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Abraham Accords

Opinion: Kazakhstan Joins Abraham Accords – More Than a Symbolic Gesture

Kazakhstan has officially agreed to join the Abraham Accords during a C5+1 summit, giving another green flag of legitimacy to Israel for its policies and actions in West Asia, especially in Palestine. Reportedly, not only Kazakhstan but also Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are set to follow this step. The Normalization process, brokered by the United States to advance the culture of peace among the three Abrahamic religions, was initiated by President Donald Trump during his first term. Since then, four Muslim-majority countries - the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan - have joined the Abraham Accords. However, other Muslim-majority countries have previously followed the stand taken under the Arab Peace Process of 2002, which emphasizes the resolution of the Palestine issue before starting the normalization of ties with Israel. The joining of the Abraham Accords by Kazakhstan and the quest by other Caucasus and Central Asian Muslim-majority countries are distinctive in multiple aspects. As per the official definition, the Abraham Accords encourage the establishment of relations between Israel and its neighbors in the region. In this context, the extension of the Abraham Accords, originally designed to broker regional peace and stability in West Asia, to other regions and securing legitimacy by Muslim-majority countries outside West Asia reflects the pan-Abrahamic outlook of the U.S.-brokered deal. Moreover, Kazakhstan is a country that has established diplomatic ties with Israel since 1992, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. So, the question is, what does the joining of the Abraham Accords by Kazakhstan signify for the Central Asian country, which shares a long border with Russia and already has substantial military and economic ties with it? The significance of the Abraham Accords for Kazakhstan can be comprehensively understood from the point of view of Kazakhstan, the United States, and Israel, the major participants of the agreement. Kazakhstan’s attempt to balance regional and global pressure Firstly, for Kazakhstan, the joining of the Accords with the perspective of enhancing ties with Israel can be taken more as a symbolic move, as Kazakhstan already fulfils 25% of Israel’s energy needs. The countries share a strong diplomatic relationship, with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu visiting Kazakhstan in 2016; the two countries have signed several bilateral agreements. Kazakhstan has significant relations with Israel in the fields of irrigation and healthcare, and has also pursued discussions on visa-free travel, tourism, and technology. Kazakhstan and Israel have launched the Israel-Kazakhstan Irrigation Demonstration Centre in the Almaty region. Kazakhstan also hosts the largest Jewish population in Central Asia, which lives in peace and harmony with other ethnic groups. Considering the strong ties already in place, the lingering question is why Kazakhstan had to formally sign an agreement that appears to be a symbolic gesture from the outside. To this question, Adil Husain, PhD scholar of Central Asian Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI), New Delhi, says that “though the decision to formalize the normalization ties with Israel may appear as a formality, the move carries a strategic significance for the Central Asian country...

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

Opinion: A Trump Visit to Central Asia Would Deliver Results and Anchor a Corridor Strategy

