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Prisons

Uzbek Diplomats Visit Prisoners in Russia’s Sakhalin Region

Officials from Uzbekistan’s Consulate General have visited Uzbek nationals serving prison sentences in Russia’s Sakhalin region to discuss their living conditions, health, and requests for transfer back to Uzbekistan, according to Uzbekistan’s state-run news agency Dunyo. The meeting took place at Correctional Institution No. 1 in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk during a working visit by consular staff. Dunyo reported that eleven Uzbek citizens are currently incarcerated at the facility after being convicted under various articles of Russia’s Criminal Code. During the visit, consular representatives inspected residential quarters, dining areas, and recreation facilities before holding a group meeting with the prisoners. Discussions focused on detention conditions and inmates’ well-being. According to the report, Uzbek officials also warned prisoners that joining foreign military formations could lead to criminal liability under Uzbek law. The issue has drawn attention since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, amid repeated warnings to Central Asian migrants against joining foreign military units. The incarcerated Uzbek citizens reportedly said they were generally satisfied with prison conditions. However, many expressed concerns over prolonged separation from family members and requested assistance in being transferred to Uzbekistan to serve the remainder of their sentences closer to home. Consular staff provided contact details for the Uzbek diplomatic mission and told inmates they could seek support if problems arose during detention. The visit comes amid broader discussions over the transfer of foreign prisoners between Russia and Central Asian countries. Earlier, Russia’s Human Rights Commissioner, Tatyana Moskalkova, said Moscow was prepared to facilitate the transfer of more than 3,000 Uzbek citizens convicted in Russia. However, she noted that the process remains blocked because Uzbekistan has not ratified the 1998 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. The issue extends beyond Uzbekistan. Last month, Moskalkova said she had received a positive response from the Tajik authorities, including President Emomali Rahmon, regarding the possible transfer of around 200 Tajik women serving prison terms in Russia on humanitarian grounds. Labor migration from Central Asia to Russia has created a growing number of cases involving citizens imprisoned abroad, increasing pressure on governments in the region to improve legal assistance, consular access, and mechanisms for prisoner transfers. The visit shows Uzbekistan is maintaining consular access to citizens held in Russian prisons, even as a broader transfer mechanism remains unresolved.

Fuel prices

Why Oil-Rich Kazakhstan Is Bracing for Higher Fuel Prices

Fuel prices in Kazakhstan are expected to rise significantly, according to Kazakh energy analysts. Although the country remains a major oil exporter and plans to expand its refining capacity, analysts warn that these measures alone will not resolve the structural problems behind rising fuel costs. Some Kazakh energy analysts have already described 2026 as “the final year of cheap gasoline” before Kazakhstan becomes more closely integrated into the Eurasian Economic Union’s common oil and petroleum products market. The situation is further complicated by the conflict in the Middle East, which has added volatility to global oil markets. For Kazakhstan, however, the deeper problem is domestic: low-regulated prices, refinery constraints, gray-market exports, and the rising cost of crude. Higher fuel prices also carry particular political sensitivity. The unrest that shook the country in January 2022 was triggered by a sharp increase in liquefied petroleum gas prices. Any new surge in gasoline or diesel costs could ripple through the economy, accelerating inflation and increasing social tensions. A Politically Explosive Commodity Kazakhstan’s leadership learned the political risks of fuel pricing during the January 2022 crisis, when protests erupted in the western city of Zhanaozen after liquefied petroleum gas prices rose sharply. Although the government quickly intervened and blamed unscrupulous suppliers, the protests rapidly escalated into nationwide unrest. Over several days, 238 people were killed, government buildings and security facilities were seized in multiple cities, and the country faced its worst political crisis since independence. In response, the authorities imposed a 180-day moratorium on fuel price increases, with some restrictions lasting even longer. Even then, it was clear that artificially suppressing fuel prices required substantial state subsidies, while the cost of oil extraction continued to rise. The “Last Year” of Cheap Fuel? Earlier this year, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy warned that domestic fuel prices would need to gradually move closer to those in Russia by the end of 2026. Officials linked the expected price convergence to the planned launch of the EAEU’s common oil and petroleum products market on January 1, 2027. At current exchange rates, gasoline prices at Kazakh filling stations remain roughly half those in Russia. A similar price gap exists with Kyrgyzstan, encouraging the unofficial export of cheap Kazakh fuel to neighboring countries. In practice, that means Kazakhstan faces pressure from both sides: raising prices risks public anger, while keeping them low encourages fuel to leave the country unofficially. The Energy Ministry insists that future price increases will not amount to “shock therapy” for consumers. Officials say the transition toward a common EAEU fuel market will occur gradually through legislative harmonization rather than through an immediate equalization of prices across member states. At the same time, the authorities acknowledge that the large price gap with neighboring countries creates strong incentives for gray-market exports of subsidized fuel, increasing the risk of artificial shortages inside Kazakhstan. According to the ministry, the current low-price environment also limits investment in the sector. Significant funding is needed to expand the Shymkent, Atyrau and Pavlodar refineries and,...

