Uzbekistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Aid Dependence

Emergency Aid to Afghanistan Is Not Enough, Humanitarian Expert Says

The return of millions of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan is placing fresh pressure on a country already struggling with declining international humanitarian assistance. Closer cooperation with Central Asian countries could help Afghanistan meet its immediate needs while reducing its long-term dependence on emergency aid. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Abdul Wahab Arash, who has more than 17 years of experience working for international humanitarian and development organizations, discusses the challenges facing Afghanistan and the role its Central Asian neighbors could play in the country's recovery. TCA: How have the needs of the Afghan population evolved, and which challenges concern you most today? Abdul Wahab Arash: Having worked in Afghanistan’s humanitarian sector for more than a decade, I have witnessed how conflict, displacement, poverty, economic instability and natural disasters have affected Afghan communities. While emergency needs have persisted, economic hardship, limited employment opportunities and recurring disasters have placed additional pressure on vulnerable families. One of my greatest concerns is the large-scale return of Afghan migrants from neighboring countries, particularly Iran and Pakistan, including people who have been deported or compelled to return. According to the International Organization for Migration, approximately 6.5 million Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan between mid-September 2023 and Aug. 31, 2026. These movements place additional pressure on Afghanistan’s already limited resources and public services. Many returnee families urgently need shelter, food, employment, healthcare, education and other essential services. Their reintegration requires not only emergency assistance but also sustainable livelihoods, housing support and access to basic services. Another major concern is the widening gap between humanitarian needs and available funding. Funding reductions mean fewer people may receive essential assistance, while humanitarian programs, local organizations and employment opportunities for qualified Afghan professionals are also affected. Economic hardship and limited livelihoods can drive dangerous and irregular migration as people seek safety, work and a more secure future. In my view, Afghanistan needs continued international solidarity alongside a stronger focus on resilience, livelihoods and investment in Afghan people. Emergency assistance remains essential, but wherever feasible it should also help families recover, protect their dignity and build more secure futures. TCA: What are the main obstacles to delivering effective international humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan? What changes would help produce more sustainable results? Arash: In my experience, one of the main obstacles is the growing gap between humanitarian needs and available resources. Other challenges include limited livelihood opportunities, difficulties in coordination, potential duplication across programs and the need to connect emergency assistance more effectively with longer-term recovery. Afghanistan needs assistance to address immediate suffering, but it also needs a humanitarian system that invests in Afghan professionals, strengthens local capacity, creates fair employment opportunities and uses limited resources effectively. International expertise remains essential, but it should complement and strengthen national capacity rather than unnecessarily replace it. International organizations could explore more cost-effective operating models, including leaner offices in Kabul and greater reliance on qualified Afghan organizations to implement activities and monitor assistance at the community level. This could reduce...

Diplomatic Protest

Iran Says Samarkand Heritage Posts Targeted U.S.

Iran has said that posts by its embassies about Samarkand’s Persian heritage were directed at the United States. The explanation followed a diplomatic protest from Uzbekistan, which demanded the removal of posts describing the city’s architecture as part of Persian civilization. Esmaeil Baghaei, spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said on October 26 that Tehran attaches great importance to its relations with Uzbekistan and views their shared cultural heritage as a foundation of friendship between the two countries. "Some of our colleagues at certain embassies published their messages as an address to the American side," Baghaei explained. In the reported remarks, Baghaei did not specifically address the architectural claims made in the embassy posts. The dispute followed U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Samarkand on October 19. Accompanied by Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration, he visited Registan Square, one of Central Asia’s best-known landmarks. Rubio spoke about Samarkand’s historical role in international trade and the region’s importance to relations with Washington. The posts appeared to be a response to a speech Rubio gave in Athens on October 7, in which he recalled the Persian destruction of the Acropolis in 480 BC and sharply criticized Iran’s current leadership. Following Rubio’s visit to Samarkand, Iranian embassies in several countries posted photographs and videos on X showing him in front of the city’s historic monuments, arguing that he was surrounded by the Persian cultural heritage he had attacked earlier that month. Iran’s embassy in Armenia wrote that the site visited by the U.S. secretary of state was part of Persian civilization and architecture. The Iranian diplomatic mission in Zimbabwe described Registan’s arches as a characteristic feature of Iranian-Islamic civilization. On October 23, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Ali Eskandari and delivered a diplomatic note of protest. Tashkent regarded the posts as one-sided and politicized, saying the heritage of Samarkand and other historic Uzbek cities reflected centuries of cultural development and formed part of Uzbekistan’s history. By October 26, Iranian embassies in Armenia, Bulgaria, Zimbabwe, Finland, and China had removed the posts, according to Uzbek Foreign Ministry spokesperson Omonulla Fayziev. The dispute touched on the sensitive issue of competing claims to Central Asia’s cultural heritage. Samarkand was one of the centers of ancient Sogdiana and later belonged to states ruled by different dynasties. Persian language and culture played an important role in the city’s life for centuries. Samarkand also remains home to a substantial Tajik population, and Tajik, a variety of Persian, is still widely spoken, particularly in the historic center. The monuments around Registan Square, built between the 15th and 17th centuries, reflect the city’s history under different rulers and the influence of several cultural traditions. Since Uzbekistan’s independence in 1991, they have also become national symbols.

