Kyrgyzstan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Foreign Trade

Kyrgyzstan Exports Recover After Sharp Fall in Gold Sales

Kyrgyzstan's exports have begun to recover after a sharp decline in 2025, when the value of its gold exports plunged by nearly three-quarters. In the first eight months of 2026, exports rose by nearly 20%. Even so, for every dollar earned from selling goods overseas, Kyrgyzstan spent more than four dollars on imports. According to a report by the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, exports fell by 41.2% in 2025 to $3 billion. Imports, meanwhile, continued to grow, reaching $13.7 billion. As a result, the country spent $10.6 billion more on foreign goods than it earned from selling its own products abroad. A year earlier, the gap stood at $7.3 billion. The main reason for the decline was a sharp drop in overseas sales of gold, one of Kyrgyzstan's principal sources of export revenue. Their value fell from approximately $2.5 billion in 2024 to $683 million in 2025. Exports of other goods also fell 11.2%. Trade was also affected by weaker demand from Russia and Kazakhstan, two major markets for Kyrgyz producers, as well as temporary restrictions on exports of certain goods, including scrap metal and livestock. Kyrgyzstan's trade is closely tied to neighboring countries. It belongs to the Eurasian Economic Union, alongside Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia. Members trade with one another without standard customs duties on most goods. Russia and Kazakhstan remain the largest buyers of Kyrgyz products and, together with China, supply most imports. The imbalance is particularly pronounced in trade with China. Chinese goods account for more than a third of Kyrgyzstan's total imports, while China receives only around 5% of its exports. Uzbekistan also remains an important market for Kyrgyz products. Outside the region, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are significant destinations. The downturn continued in the first half of 2026, when exports fell another 11.1% compared with the same period a year earlier. By the end of August, however, the picture had changed. Figures for the first eight months showed exports rising 19.5% to $2.3 billion. Gold exports also rebounded sharply, reaching $770.6 million, more than in the whole of 2025. Over half of that amount was exported in August alone. Imports also increased, reaching $9.7 billion. The recovery in overseas sales has therefore not yet significantly narrowed the gap between exports and imports. A trade deficit does not mean Kyrgyzstan is losing the equivalent amount from its government budget. It measures the difference between the value of goods imported into the country and those sold abroad. Imports are paid for by businesses and consumers, with funds coming from various sources, including remittances from migrant workers and investment. Services have become one of the fastest-growing areas of Kyrgyzstan's international trade, providing another source of funds for imports. According to preliminary figures, in 2025 the country earned $3.55 billion from services exports, up 20% from the previous year. Revenue from foreign visitors rose 36.9% to $1.19 billion. In international statistics, this category includes travelers' spending on accommodation, food, shopping, and other services during...

C5+1

Central Asian States Set Out Priorities After Rubio Talks in Samarkand

Central Asian governments backed closer cooperation on mineral processing and transport at the October 19 C5+1 meeting in Samarkand. Separate talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio covered possible aircraft purchases for Kyrgyzstan and further diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan announced a $12 billion package of agreements and prospective initiatives during the visit. For the other four Central Asian participants, the published accounts centered largely on cooperation priorities and follow-up discussions. The gathering followed the November 2025 White House summit and accompanied Uzbekistan’s signing of the Artemis Accords. It brought Rubio together with all five Central Asian foreign ministers, combining regional discussions with separate bilateral meetings. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi discussed implementation of earlier presidential agreements with Rubio. The talks addressed attracting American investment and technology, with energy and critical minerals among the priorities. Washington also expressed interest in cooperation on artificial intelligence and communications infrastructure. According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, Rubio expressed interest in visiting Kazakhstan after the December G20 summit in Miami. Kyrgyzstan’s talks included immediate obstacles to closer relations. Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev raised sanctions policy and visa restrictions with Rubio, alongside opportunities for American investment. The Kyrgyz side sought solutions that would facilitate educational and business exchanges. Presidential special representative Bakyt Sydykov briefed the U.S. delegation on Kyrgyzstan’s sanctions-related efforts, with Bishkek reaffirming its willingness to work with Washington to prevent sanctions circumvention. In a separate meeting, Kulubaev discussed possible Boeing aircraft deliveries to Kyrgyz airlines with company vice president Michael Schnabel. Financing options included possible involvement by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The discussions also covered aircraft maintenance and aviation infrastructure. Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin discussed expanding trade and investment with Rubio. The ministry’s account also described an exchange on regional security and stability in Central Asia. Turkmenistan reported a more specific diplomatic follow-up. Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and Rubio outlined a schedule of further meetings and political consultations. U.S. special envoy Sergio Gor also attended the talks. The shared C5+1 statement set out the broader economic agenda. The six governments supported further development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route and more closely aligned customs procedures. They also backed stronger industrial cooperation within Central Asia. On minerals, the statement envisaged expanded extraction and processing, alongside more production of higher-value goods within the region. It also supported exchanging expertise on geological data. These were collective policy intentions, without country-by-country financing allocations or project completion dates. Security commitments covered stronger border protection and counterterrorism cooperation, alongside efforts against transnational crime. The governments also supported practical cooperation on nuclear security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

