Regional Cooperation - The Times Of Central Asia

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Afghanistan

Central Asian Countries Launch New Contact Group on Afghanistan

At Uzbekistan’s initiative, the special representatives of four Central Asian countries convened in Tashkent on August 26, for the inaugural meeting of a new regional Contact Group on Afghanistan. Delegations from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan participated, launching a platform for regular envoy-level dialogue on shared concerns related to Afghanistan. According to the ministry, the participants emphasized the “relevance and timeliness” of creating this Contact Group as an independent mechanism for regional coordination. The meeting builds on commitments made by the presidents of the four countries during the August 2024 Central Asian summit in Astana, which produced a joint statement and a 2025-2027 roadmap for regional cooperation. In Tashkent, delegates reiterated the need for a unified regional approach to Afghanistan, given Central Asia’s geographic proximity and long-standing cultural and economic ties with its southern neighbor. The envoys underscored that the region must take a self-reliant, coordinated stance on Afghan affairs, one that promotes stability, security, and sustainable development across Eurasia. During the talks, the participants pledged to pursue common, balanced, and realistic policies toward the situation in Afghanistan based on consensus. They identified the urgent need to restore and expand trade, transport, logistics, and cultural-humanitarian connections with Afghanistan, which have deteriorated in recent years. The envoys also exchanged views on engaging with Afghanistan’s de facto Taliban authorities in line with each country's interests. They expressed support for enhanced cooperation on regional security challenges, including the fight against terrorism, extremism, narcotics trafficking, and cross-border crime. Although none of the Central Asian states formally recognize the Taliban government, all maintain practical working relationships with Kabul, particularly in areas such as border control, counterterrorism, trade, and humanitarian support. Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Central Asia has navigated a delicate diplomatic path, maintaining cautious ties with Kabul while also deepening relations with China and Russia. Uzbekistan has taken a leading role. In August 2024, its prime minister visited Kabul, signing 35 agreements worth $2.5 billion. Bilateral trade reached $866 million in 2023. Kazakhstan, Afghanistan’s primary supplier of wheat and flour, has kept its embassy open in Kabul and held multiple business forums since 2023. According to the CACI Analyst, Kazakh-Afghan trade reached $700 million in the first nine months of 2024, with projections aiming for $3 billion within five years.

Regional integration

Tokayev Calls for Global Action at UN LLDC3 Summit in Turkmenistan

At the Third United Nations Conference on the Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC3), held from August 5-8 in the Turkmen resort town of Awaza, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev urged the international community to deepen cooperation, enhance regional connectivity, and take decisive collective action in support of the 32 countries that lack direct access to the sea and remain on the periphery of global trade. A Global Call for Equality and Interconnectedness Speaking at the plenary session, Tokayev highlighted Kazakhstan’s leadership in advancing the LLDC agenda. In 2003, Almaty hosted the first UN conference on landlocked countries, which culminated in the Almaty Programme of Action (APoA). Two decades later, the president noted, structural barriers, such as limited market access, underdeveloped infrastructure, and high exposure to geopolitical shocks, remain largely unchanged. “Landlocked countries should be seen as equal and promising partners in global development,” Tokayev said. “Our voice must be louder and our cooperation deeper.” [caption id="attachment_34680" align="alignnone" width="300"] @akorda[/caption] The Awaza Action Programme: A Roadmap for 2024-2034 The centerpiece of LLDC3 was the adoption of the Awaza Action Programme for the coming decade, structured around five strategic priorities: structural transformation of economies, development of sustainable infrastructure, trade facilitation, regional integration, and resilience. Kazakhstan endorsed the plan and called for stronger political and financial support from transit countries, international institutions, and private investors. Tokayev emphasized the need for innovative financing tools to mobilize investment in transport, energy, and digital infrastructure. Addressing the Climate Challenge The president also highlighted the disproportionate climate-related vulnerabilities faced by LLDCs, including water scarcity, glacial melt, and desertification. He called for a balanced and inclusive approach to climate policy and invited participants to the Regional Environmental Summit, scheduled for April 2026 in Astana, to be co-hosted with the United Nations. Tokayev also pointed to Kazakhstan’s recent achievements in digital innovation and sustainability, citing the launch of the Alem.AI Artificial Intelligence Center and the commissioning of a new national supercomputer. “We are open to international scientific cooperation,” he said. [caption id="attachment_34681" align="alignnone" width="300"] @akorda[/caption] Central Asia as a Model of Regional Resilience Despite geographic constraints, Tokayev presented Central Asia as a case study in overcoming isolation through cooperation. “Geography does not determine destiny,” he said. “With political will, strategic investment, and international partnership, lack of access to the sea can become not a barrier but a source of growth.” Kazakhstan is investing heavily in transport corridors such as the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Route) and the North-South Corridor, strengthening its role in the Eurasian logistics network. Energy Diplomacy and Regional Projects On the sidelines of the conference, Central Asian leaders convened for informal talks, where they discussed priority areas of cooperation, including energy. Topics included development of Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh Gas Field, one of the world’s largest, and ongoing transport projects such as the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway and the Turkmenbashi-Garabogaz-Kazakhstan border highway. According to the UN, trade costs in LLDCs are 74% higher than in coastal states, and cross-border shipping takes twice as long. Collectively, these countries account for only 1.2% of...