Migration

Uzbek Labor Migration to Russia Falls 13.2% in First Half of 2026

Uzbek citizens accounted for more work-related arrivals in Russia than any other nationality in the first half of 2026, despite a 13.2% decline compared with a year earlier. According to data published by TASS on October 26, Uzbek citizens listed employment as the purpose of entry on 1,178,609 occasions. Tajikistan ranked second with 494,518 entries, followed by Kyrgyzstan with 289,061, Kazakhstan and China. The statistics count border entries rather than individual people: a single worker may have crossed the Russian border several times. The Central Bank of Uzbekistan reported approximately 1.358 million such trips in the first half of 2025, nearly 180,000 more than a year later. Russia remains Uzbekistan's largest overseas labor market, but the number of Uzbek citizens working in other countries is growing. In 2025, the number of Uzbek workers in the European Union increased by 13.2%, while the figure for Turkey rose by 10.7%. As of July 1, 2026, approximately 70,000 Uzbek citizens were in Turkey, and 102,200 were in South Korea, both increases from a year earlier. These figures reflect the number of citizens present in the respective countries and do not necessarily correspond to employment statistics. Despite the decline in work-related trips, remittances from Russia to Uzbekistan increased by 8.8% in the first half of 2026. For Uzbekistan, remittances are a significant source of household income. The Central Bank has warned that declining labor migration could eventually reduce household incomes and consumer spending. Meanwhile, the number of advertised vacancies in Uzbekistan fell by 9.8% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026, while competition for jobs intensified. Unpaid wages are another persistent problem. During the first nine months of 2026, Uzbekistan's Migration Agency handled complaints from 817 citizens concerning unpaid wages and compensation, recovering a total of $850,000 from foreign employers. Of these complaints, 533 came from Russia, 155 from Turkey, and 92 from South Korea. The agency also helped 532 Uzbek citizens recover identity documents withheld by intermediaries or employers. Russia accounted for 331 such cases and Turkey for 185. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Russia accounted for 72.4% of remittances received by Uzbekistan in the first quarter of 2026, despite its declining share.

С5+1

C5+1 Statement Omits Afghanistan, Prioritizes Trans-Caspian Trade

The United States and the five Central Asian republics have issued a joint statement on economic and security cooperation that makes no mention of Afghanistan, once a central concern of U.S. regional policy. The document followed the October 19 C5+1 ministerial meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Afghanistan's absence from the statement does not mean it has disappeared from negotiations or Washington's strategic interests. Nevertheless, a comparison with earlier C5+1 documents reveals a shift in the published agenda. Where Washington once placed considerable importance on connecting Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, the latest statement focuses on trade across the Caspian Sea and investment in the region's minerals. Afghanistan's Changing Place in C5+1 Talks In July 2021, just weeks before the Taliban retook Kabul, C5+1 participants at a conference in Tashkent explicitly supported closer trade and transport links between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan, as well as efforts to secure peace in the country. That month, the U.S., Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also announced plans for a quadrilateral platform to support trade and transportation projects linking the two regions. In July 2023, Afghanistan was the subject of a separate C5+1 special session in Astana. Officials called for an inclusive Afghan government that respected women's rights and backed further development of transport and energy links through the country. A joint statement issued by C5+1 leaders that September described Afghanistan as an important factor in Central Asian security. In the 2026 Samarkand statement, Afghanistan goes unmentioned even in the section on border security and terrorism. However, the October 2023 C5+1 connectivity statement had already highlighted the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, which connects Central Asia to Western markets, and also omitted Afghanistan. For Central Asian countries, the Afghan route remains important in practical terms. Uzbekistan is pursuing plans for a railway through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to Indian Ocean ports. Kazakhstan is already a major supplier of food to Afghanistan, exporting around $216 million worth of flour and $122 million of wheat in the first seven months of 2026. In September, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to study a railway corridor through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all share borders with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also face the prospect of reduced water supplies from the Amu Darya as Afghanistan builds its Qosh Tepa Canal. Afghanistan's omission from a joint statement should therefore not be taken as a complete account of the policies of all five Central Asian states. What Constrains Washington One possible explanation lies in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan's current authorities. Washington allows practical contacts with representatives of the Taliban but does not recognize the government it has formed. The movement remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, although it is not included in the U.S. Department of State's separate list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The designation restricts dealings with the Taliban, although U.S. sanctions rules permit many commercial transactions involving Afghanistan's governing institutions, including civilian infrastructure and transportation projects....

