Our People > Andrei Matveev

Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

Venezuela

The Venezuela Effect: Oil, Sanctions, and Kazakhstan’s Strategic Dilemma

The start of 2026 was marked by political upheaval across two continents: fresh protests in Iran drawing comparisons among some Kazakh analysts to the country’s own Bloody January of 2022, and a U.S. military operation described by Washington as a law-enforcement action in Venezuela. The latter led to the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and what some analysts are describing as a move toward far greater U.S. influence over Venezuela’s oil sector. Beyond its immediate implications for global oil supply and pricing, the geopolitical symbolism of the Venezuela operation is resonating in unexpected places, including Central Asia. Contrary to some early reports, the American intervention in Caracas was not bloodless. At least 40 Venezuelan security and military personnel were reportedly killed during the rapid offensive. Still, Kazakh political scientist Marat Shibutov argues that the perception of a swift and decisive U.S. action, especially in contrast to Russia’s grinding war in Ukraine, is symbolically damaging for Moscow. “This comparison with Russia’s prolonged conflict is not flattering,” Shibutov noted. “It creates a sensitive political backdrop for the Kremlin.” In Kazakhstan, where debates over foreign energy contracts have been simmering for years, the events in Venezuela are being closely watched. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev referenced Astana’s past discussions about reviewing oil agreements with Western companies. “The topic of revising oil contracts is becoming less and less popular. At this rate, it could even be equated with extremism,” he commented ironically, underscoring how sensitive the issue has become. Some experts are also concerned that political shifts in Venezuela and Iran could destabilize the oil market in ways that would hit Kazakhstan’s economy hard. Kazakhstan derives a substantial share of its state budget revenues from the oil sector, making sustained price declines a direct fiscal risk rather than a purely market concern, analysts note. Energy analyst Olzhas Baidildinov points out that Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world, approximately 300 billion barrels, more than 30 times Kazakhstan’s profitable reserves. “If liberal or Western-friendly governments come to power simultaneously in Venezuela and Iran, they could supply an additional 2-3 million barrels per day to the global market within the next 3-4 years,” he warned. Even without full regime change, he noted, easing sanctions or the return of “shadow exports” could push global prices down to $50-70 per barrel. “At such prices, it will be difficult to demonstrate economic growth and maintain momentum in Kazakhstan’s oil sector,” Baidildinov added. Financial analyst Arman Beisembayev offered a more bearish view. “If production volumes increase and the U.S. begins releasing more oil onto the market, including from Venezuela, then I’m afraid prices won’t stay at $60 per barrel. The base case is a drop to $50. A worst-case scenario could see prices at $40, or even lower.” But not everyone believes Venezuela can upend the market. Askar Ismailov, a Geneva-based advisor on Central Asia at the Global Gas Centre, remains skeptical. “Venezuelan crude is extremely heavy, difficult to extract, and expensive to transport. Historically, it depended on a...

5 months ago

Tax Reform

Are Kazakhstan’s Small Businesses Really Leaving Over Taxes?

