Uzbekistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Bilateral Cooperation

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan Target $1 Billion in Trade as Investment and Transit Links Expand

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have set a target of increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030, as economic ties expand from a relatively low base into vehicle manufacturing, oil and gas, investment, and transport across the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s state visit to Uzbekistan on August 23–24 added new projects to that list. The two presidents signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship and a program aimed at increasing bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030. Political relations, meanwhile, have been moving faster than economic ties. In 2023, the two countries established the Supreme Interstate Council, and a year later they signed a Treaty on Allied Relations. The latest trip was Aliyev’s third state visit to Uzbekistan in five years and his seventh visit overall. Aliyev said ahead of his trip to Tashkent that bilateral trade more than tripled in 2025 to reach $795 million. Uzbekistan’s Center for Economic Research and Reforms, however, reported a much lower total of $307.3 million for the same year. Neither side has explained the discrepancy, which may reflect different definitions of trade. Sustaining growth toward the $1 billion target will require broader trade and more joint production, including goods aimed at markets beyond the two countries. From Trade to Investment The Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan Investment Company is intended to help turn some of these plans into operating businesses. Established in 2023 with $500 million in capital, the company finances projects in both countries. Some areas of cooperation have already reached the production stage. Azerbaijan’s Azermash CP works with Uzbek manufacturers to produce Chevrolet and Isuzu vehicles in Azerbaijan. By July, more than 10,700 Chevrolet vehicles and 275 Isuzu buses had been produced. More than 130 commercial entities with Uzbek investment are registered in Azerbaijan. During the latest visit, the two sides opened a gypsum plant. They also laid foundations for five SOCAR filling stations and a silver-ore enrichment plant. For Baku, the interest in Uzbekistan is understandable. With a population of more than 38 million, Uzbekistan is Central Asia’s most populous country. The Uzbek economy is growing rapidly, while the authorities are opening more sectors to private and foreign capital. For Azerbaijani companies, this offers access to a market considerably larger than their own as well as a foothold in Central Asia. For Tashkent, Azerbaijan offers investment and expertise in the oil and gas sector. SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company, has been operating in Uzbekistan for years. A joint venture between Uzbekistan’s O‘ZLITINEFTGAZ and the Azerbaijani company’s research institute has been operating since 2016. Cooperation is now gradually moving from engineering services toward much larger exploration and potential production projects. The main project is on the Ustyurt Plateau in western Uzbekistan. BP joined the project in May 2026 with a 40% stake, while SOCAR, which is the operator, and Uzbekneftegaz each hold 30%. Total investment could reach around $2 billion if commercially viable reserves are found and the project proceeds to development. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the project envisages extensive seismic...

Opinion

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan Show What Diplomacy Can Deliver as Vast Rail Project with China Advances

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met on July 30 on the shores of Kyrgyzstan’s Lake Issyk-Kul, in Cholpon Ata, to sign the Treaty on Allied Relations. It was much more than business as usual. In their press conference, the leaders largely set aside the diplomatic boilerplate and expressions of mutual approbation that usually attend such summits. Instead, the meeting focused on putting a decisive end to mutual Kyrgyz-Uzbek grievances and rivalry, opting for dialogue over confrontation, stability over tension, and partnership over the quest for primacy in their bilateral relationship. Without ceding any of their sovereignty, they stressed that teamwork and shared responsibility—not the pursuit of great-power patronage or one-upmanship—are the surest way to advance common interests. Japarov, like Mirziyoyev, made clear that strategic-level collaboration always trumps short-term transactional gains. One of the biggest takeaways from the Japarov–Mirziyoyev summit was the confident demeanor and optimism with which they spoke about the future of Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations. Veering from his scripted notes and speaking in Russian to the press, Mirziyoyev said: “What an atmosphere we have today [here in Kyrgyzstan]. Look at what we're doing today— we're making history. This alliance — all of this will remain in history forever and ever.” Friendship, mutual respect, and hard work will produce “dynamic development” and “steady economic growth,” leading to “the well-being of peoples.” Business Development and Ahead of Schedule Once dismissed as an engineer's pipedream or a financier's nightmare, Japarov and Mirziyoyev said they’re staying the course on building strategic connectivity, energy, and water infrastructure, singling out the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Kambarata-1 Hydropower Plant (HPP), projects that some considered unrealistic. The leaders made it plain that this railway will deliver huge benefits. As Mirziyoyev put it: "We will work together non-stop to develop trade and logistics infrastructure along this railway route." Beyond offering transit times faster than the northern routes, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway will boost tourism and bring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan hundreds of millions of dollars in transit revenue. Most importantly, it will unlock untapped economic resources, fueling new jobs, businesses, and logistics hubs along the corridor. After the Japarov-Mirziyoyev meetings, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Akramjon Nematov, First Deputy Director of Uzbekistan's Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies. Having been on site, he noted that the numbers and progress on the ground speak louder than any words or communiqués: "Construction is active at 83 of 107 planned sites on the Kyrgyz line, with over 10,000 workers and 7,000 units of heavy machinery deployed. Crews are drilling 26 tunnels through the Tian Shan, with over 13.5 kilometers of the main tunnel already cut, while 38 of 50 bridges are underway. The pace is staggering. I've watched this railway move Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations from friction to cooperation – and I measure progress not in words, but in cubic meters of earth moved." China has committed to supplying most of the capital and engineering capacity. The project carries a total capitalization of roughly $4.7 billion, structured as a $2.3...

