• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10560 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10560 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10560 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10560 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10560 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10560 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10560 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10560 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 2518

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

Horses, Eagles, and Fire: The Steppe Awakens as the 2026 World Nomad Games Return to Kyrgyzstan

On the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, where mountains drop sharply into the water, and horses and cars are found in almost equal measure, Kyrgyzstan will host the World Nomad Games 2026 from August 31 to September 6, with The Times of Central Asia reporting from the ground. Since their launch in 2014, the Games have grown well beyond their origins, drawing competitors and audiences from across the world. This year’s emblem, the snow leopard, captures that idea with unusual precision. It has been adopted as the national symbol of Kyrgyzstan in recent years and has long been central to the country’s conservation diplomacy, including its role in establishing October 23 as International Snow Leopard Day. Presented as a representation of strength, clarity, and endurance, it reflects both the terrain and the mindset that fortifies the event. [caption id="attachment_46882" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: International Secretariat of the World Nomad Games[/caption] The Games have expanded beyond the region, but are now returning home again. Kyrgyzstan hosted the first three editions before they went to Turkey in 2022 and Kazakhstan in 2024. Their homecoming now carries greater international weight, reinforced by UNESCO’s support, recognizing their role in preserving intangible cultural heritage. This year’s experience is mostly set in the Issyk-Kul region, around three hours from Bishkek, where the mountainous landscape will form the backdrop to the lakeside venues. The opening and closing ceremonies are scheduled to take place in the capital’s Bishkek Arena. In Cholpon Ata, the hippodrome will host horse racing and Kok Boru, while the nearby sports complex stages wrestling competitions. The Rukh Ordo Cultural Center brings together strength events and traditional tournaments alongside parts of the cultural program. In Kyrchyn, the Ethno Village will become the core of the experience, where archery, falconry, crafts, performances, and food sit within a setting that reflects nomadic life. [caption id="attachment_46886" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Kok Boru at the Bishkek Hippodrome, 2014; image: Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Forty-plus sports disciplines will be spread across competitive and demonstrative formats, with more than 100 medals at stake. Kok Boru is fast and unforgiving, played on horseback as riders grapple over what was traditionally a headless goat carcass (now a synthetic dummy or serke), surging and colliding before hurling it into the opponent’s goal. [caption id="attachment_46885" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: International Secretariat of the World Nomad Games[/caption] Horseback archery demands precision under movement, with riders standing in the stirrups or twisting at full gallop to fire arrows at distant targets. Eagle hunting illustrates a partnership between human and bird refined over generations, as trained golden eagles launch from the arm to track and strike prey across open ground. [caption id="attachment_46887" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] Woman with a bird of prey, World Nomad Games, Astana, 2024; image: Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Wrestling styles such as Alysh and Kurash emphasize balance and control rather than brute force, with fighters gripping belts and using timing, leverage, and footwork to unbalance their opponent. The Times of Central Asia spoke with the International Secretariat of the World Nomad Games to...

Minister Sydykov on the Bakai Bank Verdict and Kyrgyzstan’s Economic Path Forward