As Kazakhstan prepares for tax reforms set to take effect in 2026, a new wave of panic has surfaced in the national discourse, one suggesting that small businesses are facing a stark choice: shut down or relocate to neighboring countries promising more favorable tax environments. This narrative has gained traction twice in the second half of 2025. The first wave came in mid-autumn, triggered by reports suggesting that Kazakhstani entrepreneurs were looking to move operations to Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan. These claims quickly spread across Kazakh social networks, particularly Threads. However, early signs indicated that the alarm was not being sounded by small businesses themselves, but by representatives of the B2B services sector, especially consultants and accountants. Media outlets amplified comments that stirred fear, reinforcing what increasingly appeared to be media-driven panic. One such moment came in late September when the Kazakhstan Association of Tax Consultants hosted a presentation by its chairman, Saken Karin, titled “Tax Reality 2026: Opportunities and Risks.” Karin warned that the proposed reforms would “tear apart the B2B and B2C sectors,” criticizing state approaches to tax administration. Even then, experts argued that large-scale relocation of Kazakhstani businesses made little practical sense. “Which Kazakhstani businesses can realistically relocate to Kyrgyzstan? Probably only IT companies, which are location-independent. Most SMEs in Almaty rely on the quasi-public sector or the domestic market, which is considerably larger and wealthier than that of our neighbors,” said financier Rassul Rysmambetov. The numbers back this up: in 2024, the economy of Almaty alone reached $60 billion, compared to Kyrgyzstan’s national GDP of approximately $17.5 billion. Despite this, a second wave of panic is now gaining momentum, this time shifting focus to Uzbekistan as a destination for potential business migration. Once again, social networks, particularly Threads, are amplifying the noise, citing interviews such as one with tax expert Maxim Baryshev, who praised the tax systems of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Baryshev represents the professional accounting organization Uchet.kz. His colleague, Uchet.kz manager Timur Abiev, has previously spoken out against what he views as unfounded panic surrounding tax reform. Despite growing anxiety on social media, government officials have yet to launch a strong counter-narrative. This lack of response reinforces the idea that panic is being stoked by peripheral sectors rather than the business community itself. When Finance Minister Madi Takiev was asked about claims of a mass relocation of small businesses to neighboring countries, he dismissed them as unfounded. He argued that tax thresholds and turnover requirements in those countries are broadly comparable to Kazakhstan’s and noted that businesses relocating abroad would still be subject to domestic taxation if their economic center of interest remained in Kazakhstan, making such moves economically unviable. As for the accounting industry, its vocal opposition to reform may be tied to structural weaknesses. Kazakhstan’s accounting sector has been slow to adapt to changing demands and is struggling to train enough professionals to meet market needs. The number of established training institutions remains small. A recent government meeting focused on SME support included plans...

5 months ago

Sports

Kazakhstan vs. Uzbekistan: A Footballing Derby with an Uncertain Outcome

The Uzbekistan national football team has qualified for the 2026 World Cup, which will take place across three North American countries: the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Meanwhile, one of Kazakhstan’s leading clubs, FC Kairat Almaty, continues to gain experience competing in the UEFA Champions League. Football in Central Asia has become a mirror of the region’s growing economic and political ambitions, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the forefront. Their rivalry, which dates back to the Soviet era, has adapted to this new chapter. Kazakhstan and the Road to Europe Matches between Almaty's Kairat and Tashkent's Pakhtakor were once marquee events during the Soviet era, filling stadiums and energizing fans across the republics. Following the collapse of the USSR, however, the footballing paths of these two historical rivals began to diverge. Initially, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), which includes countries from across Asia and parts of the Pacific, including former Oceania Football Confederation members such as Australia and Guam. Kazakhstan became a full member of the AFC in 1992, followed by Uzbekistan in 1994. However, Kazakhstan soon grew disillusioned with the level of competition within the AFC and began to explore other avenues. Its early attempts to join UEFA were rebuffed in the mid-1990s. Rakhat Aliyev, then head of the Football Union of Kazakhstan and son-in-law of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, later described the process as being dismissed “without really getting to the heart of the matter.” Despite this, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan quickly showed they were a cut above most AFC members at the time. Kazakhstan won the inaugural Central Asian Cup in 1992, while Uzbekistan claimed gold at the 1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima, defeating China 4-2 in the final. Eventually, Kazakhstan succeeded in joining UEFA. Spearheaded by Aliyev, the Football Union of Kazakhstan (FSC) lobbied hard for admission, culminating in meetings with FIFA and UEFA presidents Lennart Johansson and Joseph Blatter in Moscow in late 2000 and early 2001. The AFC issued a statement on May 10, 2001, allowing Kazakhstan to make its own decision, and five days later Johansson confirmed that UEFA would welcome Kazakhstan as its 52nd member. "Joining UEFA has given all of us who work in football a powerful boost," Aliyev said at the time. "We will strive to use this momentum to raise the level of our national football." Uzbekistan and the Central Asian Football Association Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan chose to remain in the AFC, where it has steadily risen in prominence. In 2014, it became a founding member of the Central Asian Football Association (CAFA), a regional sub-group within the AFC. Officially operational since 2015, CAFA also includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The organization is currently chaired by Rustam Emomali, son of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon. Uzbekistan is ranked second in the CAFA, behind Iran, and has consistently reached the quarterfinals of the AFC Asian Cup in 2004, 2007, 2015, and 2023. Much of this success is due to sustained investment in youth development, training...

