Middle Corridor - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 207

Railway Manufacturing

Alstom’s Jérôme Boyet: Kazakhstan Is Building a Regional Rail Manufacturing Hub

Kazakhstan has spent the past decade developing domestic rail manufacturing, supported by foreign investment and increased local production. The sector is also beginning to supply export markets. Kazakhstan is also preparing the next phase of railway expansion to increase network capacity and accommodate growing transit volumes. Alstom has operated in Kazakhstan since 2010, developing locomotive production and maintenance facilities while increasing the manufacture of components in the country. Its Astana plant has also produced locomotives for export. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Jérôme Boyet, Alstom’s managing director for Western and Central Asia, discusses the company’s investment plans and efforts to increase local production. He also considers how new locomotive projects and the Middle Corridor could affect Kazakhstan’s prospects as a regional rail manufacturing center. TCA: Alstom has now been operating in Kazakhstan for 15 years and has become one of the country’s largest industrial investors. What are the company’s current investment priorities, and how has its business in Kazakhstan evolved over that period? Jérôme Boyet: Over the past 15 years, Kazakhstan has become much more than a market for Alstom. It has evolved into one of our key manufacturing and engineering centers for Western and Central Asia. To date, we have delivered almost 500 electric locomotive sections to Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) and another 50 to international customers. Our work extends well beyond manufacturing. Through service teams based across Kazakhstan, we maintain KTZ’s locomotive fleet throughout its life cycle, helping ensure the locomotives remain safe, reliable, and available for operation. To strengthen these capabilities, we launched a €50 million investment program in 2023 covering four service depots in Almaty, Astana, Shu, and Arys. The upgraded facilities are already beginning to deliver results and are scheduled to become fully operational by the end of 2027. The program will establish a nationwide maintenance network, reduce locomotive downtime, and further strengthen Kazakhstan’s technical expertise in fleet maintenance. These investments build on the industrial base we have developed over the past decade and a half. Today, our priority is to integrate manufacturing, maintenance, digital diagnostics, and local engineering expertise into a single industrial ecosystem capable of supporting the continued modernization of Kazakhstan’s railway network and growing freight traffic along strategic routes such as the Middle Corridor. TCA: How large is Alstom’s workforce in Kazakhstan today, and what role does workforce development play in your localization strategy? Jérôme Boyet: Alstom currently employs more than 1,300 people in Kazakhstan, with our workforce divided almost equally between manufacturing and service activities. Around 20% of our employees are women, while the average length of service exceeds four years. Importantly, 98% of our employees are citizens of Kazakhstan, reflecting the strong technical capabilities that have been developed locally. For us, localization goes beyond manufacturing components. It also means developing knowledge, engineering expertise, and professional skills within Kazakhstan. Our employees work across the entire industrial cycle from engineering, welding, and assembly to testing, diagnostics, and maintenance. As new locomotive and service projects move forward, we continue...

Cross-Border Trade

Turkmenistan Renovates Customs Post on Border with Iran

Turkmenistan took steps to expand economic ties with Iran this week, completing the upgrade of a customs checkpoint on the border with its neighbor to the south and hosting an Iranian cabinet minister. The modernization of the Sarahs Autoyollary customs post at the Turkmen-Iranian border follows upgrades earlier this year at the Artyk post, also on the border with Iran, and the Garabogaz checkpoint, on the northern border with Kazakhstan, according to Turkmenistan’s State Customs Service. It said improvements to the Sarahs Autoyollary post, which is located at “the intersection of several international transport corridors,” include renovated buildings and a digital monitoring system that will help agents process vehicles and goods faster and more reliably. Meanwhile, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov discussed the expansion of Turkmen-Iranian trade in a meeting with Farzaneh Sadegh, Iran’s roads and urban development minister, in Ashgabat on Monday, Turkmenistan’s state media reported. The Iranian ministry said Sadegh and top Turkmen officials discussed joint projects in transportation, energy, electricity, and infrastructure development. Iran is a significant economic partner for Turkmenistan and other Central Asian countries that are trying to diversify and expand trade corridors to foreign markets, although Iran’s conflict with the United States has highlighted the vulnerability of transit through Iranian territory. Earlier this month, Iranian officials alleged that a U.S. strike hit a railway bridge on a northern Iranian line crossing into Turkmenistan, although there was no independent confirmation. Iran later said it had repaired the tracks and trains were running again. On Monday, Turkmenistan criticized an attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea that the Iranian government blamed on Ukraine, which has acknowledged strikes on vessels in the sea that were allegedly carrying military cargo linked to Iran and Russia. The Caspian Sea is critical to Turkmenistan's ambition to play a larger role in the Middle Corridor, a trade network linking Asia and Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Energy Security

