• KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
26 October 2026

Viewing results 13 - 18 of 901

Opinion: Central Asia’s Minilateral Diplomacy and the Limits of Cooperation

In the contemporary, largely fragmented world order, the concept of minilateralism has become increasingly relevant. As less powerful, smaller states are struggling with often ineffective multilateral diplomatic frameworks, cooperation on a smaller scale has been gaining momentum in international relations. Central Asian countries, although with an intrinsic set of strengths and resources, still lack the power to individually address some of their own issues and advocate more proactively for their interests, especially in global forums dominated by major powers and entities. Geopolitical weaknesses of each Central Asian country lie in insufficiently developed domestic economic and military power to compete with much stronger neighbors such as Russia or China. Furthermore, unfavorable geography, where Central Asia, as a landlocked region, has limited access to global trade chains, also dilutes its geopolitical strength. In addition, the transboundary nature of critical resources, especially concerning water flows and supply, often causes tensions among states of Central Asia. In such discouraging circumstances, minilateralism promises more realistic solutions that can place Central Asia on a more equal footing with external partners and enable the region to play a more significant role in regional and, to some extent, international politics. That is why the consultative meetings of the five Central Asian countries (C5), now expanded to include Azerbaijan as C6, and C5+1 dialogues with external partners have become important platforms for Central Asia’s diplomatic standing. Minilateralism and Central Asia Minilateralism represents an international relations concept that implies cooperation of a smaller group of countries (usually three to nine members) in order to resolve shared problems or pursue mutual objectives. While bilateralism remains the main form of cooperation in international politics and multilateralism is necessary for tackling global issues, minilateralism has emerged as a more appropriate response for addressing specific regional issues in a more flexible and efficient manner. One of the main features of minilateralism is prioritizing shared interests over values or ideological principles, which allows collaborating states to focus more on solving issues and avoid being burdened by ideological discrepancies. Take, for example, the Abraham Accords that managed to gather countries with very different ideological views, especially Israel and the United Arab Emirates, but still produced tangible results of cooperation. Another advantage of minilateralism is a quicker response to crises, as well as opportunities, with less of the bureaucratic hassle that often follows multilateral diplomacy. For Central Asia, working together provides a stronger platform for negotiating better outcomes, especially in the economic area. While the current major geopolitical tensions, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Iran war, continue to shake the international order, the Central Asian countries have become more aware of their opportunities, especially in terms of transit routes and natural resource demand. Central Asia has definitely caught the attention of major powers, and its geographical position along alternative transportation routes, as well as its considerable wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and critical materials, opens doors for the region to gain more influence and power. However, for all of these opportunities to materialize, Central...

Drone Strikes on Russian Data Centers Disrupt Yandex Services Across Central Asia

Drone attacks on three Yandex data centers in Russia disrupted taxi, delivery, and other digital services in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. At the same time, the company said that Kazakh users’ personal data continued to be stored within Kazakhstan. The outages revealed how heavily Central Asia’s digital economy depends on computing infrastructure beyond its borders. Between October 8 and 11, drones attacked three Yandex data centers in Russia. The first facility hit was in Sasovo, in the Ryazan region, where two supercomputers used for artificial intelligence development were located. The center shut down completely. A subsequent strike hit a data center in Kaluga, disabling some of its equipment. On October 11, another attack forced a facility in Vladimir to shut down. Yandex confirmed the damage and said no employees were injured. Company specialists began redistributing computing workloads among the remaining operational sites, but it is not yet known when the damaged equipment will be fully restored. According to Reuters, the strikes on Russian data centers were part of an expansion of attacks on economic and technological infrastructure during Russia’s war against Ukraine. The consequences quickly spread beyond Russia. On October 11, users in Kazakhstan encountered problems ordering taxis, meals, and groceries through Yandex Go, Yandex Eats, and Yandex Lavka. The disruptions also affected scooter rentals and other applications. Drivers and couriers could not receive orders, while restaurants and stores temporarily lost access to some of their customers. Yandex Qazaqstan confirmed the technical problems. By evening, taxi booking was available again, although some functions continued to operate with restrictions. The company explained that when servers fail, computing tasks are transferred to other resources, but switching workloads takes time. Similar disruptions occurred in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Users reported errors when booking rides and ordering deliveries, as well as problems displaying fares. In Kyrgyzstan, Yandex’s local division acknowledged the problems and confirmed that damage to infrastructure in one country could disrupt applications in another. For Central Asia, this is more than a temporary inconvenience. Digital platforms have become part of the urban economy, supporting the work of drivers, couriers, restaurants, stores, and delivery services. When an application stops accepting orders, some market participants effectively lose access to customers. However, reliable estimates of financial losses in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are not yet available. It is unclear how many orders were lost or whether partners will be compensated for their losses. The outages also affected Yandex’s financial services. Dmitry Pirogov, head of the company’s fintech division, said on October 11 that users were temporarily unable to check their balances, pay for purchases, or transfer money through Yandex Pay. According to him, account information is stored in multiple copies, and checks found no loss of records. However, data preservation did not ensure uninterrupted access to financial transactions. This distinction proved particularly important for Kazakhstan. Following the widespread outages, questions arose about why damage to servers in Russia affected applications in Kazakhstan despite local legal requirements to store personal data within the country. Yandex Qazaqstan said...