On April 13 in Washington, D.C., The Times of Central Asia’s Javier M. Piedra spoke with Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of Economy and Commerce, Bakyt Tolomushevich Sydykov, regarding the April 7 verdict in the “Bakai Bank vs. Open Dialogue Foundation” case before the Enterprise Court of Brussels - an important legal win for Kyrgyzstan and its stance in international financial markets. In a verdict with international implications for Kyrgyzstan and the region, the Enterprise Court of Brussels sided with Bakai Bank, a Kyrgyz financial institution, in connection with a high-profile defamation case between Bakai Bank and Open Dialogue Foundation (ODF) – finding that ODF published allegations about the bank’s financial conduct without sufficient evidence. The judgment marks a significant development in a cross-border reputational and financial dispute, setting a visible bar for accountability and offering a more balanced snapshot of Kyrgyz efforts to cultivate transparency and compliance in its banking sector. Kyrgyz government officials responded to the ruling with a practical and positive outlook, acknowledging that the country has prioritized policy, monitoring, and enforcement steps to bolster integrity and trust in its institutions. This ruling is expected to reinforce public confidence and strengthen the long-term resilience of Kyrgyzstan’s governance framework. In Washington D.C. this week, Sydykov told TCA that, “We welcome this decision not just as an affirmation of Bakai Bank, but also for our broader financial system. It helps to convey our message to policymakers, diplomats, investors, and partners that Kyrgyzstan is open for business – and a ready contributor to regional and international trade. Our financial institutions operate in line with international standards, compliance expectations, and responsible governance. We are glad to move forward with strengthening our banking system and growing Kyrgyzstan’s economy for the benefit of its citizens.” Case background The proceedings were brought before the French-speaking Enterprise Court of Brussels (Tribunal de l’entreprise francophone de Bruxelles) after Bakai Bank challenged a series of publications issued by the Open Dialogue Foundation in 2023. The NGO had alleged that Bakai Bank was involved in facilitating financial transactions linked to sanctions circumvention and networks connected to Russian capital flows following the expansion of Western sanctions in early 2022. Bakai Bank rejected these allegations as unsubstantiated and damaging to its international reputation and access to financial markets. It subsequently filed a civil action in Belgium, where the ODF is active and publishes much of its advocacy material. Court proceedings and findings In its judgment, the Brussels court examined whether the Open Dialogue Foundation had sufficient factual grounds to support its published claims. The court found that the NGO’s statements were presented as factually assertive allegations rather than opinion or conjecture, thereby requiring a higher evidentiary threshold. The court concluded that the ODF had failed to provide adequate supporting evidence for its assertions regarding Bakai Bank’s alleged involvement in illicit financial activity. As a result, the court determined that the publications were unlawful in their form and impact, particularly in relation to reputational harm inflicted on the bank. The ruling ordered the ODF...

Kyrgyzstan Accelerates Small Hydropower Construction to Achieve Energy Independence

Kyrgyzstan plans to significantly expand its hydropower capacity by commissioning new hydroelectric power plants with a combined capacity of 81 megawatts and expected annual generation of 348.3 million kWh, according to the Ministry of Energy. The largest number of new facilities will be built in Chuy region, where four plants are planned. At the same time, projects will be implemented across all regions of the country. Individual plant capacity will range from 1.5 to 9 MW, with the largest developments concentrated in Chuy and Issyk-Kul regions, with total capacities of 39.5 MW and 21 MW, respectively. The ministry noted that between 2021 and 2025, 27 small plants with a combined capacity of 109.8 MW were commissioned, generating around 427 million kWh annually. Over the next four years, authorities plan to continue expanding the sector by launching an additional 48 hydropower plants with a total capacity of 421 MW. The government views the development of small hydropower as a key element of its strategy to achieve energy independence and shift from electricity imports to exports. Energy Minister Taalaibek Ibraev emphasized that the country has significant hydropower potential. “We have substantial hydropower potential. There is an opportunity to generate 142 billion kWh. Today, we are using about 13-14 percent of this. As you can see, development is underway across the country. Many new hydropower plants are currently under construction, and we are also modernizing existing plants using new technologies,” Ibraev told The Times of Central Asia. The minister stressed that the expansion of small plants is linked to the goal of eliminating energy shortages and ending rolling blackouts during the winter period. According to Ibraev, Kyrgyzstan is adopting modern technologies for small hydropower construction from partners in Russia and European countries. Investors from Russia, Southern Europe, and Canada have also expressed interest in the country’s energy sector, including solar and wind projects. “Currently, much of the equipment for the energy sector is purchased from Russia. During our last meeting with Russian energy specialists, we agreed to procure equipment directly from manufacturers, without intermediaries,” the minister said. He added that such arrangements are expected to reduce the cost of constructing new hydropower plants.