State Visit

Steppe Diplomacy: Mongolia Deepens Central Asia Ties

Late on July 20th, the President of Mongolia, Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh, touched down in Bishkek as part of a two-day state visit to Kyrgyzstan. It forms part of Khürelsükh’s wider Central Asian tour, with the President set to fly to Dushanbe following his sojourn in the Kyrgyz capital. The trip builds on Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov’s 2023 visit to Ulaanbaatar, where he oversaw the opening of Kyrgyzstan’s first embassy in Mongolia and toured the Genghis Khan Museum in the capital. A warm greeting Khürelsükh was welcomed by Japarov on the red carpet at Manas International Airport, where traditional dances, music, and even a ceremonial eagle were laid on. The pair greeted each other like old friends before the motorcade swept along the empty roads towards the city. Like Japarov, Khürelsükh has been president since 2021, although, unlike his Kyrgyz counterpart, his role is largely ceremonial. Indeed, current Mongolian politics offers a hint of nostalgia to those in Kyrgyzstan with fond memories of the pre-Japarov era. In June, the Mongolian Prime Minister was forced to resign after losing a vote of confidence in the country’s parliament. This followed months of protests after press reports covering his son’s extravagant spending. The second day of the visit afforded Japarov the chance to play to statesman-like host and welcome a new visitor to the Presidential Palace – the Yntymak Ordo – which is still less than a year old. With temperatures hitting 37°C (98° Fahrenheit) in the Kyrgyz capital, the Mongolian leader arrived at the palace in a blacked-out Mercedes, flanked by a horse-mounted honor guard. The besuited leaders then stood in the baking sunshine to receive a military salute from Kyrgyzstan’s army. A burgeoning friendship Perhaps the scale of the pomp masks the limits of what can be achieved bilaterally. Iskander Sharsheyev, an independent Kyrgyz economist, was keen to stress to The Times of Central Asia that the leaders did achieve some breakthroughs in terms of agriculture: “Veterinary certificates were signed... This provides a new market for Kyrgyz producers. Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia signed a memorandum of cooperation in the field of wool processing, including cashmere. Mongolia is one of the world leaders in cashmere production, and the transfer of technology and training of specialists can dramatically improve the Kyrgyz textile sector.” However, real announcements were thin on the ground and the language of diplomacy was heavy with blandishments: “We strive to develop mutually beneficial cooperation in all areas, especially in the trade and economic sphere,” said Khürelsükh, while Japarov noted that “comprehensive cooperation with Mongolia is one of the priority areas of the development of Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy.” The question is whether there is any substance behind this. Economically, the numbers are hardly going to move the dial. In the first five months of this year, Kyrgyzstan exported $3.1 million worth of goods to Mongolia, much of it confectioneries. Mongolian exports in the other direction are even lower. While officials are trumpeting the rate of growth, which tripled in 2024, it’s worth having a...

