• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10813 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10813 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10813 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10813 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10813 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10813 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10813 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00206 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10813 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Our People > Andrei Matveev

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Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

Six Months to Rewrite the State: Kazakhstan Accelerates Its Constitutional Reset

Speaking on September 8, 2025, in his Address to the People of Kazakhstan in Parliament, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev outlined plans for new political reforms. At the time, nothing in his remarks suggested either the scale of the changes his initiative would entail or the speed with which they would be implemented. Yet on March 15 of this year, Kazakh citizens will vote in a referendum on a new draft Constitution, developed at high speed over roughly six months, including a period of state-organized public consultations and expert review. According to materials published on the Constitutional Court’s page on the state portal, where the final version of the draft Basic Law was published, the starting point for constitutional reform was Tokayev’s proposal to create a unicameral Parliament. The president announced the idea on September 8, 2025. A month later, on October 8, an order was signed establishing a working group on parliamentary reform. Over the following months, the group reviewed more than 2,000 proposals from citizens and experts. At the fifth session of the National Kurultai in January 2026, Tokayev summarized the proposals on parliamentary reform, the scope of which had already expanded beyond restructuring Parliament to revising the Constitution as a whole. On January 21, a Constitutional Commission was established, comprising 130 members, including representatives of the National Kurultai, legal experts, officials from central government agencies, media executives, chairpersons of maslikhats, members of regional public councils, and academics. The first draft of the Basic Law was published on January 31. On February 11, a “referendum” version of the draft was presented to the president, incorporating comments received, including his own. Tokayev had outlined his remarks the previous day during an expanded government meeting. The question to be put to voters in March is: “Do you accept the new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the draft of which was published in the mass media on February 12, 2026?” What is particularly notable is that on September 8, the president had cautioned against haste, calling parliamentary reform a “very serious issue” and stating that rushing it would be inappropriate. “This reform must be the subject of detailed discussion in civil society, among experts, and, of course, in the current Parliament… I believe that, given the extraordinary nature of the reform, the discussion will take at least a year, after which a nationwide referendum could be held in 2027, and then the necessary amendments could be made to the Constitution,” Tokayev said at the time. A little over five months later, however, the country is preparing for changes that extend beyond the initial proposal to abolish the upper house. At a government meeting, Tokayev emphasized that “no one is setting the task of negating the significance of the current Constitution, which has played a huge role in all of our country's achievements over the past 30 years. “Nevertheless, it should be noted that it was adopted when our country was just getting on its feet and bears the imprint of the first...

4 months ago

A Stranger Among His Own: Rejected by Russia, Kazakh Comedian Nurlan Saburov Faces Cold Reception at Home