Avaza Summit Highlights East–West and North–South Trade Routes

On October 8, the presidents of five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan gathered in Avaza, on Turkmenistan's Caspian coast, to discuss closer economic and political cooperation. Hosted by Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, the annual Consultative Meeting included Azerbaijan as a full participant for the first time, extending the forum across the Caspian to the South Caucasus. The six leaders adopted a joint statement recognizing East–West and North–South transport corridors as priorities for regional development. The summit highlighted the region's growing importance in Eurasian trade and international supply chains. Beyond expanding transport networks, the leaders proposed closer industrial cooperation and cross-border investment, seeking to capitalize on their geographic advantages while preserving flexibility in their international economic relationships. Transport Corridors in Multiple Directions Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov said, "I believe it is now important to intensify negotiations and practical steps toward establishing transport and logistics connectivity along the East–West and North–South routes." He added, "The Central Asia–Caspian Sea–South Caucasus–Europe corridor should play a key role here." He also emphasized that cooperation among Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as Caspian states could help integrate the wider Central Asian region and other countries into these transport networks. Turkmenistan remained prepared to make its Caspian infrastructure available for mutually beneficial projects. Its port at Turkmenbashi and rail connections toward Iran give it a practical role in both East–West and North–South trade. The Turkmen president's emphasis on North–South connectivity also reflects ongoing transport cooperation with Russia. In May 2026, Turkmenistan reported that Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran were working on an agreement to improve freight movement along the corridor's eastern branch. Turkmen officials also outlined preferential railway tariffs and container services linking Turkmenbashi with Russia's Olya port. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also highlighted growing demand for the Middle Corridor, while emphasizing the continued importance of the North–South route. "For Kazakhstan, the North–South route in cooperation with Russia remains particularly relevant," Tokayev said. The statement is consistent with Kazakhstan's longstanding multivector foreign policy, which seeks to maintain established trade connections while expanding access to alternative transport routes. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy, occupies a strategic position at the intersection of major East–West and North–South transport routes. For the region’s landlocked economies, a wider choice of reliable routes can improve access to markets and reduce dependence on individual transit connections. Expanding the Middle Corridor Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized investments on both shores of the Caspian, noting that transit cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor increased by more than 10% in 2025 and by almost 20% during the first eight months of 2026. Azerbaijan has invested in ports, railways, highways and other infrastructure to facilitate trade between Central Asia and international markets. It also serves as a transit route for Kazakh and Turkmen oil exports, giving the country a growing role in connecting Central Asian producers with markets to the west. Tokayev proposed exploring the integration of the Middle Corridor with the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a planned transport link through Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan...

They Went to Russia for Work and Ended Up at War: How Central Asians Enter the Russian Military

Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. Relatives of other young Kazakh men say they had taken jobs at a sausage factory and a poultry farm. But according to reports aired in early October on Kazakhstan’s KTK television channel, the men later ended up in or near the combat zone in Ukraine. Some appeared in videos wearing Russian military uniforms and asked Kazakhstan to help bring them home. On October 7, relatives of Kazakh citizens who had reportedly ended up in Russia’s military visited the Foreign Ministry in Astana to seek help bringing them home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied the families, said his list had grown from eight to 21 people as more relatives contacted him. The same day, ministry spokesperson Zhanbolat Ussenov said officials were checking appeals and would send Russia a list of citizens after verification. Negotiations over their return were underway, he said. Exactly how the men ended up in the Russian military remains unclear. One family said their relative had already been wounded, while KTK reported that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the military contracts have not been independently established. For now, much of what is known comes from the men themselves and their relatives. Their stories raise a broader question that neither Moscow nor the capitals of Central Asia have fully answered: how many people from the region have ended up in the Russian military, and under what circumstances did they get there? Nearly 13,000, According to a Ukrainian Database Russia does not publish comprehensive statistics on foreign contract soldiers. Central Asian governments have only fragmented data from criminal cases, consular appeals, and reports from relatives. The most detailed country-by-country breakdown comes from the Ukrainian government project I Want to Live. By May 2026, the project said it had identified 12,919 citizens of the five Central Asian states who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense: 4,955 citizens of Uzbekistan, 3,489 of Tajikistan, 2,420 of Kazakhstan, 1,474 of Kyrgyzstan, and 581 of Turkmenistan. These figures cannot be regarded as complete or independently verified. I Want to Live operates within Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Ukraine is a party to the war. In addition, 12,919 is a cumulative figure, not the number of Central Asians currently at the front. Some may have been killed or captured, completed their service, returned home, or obtained Russian citizenship. Another major estimate comes from the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Truth Hounds, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. Their report estimates that Russia recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries after February 2022. More than 10,000 of them, according to the study, came from Central Asia. The study is based on open sources, consultations with Ukrainian authorities and experts, and interviews with 16 prisoners of war and former Russian servicemen. There are no comparable publicly available Russian statistics, meaning it is impossible to...