Afghanistan

Kazakhstan in Afghanistan: From Rhetoric to Infrastructure

The visit of Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu to Kabul (July 10–11) was a turning point not only for bilateral relations but also for the entire regional logistics agenda. While Astana's previous statements about its readiness to participate in the Trans-Afghan Corridor were viewed by many with skepticism as a demonstration of goodwill without practical substance, these doubts have now been dispelled. Kazakhstan has not only reaffirmed its commitment to the project but also reinforced it with concrete commitments. An interdepartmental memorandum on the implementation of the Torgundi-Herat railway line has been signed, and Astana has confirmed its readiness to invest up to $500 million in the Trans-Afghan railway project. This is an important step in the formation of future transport corridors within the Central Asia to South Asia (CA2SA) initiative. Practical matters such as tariff policy, border crossing procedures, logistics, and digitalization were also discussed. The visit also carried diplomatic weight. Kazakhstan is demonstrating its willingness to engage pragmatically with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. This is not a step towards recognizing the Taliban regime, but an effort to involve Kabul in economic processes without altering Kazakhstan’s legal or political stance. Attempts to link this visit to Russia's recognition of the Taliban appear superficial. Such trips are not planned spontaneously — in diplomatic practice, visits at this level are prepared for weeks, if not months. The very structure of the negotiations made it clear what the priorities were: infrastructure, transport security, and economic cooperation, not political recognition. Given Kazakhstan’s balanced foreign policy, formal de jure recognition of the Taliban regime is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The current status quo — practical cooperation without political legitimization — is acceptable to all parties, regional states, and Afghanistan alike. At most, we may see an elevation of diplomatic representation. Currently, both countries are represented by temporary chargés d'affaires. After the visit, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors may be appointed. However, even this would not mean recognition. Diplomatic missions are a means of communication, not a political endorsement. Kazakhstan’s position continues to be guided by that of the United Nations. Until the Credentials Committee changes its position on the Afghan side's participation in the General Assembly, Astana will not force events. From 2021 to 2024, the committee rejected the Taliban's applications for accreditation, which de facto means a refusal of international recognition at the global level. Although these decisions are not legally binding, they serve as the main political guideline for states that adhere to a collective approach. In matters of recognition, it is essential not to get ahead of geopolitical realities. It is important that Kazakhstan's actions are not isolated: they are in line with other countries in the region, especially those bordering Afghanistan. Whereas previously the policy of Central Asian countries towards their southern neighbor was determined by security issues, the focus is now shifting to trade, logistics, and infrastructure development. Across all regional capitals, there is growing recognition that supporting Afghanistan is not a formality, but a rational strategic choice. After...

Organization of Turkic States

The Turkic States Are Quietly Building a Geoeconomic Power Base

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) has spent the past years assembling itself not through declarations or summit communiqués, but through shared transport and logistics, harmonized customs procedures, and coordinated capital flows. What began in 2009 as the Turkic Council, a lightly institutional and rhetorically cohesive forum for shared identity, has evolved, following its 2021 transformation into the OTS, into a logistical and regulatory organism. Its under-the-radar evolution has been systematized through agreed documents, deployed capital, and materialized infrastructure. The OTS has entered a phase of procedural coordination and structural intent. Its cooperation is now practical, strategic, and functionally embedded. This evolution has not followed a single arc, nor has it merely responded to outside pressures. Instead, it has progressed through an uneven sequence of internal adjustments, sometimes slow and technical, sometimes accelerated by external jolts such as the recent disruption in Azerbaijani–Russian relations. But such jolts only intensified a trajectory already underway. Member states had been converging long before this most recent bilateral crisis by aligning their policies, testing instruments, and developing the practical grammar of multilateral coordination. The current phase of renewed cooperation is not a reactive surge but a prepared transition that expresses an underlying structural shift in Eurasian geoeconomics at large. Digital Infrastructure and Networked Cooperation If there is a single domain where institutional convergence becomes immediately visible, this would be digital logistics. Once-fractured national processes — disjointed customs systems, mismatched permits, bureaucratic duplication — have begun to fold into a shared administrative architecture (including eTIR, eCMR, and ePermit) structured by international conventions that have been adapted to fit the particular alignments now emerging in the Turkic sphere. These procedures are no longer pilot projects but live systems. They digitize paperwork, synchronize border procedures, and build the kind of operational rhythms that trade corridors need in order to function. Negotiations continue, meanwhile, on a Free Trade in Services Agreement, targeted not at deregulation but at harmonization, viz., the alignment of technical and professional standards across a disparate set of economies. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, for example, are already piloting a Simplified Customs Corridor. Its eventual integration with the multimodal Uzbekistan–Türkiye axis is not a matter of if, but of how soon. Official observer states to the OTS are also beginning to move, with Hungary being the clearest case. Its $100 million injection into the Turkic Investment Fund made headlines, but the real story is downstream: Hungarian infrastructure now receives Azerbaijani gas via Türkiye. That is not diplomacy; that is energy dependence, structurally routed. Turkmenistan, long the holdout, has started to engage, first through planning meetings and now through signed agreements. Its ports, once idle in regional plans, are being fitted into the wider Caspian logistics network. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), formally recognized only by Türkiye, is also a functional participant through educational exchanges, shared language, and soft institutions. Reciprocal Trade and Development The shift underway is as much geographic as it is institutional. Central Asia is no longer on the margins of the OTS...