EAEU

EAEU Summit in Astana: Is Moscow Pushing Armenia Toward the Exit?

Russian President Vladimir Putin is due to arrive in Astana on May 27 for a state visit, while the Eurasian Economic Forum and a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council will take place in Kazakhstan’s capital on May 28-29. Against the backdrop of increasingly strained relations between Moscow and Yerevan, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will not attend the summit. Armenia will instead be represented by Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan. Kazakhstan’s presidential administration has already outlined the agenda for the visit. Putin is expected to receive full state honors. After the official welcoming ceremony, Putin and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will hold bilateral talks. On May 28-29, Tokayev, Putin, and other EAEU leaders are expected to take part in the Eurasian Economic Forum and the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meetings. Strategic Partnership and Growing Pressure Political analyst Andrey Chebotarev said the agenda of the Tokayev-Putin talks is likely to focus on implementing the declaration signed during Tokayev’s state visit to Russia in November 2025, which raised Kazakhstan-Russia relations to the level of a “comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance.” The declaration envisioned expanded cooperation in politics, security, economics, integration, high technology, and humanitarian affairs. According to Chebotarev, the two presidents now need to define concrete mechanisms for implementing those agreements. Among the most sensitive issues is the planned construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant with the participation of Russia’s Rosatom. Astana, Chebotarev argued, is particularly interested in ensuring the continuity of the project as Western sanctions against Moscow tighten. Another key issue is the uninterrupted transit of Kazakh oil exports to Europe through Russian territory. “This issue is especially relevant given, first, the suspension of oil deliveries through the Druzhba pipeline, which the Russian side explains as being due to technical reasons, and second, the continuing Ukrainian drone attacks on the Russian ports of Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga on the Black and Baltic seas,” Chebotarev said. Other likely topics include logistics linked to the North-South transport corridor and the worsening decline in the Caspian Sea’s water level, particularly ahead of the planned seventh summit of Caspian littoral states later this year. Information Wars and the Golden Horde Debate The Putin-Tokayev meeting is taking place against an increasingly difficult information backdrop shaped by several Russian media outlets and commentators. Russian public discourse has continued to react strongly to the recent international symposium in Astana dedicated to the legacy of the Golden Horde, as well as to Tokayev’s remarks during the event. Kazakh political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev, commenting ahead of Putin’s visit, argued that Kazakhstan-Russia relations were being subjected to “attacks and information provocations.” He described this as part of a campaign to turn Kazakhstan into “a platform for confrontation with Russia” amid the broader Russia-West conflict. He added that similar efforts were visible in attempts to inflame tensions between Kazakhstan and China. At the same time, Ashimbayev avoided publicly criticizing Russian opinion leaders, many of whom have become increasingly vocal in questioning the alliance between Moscow and Astana. Armenia’s Growing...