Central Asia Looks to a Possible Trump Visit

U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed an interest in visiting Uzbekistan, according to one of his special envoys, raising the possibility that Central Asia could eventually receive its first visit by a sitting American president. Paolo Zampolli, Trump’s Special Envoy for Global Partnerships and long-time Trump associate, made the comment in an interview with Uzbekistan 24 while visiting the country. “I know that he wants to come to Uzbekistan,” Zampolli said, adding that Trump had personally told him he wanted to make the trip. Zampolli said he was encouraging the idea, but gave no timetable, and there has been no announcement that a visit is being scheduled. Trump had already publicly indicated that he may visit Kazakhstan. Asked during the November 2025 C5+1 summit if he might become the first U.S. president to visit the country, Trump replied, “I think it’s very possible that we’ll do that.” The comments come as U.S. engagement with Central Asia is accelerating. Trump hosted all five Central Asian presidents at the White House in November 2025. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has invited him to Kazakhstan, while Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has also invited him to Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is reported to be planning a mid-October visit to Samarkand for a C5+1 ministerial, with a delegation expected to include representatives of more than 100 U.S. companies. Sergio Gor, Trump’s Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, has also been involved in Washington’s engagement across the region. In Uzbekistan, he co-chairs the American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council with Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the presidential administration. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan bring different economic and strategic profiles to Washington’s expanding engagement with Central Asia. Why Kazakhstan Matters Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s largest economy. Its GDP reached about $306 billion in 2025, accounting for more than half of the combined economy of the five Central Asian states. Its share of accumulated foreign investment is even larger, with Kazakhstan holding roughly two-thirds of the region’s inward FDI stock, according to The Times of Central Asia’s Central Asia Balance Sheet. Its strategic importance extends beyond those measures. Kazakhstan produces close to 40% of the world’s uranium and is a major oil producer and exporter, supplying primarily European markets. It also holds substantial critical mineral resources and occupies a central position on the Middle Corridor connecting China and Europe. Recent U.S.-Kazakh commercial agreements include several large transactions. Wabtec has a $4.2 billion locomotive agreement, while Tau-Ken Samruk and Cove Capital have signed transaction documents for at least $1.1 billion in tungsten development. Other agreements cover agricultural machinery, air-traffic management, and additional Boeing aircraft. Kazakhstan also has a distinct diplomatic role in Trump’s engagement with the Muslim world. In November 2025, Kazakhstan joined the Abraham Accords, becoming the first Central Asian and first non-Arab Muslim-majority country to join the framework. Why Uzbekistan Matters With about 39 million people, Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia. It is also the only state that borders all four of the other...

Latvia Proposes Temporary Visa Suspension for Uzbek Citizens

Latvia’s Interior Ministry has proposed temporarily suspending visa issuance to Uzbek citizens after several Uzbek nationals were accused of committing crimes shortly after arriving in the country, including offenses against minors. Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava said the measure was necessary to protect public order and give Latvian authorities time to work with Uzbekistan on tighter screening procedures. Latvian law allows the government to temporarily restrict visa applications and entry for citizens of a particular third country if authorities identify risks to internal security or public order. The proposal has not yet been approved – the Interior Ministry wanted the Cabinet to consider it on September 29, but its coalition partners were not ready to place the issue on the agenda. The ministry said it expects the proposed restriction to be considered at the next government meeting. If adopted, Latvian authorities plan to use the suspension period to work with Uzbekistan on improved screening procedures aimed at preventing people considered a security risk from entering the country. The ministry has not specified how long the proposed suspension would last or whether exemptions would apply. As Latvia is a member of the Schengen Zone of European countries, it is also questionable how enforceable such restrictions would be. The visa concerns come as Riga and Tashkent are simultaneously trying to expand business ties. Uzbekistan’s Dunyo news agency reported on October 4 that a Latvian business delegation was due to visit Uzbekistan on October 5–10 for a business forum. Latvian companies have expressed interest in closer economic ties, with agricultural producers particularly interested in importing more Uzbek mineral fertilizers. Latvia is not the only Baltic state tightening scrutiny of migration from Central Asia. Neighboring Lithuania is closing external service centers that accept applications for temporary residence permits in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from November 1, citing security concerns. The closures follow a sharp increase in applications from Central Asian workers as more people from the region seek employment outside Russia. The Times of Central Asia recently examined the restrictions and the limits they expose in Central Asia’s growing shift toward European labor markets.