Regional Cooperation

Opinion: Regional Power Starts at Home – Central Asia’s Path to Autonomy

The world is once again in a phase of systemic uncertainty. As conflicts proliferate and global governance splits, small and medium states must grapple with the consequences. For Central Asia, these external crises are not distant events; they are transmitted through trade, remittances, energy prices, and diplomatic pressure. But while exposure is unavoidable, dependence is not. The region’s future lies not in aligning with competing hegemons, but in constructing durable institutions of regional cooperation and self-governance. Over the last two decades, Central Asian countries have existed in a delicate balance. Security guarantees from Russia, infrastructure finance from China, and development assistance from the West provided a measure of stability, but they also bred institutional inertia. Today, that equilibrium is breaking down. Russia is preoccupied and sanctioned. China’s external ambitions are increasingly self-serving. The West is distracted. The resulting vacuum could leave Central Asia either exposed or, more optimistically, empowered to shape its own destiny. Uzbekistan's Institutional Recalibration Uzbekistan's pivot after 2016 was more than a diplomatic rebranding. It marked a nascent effort to build regional institutional trust, which was long absent in Central Asia. For the first time since independence, disputes over borders, transit, and trade were addressed not through coercion or isolation, but negotiation. The Khujand Declaration, signed by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, offered a blueprint for how local capacity, rather than external mediation, can resolve long-standing frictions. This was a decisive shift from extractive bilateralism to inclusive multilateralism. But diplomatic normalization is only a prelude. The deeper question remains: Can Central Asia institutionalize integration? Can it create shared rules and enforcement mechanisms strong enough to withstand both internal and external shocks? If Central Asian countries want to succeed, they should invest in four areas of regional institution-building, which will bring collective autonomy to the region. Mobility without bureaucracy Mobility is not just about tourism or convenience; it is about labor markets, political identity, and state capacity. Central Asia must move toward the full elimination of intra-regional visa and registration requirements. A legally binding regional agreement should guarantee the right of all citizens to live, work, and invest across borders without administrative friction. Strategic alignment through membership discipline Membership in multilateral organizations is not costless. It binds countries to external norms and power hierarchies. Uzbekistan’s exit from the CSTO and its calibrated WTO accession strategy demonstrate the value of selectively aligning with institutions that advance national and regional interests. Central Asian countries should have the political will to reconsider all memberships that harm their prosperity. Instead, a coordinated foreign policy doctrine between countries could increase their authority and bargaining power on the global stage. Energy security through joint investment and governance Energy independence is the main concern in Central Asia. Therefore, a Central Asian Energy Association should be established to coordinate grid connectivity, renewable development, and strategic reserves. Collective energy governance would reduce dependency on Russian and Chinese systems, while enabling scale economies in transition technologies. Investment in Afghanistan as a regional stability mechanism The marginalization of Afghanistan has...