Central Asia Rethinks Energy Security After the 2026 Fuel Crisis

The summer of 2026 marked a turning point for energy security in Central Asia. In July, drone strikes temporarily halted crude oil receipts and loadings at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) marine terminal in Novorossiysk. Although CPC resumed normal operations on July 27, the incident exposed the vulnerability of one of the region’s principal export routes to external security risks. Russia, which for decades has been Central Asia’s principal supplier of refined petroleum products, has also faced prolonged pressure in its domestic fuel market. Reduced utilization at some refineries and rising domestic demand have created longer-term challenges. Restrictions on gasoline and diesel exports have added to the pressure, affecting the Russian economy and neighboring states that have traditionally relied on Russian supplies. For three decades, Central Asia’s system for supplying refined fuels remained relatively stable. Russian refineries covered shortages in local markets, providing fuel that was both comparatively affordable and predictable in volume. The events of 2026, however, reaffirmed a basic principle of national security: during large-scale crises, governments tend to prioritize domestic stability over external trade commitments. For Central Asian states, this has prompted a fundamental reassessment of long-established approaches to energy security. Any strategy dependent on a single external supplier ultimately becomes vulnerable to disruptions beyond its control, regardless of their origin. The current crisis has also revealed significant differences in how well prepared the region’s governments are to protect their domestic fuel markets. Kyrgyzstan has proved the most vulnerable. The country consumes around 1.6 million metric tons of fuel annually, with 90-95% of supplies imported from Russia. Faced with a sharp reduction in available supplies during May and June 2026, the Kyrgyz authorities were forced to begin urgent negotiations with alternative suppliers, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. Uzbekistan has been in a somewhat stronger position. Until recently, Russian companies dominated the country’s imported gasoline market. During the first five months of 2026, Uzbekistan spent more than $1 billion on imports of crude oil and petroleum products, while spending on motor gasoline imports increased by 85.1% compared with the same period a year earlier. Tashkent has responded by prioritizing strategic fuel reserves. Ahead of the coming autumn and winter season, the government has begun building a 120,000-metric-ton reserve of motor gasoline. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, enjoys a considerably higher degree of energy self-sufficiency thanks to its developed refining sector, centered on the modernized refineries in Atyrau, Pavlodar, and Shymkent. It is therefore unsurprising that Bishkek turned first to Astana when seeking emergency fuel supplies. Kazakhstan’s potential to serve as a regional supplier nevertheless has clear limits. The country’s domestic fuel market periodically comes under structural pressure during the spring and autumn agricultural seasons and when planned maintenance is carried out at its refineries. As a result, Astana must balance support for its regional partners with maintaining stability at home. Although Kazakhstan annually agrees with Russia on duty-free import quotas of up to 1.12 million metric tons of Russian petroleum products under the indicative fuel balance mechanism, the current...

Caspian Sea

As Two Wars Reach the Caspian, Central Asia’s Middle Corridor Holds

On July 25, two wars met in waters that Central Asian governments had tried to keep apart. Ukraine reported successful long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the targets included vessels involved in carrying military cargo from Iran and a warship. Tehran said an Iranian commercial vessel had been struck, killing one sailor and injuring another, and accused Kyiv of trying to widen the war. It remains unclear whether the vessel identified by Iran was among the targets described by Zelenskyy. Diplomacy produced a limited off-ramp. On July 28, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, that the strike on the Iranian ship was unintended. Both governments said they wanted to avoid further escalation. The call reduced the immediate risk of retaliation, but it did not remove the new danger. The Caspian is now one of the places where Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States intersect. Central Asia is exposed through the infrastructure and trade routes linking them. A “Sea of Peace” Under Pressure Turkmenistan responded to the incident with unusually direct language. Its Foreign Ministry called attacks on vessels in the Caspian “inadmissible” and described the waterway as a “sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness.” Ashgabat did not name Ukraine or endorse Iran’s account. Its restraint was characteristic, but the public criticism was unusual. Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality normally produces guarded statements during external conflicts. The intervention showed that Ashgabat viewed the attack as a challenge to the regional order. Turkmenistan faces Iran across a 1,148-kilometer land border and the southern Caspian. Turkmenbashi port is also central to its plans for a larger role in Eurasian trade. The principle is set out in the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, signed in Aktau in 2018. Its text calls for the peaceful use of the sea, prohibits the use or threat of force, and bars armed forces belonging to non-Caspian states. The convention has not entered into force because Iran has not ratified it. Its provisions were designed to govern relations among the five littoral states. They do not address a long-range strike carried out by a non-littoral state. But modern drones can cross distances that once provided strategic shelter. A landlocked sea can no longer be assumed to sit beyond the reach of surrounding wars. The Iran-Russia Link Ukraine has clear military reasons to look toward the Caspian. Iran has supplied Russia with drone technology used against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The sea also provides a direct commercial route between Iranian ports and Russia’s Volga region. Kyiv now treats vessels on that route carrying military cargo as part of Russia’s military logistics. Iran described the vessel struck on July 25 as civilian. The dispute over the ship’s cargo is central because commercial and military supply chains can overlap. A vessel may be civilian by flag and registration while carrying goods that Ukraine considers part of Russia’s war effort. That uncertainty reaches beyond...