On November 6, Washington will host the C5+1 leaders’ summit, marking the format’s 10th anniversary and signaling a rare alignment of political attention and regional appetite for concrete outcomes. The date is confirmed by regional and U.S.-focused reporting, with Kazakhstan’s presidency and multiple outlets noting heads-of-state attendance in the U.S. capital. This timing is decisive. Russia’s bandwidth is constrained by the war in Ukraine, China’s trade weight in Central Asia has grown, and European demand for secure inputs and routes has intensified. All these developments together create a window where a visible United States presence can meaningfully alter the deal flow. A visit sequenced off the November C5+1 will attach U.S. political attention to minerals, corridors, and standards that regional governments already prioritize, confirming the conversion of the summit's symbolism into leverage. Washington already has the instruments but has lacked a synchronized presence. Development finance, export credit, and C5+1 working groups exist, yet announcements have too often outpaced commissioning. A targeted tour could unveil named offtakes, corridor slot guarantees, and training compacts. This would move from the dialogue to bankable packages if paired with financing envelopes, posted schedules, and third-party verification. Deals, dates, and delivery would make operational signals clear to partners and competitors alike. Strategic Rationale and Operating Concept The United States has three clear goals. These are to diversify critical minerals away from single-point dependency on China, de-risk trans-Eurasian routes that connect Asian manufacturing to European demand, and reinforce the sovereignty of the states in the region without pressuring them to choose sides in great-power competition over other issues. These imperatives already guide the national-security strategies of Central Asian governments, which implement them according to multi-vector doctrines. A presidential visit that treats minerals, corridors, and standards as a single package would show that Washington is prepared to move forward on the same problem set that the region has defined for itself. The ways to do that are through finance-first diplomacy and an end-to-end corridor approach, including the Caspian crossing. Finance-first diplomacy pairs every political announcement with insurance, offtake letters, and term sheets (short non-binding summaries of key commercial and legal terms for a proposed deal). These signal the intention to convert declarations into commissioning. An end-to-end corridor approach accepts the physical reality that Central Asian outputs move west through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and across the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan functioning as the hinge that makes Europe reachable at scale. Each element of the “minerals–corridors–standards” triad reinforces the others when the whole is pursued as a single program. Reliable customs and traceability raise corridor credibility, which raises project bankability, which in turn attracts the private capital required for mineral processing. The instrumentalities for this already exist. The C5+1 framework can be tasked to track deliverables; the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can cover risk and long-term debt; aid and technical programs of the Department of State and Commerce can align standards, procurement integrity, and traceable supply chains; U.S. universities and labs can...

SCO Summit

Opinion: China’s Diplomatic Power Play Unfolds in Tianjin

On August 31, the next SCO Plus summit will begin in the Chinese city of Tianjin and run through to September 1. Judging by the list of participants, China, under Chairman Xi Jinping, is positioning itself to challenge the United States for influence over the global geopolitical agenda. As part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, Xi will host a formal banquet for the attending heads of state, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Xi is also scheduled to chair the 25th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State and lead the expanded SCO Plus session - the largest since the establishment of the organization - where he will deliver a keynote address. Clues to the themes of Xi’s speech can be found in the diverse array of leaders expected to attend. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Bin confirmed at a Beijing press conference that among the SCO member states, participants will include Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Several leaders from non-member states will also join, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh; Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev; Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto; and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, whose participation suggests Ashgabat’s cautious but growing interest in regional dialogue. Also in attendance will be the prime ministers of Armenia (Nikol Pashinyan), Cambodia (Hun Manet), Nepal (Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli), Egypt (Mostafa Madbouly), Malaysia (Anwar Ibrahim), and Vietnam (Pham Minh Chinh). The summit will also host key international institutional leaders, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres; SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev; CIS Secretary-General Sergey Lebedev; ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn; CSTO Secretary-General Imangali Tasmagambetov; EAEU Chairman Bakytzhan Sagintayev; and AIIB President Zhou Ji. Kazakhstan will be prominently represented. In addition to President Tokayev, three high-profile Kazakhs mentioned above - Yermekbayev, Tasmagambetov, and Sagintayev - will attend in their capacities as heads of international organizations. Their presence signals Astana’s growing diplomatic weight and reflects the strategic outreach led by Tokayev, himself a former UN Deputy Secretary-General. This background likely contributes to the rapport between Kazakhstan and Guterres. The summit will also inevitably draw attention due to the presence of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, figures central to the ongoing realignment in the South Caucasus. Both Baku and Yerevan have increasingly distanced themselves from Moscow, favoring closer ties with Turkey and the United States. The recent peace agreement between Aliyev and Pashinyan, signed in the presence of President Trump, underscored the growing American role in the region and the diminishing influence of Russia. While Moscow appears willing to tolerate this shift, Tehran views it with deep concern, especially after its recent 12-day conflict with Israel. Russia, for its part, seems to be signaling disengagement from the region. Its silence in response to Baku and Yerevan’s Western overtures suggests strategic apathy, if not withdrawal. Beijing, of course, is...