5 months ago

Politics

Kazakh MP Sarym Proposes Legal Measures Over Social Media Posts on Pipeline Strike

A Kazakhstani lawmaker has proposed criminal liability for social media posts that express support for attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure. During a recent session of the Mazhilis (lower house of parliament), MP Aidos Sarym called for posts endorsing Ukrainian military strikes on oil infrastructure to be examined under existing laws on terrorism and high treason. The proposal follows a November 29 incident in which Ukraine’s armed forces reportedly targeted the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal in Novorossiysk, Russia. The attack damaged the CPC’s VPU-2 offshore loading terminal and temporarily halted operations. Addressing Prosecutor General Berik Asylov and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balaeva, Sarym said the incident had sparked public commentary online that he believes exceeds the boundaries of protected speech. He called for investigations into such posts and suggested they may warrant legal action. “Such actions clearly go beyond the constitutional right to freedom of speech and directly harm national interests,” Sarym said, proposing that the government also launch an information campaign to discourage rhetoric supporting violence against critical infrastructure. The initiative coincides with broader debates in Kazakhstan over how to manage public discourse surrounding the war in Ukraine, amid concerns that expressions of support for either side could have diplomatic implications. Kazakhstan maintains relations with both Ukraine and Russia and has sought to preserve a neutral stance throughout the conflict. Sarym’s remarks were interpreted by some political analysts as a broader signal to members of parliament, following earlier comments by fellow deputy Yermurat Bapi. Bapi had previously characterized Ukrainian strikes on CPC facilities as part of a legitimate military strategy, a position that Sarym suggested could fall under legal review. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov noted that approximately 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports transit through the CPC. While the pipeline includes Russian ownership, most shares belong to companies based in Kazakhstan, Europe, and the U.S., he said, countering claims that the CPC is solely a Russian asset. Kazakhstan is accelerating the repair of the VPU-2 terminal, now aiming for completion by January 2026. The Ministry of National Economy is currently assessing the economic impact of the disruption. Oil and gas analyst Olzhas Baidildinov estimated the production loss at 480,000 tons, equating to about $210 million in revenue over two weeks. He forecast monthly losses exceeding $400 million, including an estimated $150 million shortfall in budgetary revenue. Baidildinov expressed support for Sarym’s proposal, describing it as part of efforts to safeguard internal stability amid external geopolitical uncertainty. The proposal has not yet led to formal legislative action, and no prosecutions have been reported. Further discussion on the issue is expected as part of Kazakhstan’s broader approach to managing public discourse and national security in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