Central Asia’s Climate Risks Could Cost Up to 130% of GDP by 2080

By 2080, climate change is expected to have a profound impact on the economies of Central Asian countries, with potential losses ranging from 20% to 130% of GDP. The most severe effects are projected for mountainous nations. These estimates were presented at a CAREC technology forum by Iskandar Abdullaev, a senior research fellow at the International Water Management Institute in Uzbekistan. According to Abdullaev, climate change is no longer solely an environmental issue but an increasingly significant economic factor. Key risks include droughts and water scarcity, floods, heatwaves, and glacier melt. The projected economic impact varies across the region. Tajikistan could face losses of between 80% and 130% of GDP, Kyrgyzstan 70% to 120%, Kazakhstan 40% to 80%, Uzbekistan 30% to 45%, and Turkmenistan 20% to 60%. Abdullaev emphasized that mountainous countries – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – are particularly vulnerable, as climate change directly affects water resources. Glacier melt reduces river flows, creating challenges for both energy production and water supply. Droughts and extreme heat are already placing pressure on agriculture, with declining crop yields and reduced pasture productivity. Without adaptation measures, the region’s long-term sustainability could be at risk. Experts stress that mitigation and adaptation efforts are essential to reduce these risks. These include modernizing irrigation systems, adopting climate-resilient agricultural technologies, and expanding renewable energy capacity. This is not the only warning. According to the World Bank, natural disasters are already causing significant economic damage in Central Asia.  Losses from extreme events, including floods and earthquakes, can reach up to 6% of GDP, with earthquakes alone accounting for up to $2 billion in damages. At the same time, countries in the region face substantial financing gaps following major disasters. In Tajikistan, this gap could reach up to $1.5 billion. Experts warn that climate change is likely to intensify these risks, further increasing the economic burden on the region.

Hungary’s Political Shift Puts Central Asia Partnerships Under Scrutiny

Hungary’s political transition following the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party and his resignation as prime minister is drawing attention not only in the EU and the United States, but also in Central Asia, where Budapest has built growing energy and investment ties. The key question is whether the policy of cooperation with Central Asia developed under Orbán will continue under the new leadership. In recent years, under Orbán, Budapest has actively developed its Central Asian foreign policy, primarily driven by the desire to find alternatives to Russian energy supplies. That push reflects Hungary’s long-standing reliance on Russian oil and gas, which has shaped its search for alternative suppliers beyond Europe. Resource-rich Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan became natural partners for diplomatic engagement. Orbán succeeded in building trust-based relationships with the presidents of the Central Asian republics, grounded in what Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, described as “sincere friendship” in an interview with Uzbek media. “In Hungary, we have always viewed Central Asia as one of the fastest-growing regions in the world, with enormous potential. Our efforts to build these relations did not begin today, but decades ago,” he said. Hungary became the first Central European country to sign a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan in 2014. Currently, the Kazakhstan-Hungary Business Council is in operation, along with a joint agricultural direct investment fund. In 2024, bilateral trade approached $200 million, and from January to August 2025, it grew by another 22.1%, exceeding $164.6 million. Hungarian investments in Kazakhstan’s economy have surpassed $370 million, while the current investment portfolio includes 16 projects worth about $700 million in engineering, agriculture, and logistics. These links also intersect with wider efforts to expand east–west transport routes through the Caspian region, offering Hungary indirect access to Central Asian energy and trade flows. In May 2025, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held talks with Orbán in Budapest, where both sides highlighted rising trade volumes and a joint investment portfolio of about $500 million. Hungary’s OTP Bank entered into Uzbekistan’s financial market in 2023, acquiring a 73.71% stake in Ipoteka Bank, becoming its principal owner and the majority shareholder of the country’s fifth-largest bank. As early as 2019, Hungary had intensified cooperation with Turkmenistan. After talks at the Turkmen Foreign Ministry, Szijjártó told the media that Hungary views Turkmenistan as an important country from the perspective of European security. “We very much hope that Turkmenistan’s gas resources will be integrated into the overall energy flow of Central Europe,” he said. However, uncertainty remains over whether this policy direction will continue under Orbán’s successor, Péter Magyar. Oil and gas analyst Oleg Chervinsky has suggested that political changes in Hungary could affect cooperation with Kazakhstan’s national company KazMunayGas (KMG). Chervinsky notes that, having secured a constitutional majority in parliament, Magyar has a mandate to “implement reforms in both foreign and domestic policy [which could] reshape the constitutional structure of the right-wing populist authoritarian system built around Orbán.” The analyst points to Hungary’s oil and gas company MOL Group, which in recent...