C5+1

Uzbekistan Signs Space Accords as Rubio Opens Samarkand Talks

Uzbekistan joined the U.S.-led Artemis Accords on October 19 as Secretary of State Marco Rubio held talks in Samarkand. The signing accompanied the first Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue between the two countries, with critical minerals among the priorities. Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov announced the signing after bilateral talks with Rubio. He said Uzbekistan had become the 77th country to join the framework for peaceful space exploration. Saidov said accession would support closer cooperation with NASA and other participating space agencies. He identified training for Uzbek specialists and access to space technologies as potential benefits. Established in 2020, the Artemis Accords set out principles for civilian space exploration. Signatories commit to peaceful operations and greater transparency, including sharing scientific data. The framework also addresses interference between missions and the preservation of historic sites in space. NASA describes the accords as nonbinding principles. Posting on X, Rubio confirmed he had met all five Central Asian foreign ministers during the C5+1 gathering. He said cooperation would expand commercial opportunities and strengthen regional security. American businesses also joined the visit as Washington seeks deeper economic ties across Central Asia. The visit follows the November 2025 White House summit, where Trump hosted all five Central Asian presidents. That meeting gave the partnership a stronger commercial focus, with aircraft orders and minerals projects featuring prominently. Samarkand brings ministers and businesses together to advance that agenda. The strategic dialogue focused on implementing agreements reached by the countries’ leaders and expanding economic cooperation. Saidov said the discussions covered energy and advanced technologies, alongside critical minerals. Education and security cooperation were also on the agenda. Rubio said separately that the talks addressed infrastructure and space cooperation, as well as engagement through C5+1, which brings together the United States and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In a separate meeting with Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi, Rubio reaffirmed plans to expand economic and security cooperation. He thanked Kazakhstan for supporting “President Trump’s peace initiatives, including the Abraham Accords.” Speaking to reporters in Samarkand, Rubio said nearly 300 American businesses were represented, and that agreements potentially worth billions of dollars were under discussion. He presented the visit as the start of deeper U.S. economic engagement with Central Asia. “I think we’ll have some concrete deals to announce,” he said, according to Euronews. A final list of agreements and their value had not been circulated at the time of those remarks. Rubio identified critical minerals as a priority, arguing that concentrated supplies created risks for countries dependent on them. "This is not about coming here to say, stop talking to somebody else or stop working with some other country," he said. Days earlier, at the October 15 summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in Baku, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed a transport strategy spanning several international initiatives. His proposal included China’s Belt and Road and the planned Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) through Armenia. It illustrated the region’s pursuit of transport links involving...

Air Pollution

Air Pollution in Central Asia: Why Winter Smog Persists in Almaty, Bishkek, and Tashkent

Almaty is investing 325.9 billion tenge (about $720 million) in converting a coal-fired power plant to natural gas, but the plant will continue burning coal for several more years. Bishkek is restricting certain types of coal while maintaining supplies of permitted fuel for winter. Tashkent reported lower pollution over much of the year, though early October brought a sharp increase in harmful particles. Across these three Central Asian cities, winter smog remains a problem as the heating season begins. According to World Bank estimates, concentrations of fine particulate matter, known as PM2.5, in major Central Asian cities frequently exceed World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines by six to twelve times, particularly in winter. PM2.5 particles can penetrate deep into the lungs and increase the risk of respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. During colder months, emissions from heating and transportation accumulate near the ground. When winds are weak and temperature inversions occur, polluted air can remain trapped over a city for several days. Almaty: Gas Conversion, Coal Remains Almaty's heating season began on October 9, with schools and hospitals connected first, followed by residential buildings on October 10. By then, the modernization of CHP-2, the city's largest coal-fired heating plant and one of its biggest sources of industrial emissions, had yet to be completed. According to project estimates, converting the plant to natural gas should reduce annual emissions of harmful substances from 37,300 tons to 2,700 tons. However, those reductions will not be achieved immediately after the new equipment begins operating. Environmental assessment documents cited by Kursiv indicate that coal-fired boilers and turbines will continue operating alongside gas-fired units in 2027–2029 during commissioning and periods of peak winter demand. The documents also envisage keeping coal-fired equipment in operation into the 2030s to safeguard energy supplies in case of gas shortages. Vehicle exhaust is another major problem for Almaty. In April, the city introduced a pilot low-emission zone (LEZ) in its center. Until the end of the year, the zone is operating without entry fees, fines, or traffic restrictions. Separately, citywide emissions checks have been underway since the beginning of 2026. By late August, inspectors had tested 5,496 vehicles and found 1,301 exceeding emissions limits, nearly a quarter of those checked. Violations detected during citywide inspections can result in penalties. Bishkek: Coal Restrictions, but No Easy Alternative In Bishkek, the main cause of winter smog is heating in private homes. Residential heating accounts for approximately 29% of air pollution, transportation for 27%, and dust for 21%. Combined emissions from the main thermal power plant and smaller boiler houses account for 11%, according to international research cited by the city administration. In October 2025, the municipal authorities imposed restrictions on the sale, storage, and use of fine coal in Bishkek. They also stepped up inspections targeting waste burning and began converting some boiler houses to cleaner fuels. On October 1, 2026, the mayor's office announced plans to maintain adequate supplies of coal meeting quality standards at fuel depots across the city. For many private residents,...

