• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
05 September 2026

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 2553

Turkmenistan Methane Emissions Under Scrutiny After 192 UN Alerts

UN satellite monitoring has identified Turkmenistan as one of the world’s most serious methane hotspots, with 192 alerts for the country issued over the past year. Three of the six largest leaks detected globally by the system over the past six months were in Turkmenistan, as were nine of the top 50. Eight major leaks have since been stopped after repairs. For Ashgabat, however, the issue is also taking on commercial significance: new EU rules are gradually linking access for imported gas to the European market with its methane footprint. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has confirmed eight cases in which major methane leaks in Turkmenistan were stopped after operators took action. The first two were recorded in November 2024, with further cases confirmed at several oil and gas sites over the following year. In February 2026, two leaks were stopped at Dauletabad, one of Turkmenistan’s largest gas fields. The latest confirmed case dates to March, in Lebap Province, one of the country’s main gas-producing regions. The leaks are detected by the UN's Methane Alert and Response System (MARS), which uses data from more than 30 satellite instruments. After detecting a major methane plume, MARS provides the information to the government or facility operator and then uses satellite observations to determine whether the emissions have stopped. Meghan Demeter, program manager for MARS at UNEP’s International Methane Emissions Observatory, called the first repairs an “incredible first step.” In comments to The Guardian on August 31, she stressed that significantly more work remains to be done, saying the repairs did not yet represent a breakthrough in the overall scale of Turkmenistan’s emissions. The scale of the problem is also reflected in data from the International Energy Agency (IEA). In its Global Methane Tracker 2026, Turkmenistan and Venezuela have by far the highest methane emissions intensities from upstream oil and gas production among major producers. The gap between the best and worst performers is more than 100-fold. Methane intensity measures emissions relative to the amount of fuel produced, allowing producers of different sizes to be compared. According to the IEA, large emissions events visible from satellites are particularly common in Turkmenistan: the country accounts for more than a third of all oil- and gas-related MARS observations in Eurasia. Satellite studies point to a worsening trend in recent years. One found that super-emitter activity on Turkmenistan’s western coast increased by about 8% annually between 2020 and 2023. The IEA’s own analysis shows that emissions from super-emitter events across Turkmenistan grew by more than 15% a year on average over the same period. The study of the western coast also estimated that methane emissions there rose by around 7% annually between 2020 and 2023, broadly in line with growth in natural gas production. Methane has a much stronger short-term warming effect than carbon dioxide. At the same time, it is the main component of natural gas, meaning leaks also represent a loss of fuel that could otherwise be sold. The IEA notes that high emissions intensity...

SCO Summit Delivers Institutional Reform but Leaves Development Bank Unsettled

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization adopted amendments to the bloc's Charter and approved regulations for two security bodies in Bishkek on September 1, but stopped short of launching the proposed SCO Development Bank. The official outcome list contains 28 documents. They include the Bishkek Declaration marking the SCO's 25th anniversary, a statement on assistance to countries affected by emergencies, and measures covering transport, digital policy, energy, and climate cooperation. For Kyrgyzstan, which used its fourth chairmanship to press for new financial and emergency response mechanisms, the results were mixed. The emergency statement gave political backing to a Kyrgyz initiative, while the bank remained under negotiation. Kazakhstan then made a competing offer to host its headquarters. An institutional package The member states signed a protocol amending the 2002 SCO Charter and approved regulations for the Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats. They also approved rules for the executive committee of the SCO Anti-Drug Center. The package included programs against drug addiction and synthetic narcotics through 2030, as well as amendments to the 2010 agreement on cooperation against crime. The decisions continue an institutional reorganization begun at the 2025 Tianjin summit. That meeting approved agreements establishing the Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and a Universal Center based on the SCO's existing regional counterterrorism structure in Tashkent. President Sadyr Japarov said the organization should remain free of bloc politics and confrontation. He called for the rapid launch of the Universal Center and said Bishkek had prepared the conditions for an SCO center against transnational organized crime. Opening the meeting, he said the anniversary should become the start of a new phase for the organization. Bank progress, but no launch The Bishkek Declaration records progress toward creating an SCO Development Bank among interested member states during Kyrgyzstan's chairmanship, though the wording is qualified. The summit did not produce a founding agreement, capital commitment, or a launch date. Japarov urged members to reach a practical decision on the bank and invited them to use Kyrgyzstan's Tamchy Special Financial Investment Territory for joint projects. Kyrgyzstan had already proposed Bishkek as the bank's headquarters. However, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev used his summit address to make a rival offer. Kazakhstan supports directing the proposed bank's resources toward infrastructure, technology, and industry, he said. "If there is consensus among the member states, Kazakhstan could host this institution, its headquarters," Tokayev said in the official transcript. The two bids underline how much remains unresolved. Members reached political consensus to establish the bank in Tianjin last year, but its membership, governance, capital, and location are still being negotiated. Kyrgyz emergency initiative advances The heads of state adopted a separate statement on assistance to countries affected by emergencies. Kyrgyzstan had spent its chairmanship promoting an SCO assistance mechanism and, in May, sought support for a special account to finance emergency aid after major natural disasters. The statement's adoption is a clear political success for Bishkek. Its published title does not establish whether members accepted the proposed special account or how...

World Nomad Games Return Home as Kyrgyzstan Welcomes World Leaders

Few periods since independence have put Kyrgyzstan so squarely in the international spotlight. On August 31, the country marked 35 years of independence, opened the sixth World Nomad Games, and prepared to host a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit that has brought more than a dozen foreign leaders to Bishkek. The Games themselves were back where they began. Kyrgyzstan launched the World Nomad Games in 2014 and staged the first three editions at Cholpon Ata before the event moved to Turkey in 2022 and Kazakhstan in 2024. This year's Games run through September 6, with The Times of Central Asia reporting from Bishkek and Issyk-Kul throughout the week in our special coverage. The opening took place at the new Bishkek Arena, rising out of the dust on the southwestern edge of the capital near the foothills of the Kyrgyz Ala-Too Range. Around 30,000 spectators attended the ceremony. The stadium will eventually hold more than 51,000, but it is not formally due to open until October 5. The Games opened while work on the arena was still underway, with parts of the building still looking unfinished. In the weeks before the ceremony, horses had circled the arena floor during rehearsals while drilling continued around them. By the time the spectators arrived, the construction site had become the biggest show in town. Before the politics and pageantry, there was pop. Kyrgyzstan put many of its best-known performers on stage in a concert that at times had a distinctly Eurovision feel. Energetic hosts introduced a succession of singers and rappers while tightly choreographed dancers moved between traditional dress and contemporary styling. The lineup included Bayastan, Malika Dina, Erlan Andashev, Begish, and others, but veteran singer Baktiyar Toktorov received the loudest reaction. When he launched into "Yza," known almost universally by its "Bui-Bui" refrain, spectators rose from their seats and sang with him. Even some of the security guards joined in. The refrain does not demand many words, but almost everybody in the arena seemed to know them. The new stadium also showed some early teething problems, with concession stands running out of bottled water and food as crowds built. After the concert, the momentum disappeared. The audience waited for around 90 minutes while footage of arriving dignitaries played on the giant screens. The reason for the pause soon became clear, as one motorcade after another delivered guests for the formal ceremony. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko were among those in the stands. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan also attended, along with leaders and senior officials from elsewhere in Asia, the Caucasus, and Africa. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres was among the international guests. One expected heavyweight was missing. Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Bishkek for a state visit and the SCO summit, had been due to attend the opening. Presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov said Xi had stayed away because of the deadly flooding and landslides in...

Kazakhstan Vice President and Prime Minister Approved by Parliament

Kazakhstan has begun its first major round of senior appointments since the new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, started work. On August 31, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev appointed Erlan Karin as vice president, retained Olzhas Bektenov as prime minister, and moved Aida Balayeva from the cabinet to the Security Council. Karin, who had previously served as first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, was the most significant appointment. The vice presidency in its current form was established under Kazakhstan’s 2026 constitutional reform. The post itself is not entirely new to the country: it existed during the first years of independence before being abolished in 1996. Under the new Constitution, at the president’s instruction, the vice president represents the president in interactions with the Kurultai, the government, and other state bodies. If presidential powers are terminated early, the vice president is first in line to assume them. The Kurultai must announce a presidential election within seven days, with the vote to be held within two months of that decision. Karin’s appointment therefore establishes, for the first time under the new system, who would assume presidential powers if the presidency became vacant before the end of a term. Karin is regarded as one of Tokayev’s closest advisers. He has worked alongside the president since 2019 and has served as presidential adviser, state secretary, state counselor, and first deputy head of the Presidential Administration. The creation of the vice presidency does not establish an independent political center alongside Tokayev. Instead, one of his most experienced political aides has taken the new constitutional office and become first in line to assume presidential powers if the office becomes vacant. Olzhas Bektenov, who has headed the government since February 2024, retained the post of prime minister. The Kurultai approved Bektenov’s candidacy by 137 votes, with seven abstentions and none opposed, after which Tokayev formally reappointed him. Meanwhile, Aida Balayeva left her posts as deputy prime minister and minister of culture and information to become deputy chair of the Security Council. Balayeva has long worked in Kazakhstan’s domestic policy establishment. She has served as an assistant to the president, deputy head of the Presidential Administration, minister of information and social development, and, since 2023, minister of culture and information. She now moves from the government to a body working directly under the president. The Kurultai replaced the Senate and Mazhilis, ending more than 30 years of bicameral parliament in Kazakhstan. All 145 members of the new chamber are elected through party lists. In the first election on August 23, the Adilet party won 71.17% of the vote and secured 110 of the 145 seats. Four other parties cleared the 5% threshold. With 110 seats, Adilet has enough deputies to approve presidential nominees requiring a simple majority without support from other parties. Under the new Constitution, however, the Kurultai has a formal role in senior appointments. Its consent is required for the appointment of both the prime minister and vice president, while most other government appointments follow consultations with the chamber....

Islamic State Khorasan Province Expands Reach Beyond Afghanistan

More than a decade has passed since the formal emergence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). For Central Asia, the history of this group is especially significant: the region features prominently in its propaganda and recruitment, and people from Central Asian countries have become part of transnational networks linked to ISKP. Today, ISKP must be assessed as more than an armed group operating in Afghanistan. Over the past decade, it has repeatedly lost leaders, been driven from most of its original territorial strongholds, and endured several major campaigns against it. Yet it has not disappeared. The current iteration of ISKP differs markedly from the organization that tried to establish itself in eastern Afghanistan in 2015-16. The main change is that it has learned to survive and spread its influence without controlling substantial territory. This transformation makes it especially important for Central Asia. Distance from the Afghan border and the number of districts under the group’s control are becoming less important measures of the threat. Its ability to maintain transnational ties, address audiences in local languages, and use migrant and digital networks is becoming more important. A large body of recent research, including a recently published monograph by the Usanas Foundation, makes it possible to trace this transformation. The group’s decade-long history is important for what it reveals about changes in the modern terrorist threat: loss of territory and a decline in membership do not necessarily mean an organization will disappear. ISKP did not emerge in a vacuum. Its original core was formed largely by members of existing jihadist organizations. They included former commanders of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Taliban members, and representatives of other groups who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s leadership after the organization emerged in Iraq and Syria. On January 26, 2015, Islamic State officially announced the creation of its “Khorasan Province.” Eastern Afghanistan became its main territorial base. This choice was no accident. Significant Salafi communities and religious networks had long existed in the region. Their development can be traced at least to the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s, and by 1990, Kunar Province already had its own Salafi political-religious movement, which briefly established the Islamic Emirate of Kunar. These networks should not automatically be equated with jihadism, but the presence of an established religious milieu and long-standing tensions between some Salafis and the Taliban gave ISKP more favorable conditions for its initial recruitment and entrenchment. The initial strategy largely replicated the Islamic State model in Iraq and Syria. ISKP sought to do more than carry out terrorist attacks. It tried to establish itself on the ground, build bases and its own control structures, collect local revenue, and demonstrate an ability to impose an alternative order. It was an effort to implement a specific territorial project. That effort to establish a territorial foothold soon became the group’s main source of vulnerability. From the middle of the decade, ISKP came under pressure from several adversaries at once. The armed forces of the former Afghan government and the...

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team is covering the Kurultai elections and what they mean for Kazakhstan. Special guest: Central Asia journalist Paul Bartlett.