6 months ago

Cultural Ties

From Medieval Persia to Modern Kazakhstan: Decolonizing History

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent visit to Kazakhstan might have appeared routine amid a series of diplomatic engagements by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2025. Yet one element of the visit stood out for Tokayev, a gift of 27 ancient Persian manuscripts, which were immediately put on public display in Astana’s National Museum. Together, the two presidents opened the exhibition titled The History of the Great Steppe in Iranian Sources, highlighting long-standing historical ties between Persian states and the Kazakh steppe. Speaking at a joint briefing, Tokayev emphasized the significance of the manuscripts, which he said contain historical accounts affirming the Kazakhs as a "brave people" and detailing diplomatic relations between the Kazakh khans and Iranian shahs. “Close relations were established between Tauke Khan and Shah Sultan Hussein,” Tokayev noted. “Records show embassies met in Moscow, and the Iranian ambassador visited the Kazakh steppe. Abul Khair Khan sent an envoy to Nadir Shah to foster diplomatic ties,” he said, underlining the depth of historical relations. Tokayev also referenced the cultural and linguistic connections between the two peoples. The taikazan (large ceremonial cauldron) in the mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi in Turkestan, he noted, was crafted by the Iranian master Abdul-Aziz Sharafuddin Tebrizi. Persian has left a linguistic imprint on the Kazakh language, with estimates suggesting Persian-origin words comprise 4% of the vocabulary, including astana (capital), paida (benefit), oraza (fast), and dәri (medicine). Tokayev further cited the Persian epic Shahnameh by Ferdowsi as culturally significant to the peoples of Turan, adding that Kazakh poet Abai was familiar with Persian literature. According to Tokayev, the newly acquired manuscripts contain historical analyses of the socio-economic and political conditions of the 18th-century Kazakh Khanate, including interactions with neighboring powers, records on Turkestan, and reports on Russian imperial activities in the region. The documents also reference resource extraction, coal, iron, copper, lead, and turquoise, on Kazakh territory. [caption id="attachment_40893" align="aligncenter" width="750"] Image: Akorda[/caption] “This is a very valuable gift. We will present this exhibition to the Kazakh public and promote it widely in the media,” Tokayev told reporters. “The documents contain previously unknown historical material. I think this will be useful for our compatriots.” The Ministry of Culture and Information, which organized the exhibition, confirmed that the manuscripts substantiate centuries-old ties between Kazakhstan and Iran, including evidence of trade and diplomatic exchanges along the Silk Road and archival references to intergovernmental negotiations and ambassadorial visits. Tokayev’s enthusiasm for the manuscripts is closely linked to Kazakhstan’s broader effort to “decolonize” its national history. The country is currently preparing a new seven-volume historical account under the editorial leadership of State Advisor Yerlan Karin. This project aims to reposition Kazakhstan not simply as a site of ancient states, but as an independent cultural and political center that influenced the broader region. “Kazakhstan is presented as a hub for civilizational development,” Karin explained. “This is our methodological innovation.” Previously, Kazakhstan’s history was largely framed within the narrative of the Russian Empire and Soviet rule. The current academic effort seeks to...

6 months ago

devaluation

Devaluation in Kazakhstan: Grim Forecast or Financial Strategy?

Expectations of a potential devaluation of Kazakhstan's national currency, the tenge, are gaining momentum in the country, despite its recent strengthening against the dollar. While the government projects stability, some financial players and experts openly support a weaker tenge. But are these fears grounded in economic reality, or do particular interests drive them? Kazakhstan’s currency is particularly sensitive to global market shifts because around half of the country’s export revenues come from oil and other raw materials. When commodity prices fall or external demand weakens, pressure on the tenge increases. The currency is also affected by high import dependence: many consumer goods, industrial inputs, and food products are priced in foreign currencies, making the economy highly responsive to exchange-rate movements. One of the most vocal proponents of a free-floating tenge is economist Aidarkhan Kusainov, a former adviser to the head of the National Bank. A long-time advocate for a free-floating tenge, Kusainov maintains that the currency remains overvalued. In 2021, he predicted the exchange rate would reach 500 tenge to the $1. As of now, the rate hovers around 510. Kusainov has recently gained broader attention following his criticism of rising taxes and utility tariffs during an appearance on a YouTube podcast hosted by Senate Speaker Maulen Ashimbayev. “Today, the singer of devaluation, a well-known but unpopular economist, woke up as a competent people’s professional (judging by the comments),” Kusainov wrote, replete with smiling emojis in assessing his newfound popularity on his Telegram channel. His prediction of a $1-to-1,000-tenge exchange rate has indeed gone viral. “If our National Fund runs out today, the exchange rate will instantly soar above 1,000. As soon as we stop injecting petrodollars and transfers into the economy, the tenge will drop to 800–900, and then quickly weaken to beyond 1,000. I've always advocated for these measures," he said in an interview with Ulysmedia. These debates are unfolding against a backdrop of persistent inflationary pressure. Although headline inflation has moderated from its earlier peaks, price growth in consumer-credit-driven segments remains elevated. Any significant weakening of the tenge would likely feed directly into consumer prices, especially for imported goods, which still account for a large share of household consumption. Kusainov's projection is not shared by the majority of analysts, however, who see such a scenario occurring only under the weight of severe external shocks. In contrast, the National Bank’s forecasts remain more conservative. According to analysts surveyed by the Central Bank in November 2025, the exchange rate is expected to reach 525.8 tenge by the end of 2025. For 2026 and 2027, the tenge is projected to weaken gradually to 548.2 and 565, respectively. Economist Serik Kozybaev, among others, rejects the idea of a sharp devaluation. He has attributed the tenge’s recent strength to currency interventions by the National Bank: “There are no serious reasons for such a significant weakening. On the contrary, over the past month, the exchange rate improved from 540 to 518 due to announced interventions. I expect this trend to continue, possibly bringing...