Middle East Crisis

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Drone Attack

Nizhnekamsk Drone Attack: Families of Uzbek Victims to Receive Compensation

The families of Uzbek citizens killed in the August 10 drone attack on Nizhnekamsk in Russia’s Tatarstan region will receive compensation from the regional authorities. The attack killed 13 people, including eight Uzbek citizens who had been working in the city as construction workers. The family of each person killed will receive 2 million rubles, about $23,500, from the Tatarstan government. Payments will also be made to those injured, with the amount depending on the severity of their injuries. Tatarstan’s regional government will pay 2 million rubles to the family of each person killed. The companies that employed the victims will also pay compensation to their families and to injured workers. A temporary accommodation center has also been opened for residents whose homes require major repairs, and claims for property damage are being accepted there. According to updated figures from the Tatarstan authorities, 78 people sought medical assistance following the attack, with 27 hospitalized. Nizhnekamsk lies about 1,200 kilometers from Ukraine and is one of Russia’s major industrial centers, home to the TANECO oil refinery. Russian authorities said both industrial facilities and residential areas were hit and have opened a criminal investigation. Ukraine’s General Staff said its forces had struck the TANECO refinery and caused a fire. Uzbek authorities initially reported that seven citizens had been killed, before raising the figure to eight. One Tajik citizen was also among those killed. On August 12, the bodies of the eight deceased Uzbek citizens were repatriated. Officials in Tashkent said they were coordinating with their Russian counterparts to assist Uzbek citizens who remained hospitalized. For Uzbekistan, the Nizhnekamsk tragedy is another reminder of the risks faced by labor migrants in Russia. Large numbers of Central Asians work in major Russian industrial centers, while the expanding geographic reach of drone attacks is increasingly affecting cities far from the Russia-Ukraine front.

Power Outage

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Dispute Cause After Regional Power Failure Hits Almaty