Middle East Crisis

Turkmenistan Condemns Strike on Iranian Ship in Caspian Sea

Turkmenistan has criticized an attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea that the Iranian government blamed on Ukraine. In a statement on Monday, Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to media reports of an attack on a ship in the Caspian on July 25 and described “such actions” as unacceptable. “As a Caspian littoral state and the country with a status of permanent neutrality recognized by the United Nations, Turkmenistan underlines that the Caspian Sea is a sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness,” the ministry said, without specifically referring to Ukraine or Iran. The Caspian Sea is critical to Turkmenistan´s ambition to play a larger role in the Middle Corridor, a trade network linking Asia and Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran had blamed Ukraine for the attack that it said resulted in an explosion on an Iranian commercial vessel, killing one sailor and injuring another. It described the attack as “an act of aggression that could further inflame and expand the ongoing conflict.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said the Ukrainian military’s deep strike range is more than 3,000 kilometers, indicating that the Caspian Sea is within reach. “We also have very good results from long-range strikes in the waters of the Caspian Sea,” Zelenskyy said on July 25. “In particular, these are vessels that were involved in transporting military cargo from Iran, and a warship.” Iran has provided drone technology to Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The attack in the Caspian Sea comes amid heightened Mideast tension and open conflict between Iran and the United States. Earlier in July, Kazakhstan had condemned drone strikes on oil infrastructure in the Black Sea that is critical to Kazakhstan’s energy exports. Ukraine has said it was targeting Russian interests in the Black Sea. On July 25, in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for a freeze of the Russia-Ukraine war in some of his strongest comments about ending the fighting.

Middle Corridor

Uzbekistan Seeks More Freight Capacity Through Kazakhstan’s Caspian Ports

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have instructed their national railway companies to draw up a plan to increase Uzbek freight shipments through the ports of Aktau and Kuryk, expanding Tashkent’s access to markets across the Caspian Sea. Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and his Uzbek counterpart, Abdulla Aripov, discussed the plan during a July 23 visit to the Aktau International Sea Trade Port. The volume of Uzbek freight handled through Aktau and Kuryk increased by more than 60% in 2025, according to the Kazakh government. “Our task is to provide cargo from Central Asian countries with fast and reliable access to the markets of the Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe,” Bektenov said. Aktau and Kuryk are the main Kazakh ports on the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor. The rail-and-sea route links China and Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. For Uzbekistan, one of the world’s two double-landlocked countries, the Kazakh ports provide access to the western section of the corridor. Freight is carried by rail to the Caspian coast before being transferred to ships bound for Azerbaijan. The two governments did not say how much additional freight they expect to carry or when the railway companies must complete their plan. Further growth will depend on tariffs, the availability of railcars and vessels, border procedures, and the capacity of railway lines serving the ports. The combined infrastructure capacity of Aktau and Kuryk is about 22 million metric tons a year, according to Yelzhas Otynshiyev, chairman of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, the state railway company. Aktau alone can handle as much as 12 million tons annually and operates throughout the year. Container transit through the Kazakh ports on the Middle Corridor increased 3.8-fold between 2022 and 2025, the government said. The first phase of a container hub with annual capacity of 140,000 twenty-foot equivalent units has opened at Aktau. A second phase, due in 2027-2028, is expected to lift capacity to 240,000 TEUs. Kazakhstan has also ordered six container vessels. Four are due for delivery in 2027 and two more in 2028. The additional ships are intended to reduce dependence on the limited pool of vessels operating on the Caspian Sea. Capacity constraints remain at the ports and on the rail network. Falling Caspian Sea levels have made it harder for fully loaded vessels to enter some harbors and increased the need for dredging. Kazakhstan completed dredging at Kuryk in 2025 and plans to finish similar work at Aktau by the end of 2026. The World Bank lists port capacity, rail access, and delays at the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border among the main bottlenecks affecting the Middle Corridor. Some freight operators use longer routes because existing border crossings and rail links cannot handle demand efficiently. The bank has also called for additional berths and modern cargo-handling equipment at Aktau as the Caspian becomes shallower. Kazakhstan is upgrading the Shalkar-Beineu and Beineu-Mangystau railway sections that carry traffic to Aktau and Kuryk. In February 2026, the World Bank approved an $846...