6 months ago

Freedom of Speech

Information Sovereignty? Central Asia Tightens Control Over Its Information Space

Across the post-Soviet space, governments are adopting new measures that affect the scope of free expression. Similar trends are visible in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of Eastern Europe, reflecting wider global shifts in how states manage their information environments. In Central Asia, where journalism has long faced political constraints, recent policies indicate a renewed emphasis on controlling the flow of information. From Georgia to Kazakhstan: Pushback Against Foreign Narratives Recent events in Georgia highlight these changes. The adoption of a controversial “foreign agents” law, widely described as a Russian-style or “pro-Russian” measure, reflected the ruling party’s growing hostility to foreign-funded media and NGOs, many backed by European donors, and triggered mass pro-EU protests in Tbilisi. Similar dynamics are emerging in Central Asia, where officials increasingly view foreign narratives as interference in domestic affairs. In Kazakhstan, legislative restrictions on so-called "LGBT propaganda" have sparked both domestic protests and criticism from international partners. At the same time, well-known media figure Gulnar Bazhkenova, editor-in-chief of Orda.kz, has been placed under house arrest, an episode that underscores the tightening environment for journalists. The Bazhkenova Case: A Turning Point for Kazakh Media Bazhkenova, a prominent editor known for critical coverage of Kazakhstan’s political elite and security services, came under scrutiny after Orda.kz falsely reported the arrest of Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, an unverified claim that was quickly debunked. Although Nurtleu remained in his position immediately afterward, he was dismissed later in September, prompting speculation that the incident had political consequences. Soon after his departure, law enforcement launched an investigation into Bazhkenova. On December 1, Almaty police searched her residence and the offices of Orda.kz. Authorities stated that a 2024 article had disseminated false information regarding a law enforcement officer allegedly caught accepting a bribe, an incident that officials assert never occurred. Another article reportedly misrepresented details in a property dispute, allegedly damaging the business reputation of the involved party. The Almaty police have since opened additional investigations into past publications from Orda.kz that may contain misleading content. Media organizations have largely responded with condemnation, urging the authorities to decriminalize the dissemination of false information and instead treat such cases under civil law. However, the Union of Journalists of Kazakhstan issued a pointed statement calling on media professionals to “treat the preparation and dissemination of information responsibly. Individual cases for the dissemination of inaccurate information cast a shadow on the entire journalistic community of our country,” the organization said. An implicit acknowledgment, perhaps, that Bazhkenova’s actions may have crossed legal or ethical boundaries. Parallel Cases and Regional Patterns While suppression of the media in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan has long been widespread, Kyrgyzstan - long considered the most politically open country in Central Asia - has also moved to tighten control over its information space. In early 2024, authorities introduced a controversial “foreign representatives” law requiring NGOs and media outlets receiving international funding to register under a special status, echoing legislation seen in Russia and Georgia. Independent outlets such as Kloop, Temirov Live, and Azattyk...