Kazakh comedian Nurlan Saburov has become the third stand-up performer to be officially barred from entering Russia, this time with a 50-year entry ban. The decision, reportedly issued on national security grounds, follows years of mounting controversy surrounding the artist, who has struggled to reconcile his dual identity as a Kazakhstani citizen and a celebrity shaped by Russian showbusiness. From Stepnogorsk to Moscow Spotlight Born in 1991 in Stepnogorsk (Akmola region, Kazakhstan), Saburov’s career took off through KVN, the long-running Soviet-era improv competition, after enrolling at Ural Federal University in Yekaterinburg. In 2014, he relocated to Moscow with his family to pursue a career in the booming Russian stand-up scene, eventually gaining national fame through television appearances. However, that rise has since been marred by a series of political and legal controversies. Neutrality in the Spotlight and Its Consequences Saburov's troubles began in April 2022, when he was confronted during a U.S. tour by a protester covered in red paint, a symbolic act referencing the war in Ukraine. His offhand joke referencing menstruation drew global backlash, leading to an American tour cancellation and public outrage. Attempts to declare a neutral stance on the war in Ukraine only deepened public criticism. By May 2025, he faced his first major setback at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport, where he was fined for immigration violations but allowed to leave without a ban. Then, on February 6, 2026, upon arrival at Vnukovo airport from Dubai, Saburov was detained and issued an official notice of a 50-year ban from entering Russia. The document cited violations of tax and migration law, with authorities alleging he attempted to legalize his earnings through intermediaries while refusing to apply for Russian citizenship. “In 2024 alone, Nurlan Saburov declared more than 50 million rubles [$645,000] in income while ignoring tax and migration rules,” Russian law enforcement sources told RIA Novosti. He was initially scheduled for deportation to Dubai but instead chose to fly to Almaty, Kazakhstan. Uneasy Return to Kazakhstan Speculation quickly emerged about whether Saburov would settle permanently in Almaty, where he co-hosts a successful YouTube talk show alongside three Russian hosts. The program, previously hosted on YouTube, now runs on VK, Russia’s state-backed video platform, and frequently features Russian celebrities. Relocating the production to Kazakhstan could, some argued, benefit the country’s cultural profile and tourism appeal. However, Saburov was met with public hostility. A video from 2025 resurfaced online showing him donating 10 enduro motorcycles to fighters from the Wagner Group’s Istra unit, a controversial paramilitary force implicated in operations in Ukraine. In response, Almaty-based activist Marat Turymbetov submitted a formal complaint to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Kazakhstan, calling for an investigation into possible violations of Article 170 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits financing illegal armed groups. “I believe the authorities will investigate and bring this individual to justice,” Turymbetov stated in a social media post, citing possible mercenary activity. Other Kazakhstani citizens, particularly those who support Ukraine, joined Turymbetov’s call for legal action. Saburov Responds Despite the...

4 months ago

Kyrgyzstan’s Sanctions Dilemma: Drifting from the Central Asian Consensus?

While Kyrgyzstan is improving relations with the United States by hosting the second B5+1 forum in its capital, with the participation of U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor, Bishkek’s relations with Brussels appear to be deteriorating. The European Union is discussing possible sanctions against Kyrgyzstan, and is reportedly considering a ban on the import of certain categories of goods into the country. According to Bloomberg, which was the first to disclose details of the EU’s upcoming 20th package of sanctions against Russia, Brussels is prepared to restrict Kyrgyzstan’s trade in machine tools and radio equipment over allegations of helping the Kremlin circumvent existing bans. The Kyrgyz government has already responded to the report. On February 3, Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiev held a video conference with EU sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan, during which the sides agreed to engage in “constructive and substantive dialogue on issues related to sanctions.” Further discussions are expected during O’Sullivan’s visit to Bishkek at the end of the month, scheduled for February 26. Even before the EU representative’s visit, Kyrgyz officials have publicly commented on the prospect of sanctions, offering a clear sense of the tone likely to shape the dialogue. In an interview with Azattyk, Amangeldiev stressed that Kyrgyzstan has imposed restrictions on the export of dual-use goods, including weapons, and therefore sees no grounds for measures against the state. He also suggested that any potential restrictions might not take the form of sanctions against Kyrgyzstan itself, but rather recommendations to individual EU member states not to supply certain goods to the republic. Deputy Chairman of Kyrgyzstan's Cabinet of Ministers, Edil Baisalov, emphasized that Bishkek consistently communicates its position to European officials, arguing that its “trade relations with Russia do not cause any damage to third countries.” As a negotiating advantage, Baisalov pointed to what he described as growing international attention toward Kyrgyzstan. “Compared to the past, interest in our country and in the history of its socio-economic strengthening has grown significantly,” Baisalov said. “I believe the European authorities have enough patience, wisdom, and understanding not to damage relations with the Kyrgyz Republic. There is no need to create the impression that they intend to restrict us in any way or undermine our policy of national development and economic strengthening.” At the same time, small and medium-sized businesses in Kyrgyzstan are already facing serious difficulties due to the existing sanctions regime, even though these measures do not directly target the country’s key economic sectors. The logistics sector has been hit hardest. Delivery times have increased, costs have risen, visa requirements for drivers have tightened, and the volume of required documentation has expanded significantly. International payments have emerged as a separate challenge. Transfers in dollars, euros, and other currencies are increasingly delayed. Banks demand additional explanations, scrutinize the origin of funds, and in some cases suspend transactions indefinitely, creating cash-flow gaps. To reduce risks, companies are spreading payments across multiple banks: one for ruble transactions, another for Europe, and a third for...