Military

Russia and Kyrgyzstan Sign Military Cooperation Plan for 2027

Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed a military cooperation plan for 2027 on October 15, a day after Russian lawmakers approved measures to simplify arms deliveries to Bishkek. Defense ministers Andrei Belousov and Ruslan Mukambetov signed the agreement in Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, ahead of a meeting of defense ministers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The plan's contents have not been made public. Russia's Defense Ministry said the two sides discussed military personnel training, military-technical cooperation, and the operation of the joint Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan. Russia's military presence in Kyrgyzstan consists of four facilities, including Kant Air Base, around 20 kilometers from Bishkek, which Russian forces have used since 2003. It is part of the forces of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The other facilities are a Russian Navy communications station in Chaldovar, a seismic monitoring station in Mailuu-Suu, and a naval weapons testing base near Karakol on Lake Issyk-Kul. Belousov inspected the Issyk-Kul facility on October 14. The base tests anti-submarine weapons and systems designed to protect ships and submarines from torpedo attacks. The joint military base operates under bilateral agreements. Its current structure took shape after Russia's military facilities in Kyrgyzstan were brought together under an agreement signed in 2012, which entered into force in 2017. On October 14, Russia's State Duma ratified a protocol simplifying military-technical cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. Signed in November 2025, the protocol allows military equipment to be supplied under contracts between authorized organizations without additional import and export licenses. It also simplifies procedures for spare parts, repairs, and maintenance. The changes could speed up deliveries to the Kyrgyz military, although no new contracts have been announced. In 2025, Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed a strategic military partnership program covering 2026–2030. The two defense ministries have now agreed on their work for the coming year. Kyrgyzstan also maintains military ties with other countries. In February 2026, representatives of U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Air Force, and the Montana National Guard discussed joint training plans for fiscal year 2027 with Kyrgyz military officials.

Migrant School Fees

Russian Lawmakers Propose School Fees for Central Asian Migrants’ Children

Russia relies on millions of workers from Central Asia, but lawmakers want to charge some of their children, typically aged 15–17, for the final two years of public schooling. The move comes after tougher enrollment rules that have left thousands of migrant children struggling to attend Russian schools. The proposal, submitted to the government by deputies from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) on October 14, would require foreign citizens and stateless people to pay for education in grades 10 and 11. LDPR leader Leonid Slutsky argued that migrant families should bear the costs of educating their children in Russian upper-secondary schools, allowing public funds to be redirected toward Russian students. The party claimed that more than 130,000 foreign children attend grades 10–11, costing the state over 37 billion rubles (about $440 million) annually. However, these figures contradict data from Russia's Ministry of Education analyzed by the data project Tochno, which found approximately 130,000 foreign pupils and another 3,000 stateless pupils enrolled across all school grades in 2025–26, with only 4% of foreign pupils attending grades 10–11. That would put the number of foreign pupils in the final two grades at roughly 5,200, casting doubt on the LDPR's estimated savings. Growing Pressure on Migrant Families The proposed fees follow a series of Russian restrictions that have already made it more difficult for Central Asian families to educate their children in Russia. Since April 2025, foreign children seeking admission to Russian schools have been required to demonstrate sufficient Russian-language proficiency and provide documentation establishing their legal residence. Enrollment among children from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fell by 27% in the 2025–26 school year, from approximately 122,000 to 89,000. In January 2026, Tajikistan's Minister of Education and Science Rahim Saidzoda reported that approximately 9,000 Tajik children had returned from Russia during 2025 following difficulties continuing their education there. Kyrgyzstan's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) raises a separate legal question. The EAEU treaty recognizes the right of migrant workers' children to receive education in the country where their parents work, subject to that country's legislation. However, it does not explicitly guarantee free tuition, leaving unclear whether children of workers from EAEU member states would qualify for exemptions. For migrant families, the immediate consequences would depend on the eventual tuition charges and exemptions. Some parents might choose vocational education for their children after grade nine, while others could leave them with relatives in their home countries rather than incur additional schooling expenses in Russia. Additional education costs could discourage migrant workers from bringing their families to Russia, even as the country continues to rely on Central Asian labor. Central Asia's Dependence on Remittances The proposed fees would affect families whose earnings are often vital to their home countries' economies. Tajikistan is the most dependent on remittances relative to the size of its economy, Kyrgyzstan relies particularly heavily on earnings from Russia, and Uzbekistan receives the largest remittance inflows in absolute terms. According to The Times of Central Asia's Central Asia Balance...