Diplomatic Protest

Iranian Embassy Posts on Samarkand’s Persian Heritage Spark Uzbek Protest

Uzbekistan has lodged a diplomatic protest with Iran over social media posts describing Samarkand's architecture as part of Persian civilization. The posts targeted United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio. On October 23, Uzbekistan's First Deputy Foreign Minister Bakhromjon Aloyev met with Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Ali Eskandari, who was handed a diplomatic note of protest. Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry described posts published by Iranian diplomatic missions on X as a one-sided and politicized interpretation of Samarkand's history. Tashkent demanded that the posts be removed and that similar incidents be avoided in the future. The dispute followed Rubio's visit to Samarkand on October 19, when he recorded a video in Registan Square highlighting the city's historical role in international trade. Iran's embassy in Armenia described the site where Rubio stood as part of Persian civilization. The embassy in Zimbabwe called Registan's arches a "hallmark of Iranian-Islamic civilization," accusing Rubio of seeking to destroy that heritage. Iran's embassy in Bulgaria also criticized Rubio for disparaging Persian civilization while standing in front of monuments bearing its influence. Earlier, during an October 7 speech in Athens, Rubio recalled the destruction of the Acropolis by the forces of Persian King Xerxes in 480 BCE. He also attacked Iran's current clerical rulers, accusing them of promoting a "cult of death." Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry said that the heritage of Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva, and other historic cities reflects centuries of statehood and cultural development among the Uzbek people. Tashkent objected to the use of the country's history in political disputes between other states. Samarkand has deep ties to the Persian-speaking world. Before the Arab conquest, it was one of the centers of Sogdiana, whose inhabitants spoke a language belonging to the Iranian language family. Persian later became widely used in Central Asian cities, including in literature and scholarship. In the late 14th and early 15th centuries, Samarkand was the capital of Timur's empire. Craftsmen from various regions, including Iran and the historic region of Khorasan, participated in the construction of its monumental buildings. The Registan architectural ensemble was built between the 15th and 17th centuries, combining local artistic traditions with those of the wider Islamic world. The concept of Persian civilization encompasses a cultural area much larger than modern Iran. UNESCO describes Samarkand as a crossroads of cultures, reflecting influences from successive civilizations. The Iranian embassies did not make territorial claims against Uzbekistan; their posts concerned cultural and architectural history. Samarkand's heritage has also been a subject of debate within Central Asia. During the Soviet redrawing of Central Asia's internal borders in 1924, Samarkand and Bukhara became part of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Both cities historically had substantial Persian-speaking populations, and Tajik continues to be spoken there today. Historians have also documented Soviet-era pressure on Tajik residents to register as Uzbeks, contributing to longstanding disputes over the cities' ethnic composition. The dispute occurred amid increased U.S. diplomatic engagement in Central Asia. During his visit, Rubio attended a C5+1 meeting with the foreign ministers of the five Central Asian countries. The talks focused on expanding economic...

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SCO Economic Ambitions Outpace Agreement

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) renewed calls for a development bank at its October 20 heads of government meeting in Dushanbe, but the institution remains under negotiation more than a year after members reached political agreement on its creation. Participants adopted a joint communiqué and decisions on economic cooperation, including joint manufacturing and transportation. Financing those ambitions remains a central challenge. Members backed the bank at their September 2025 summit in Tianjin. A year later, the Bishkek summit ended without a founding agreement or capital commitments, and no launch date was set. The SCO brings together ten countries whose economic priorities differ sharply. China and India are among the world's largest economies, while Russia and Iran face Western sanctions. For Central Asian members, the organization offers another route to investment, but agreement on shared goals has yet to produce a common financing institution. Different Priorities Tajik Prime Minister Kohir Rasulzoda reported that SCO countries accounted for 70% of Tajikistan's foreign trade turnover in January–August 2026. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment from member states amounted to just $350 million for the whole of 2025. "These figures demonstrate the enormous untapped potential of our investment cooperation, which significantly lags behind the dynamics of trade relations," Rasulzoda said. Iran has different concerns. First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref called for wider use of national currencies in trade, alongside export insurance and investment protection. Tehran has long sought to reduce its foreign trade dependence on Western financial infrastructure. Sanctions make this an urgent priority, but Iran's interests in international settlements differ considerably from those of India or China, for example. Beijing and New Delhi conduct extensive trade with Western countries, so a single financial model for all SCO members is unlikely to satisfy everyone. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin encouraged joint manufacturing projects using Russia's special economic zones and investment protection agreements. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, is seeking investors for the Tamchy special investment and financial territory, established in July 2025 in the Issyk-Kul region. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev invited SCO partners to develop joint projects there. Financing the Bank A development bank could provide a common source of funding for such projects. In Dushanbe, Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin renewed calls to accelerate its establishment. "We consider it fundamentally important that this institution become a multilateral development bank with a unique mandate, providing access to long-term investment financing without political conditions," he said. Kyrgyzstan also supported establishing the bank. Amangeldiev urged members to draw on existing financing channels, including the SCO Interbank Consortium, while negotiations continue. Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov confirmed Astana's willingness to host the bank's headquarters. Bishkek had already put forward its candidacy at the September summit. Choosing a headquarters is only part of the task. Members must agree on their financial contributions and how the bank will operate, including who decides which projects receive loans. China has far greater financial resources than most of its SCO partners, giving it the potential to become the bank's principal...