U.S.-Turkmenistan Relations

Opinion: Gas, Geopolitics, and Realism: U.S.–Turkmenistan Talks Signal Shift

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Turkmen counterpart Rashid Meredov wrapped up bilateral consultations last week in Washington, DC. The encounter suggested a new awareness on Washington’s part of Turkmenistan’s pivotal geostrategic location in the heart of Central Asia and its status as a major hub of natural resources. Since becoming head of state in March 2022, Turkmenistan’s President Serdar Berdimuhamedov has shifted his country’s foreign policy from one of strategic isolation to what might be called practical realism, whereby priority is given to fair trade and investments that are in line with national interests and long-term development. Like the other Central Asian heads of state, Berdimuhamedov also champions a pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy. Consequently, they find the current, pragmatic U.S. administration with its concern to work out deals (presumably mutually beneficial ones) more congenial than its predecessor, with its penchant for geostrategic maneuvering and ideology. Secretary Rubio recently observed: “A mature foreign policy requires a balancing of interests - that’s a fact.” This way of thinking goes over well in smaller independent states such as Turkmenistan and other Central Asian countries, whose key national priorities include establishing their statehood on a firm basis and safeguarding their sovereignty amid the turbulent great power politics being played out in their vicinity. Oil and Gas Over the years, Berdimuhamedov has insisted that foreign entities seeking access to the country’s vast natural gas reserves must play by Ashgabat’s rules. Home to the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves, Turkmenistan invites foreign participation in its energy sector, provided that agreements are structured as win-win arrangements and don’t give suitors the geostrategic upper hand. In this context, it would make sense for Washington to get the word out about two upcoming conferences in Ashgabat: The Turkmenistan Investment Forum, September 18– 19, 2025, which will serve to attract long-term investment into the country's economy, and the 30th Oil & Gas of Turkmenistan – 2025 International Conference & EXPO (OGT 2025) on 22–24 October. Turkmenistan had a strong 2024 in terms of energy, producing 77.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 8.3 million tons of oil. The OGT 2025 will showcase the country’s resource potential and new investment opportunities, focusing on upstream projects such as the Galkynysh gas field and the Caspian blocks, as well as on initiatives in the areas of renewable energy, methane mitigation, and infrastructure modernization. Moreover, Ashgabat wants to expand its Trans-Caspian and north-south economic corridors and complete the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, among other initiatives in transport and logistics. U.S. companies may want to explore these new opportunities. Travel Limitations to the U.S. Ashgabat is working with the U.S. Department of State to lift recently imposed restrictions on Turkmen citizens wishing to travel to the U.S. Both sides are aiming to ensure that applicants are properly screened before a visa is granted and that recipients comply with its terms. To further deepen ties, Washington should view Turkmenistan’s neutrality towards others on the global stage in security and foreign-policy matters not as an obstacle, but as an advantage that facilitates dialogue. While maintaining its advocacy for democratic principles,...

Reforms

Insider’s View: From Reform to Rights – Strengthening Uzbekistan’s Legal Foundations