6 months ago

Electoral Reform

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Electoral Reforms – Why Officials and Experts Are Reconsidering Local Democracy

The metaphor that history moves in a spiral has resurfaced in Kazakhstan, where ongoing debates over electoral reform and information policy are testing the boundaries of the country’s democratic trajectory. Recent official messaging points toward a more managed model of political participation, framed as a necessary response to emerging challenges. This trajectory was articulated by State Councilor Erlan Karin in his article, "The Politics of Common Sense," published in the state-run Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. In the piece, Karin reflects on the formation of public values in Kazakhstan, portraying it as an evolutionary process. Simultaneously, Karin references government-led social programs, such as “Law and Order,” “Clean Kazakhstan,” and “Adal Azamat” - a program focused on building character, promoting civic responsibility, and fostering national unity - as instruments of state-directed civic education. Karin reiterates his previously stated position on the existence of “red lines” in public discourse, sensitive subjects such as interethnic relations, religion, language, and foreign policy. While insisting that these topics should not be off-limits, he calls for “common sense” in how they are discussed. “When it comes to public stability, the state will not compromise,” he asserts, adding that the government will lawfully oppose any attempts at “destructive information influence and incitement to hatred.” Karin also highlights what he describes as a new category of problematic actors: "This spring, I drew attention to a phenomenon known as ‘inforeket,’ in which certain bloggers and activists engage in outright extortion. This practice stems from past policies of appeasement toward disruptive elements, which encouraged the rise of pseudo-public figures, bloggers, and ‘tame oppositionists.’ Now abandoned by their once-powerful patrons and wealthy clients, they continue to seek income using outdated methods." In the same article, Karin names a group of experts, deputies, and public figures who contributed input to the new internal policy principles. Several of these individuals are currently advancing proposals to revise aspects of Kazakhstan’s electoral system—particularly the mechanisms for selecting district akims. Among them is Berik Abdygaliuly, political scientist, historian, and director of the National Museum of Kazakhstan. In a recent podcast, Abdygaliuly argued for reconsidering the model of electing district akims. He noted that while more than 3,000 rural akims and maslikhat deputies have been elected in recent years, the outcomes have been mixed. Voter fatigue is mounting, he said, and the financial costs of repeated campaigns - amounting to hundreds of millions of tenge - have not corresponded with visible improvements in local governance. His proposal is that district akims should be chosen not by direct popular vote but by maslikhats, the local representative bodies empowered to demand reports, assess performance, express no confidence, and initiate dismissals. This idea quickly gained support from other commentators participating in public discussions of governance reform. Political analyst Marat Shibutov wrote on his Telegram channel that the electorate is “simply getting tired of elections” after several consecutive voting cycles since 2021. Shibutov supported the idea of “revising or freezing” the election mechanism for district akims as “rational.” Meanwhile, political scientist Andrey Chebotarev highlighted...

6 months ago

CSTO

CSTO Summit in Bishkek: Armenia’s Boycott, Russia’s Agenda, and a New Secretary General

On November 27, Kyrgyzstan will host the annual summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Bishkek, bringing together foreign ministers, defense ministers, and security council secretaries from member states. While often portrayed in Russian media as an Eurasian analogue to NATO, the CSTO remains an organization heavily dependent on Russian military power. Should Moscow withdraw or reduce its support, the Organization’s relevance would likely collapse. A stark illustration of this fragility is Armenia, whose Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will boycott the summit entirely. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov confirmed that Armenia will not attend the session of the Collective Security Council, the CSTO’s highest governing body, though it does not object to the adoption of bloc-wide documents. According to the CSTO press service, the Council is expected to adopt a declaration outlining member states’ joint positions on current security challenges. Also on the agenda is the formal appointment of the next Secretary General for the 2026-2029 term, and the unveiling of Russia’s priorities for its upcoming presidency in 2026. President Vladimir Putin’s speech on these priorities is expected to dominate the summit. Armenia’s withdrawal highlights the CSTO’s waning cohesion, maintained largely by members' reliance on Russian security assistance, a dynamic in place since the Treaty’s inception in Tashkent on May 15, 1992. The original signatories included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joining in 1993. The treaty entered into force in 1994. Its central provision, Article 4, mandates collective defense: an attack on one member is considered an attack on all, obligating military and other forms of assistance in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In 1999, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan signed a protocol extending the treaty, establishing an automatic renewal every five years. The formal CSTO was created in 2002; its charter was registered with the UN the following year, and it has held observer status at the UN General Assembly since 2004. For Armenia, the CSTO’s relevance has waned dramatically since the bloc declined to intervene during the final phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. Yerevan’s disenchantment, however, predates 2023 and stretches back to the 2021–2022 border clashes, when it also felt the organization had failed to provide meaningful support. Kazakhstan, by contrast, remains a key beneficiary: the rapid CSTO deployment in January 2022 played a central role in stabilizing the country during a period of acute domestic unrest. As the current Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov - an influential figure from the “Old Kazakhstan” elite - completes his term, the position is scheduled to rotate to Taalatbek Masadykov of Kyrgyzstan. Ushakov confirmed that Tasmagambetov will deliver a final report on the Organization’s activities and security concerns before officially stepping down on January 1. Masadykov, currently Deputy Secretary General, is expected to assume the role seamlessly. While Masadykov brings diplomatic gravitas, the question remains whether he can restrain Moscow and Minsk from pushing CSTO allies toward confrontation with NATO. Tasmagambetov leaves behind a significant legacy and an...