4 months ago

Why Kazakhstan Is Not Celebrating Its Multi-Billion-Dollar Win in the Karachaganak Oil Arbitration Just Yet

In late January 2026, international media reported that Kazakhstan had won a significant arbitration case against the shareholders of the Karachaganak oil field, with compensation estimated between $2 billion and $4 billion. The Ministry of Energy has not commented on the substance of the ruling, citing confidentiality, though experts say it strengthens Kazakhstan’s position in ongoing legal proceedings related to the Kashagan oil field. According to Bloomberg and Reuters, the Kazakh government initiated legal action in 2023 over what it described as unjustified cost deductions. Originally filed for $3.5 billion, the claim later expanded to include additional allegations, such as inflated expenses tied to corruption. In 2025, the shareholders of Karachaganak Petroleum Operating proposed settling the dispute by financing a domestic gas processing plant in Kazakhstan. The government rejected the proposal, however, and arbitration continued, resulting in a ruling in favor of Kazakhstan. Sources familiar with the proceedings said the consortium, led by Eni and Shell, has been ordered to pay compensation of up to $4 billion. The tribunal has yet to finalize the exact amount. As the arbitration process remains confidential, sources requested anonymity, noting that the Karachaganak consortium still has the option to appeal. While the ruling represents a partial victory, Kazakhstan had originally sought a significantly higher sum; the tribunal accepted the government's core argument: under the production sharing agreement (PSA), the consortium charged the state for unapproved and non-reimbursable expenses. Kazakhstan’s external legal advisers estimate the final payment will range between $2 billion and $4 billion. According to sources familiar with the proceedings, the recovery mechanism will likely involve revisions to the oil distribution formula within the PSA. In its written decision, the tribunal referenced Kazakhstan’s own admission that it had tolerated “corruption and kleptocracy” until 2022. A source familiar with the ruling said Kazakh officials had accepted bribes to approve inflated costs at Karachaganak, expenses that were then inappropriately reimbursed by the state. During the arbitration, Kazakhstan’s legal team presented documents from criminal proceedings in Italy. These revealed that, in 2017, several Italian contractors pleaded guilty to bribing Kazakh officials to secure contracts at both Karachaganak and the Kashagan offshore field. Oil and gas analyst Olzhas Baidildinov said the ruling gives Kazakhstan a stronger position in the Kashagan case. He asserted that Kazakhstan can now “firmly defend its rights in major oil and gas projects,” and that the "decades of privileged status enjoyed by foreign oil and gas majors in Kazakhstan's oil industry are over.” Baidildinov added that the operating models at Karachaganak and Kashagan are likely to be restructured and possibly “de-Italianized”. He also criticized the national oil company, KazMunayGas, for its silence on the Tengizchevroil (TCO) expansion project, whose capital expenditure has surged from $12 billion to $48.5 billion. Drawing comparisons to Uzbekistan, Baidildinov noted that former Uzbekneftegaz head Bahodir Sidikov was dismissed in December 2025 and later detained on corruption charges. In the same month, presidential energy adviser Alisher Sultanov was also removed. “I’m astonished that, while regional Kazakh officials are being...

4 months ago

Oil Eclipse: Power Cuts Expose Fragility of Western Kazakhstan’s CPC-Linked Energy System