New Uzbekistan is pressing ahead with democratic reforms while pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy, deepening dialogue with the international community, and rolling out reforms that reinforce guarantees for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Within the framework of the Uzbekistan–2030 Strategy - now paired with the State Program, “Year of Environmental Protection and the Green Economy” – the authorities are upgrading legal safeguards and institutional mechanisms aimed at protecting citizens’ rights. As President Shavkat Mirziyoyev stated, “The dreams and aspirations of our people, shaped over centuries through diverse ideas and practical endeavors, are today embodied in the concept of New Uzbekistan.” That vision has coincided with rapid socioeconomic change: GDP has topped $110 billion; preschool enrollment has risen sharply since 2017; higher-education participation has climbed from about 9% in 2017 to roughly 42%; and elite public schools - creative, specialized, and presidential - have taken root. Uzbek athletes placed among the top national teams at recent global competitions, and football milestones at both the youth and senior levels have broadened the country’s international profile. Together, these gains bolster Uzbekistan’s status as a sovereign, democratic, legal, social, and secular state, and as a more reliable partner on the global stage. The Pragmatic Diplomacy of New Uzbekistan Against a backdrop of armed conflicts, environmental emergencies, trade frictions, and evolving security threats, Uzbekistan has worked to strengthen peace and regional stability while educating its youth in the spirit of both national and universal values. In recent years, high-level outreach has rebuilt trust with neighbors and helped popularize concepts such as a “Central Asian spirit” and “Central Asian identity.” The March unveiling of a Friendship Stele at the junction of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan borders symbolized this thaw, while cooperation on transit, water and energy exchanges, and security has become more predictable. A “New Central Asia” is taking shape as a unified transport and logistics space. Mutual trade volumes in the region have multiplied, investment flows have increased, and cross-border ventures have expanded. Major projects—from the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway to rising cargo across the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye corridor—are laying the ground for a trans-continental transit hub. At the same time, Uzbekistan’s convening role has grown. In April 2025, Samarkand hosted the first EU–Central Asia Summit, chaired by President Mirziyoyev and attended by EU leaders and all five Central Asian presidents - an event that elevated ties to a strategic partnership and set a broader agenda on connectivity, critical raw materials, energy, and digital links. Environmental diplomacy has also moved up the agenda. The Samarkand Climate Forum gathered UN deputy secretary generals, heads of major environmental organizations, and experts from dozens of countries, signaling a step-change in the region’s engagement on ecology, desertification, and resilience. The Parliamentary Dimension of New Uzbekistan Tashkent’s rising parliamentary diplomacy culminated in the 150th Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Assembly, held between 5–9 April 2025 - the first of its kind in Central Asia – which brought together some 2,000 parliamentarians from more than 140 countries, plus over 20 international organizations. The proceedings, themed “Parliamentary Action for Social...

Peace Initiative

Opinion: Washington Meeting and the Shifting Geopolitics of the Caspian

The Washington meeting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hosted by President Donald Trump on August 8, 2025, may go down as a pivotal moment in the geopolitics of the Caspian and the wider Eurasian space. While on the surface the talks aimed to normalize relations between the two South Caucasus neighbors, the ripple effects extend far beyond bilateral reconciliation. For Azerbaijan, the meeting is not only about ending three decades of conflict with Armenia but also about positioning itself as a central bridge linking the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, and even Europe. The Caspian region has always been a security crossroads, where energy interests, military presence, and trade routes overlap. Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Iran-Israel conflict, and shifting Western engagement have made the region more volatile. In this context, a potential Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement offers a chance to stabilize the South Caucasus - the natural gateway between the Caspian and Europe. For Azerbaijan, peace with Armenia would solidify its position in the region where Baku has promoted several important transregional projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Southern Gas Corridor, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Azerbaijan is heavily investing in the development of the Caspian trade routes, energy infrastructure, and regional connectivity projects such as the Middle Corridor. Stability in the South Caucasus also makes it harder for external actors to exploit divisions - an especially significant factor given the previous attempt to exploit Armenia against Azerbaijan and Türkiye. That strategy brought no tangible results to Armenia, which remained regionally isolated and dependent on Russia. After the military defeats in 2020 and 2023, the Armenian leadership realized that peace and respect for the principle of territorial integrity is a much greater opportunity for the country rather than an irredentist project, which Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan dubbed “mythical.” At the same time, a peace framework reduces the risk of military escalation spilling into the Caspian region. Naval modernization efforts by Russia and Iran in recent years have heightened anxieties. In short, normalization indirectly enhances Azerbaijan’s capacity to act as a stabilizing actor within the Caspian basin. Increasingly, Iran has also spoken about peace and cooperation, especially with Azerbaijan. Relations were tense a few years ago, but the incumbent President, Masud Pezeshkian, questioned the strategy employed previously by the Iranian clerics regarding Azerbaijan, which failed to gain any benefits. Perhaps the most significant geopolitical dividend for Azerbaijan lies eastward, across the Caspian. The Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan - have long sought secure, diversified links to Europe. Russia’s war has made northern routes through its territory unreliable, while instability in the Red Sea undermines the traditional supply route. That leaves the Trans-Caspian link through Azerbaijan as promising. The Washington meeting, by promoting the peace agenda, reassures Central Asian partners that Baku is a reliable hub. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed an MOU about the transfer of alternative energy sources to Europe through another potential project – a Black Sea electricity cable from Georgia to Romania and Hungary. Azerbaijan...