6 months ago

Lukoil

Lukoil ‘Garage Sale’ – Uzbekistan Bows Out, Kazakhstan Keeps Its Options Open

The story of the disposal of foreign assets by Lukoil, which has fallen under U.S. sanctions, is reaching its closing stages. A shortlist of potential buyers has already emerged, and in Kazakhstan intrigue remains: will the country’s national oil and gas company capitalise on the opportunity to acquire Lukoil’s shares in major projects? A recent Reuters report noted that potential buyers of Lukoil’s assets face two key complications: first, U.S. firms, such as Carlyle, Chevron, and Exxon, are seen by analysts as more likely to get licensed, meaning deals will only be recognised after proper U.S. licence approval. Second, Lukoil itself had preferred to sell its assets as a package deal rather than piecemeal. However, after a deal to offload assets to Guvnor collapsed, several analyses now say a full package sale is unlikely and that piecemeal deals are more realistic or even more profitable. A new negotiation deadline has now been set for December 13, 2025, for the completion of authorised transactions. Kazakhstan-based oil and gas market observer Oleg Chervinsky suggests that this could increase the likelihood of a “twostage process”. “Most likely, a single buyer with sufficient resources will purchase all of Lukoil’s foreign assets at a significant discount, then sell them off in parts,” Chervinsky said. Some media reports point to the U.S. investment firm Carlyle Group as showing interest in Lukoil’s assets. The firm is considered a plausible main buyer due to its former ties to U.S. presidents Bush senior and junior. In this scenario, Carlyle would act both as buyer and organiser of the subsequent 'garage sale' of individual assets. Other firms, such as Chevron Corporation and ExxonMobil, have already been linked in reports with interest in Lukoil’s Kazakh stakes in the Tengiz and Karachaganak oil fields, while Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) has shown interest in Lukoil’s Uzbek gas projects. Meanwhile, three weeks ago, Uzbekistan made its position clear: it will not participate in the acquisition of Lukoil’s assets. Uzbekneftegaz Chairman Bahodir Sidikov said that "Buying out Lukoil’s assets in Uzbekistan is not on the table right now.” In Kazakhstan, energy sector experts believe that this moment presents a real window of opportunity to acquire Lukoil’s shares in systemically important oil and gas projects. “Why hasn’t our Ministry of Energy asked: does the Ministry approve changes in the shareholder structure under the terms of the stabilized contracts for Tengiz and Karachaganak? These shares (if a sale takes place) should go to KazMunayGas. If KMG doesn’t have the cash, then the Chinese state-owned CNPC should be brought in. To balance interests, it would be optimal for one of the world’s largest oil corporations to enter Tengiz and Karachaganak,” argues specialist Olzhas Baidildinov. Baidildinov cited a review by Norway’s Rystad Energy estimating that Lukoil’s net cash flow from its Tengiz stake over the next five years will total $2.8 billion, and from Karachaganak $2.1 billion. However, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov recently stated that the government is not considering a purchase of Lukoil’s shares. At the same time,...

7 months ago

Previous 1 … 3 4 5 6 7 … 15 Next