Production at the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan is set to resume, according to the Ministry of Energy, which has been monitoring the situation since January 18. The restart does not, however, represent a full return to pre-shutdown production levels. While the disruption had no immediate impact on global oil prices, which continued to decline at the time of the outage, it triggered widespread electricity restrictions across western Kazakhstan. On January 21, Brent crude futures fell by 79 cents (1.22%) to $64.13 per barrel, while West Texas Intermediate dropped by 64 cents (1.06%) to $59.72 per barrel, Reuters reported. By then, production at Tengiz had already been suspended for three days, with sources indicating that the downtime would continue for another seven to ten days. From January 20, local authorities in Atyrau and Mangistau regions reported systemic electricity supply restrictions, including altered street-lighting schedules in Atyrau to conserve power, amid reduced gas deliveries to regional generators. The Ministry of Energy did not publicly respond to this until January 22, when, in a statement, it confirmed that gas turbine units at Tengiz were shut down on January 18. At the direction of Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov, his deputy was dispatched to oversee the situation on the ground. A special commission was established to investigate the incident, including representatives from the State Energy Supervision and Control Committee, the Atyrau Region Akimat’s Energy Department, KEGOC JSC, and Tengizchevroil LLP. No official explanation for the shutdown has yet been provided. However, some Kazakh energy experts have publicly speculated about a possible link to recent Ukrainian drone attacks on the infrastructure of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which plays a vital role in exporting Kazakh oil. Oil and gas analyst Olzhas Baidildinov drew a connection between the attacks and cascading effects on domestic energy supply: “They hit the CPC; exports declined, followed by oil production. Gas production declined along with oil. Gas is essential for electricity generation in western Kazakhstan,” he said. Baidildinov added that imported gas and electricity from Russia helped prevent more severe outages, though the energy crunch underscores longstanding vulnerabilities in Kazakhstan’s infrastructure. Baidildinov also referred to recent criticism from President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who at the 5th session of the National Kurultai voiced dissatisfaction with the energy sector, signaling potential personnel changes. On January 26, the Ministry of Energy announced that production at Tengiz would restart “in the near future,” and, at 4 a.m., the second-generation plant resumed operations, initiating raw material flows from the Royal field. “The current flow to the ZVP is 2,500 tons per day. Specialists are systematically increasing the supply of multiphase flow (oil and gas) to reach design capacity. At Tengiz, all technical and human resources have been mobilized to inspect energy facilities and power distribution systems,” the ministry stated. Officials emphasized that restoration efforts are under constant oversight. “TCO remains committed to ensuring reliable production and will increase volumes in stages, as infrastructure readiness and safety have been confirmed.” While the ministry has yet to publicly acknowledge...

4 months ago

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan Join Trump-Initiated Board of Peace

A new international organization, the Board of Peace, was formally established yesterday on the initiative of U.S. President Donald Trump. The charter for the board was signed on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos by representatives from 19 countries. Joining Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as founding signatories, the other parties are Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Mongolia, Pakistan, Kosovo, and Vietnam. The United States is not counted among the 19 signatories, acting instead as the initiative’s convener and chair. The Board of Peace is designed as a consultative platform rather than a treaty-based organization, with no enforcement powers and voluntary participation by member states. Following the signing, a comprehensive development plan for the Gaza Strip was unveiled, which envisions transforming the enclave into a regional economic hub by 2035, with a projected GDP of over $10 billion under the proposal. The plan includes restoring water, electricity, sewage systems, and hospitals, creating jobs, and developing coastal tourism. The concept was presented by entrepreneur Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law. Kushner will serve on the Board of Peace’s executive board, alongside U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, World Bank President Ajay Banga, and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, among others. The inclusion of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two largest economies in Central Asia, as founding members underscores their growing role in global diplomacy. Azerbaijan, which has recently expressed interest in joining the Central Asia-focused C5 regional format, also signed the charter. Separately, observers have begun referring to the growing cooperation between Central Asia and Azerbaijan as the “C6,” which could pave the way for greater collaboration on the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, including the Zangezur Corridor through Armenia. [caption id="attachment_42672" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] Uzbekistan’s participation reflects Tashkent’s increasingly active multi-vector foreign policy under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, which has sought to expand the country’s diplomatic footprint beyond its immediate neighborhood. In recent years, Uzbekistan has stepped up engagement with the United States, the European Union, and the Middle East, while positioning itself as a pragmatic regional actor on development, connectivity, and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. During the signing ceremony, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan and Trump reportedly had a brief but cordial exchange. In a statement to the press, Ruslan Zheldibay, spokesperson for the Kazakh president, said Tokayev pointed out that Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords was listed as item 177 in a document titled 365 Victories of President Donald Trump in 365 Days, distributed at the Davos Forum. Tokayev also wished Trump success in pursuing a “common sense” domestic policy. Trump, in turn, thanked Tokayev for supporting the Board of Peace initiative. [caption id="attachment_42673" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Image: Akorda.kz[/caption] The press service of Akorda, the presidential residence of Kazakhstan, later clarified that joining the Board of Peace is based on a sovereign decision and entails a standard three-year term. Participation does not require a financial contribution, though the charter allows member states...