Fuel prices

Central Asia Feels Fuel Strain as Kazakhstan Prices Edge Higher

Kazakhstan's fuel market is moving into a new phase after the end of the government freeze on AI-92 gasoline and diesel. Pump prices have risen by small amounts so far. Retail prices are rising cautiously amid growing pressure from neighbors where fuel costs more. Kazakhstan still has some of the cheapest gasoline in the region, but that advantage creates a risk: cheap fuel attracts cross-border demand and makes it harder to fund the refining capacity the country says it needs. On October 16, 2025, Kazakhstan's government introduced a moratorium on further increases in AI-92 gasoline and diesel as part of a wider anti-inflation package. The decision also put the Energy Ministry, the competition agency, and regional authorities in charge of keeping supplies stable. The measure came after inflation and tariff reforms had raised concerns about household costs. The freeze ended on April 1, 2026, but by mid-April, the Energy Ministry was still trying to calm expectations. Kazinform cited Vice Minister of Energy Kaiyrkhan Tutkyshbayev on April 14 as saying most prices had risen mainly by one tenge after the moratorium was lifted, and that the state would not allow a sharp jump. The tone matched what drivers were seeing: a controlled rise rather than a sudden reset. The memory of January 2022, when an LPG price jump helped spark unrest, still hangs over fuel policy. The end of the freeze also fed into inflation expectations. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov warned in April that renewed growth in fuel prices and utility tariffs had to be handled cautiously, because a sharp reset could reverse the slowdown in inflation. The National Bank later said reforms in utility tariffs and fuel prices accounted for 32.9% of household inflation expectations in March. That made the fuel moratorium more than a pump-price measure: it was one of the state’s main tools for containing expectations while inflation remained in double digits. An April 9 check by Tengri Auto found that most filling stations in Almaty and the surrounding area were still selling fuel close to the previous price range. Several major networks, however, had already moved AI-92 toward 240 tenge per liter. AI-95, which was not covered by the main freeze, had risen to 328 tenge at one network. A Kazinform market check published on May 25 showed the same gradual pattern. AI-92 was listed at 238-239 tenge per liter in Astana, 238-241 tenge in Almaty, and 224-227 tenge in Shymkent. Diesel stood at 329 tenge in Astana, 330-337 tenge in Almaty, and 332-335 tenge in Shymkent. The figures point to a market that is moving, but still under close control. Fuel is also feeding into Kazakhstan's broader inflation picture. The Bureau of National Statistics put annual inflation at 10.6% in April 2026. Petrol prices were up 16.1% year-on-year and added 0.53 percentage points to annual price growth. Transport as a category added 1.1 percentage points. Fuel is one of the costs households notice most directly, and its effects spread through freight, food distribution, agriculture, taxis,...