A major power failure affected parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on August 14. In Almaty, electricity went out at 2:38 p.m. local time in four districts, disrupting transport and traffic in Kazakhstan’s largest city. Traffic lights stopped working and some businesses closed. The metro suspended service, and passengers still underground were evacuated. At several busy intersections, motorists and delivery couriers began directing traffic themselves. In Kyrgyzstan, outages affected parts of Bishkek and Issyk-Kul Region. “An accident in the power system of a neighboring country affected the Central Asian power grid. As a result, power supply disruptions were observed in the Surkhandarya region and several other regions,” Uzbekistan’s Energy Ministry said. In Tajikistan, electricity went out in Dushanbe at about 3 p.m. and in numerous other cities and districts. Later that day, the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources said it had formed a working group to determine the cause. The ministry also denied reports of an accident at the Nurek Hydropower Plant. The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) later issued a preliminary account attributing the blackout to an emergency at Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul Hydropower Plant. “Due to the emergency shutdown of two hydropower units with a combined capacity of 600 megawatts at the Toktogul HPP in the Kyrgyz Republic, there was a power surge on the North-South transit line, causing an overload and its disconnection by emergency protection systems. As a result, Kazakhstan’s southern zone was separated from the country’s unified power system,” KEGOC explained. Kyrgyz energy officials offered a different account. They said an external outage occurred at 3:34 p.m. Kyrgyzstan time on a high-voltage transmission line connecting northern and southern Kazakhstan. The disturbance split the Central Asian grid into isolated sections, leaving Kyrgyzstan temporarily operating autonomously while automatic protection safeguarded equipment. Both accounts illustrate the interdependence of the Central Asian Power System (CAPS). The Soviet-era network connected the region’s electricity systems across borders that were then internal. It was part of a regional water-and-energy arrangement in which hydropower releases from upstream republics supported irrigation downstream. Cross-border power exchanges declined after the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1999, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed a parallel-operation agreement. Turkmenistan disconnected from CAPS in 2003, while Tajikistan was disconnected from Uzbekistan in December 2009. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an electricity-trade agreement in March 2018. The southwestern section of Tajikistan’s grid reconnected to CAPS in June 2024, but the northern connection was still under development in July 2026. Turkmenistan remains outside the system. In an assessment published on August 16, Zhakyp Khairushev, chairman of the Public Council under Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, called the incident a serious test of the country’s southern power system. He said emergency protection contained the disruption and allowed electricity to be restored in stages. Power restrictions in Kazakhstan were lifted by 5 p.m., but Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continued to disagree over where the failure began.

Central Asia’s C6 Takes Shape in Washington as Ambassadors Push for Practical Integration

Less than two weeks after regional leaders gathered in Cholpon Ata, diplomats from the emerging C6 grouping used a discussion in Washington to shift the focus from declarations of unity to the mechanics of integration: customs, railways, digitalized trade, access to European markets, and stronger links across the Caspian. The sharpest political message came from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States, Edil Baisalov, who said that Central Asian states were increasingly recognizing that they were “enough for each other,” and that resolving differences within the region had become a pragmatic national interest. His comments gave unusually direct language to a trend that has accelerated since the region’s consultative meetings began in 2018. The August 12 event at the Caspian Policy Center brought together the U.S.-based ambassadors of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan, the sixth country in the emerging C6 framework, was not listed among the participants. The event followed a late-July meeting in Cholpon Ata, where leaders concentrated on transport, energy security, investment, and foreign-policy coordination. The C6 label remains shorthand rather than the name of a formal organization. Its political basis, however, has become more concrete since Azerbaijan was admitted as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in November 2025. The shift extended a format once focused on relations among the five Central Asian republics across the Caspian Sea. From Regional Dialogue to Regional Agency Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Khazar Ibrahim, presented Cholpon Ata as evidence that the six states increasingly see themselves as part of one political and economic space. “We are finally holistic. We are all together,” he said. He argued that Azerbaijan’s presence changes the geography of the grouping by turning the Caspian from a dividing line into a connecting space between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. That idea has been developing for some time. TCA has previously examined how Azerbaijan’s entry could turn the C6 framework into a platform for common rules on transport, tariffs, customs systems, and digital data, rather than another layer of summit diplomacy. Kazakhstan’s ambassador, Magzhan Ilyassov, put the emphasis on building an “economically active neighborhood.” He pointed to the frequency of regional meetings and said the value of the current process lies partly in maintaining an inclusive conversation among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has also pushed for stronger coordination on transport planning as the consultative format develops. For Uzbekistan, the discussion was more explicitly about market access. Ambassador Furqat Sidiqov said cooperation with Azerbaijan could give Uzbekistan wider access to European and other export markets. He also called for further digitalization of the Middle Corridor. Sidiqov said Uzbekistan had close to 300 joint ventures with Central Asian countries in 2017, and now has about 1,500 with neighboring states. Corridors Become the Practical Core Digitalizing the Trans-Caspian route is not a new proposal. The countries of the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia, which already brings together the five Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, endorsed a digitalization...