4 months ago

Tokayev Unveils Major Political Reforms as Kazakhstan Moves to Replace the National Kurultai

The fifth and final session of the National Kurultai in Kazakhstan, held on January 20, marked the announcement of plans to dismantle and replace two key institutions: the National Kurultai and the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, structures that have played central roles in the country’s civic dialogue, particularly over the past three decades. In a sweeping address, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that these legacy institutions would be replaced by new mechanisms for state-society interaction, crafted with an eye toward modern governance models and constitutional reform. The move reflects Tokayev’s long-running criticism of consultative bodies that, while symbolically inclusive, have often duplicated functions or lacked clear decision-making authority. Tokayev’s address, which included references to U.S. President Donald Trump, prompted analysts to draw deeper geopolitical and institutional parallels. As Tokayev enters the second phase of his presidency, analysts note a shift in strategy and control. His first term (2019-2022) was marked by attempts to correct the excesses and structural stagnation of his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev. At the time, Tokayev faced entrenched resistance from the political establishment, with some officials reportedly appealing directly to Nazarbayev to circumvent presidential directives. The January 2022 unrest, an attempted power shift, marked a turning point. Tokayev consolidated power and launched a comprehensive reform agenda across the political and economic spectrum. The analogy with Trump, some analysts argue, lies in this dual-phase leadership: an initial struggle with the establishment, followed by a more assertive, transformation-driven second term. Since then, Tokayev has framed political reform as a safeguard against elite capture and institutional paralysis, arguing that fragmented authority contributed to the crisis. Yet Tokayev continues to face political resistance, particularly to structural reforms. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev, commenting on Tokayev’s Kurultai speech, described the president’s evolving approach as both methodical and tactical. “Sometimes, the head of state announces strategic steps he has been considering for over a year, but only unveils them at the last moment, when no one has the opportunity to influence the message,” Ashimbayev observed. He cited Tokayev’s September 2025 proposal for a unicameral parliament as an example of such strategic maneuvering, an initiative that caught even senior officials by surprise. Ashimbayev argues that Tokayev’s aim was to sideline speculation about succession by announcing long-term institutional reforms. The president further solidified this strategy by reviving the position of vice president, abolished under Nazarbayev, while proposing the dissolution or merging of overlapping structures such as the Senate, the Assembly of the People, and the Kurultai into a proposed National People’s Council. This consolidation, Ashimbayev notes, serves both symbolic and strategic purposes. “The image of a 'lame duck' has vanished, and a self-confident Uncle Scrooge, so to speak, with complex plans, has returned. Everyone expected the discussions to take a year or a year and a half, but the president decided to seize the initiative again and unexpectedly moved the Kurultai to January, where he announced a huge package of new ideas,” he remarked. The announcement of the vice presidency, one of the most consequential changes, reportedly...

4 months ago

Kazakh Diplomacy: Why Tokayev Aligned Kazakhstan With the Abraham Accords

On November 6, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev confirmed that Kazakhstan had formally acceded to the Abraham Accords, aligning the Central Asian state with the U.S.-brokered diplomatic framework. Launched during Trump’s first presidential term, the Abraham Accords seek to expand diplomatic normalization between Israel and Muslim-majority states. Initially signed in September 2020 by Israel and the United Arab Emirates, and separately by Israel and Bahrain, the Abraham Accords were later expanded to include Morocco and Sudan. Within the broader Abraham Accords framework, Washington continues to seek Saudi Arabia’s participation, a step viewed as diplomatically significant given the kingdom’s custodianship of two of Islam’s holiest sites. However, the process was derailed following the outbreak of the Gaza war in late 2023, triggered by a Hamas attack on Israel. Riyadh has since insisted that normalization can only proceed once there is meaningful progress toward establishing a Palestinian state. Kazakhstan, a secular state with a Muslim-majority population, has maintained diplomatic ties with Israel since April 1992. Embassies were opened in 1996, and bilateral relations have expanded steadily, including in trade, defense, and humanitarian fields. In 2016, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Kazakhstan, highlighting the strength of this relationship. These longstanding ties help explain why Kazakhstan’s accession did not mark a shift in its bilateral relationship with Israel. Because Kazakhstan established full diplomatic relations with Israel decades ago, several analysts have described the country’s accession to the Abraham Accords as largely symbolic. Uzbek political scientist Kamoliddin Rabbimov argues that the decision was a calculated gesture rather than a shift in Kazakhstan’s geopolitical orientation. “The question arises: is Kazakhstan really ready to weaken its relations with China, Turkey, and Russia in order to join the American-Israeli alliance? I don’t think so,” Rabbimov said. “President Tokayev most likely just formally supported Trump’s initiative by saying ‘yes’ without putting any real geopolitical meaning into it. Nevertheless, even such a ‘yes’ is capable of slightly upsetting the balance in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.” Giorgio Cafiero, the CEO of Washington-based Gulf State Analytics, views the move as strategic positioning. “Given the Trump administration’s determination to expand the scope of the Abraham Accords, this move by Kazakhstan was a relatively easy way to win the White House’s favor.” German analysts at Kettner Edelmetalle emphasize Kazakhstan’s natural resource wealth as a key factor. “The country has significant deposits of minerals and rare earth elements, resources that are indispensable for modern technologies. By strengthening ties with Washington, Astana apparently hopes to attract more American investment in this strategically important sector.” Eldar Mamedov, non-resident fellow at the Queens Institute and a former senior advisor to the European Parliament, views the development through the lens of geopolitical balancing. “The Abraham Accords are merely a tool in Astana’s deliberate efforts to diversify its geopolitical dependence on Moscow and strengthen its strategic relations with the United States,” he writes. “Perceiving them as the beginning of a new, ideologically defined bloc misinterprets the fundamentally pragmatic and self-interested nature of Kazakhstan’s calculations.” Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords reflects...

5 months ago

From Tehran to Tashkent: How Iran’s Crisis and U.S. Tariffs Reverberate Across Central Asia

At the end of 2025, Iran once again emerged as a flashpoint on the global political map. Mass protests erupted across the country, fueled by spiraling inflation and economic hardship. At present, the Iranian rial has plummeted to the point where it is effectively worth less than the paper it's printed on. The current wave of unrest, already the largest and deadliest nationwide unrest Iran has seen since 2022, is not occurring in isolation. U.S. President Donald Trump has renewed what his administration describes as a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, and his administration is now pursuing what observers have characterized as a strategy of “pushing the falling,” a move aimed at reshaping the political order of the Middle East. What might this mean for neighboring Central Asia? Tajik political analyst Muhammad Shamsuddinov argues the crisis must be viewed within a broader geopolitical context. “The situation in Iran is directly tied to Trump’s second-term pressure campaign,” Shamsuddinov said, referencing a string of destabilizing events. “These include the 12-day U.S.-Israel war against Iran and the reimposition of U.N. sanctions in September 2025," he added, referring to the 12-day June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran, during which U.S. forces also struck Iranian nuclear facilities. "All of these have deepened the domestic crisis in Iran.” In a further escalation, on January 12, Trump announced 25% tariffs on countries conducting trade with Iran. The move appears targeted primarily at Russia, China, and India - Iran’s largest international partners, but also has implications for Central Asian economies. In the first nine months of 2025, trade between Kazakhstan and Iran grew by nearly 45%, reaching $310.8 million. Tajikistan, which maintains the closest economic ties to Tehran among Central Asian states, reported trade worth $430.7 million in the first eleven months of 2025, an increase of 28% over the same period in 2024. Uzbekistan, while less directly exposed to Iran than Kazakhstan or Tajikistan, has also moved cautiously in recent years to expand trade links with Tehran, making it sensitive to further sanctions pressure. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, faces its own exposure through gas swap arrangements involving Iran, which could become collateral damage of escalating regional tensions. Iranian investments in Tajikistan are also substantial. Among the most prominent projects is the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric power plant, estimated at $256 million. The Iranian government contributed approximately $180 million, with an additional $36 million from an Iranian contractor. The remainder was financed by Tajikistan. According to official data, roughly 160 companies with Iranian capital are currently operating in Tajikistan across multiple sectors. In Kazakhstan, around 650 Iranian companies are registered, with over 350 operational, primarily in manufacturing, infrastructure, and agriculture. By contrast, trade between Iran and Russia, a strategic partner since the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement in January 2025, increased by only 8% in the first nine months of 2025, according to official figures. Despite modest growth, Russian analysts view the figures optimistically. “Growth is happening under challenging geopolitical conditions, with sanctions, logistical restructuring, and financial hurdles,” said...

5 months ago

The Trump Factor: Why Central Asia Has Remained Silent on Iran’s Protests

The wave of protests that erupted in Iran in late December and spread to at least 27 of the country’s 31 provinces has become the largest since 2022, when mass demonstrations followed the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s morality police. The unrest has raised new concerns across the region about political stability, energy markets, and the risk of external intervention. Rights monitors say protests have been reported in hundreds of locations nationwide, with death and detention tolls still contested. Human rights groups and independent monitoring organizations estimate that dozens of people have been killed and more than 2,000 detained, while Iranian officials have offered varying accounts and blamed violence on what they describe as “rioters.” In Kazakhstan, observers are drawing comparisons to the country’s own January 2022 unrest, officially labeled an attempted coup that ended in a violent crackdown. But beyond the parallels with Kazakhstan’s ‘Qantar’ events, analysts are focusing on the wider implications, particularly the potential impact of Iran’s domestic turmoil on global oil markets. For Kazakhstan, the stakes are heightened by the country’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports and the sensitivity of global energy markets to supply shocks. Any sharp change in Iranian output, even if temporary, could place downward pressure on prices and complicate budget planning for oil-dependent economies across Central Asia. Kazakh financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov has voiced concern that unrest in Iran could trigger a surge in oil production aimed at funding social spending, a move that could drive down global oil prices and harm Kazakhstan’s oil-dependent economy. “Iran could add half a million barrels a day within six months and cause oil prices to collapse, but it would not do so casually. The Middle East is very sensitive and knows how to negotiate. Still, if the protests persist, Tehran might ramp up production to finance social needs. [This would be] painful for Kazakhstan. If Venezuela is a bear cub, then Iran is a grizzly bear in the bushes with its oil,” Rysmambetov warned on his Telegram channel. While political unrest typically raises oil prices by increasing supply risk, analysts note that Iran’s response could be atypical. Faced with fiscal pressure, Tehran may opt to increase production to stabilize revenues, a move that would push prices lower despite heightened instability. Iran’s chronic social issues, exacerbated by inflation and the collapse of the national currency, have fueled public discontent for more than a decade. While the Iranian authorities acknowledge the severity of the economic crisis and have conceded that some demands are legitimate, they have also warned of further hardships. On January 5, the judiciary announced that no leniency would be shown toward those detained during the protests. Russian experts, meanwhile, have framed the unrest in geopolitical terms. Irina Fedorova of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies cited renewed sanctions, critical shortages of water and electricity, and foreign interference as the root causes. However, she dismissed the likelihood of regime change, pointing to disunity among opposition factions. “The difference...

5 months ago