Energy Security

Kazakhstan Targets 2027 Exit From Routine Russian Electricity Imports

Kazakhstan wants to stop buying electricity from Russia by 2027. The challenge is whether it can do so while keeping homes warm, mines running, and fast-growing regions supplied when demand peaks. The target is a test of whether the country can close a power deficit caused by years of underinvestment, rising demand, aging thermal plants, and uneven regional supply. The goal was restated this month by Deputy Energy Minister Sungat Yessimkhanov, who said Kazakhstan expects to reduce its electricity shortfall this year and bring it down to zero in 2027. The pledge builds on earlier government comments that Kazakhstan would cut imports as new domestic capacity comes online. In February 2025, Yessimkhanov told Kazinform that Kazakhstan planned to reduce electricity imports from Russia and could stop buying foreign electricity once planned capacity was commissioned in 2027. The gap is small on paper, but it carries political weight. Kazakhstan may be energy-rich, but its electricity system has been running short. The country produces coal, oil, gas, uranium, and growing volumes of renewable power, yet it still relies on imports from Russia to cover gaps between generation and consumption. In 2025, Kazakhstan generated 123.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity and consumed 124.6 billion kilowatt-hours, according to a January government meeting on new capacity. Installed capacity rose from 25.3 gigawatts to 26.7 gigawatts, but demand still exceeded domestic generation. Data from KEGOC, Kazakhstan’s national grid operator, shows how narrow the margin has become. In 2025, the gap between production and consumption was 1.4956 billion kilowatt-hours. KEGOC said the shortfall was covered by supplies from the Russian energy system. Kazakhstan received 4.6388 billion kilowatt-hours from Russia and sent 2.1595 billion kilowatt-hours back. That left a net power flow from Russia of 2.4793 billion kilowatt-hours, down from 3.4111 billion kilowatt-hours in 2024. The planned 2027 shift does not mean Kazakhstan will disconnect from Russia’s grid. The objective also fits a wider pattern in Astana’s energy policy: not breaking with Russia, but reducing the number of areas in which Russia is the default route, supplier, or emergency backstop. In oil and trade, Astana has been trying to expand alternatives to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route through Russia, including through the Middle Corridor. In electricity, the logic is narrower but similar. Ending Russian power imports would not make Kazakhstan energy-independent, but it would turn one more Russian-linked dependency from a structural need into a contingency option. Kazakh energy analyst Zhakyp Khairushev made this distinction in comments to LS, stating that Kazakhstan has a real chance to reach annual self-balance in 2027, but a stable surplus will be harder. The key issue is not only installed capacity, but available capacity during peak hours, winter demand spikes, and repair periods. A megawatt of wind or solar power does not play the same role as a megawatt of coal, gas, or flexible generation during a cold evening. Kazakhstan’s deficit is not only about total output; it is also about where electricity is produced, when it is available, and whether the grid...

Victory day

No Tanks on Red Square as Moscow’s Victory Day Pull Fades in Central Asia

Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9 is set to be more restrained this year, with tanks, armored vehicles, and missile systems absent from Red Square for the first time in nearly two decades. The Russian Defense Ministry cited the “current operational situation,” while the Kremlin blamed what it called Ukrainian “terrorist activity.” Russia also reported drone attacks aimed at Moscow in the days before the ceremony, and security around President Vladimir Putin has been tightened. The reduced scale of the parade carries a resonance beyond Russia. Victory Day remains one of the most emotionally charged dates in the post-Soviet calendar, including in Central Asia, where families still remember relatives who fought, died, or labored during World War II. But across the region, the holiday has increasingly been placed inside national calendars rather than left as part of Russia’s political script. The contrast with last year is sharp. In 2025, Moscow marked the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat with its largest Victory Day parade since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Chinese troops marched on Red Square, Xi Jinping sat beside Putin, and foreign leaders attended from across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet space. Tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, drones, and other military hardware rolled through the square. This year’s guest list is more limited. The Kremlin’s initial list of foreign delegations included leaders and senior figures from Belarus, Laos, Malaysia, Slovakia, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. Attendance has also been hard to read. Earlier reports said Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov were expected in Moscow, while the Kremlin’s initial published list of foreign guests did not include any Central Asian presidents. On May 8, however, Kazakh and Uzbek media reported that Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev were traveling to Moscow for Victory Day events. The late confirmations complicate the picture, but they do not restore the full regional show of unity seen in the last two years, when all five Central Asian presidents were present at the Moscow parade. It does suggest, however, that Moscow’s political ownership of the date is less automatic than it once was. Victory Day, which commemorates the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in what Russia calls the Great Patriotic War, has long been one of the main rituals of modern Russian power. It draws large television audiences, fills public space with military symbolism, and presents the Kremlin as the guardian of a sacred national memory. The holiday speaks of sacrifice and family loss, but also of nationalism and state control over history. Putin has used that language repeatedly. On May 9, 2024, after appearing on Red Square in snowfall, he said Russia was going through a “difficult, milestone period,” and warned: “We will not allow anyone to threaten us. Our strategic forces are always in combat readiness.” In 2025, he used the 80th anniversary parade to link Soviet wartime memory to Russia’s current war, saying...