as it hosted a series of high-level meetings, including bilateral talks between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Only a few years ago, such a format would have seemed unlikely. Today, however, regional leaders are discussing joint railway projects, energy security, transport corridors, investment, and foreign-policy coordination rather than managing old disputes. The agreements reached in Cholpon-Ata suggest that the consultative format is gradually evolving from a platform for political dialogue into a mechanism for practical regional cooperation. From Conflict to Alliance                                                 Ahead of the informal multilateral meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held bilateral talks that set the tone for the broader regional meeting. Relations between the two countries now stand in sharp contrast to the situation sixteen years ago. Following the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, relations between Bishkek and Tashkent entered one of their most difficult periods since independence. The agenda between the two neighbors has since changed dramatically. Speaking in Cholpon-Ata, Mirziyoyev said relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had reached “a historic peak.” Bilateral trade has increased almost tenfold in recent years, reaching $1.2 billion last year. The two countries now have around 450 joint ventures, operate a joint Development Fund to support cooperative projects, and have established 15 air routes and five bus services linking their cities. Mirziyoyev described the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway as one of the most important joint initiatives between the two countries, arguing that the project would reshape transport links across Eurasia. “This railway will fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape. Those who understand what it took to make this happen know what a major achievement it is,” Mirziyoyev said. The talks concluded with the signing of a Treaty on Allied Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two sides also exchanged several bilateral documents, including agreements covering sections of their common border and the joint use of the Chashma spring. A Broader Regional Agenda While the Japarov-Mirziyoyev talks focused primarily on bilateral relations, the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan broadened the discussion to regional integration, transport connectivity, energy security, and foreign-policy coordination. Opening the meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said one of the clearest results of closer regional cooperation had been the Central Asian countries’ growing support for one another on the international stage. As an example, he cited the region’s joint support for Kyrgyzstan’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term. Japarov also revived the idea of introducing a single tourist visa for foreign visitors traveling across Central Asia, proposing that the region’s foreign ministries intensify consultations on the initiative. Azerbaijan’s participation as a full member gave the meeting additional significance. Baku joined the consultative format as a...

Alstom’s Jérôme Boyet: Kazakhstan Is Building a Regional Rail Manufacturing Hub

Kazakhstan has spent the past decade developing domestic rail manufacturing, supported by foreign investment and increased local production. The sector is also beginning to supply export markets. Kazakhstan is also preparing the next phase of railway expansion to increase network capacity and accommodate growing transit volumes. Alstom has operated in Kazakhstan since 2010, developing locomotive production and maintenance facilities while increasing the manufacture of components in the country. Its Astana plant has also produced locomotives for export. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Jérôme Boyet, Alstom’s managing director for Western and Central Asia, discusses the company’s investment plans and efforts to increase local production. He also considers how new locomotive projects and the Middle Corridor could affect Kazakhstan’s prospects as a regional rail manufacturing center. TCA: Alstom has now been operating in Kazakhstan for 15 years and has become one of the country’s largest industrial investors. What are the company’s current investment priorities, and how has its business in Kazakhstan evolved over that period? Jérôme Boyet: Over the past 15 years, Kazakhstan has become much more than a market for Alstom. It has evolved into one of our key manufacturing and engineering centers for Western and Central Asia. To date, we have delivered almost 500 electric locomotive sections to Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) and another 50 to international customers. Our work extends well beyond manufacturing. Through service teams based across Kazakhstan, we maintain KTZ’s locomotive fleet throughout its life cycle, helping ensure the locomotives remain safe, reliable, and available for operation. To strengthen these capabilities, we launched a €50 million investment program in 2023 covering four service depots in Almaty, Astana, Shu, and Arys. The upgraded facilities are already beginning to deliver results and are scheduled to become fully operational by the end of 2027. The program will establish a nationwide maintenance network, reduce locomotive downtime, and further strengthen Kazakhstan’s technical expertise in fleet maintenance. These investments build on the industrial base we have developed over the past decade and a half. Today, our priority is to integrate manufacturing, maintenance, digital diagnostics, and local engineering expertise into a single industrial ecosystem capable of supporting the continued modernization of Kazakhstan’s railway network and growing freight traffic along strategic routes such as the Middle Corridor. TCA: How large is Alstom’s workforce in Kazakhstan today, and what role does workforce development play in your localization strategy? Jérôme Boyet: Alstom currently employs more than 1,300 people in Kazakhstan, with our workforce divided almost equally between manufacturing and service activities. Around 20% of our employees are women, while the average length of service exceeds four years. Importantly, 98% of our employees are citizens of Kazakhstan, reflecting the strong technical capabilities that have been developed locally. For us, localization goes beyond manufacturing components. It also means developing knowledge, engineering expertise, and professional skills within Kazakhstan. Our employees work across the entire industrial cycle from engineering, welding, and assembly to testing, diagnostics, and maintenance. As new locomotive and service projects move forward, we continue...

Turkmenistan Renovates Customs Post on Border with Iran

Turkmenistan took steps to expand economic ties with Iran this week, completing the upgrade of a customs checkpoint on the border with its neighbor to the south and hosting an Iranian cabinet minister. The modernization of the Sarahs Autoyollary customs post at the Turkmen-Iranian border follows upgrades earlier this year at the Artyk post, also on the border with Iran, and the Garabogaz checkpoint, on the northern border with Kazakhstan, according to Turkmenistan’s State Customs Service. It said improvements to the Sarahs Autoyollary post, which is located at “the intersection of several international transport corridors,” include renovated buildings and a digital monitoring system that will help agents process vehicles and goods faster and more reliably. Meanwhile, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov discussed the expansion of Turkmen-Iranian trade in a meeting with Farzaneh Sadegh, Iran’s roads and urban development minister, in Ashgabat on Monday, Turkmenistan’s state media reported. The Iranian ministry said Sadegh and top Turkmen officials discussed joint projects in transportation, energy, electricity, and infrastructure development. Iran is a significant economic partner for Turkmenistan and other Central Asian countries that are trying to diversify and expand trade corridors to foreign markets, although Iran’s conflict with the United States has highlighted the vulnerability of transit through Iranian territory. Earlier this month, Iranian officials alleged that a U.S. strike hit a railway bridge on a northern Iranian line crossing into Turkmenistan, although there was no independent confirmation. Iran later said it had repaired the tracks and trains were running again. On Monday, Turkmenistan criticized an attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea that the Iranian government blamed on Ukraine, which has acknowledged strikes on vessels in the sea that were allegedly carrying military cargo linked to Iran and Russia. The Caspian Sea is critical to Turkmenistan's ambition to play a larger role in the Middle Corridor, a trade network linking Asia and Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus.