Kyrgyzstan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Central Asia-South Korea Summit 2026

Central Asia’s First Korea Summit Produces Different Deals for Each Country

The first Central Asia-Republic of Korea Summit brought five countries to Seoul with very different records of working with Korean capital. Kazakhstan arrived with commercial agreements worth about $19 billion, while Uzbekistan is discussing multibillion-dollar financing through the state-owned Export-Import Bank of Korea. In Turkmenistan, Korean companies are expanding beyond their traditional role in the gas-chemical industry; Tajikistan is offering mineral resources; and Kyrgyzstan is establishing a dedicated government contact point to help attract Korean businesses. On September 16, the presidents of all five Central Asian states met South Korean President Lee Jae Myung together for the first time. Until now, the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum, established in 2007, had operated mainly at a ministerial level. A permanent secretariat was established in 2017, and in 2020 the meetings were elevated to the level of foreign ministers. The leaders adopted the Seoul Declaration, agreeing to hold summits every two years, with Kazakhstan set to host the next in 2028. Ministerial meetings in the intervening years will review implementation and prepare the next summit’s agenda. The declaration also envisages Korea Desks across the five Central Asian countries to help businesses address administrative obstacles. The leaders expressed interest in combining Central Asian minerals with Korean technology to build joint production networks, and agreed to pursue measures to reduce non-tariff barriers. Seoul also sees Central Asia as part of its own industrial strategy. South Korea, one of the world’s leading producers of automobiles, electronics, batteries, and ships, needs stable supplies of energy and raw materials. Opening the summit, Lee spoke of combining the region’s resources with Korean exploration and processing technologies. Critical minerals, energy, and supply-chain resilience were among the main issues at the meeting. In 2025, South Korea’s trade with the five countries reached $10 billion for the first time: Korean exports totaled $8.67 billion, while imports from Central Asia amounted to $1.39 billion. Cumulative Korean investment in the region reached $6.48 billion. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan continue to account for most of this trade and investment. The talks in Seoul showed how different the next step could look in each of the five countries. [caption id="attachment_56323" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: Akorda[/caption] Kazakhstan: $19 Billion in Agreements and Large-Scale Industry Kazakhstan arrived at the summit with the largest announced commercial package. On September 15, a day before the regional summit, Kazakhstan and South Korea signed around 80 agreements worth approximately $19 billion through the Kazakhstan-Korea Business Council in Seoul. About $11 billion is associated with projects involving Samruk-Kazyna, Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund, which controls major state assets in oil and gas, energy, transport, telecommunications, and uranium mining. The $19 billion figure represents the value of signed agreements and announced projects at different stages of development. Behind the headline figure are several major industrial projects. QazaqGaz and Hyundai Engineering agreed to implement a gas processing plant at Karachaganak with an annual capacity of 5 billion cubic meters. KazMunayGas and Samsung E&A signed an agreement on expanding the Pavlodar refinery’s capacity to 9 million metric tons a...

TCA Interviews

Kyrgyzstan’s High-Wire Act: Sanctions, Compliance, and National Interest

On September 2, the day after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Heads of State Summit in Bishkek, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Bakyt Sydykov, Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of Economy and Commerce and Special Presidential Representative for Sanctions Policy. He outlined the government’s approach to sanctions compliance and protecting Kyrgyz businesses. Sanctions exposure can affect Kyrgyz banks and businesses, as well as their international partners. U.S. secondary sanctions and EU and UK measures affecting foreign entities operate through different legal mechanisms. Some portions of the text have been edited for clarity. TCA: The sanctions against Russia adopted by the U.S., EU, and UK are not UN Security Council-mandated. Is it correct that Kyrgyzstan’s compliance policy addresses these measures rather than UN-mandated sanctions? Sydykov: That's correct. Secondary sanctions can affect non-U.S., non-EU, and non-UK entities or persons who knowingly facilitate transactions involving sanctioned parties. Our focus is on establishing better and better mechanisms and frameworks that address this bilateral dimension, that is, Kyrgyzstan's direct exposure through its relations with the sanctioning jurisdictions, in order to mitigate our exposure to potential secondary sanctions. TCA: Kyrgyz citizens and businesses can face sanctions exposure through dealings with sanctioned parties, including the risk of U.S. secondary sanctions. What are Kyrgyzstan’s main challenges in improving its compliance regime, and how are you addressing them? Sydykov: For technical reasons, our compliance regime is moving toward putting in place mechanisms that can flag or be anticipatory. I think you would agree that free markets are complicated and circumvention often comes to light only after it has occurred. We are largely equipped to manage these occurrences. We are moving to put in place firewall-like frameworks which would allow the country to identify and respond to occurrences before the fact. It is a great challenge — and one that every country operating in a free-market economy faces — to develop such a capacity, namely, to anticipate and prevent circumvention before it happens. Despite our best efforts, this remains a structural limitation. TCA: What concrete actions have you taken, or are you planning to take? Sydykov: We have established working groups, task forces, and interagency committees capable of swiftly halting the operations of any company engaged in sanctions circumvention. We are also working closely with commercial banks on these efforts. The banks, for their part, have introduced internal compliance committees and, in some cases, adjusted the composition of their boards of directors to strengthen governance and decision-making around potential circumvention risks. The banks are also developing a joint interbank blacklist of sanctioned entities, so that these entities are unable to operate through the banking system going forward. Those are steps to develop a working forward-looking, predictive approach — one that flags suspicious activity before it materializes – central to the comprehensive framework we are building. TCA: Some foreign investors may be reluctant to invest in Kyrgyzstan because of sanctions exposure. How could the measures you are taking address those concerns? Sydykov: Let me first say that we understand the rationale behind...

Rule of Law

Kyrgyz Court Upholds Ex-Security Chief Tashiyev’s Conviction but Changes Charge

On September 10, the Bishkek City Court upheld convictions against former security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev and seven others, but changed the offense from plotting to overthrow the government to interfering with electoral rights. All eight had been convicted in July of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. They received four-year prison sentences, replaced by three years of probation. The change has added to the confusion surrounding the alleged plot. On September 14, Tashiyev’s lawyer asked the Prosecutor General’s Office to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, saying the defense had received no warning of the new charge. The Letter of 75 The saga started in February, when a group of 75 prominent figures in Kyrgyzstan released an open letter calling on President Japarov to call for an early presidential election. The group argued that Japarov was elected in January 2021 under the terms of the previous constitution, which allowed a president one six-year term in office. Several months after Japarov was elected, the country approved a new constitution that gave an individual the right to be elected to two five-year terms as president. Within hours of the letter’s publication, the authorities started rounding up some of the authors of the letter, and President Japarov dismissed his long-time friend Tashiyev as security chief. Japarov said he dismissed Tashiyev to “prevent a split in society,” and for weeks after that, the Kyrgyz president was evasive about the exact reason for sacking a man Japarov continued to call his close friend. In an interview in late April, parliamentary deputy Elvira Surabaldiyeva was the first Kyrgyz official to clarify that Tashiyev was being charged with planning a coup. The trial opened on June 15. Tashiyev’s co-defendants were former Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev, former Parliamentary Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu, former Deputy Interior Minister Kursan Asanov, former Deputy Prime Minister Aaly Karashev, and politicians Emilbek Uzakbayev, Bekbolot Talgarbekov, and Kurmanbek Dyykanbayev. On July 2, all eight were found guilty of plotting the violent overthrow of the government. The court imposed four-year prison sentences and ordered confiscation of their property, but replaced imprisonment with three years of probation. Most of the defendants and the prosecution appealed the court decision, setting the stage for the court ruling on September 10. Still Guilty, but of Something Different The prosecution sought to have the sentences increased to nine years in prison for all the defendants. The defendants, of course, wanted to be exonerated. On September 10, the Bishkek City Court rendered its verdict. All eight defendants were declared guilty, but not of attempting to overthrow the government. They were guilty of “interfering with exercising voting rights.” The court retained the four-year prison terms but again allowed all eight defendants to serve probation instead. It reduced probation from three years to two and lifted the property confiscation order. Zulushev’s lawyer has said he will appeal to the Supreme Court. Tashiyev’s lawyer has separately asked prosecutors to investigate the appeal judges’ actions, arguing that his client was convicted on a charge the...

Gold Mining

AzerGold Eyes Gold Mining Projects in Kyrgyzstan

Azerbaijan’s state-owned mining company AzerGold is exploring potential gold and other mineral projects in Kyrgyzstan as it looks to expand its operations in Central Asia. On September 14, AzerGold Chairman Zakir Ibrahimov met executives from Kyrgyzaltyn, Kyrgyzstan’s state-owned gold mining company, to discuss potential joint mining and exploration projects. The two companies formalized their initial agreement on July 31 in Cholpon-Ata, where AzerGold and Kyrgyzaltyn signed a memorandum of cooperation. A month and a half later, the Azerbaijani delegation traveled to see Kyrgyzstan’s gold mining operations firsthand. One of the stops was the Altynken gold mine in the Chuy Region. It is operated by a joint venture between Kyrgyzaltyn and a subsidiary of China’s Zijin Mining. Kyrgyzaltyn holds 40% of the venture, and Zijin 60%. The AzerGold delegation was shown the mine and its processing facilities. It then traveled to Kyrgyzaltyn’s refinery in Kara-Balta, giving the delegation a view of both extraction and refining operations. For AzerGold, Kyrgyzstan would mark another step in a recently launched international expansion. In June, the company signed an agreement in Tashkent on the joint development of a gold deposit in Uzbekistan, albeit with scant details. AzerGold nevertheless described the Uzbek project as the first major step in its international growth and has identified Central Asia as one of its priority regions for expansion. The talks in Bishkek suggest it is now looking for a second foothold in the region. For Kyrgyzaltyn, interest from a new partner comes after major changes in the country’s gold mining industry. The most significant was the long-running dispute over Kumtor, Kyrgyzstan’s largest gold mine. The government took control of the mine from Canada-based Centerra Gold in May 2021. Under a settlement reached the following year, Centerra transferred ownership of its Kyrgyz subsidiaries to Kyrgyzaltyn, while Kyrgyzaltyn gave up its roughly 26% stake in Centerra. That episode did not end Kyrgyzstan’s use of foreign mining capital. Kyrgyzaltyn remains partnered with Chinese investors at Altynken, while an Indian-backed project at the Altyn-Tor section of the Solton-Sary deposit reached the production stage this month. Kyrgyzaltyn holds 35% of that venture and Avelum Partner, controlled by India’s Deccan Gold Mines, holds 65%. AzerGold could now become another foreign partner in the state company’s portfolio.

Mining Investment

Indian Gold Mining Project in Kyrgyzstan Reaches Production Stage

An Indian-backed gold project has moved into the production stage at the high-altitude Solton-Sary deposit in Kyrgyzstan, nearly five years after its developer signed an agreement with the state-owned Kyrgyzaltyn company. Deccan Gold Mines says it is the first Indian investment in Kyrgyzstan’s gold mining sector to reach this stage. On September 12, a gold processing plant began test operations at the Altyn-Tor section of the Solton-Sary deposit in the Naryn Region. The project is being developed by Avelum Partner, in which India’s Deccan Gold Mines holds a controlling stake, together with Kyrgyzaltyn. The two sides have been working together since December 2021. Under their partnership agreement, Kyrgyzaltyn holds a 35% stake, while Avelum Partner holds 65%. The project involves the comprehensive development of Altyn-Tor, including the processing of accumulated tailings and waste rock. Solton-Sary is located about 355 kilometers from Bishkek at an altitude of 3,500–3,600 meters. Soviet geologists first studied the deposit, and trial production at Altyn-Tor began in 1994. Operations have since been intermittent. Investment in the project reached $34.2 million by the end of August 2026. The foundation stone for the new plant was laid in July 2024. At the time, Kyrgyzaltyn said that once the facility reached its planned operating capacity, it was expected to create at least 400 jobs, more than 95% of them for Kyrgyz citizens. The agreement also stipulates that commercial-grade gold produced at the facility must be transferred to Kyrgyzaltyn and cannot be exported independently by the Indian partner. The structure is significant in a mining sector where foreign ownership has repeatedly become politically contentious. The most prominent example is Kumtor, Kyrgyzstan’s largest gold mine, which the government took under state control from Canada’s Centerra Gold in 2021. A settlement the following year transferred ownership to Kyrgyzaltyn. At Altyn-Tor, by contrast, Kyrgyzaltyn remains a partner in the project while the foreign investor provides most of the investment. Chinese investment is also present at Solton-Sary itself, although its history there has been considerably more complicated. The deposit consists of three main gold-bearing sections – Altyn-Tor, Buchuk, and Ak-Tash. Total gold reserves have been estimated at about 20 metric tons. Buchuk is being developed by the Kyrgyz-Chinese company Zhong Ji Mining. Explored gold reserves at the site are estimated at 12 metric tons, while geologists have indicated a possible additional 22 metric tons of gold resources. The project became the center of a major dispute over foreign mining investment in 2019. In August of that year, hundreds of residents of the Naryn Region gathered near Zhong Ji Mining’s operations. Local residents linked mining activity to livestock deaths and feared environmental contamination. On August 5, the protest escalated into clashes with Chinese workers, and more than 20 people received medical treatment. The authorities suspended operations, while the company removed some of its workers and equipment. When President Sadyr Japarov visited Solton-Sary in 2022, the Chinese project was still not operating. Local residents again raised concerns about the environment and the condition of roads. Japarov said...

Women in Media

Central Asian Women Journalists Set Regional Priorities Through 2029

The Coalition of Women Journalists of Central Asia is preparing a multi-year program. At a conference that opened in Tashkent on September 14, more than 100 media professionals from across Central Asia are discussing common priorities through 2029 and developing a regional guide to gender-sensitive journalism. For the coalition, the program is an attempt to move from periodic conferences toward a permanent professional network. The Second Central Asian International Conference of Women Media Professionals runs from September 14 to 15 under the theme “Regional Solidarity, Digital Security and an Inclusive Future for Journalism.” The event is organized by Uzbekistan’s Modern Journalism Development Center, with the National Coalition of Women Journalists of Tajikistan serving as its regional partner. The coalition emerged after the first such meeting in Dushanbe. On May 3, 2024, participants signed a memorandum establishing it. A planned follow-up conference in Dushanbe in May 2025 was abruptly canceled after two venues declined to host it. No official explanation was given. Participants are now discussing a program for 2026–2029 covering mutual support and exchanges of experience. It would also provide for coordinated responses to threats against journalism. Digital security is a major focus of the Tashkent program. The agenda covers online harassment and how deepfakes are used to spread disinformation. Separate sessions address the psychological toll on journalists and ways to protect personal data and newsroom systems during a digital attack. Those concerns reflect a wider problem for women working in journalism. According to a report published by UNESCO in May 2026, 45% of surveyed women journalists and other media workers said they self-censored on social media because of online violence, up from 30% in 2020. About 22% reported self-censorship in their professional work. Roughly a quarter had been diagnosed with or treated for anxiety or depression linked to online violence, while 13% reported post-traumatic stress disorder. Regional newsrooms are also working to improve reporting on violence against women. On September 8–9, just days before the Tashkent conference, journalists from across Central Asia gathered in Almaty for training on ethical reporting of gender-based violence. The event, held with the participation of UN Women, focused on professional and ethical standards for covering such cases. The Tashkent meeting is also intended to make regional solidarity more practical. Participants are discussing ways to provide rapid professional support when journalists face online attacks or other pressure. Another expected outcome is a unified regional guide to gender-sensitive journalism. It is intended to bring together recommendations for reporting on gender-related issues in a responsible and balanced way. Tashkent will also host the Women Media Awards Central Asia, a regional award for women working in the media. The program includes an audiovisual performance, “Echo: The Power of Invisible Voices,” addressing hate speech and digital attacks involving bots and deepfakes. After Tashkent, the test will be whether the network works between conferences, when journalists are separated by national borders and a colleague may need help that same day.