Our People > Andrei Matveev

Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

political reforms

Tokayev Unveils Major Political Reforms as Kazakhstan Moves to Replace the National Kurultai

The fifth and final session of the National Kurultai in Kazakhstan, held on January 20, marked the announcement of plans to dismantle and replace two key institutions: the National Kurultai and the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, structures that have played central roles in the country’s civic dialogue, particularly over the past three decades. In a sweeping address, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that these legacy institutions would be replaced by new mechanisms for state-society interaction, crafted with an eye toward modern governance models and constitutional reform. The move reflects Tokayev’s long-running criticism of consultative bodies that, while symbolically inclusive, have often duplicated functions or lacked clear decision-making authority. Tokayev’s address, which included references to U.S. President Donald Trump, prompted analysts to draw deeper geopolitical and institutional parallels. As Tokayev enters the second phase of his presidency, analysts note a shift in strategy and control. His first term (2019-2022) was marked by attempts to correct the excesses and structural stagnation of his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev. At the time, Tokayev faced entrenched resistance from the political establishment, with some officials reportedly appealing directly to Nazarbayev to circumvent presidential directives. The January 2022 unrest, an attempted power shift, marked a turning point. Tokayev consolidated power and launched a comprehensive reform agenda across the political and economic spectrum. The analogy with Trump, some analysts argue, lies in this dual-phase leadership: an initial struggle with the establishment, followed by a more assertive, transformation-driven second term. Since then, Tokayev has framed political reform as a safeguard against elite capture and institutional paralysis, arguing that fragmented authority contributed to the crisis. Yet Tokayev continues to face political resistance, particularly to structural reforms. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev, commenting on Tokayev’s Kurultai speech, described the president’s evolving approach as both methodical and tactical. “Sometimes, the head of state announces strategic steps he has been considering for over a year, but only unveils them at the last moment, when no one has the opportunity to influence the message,” Ashimbayev observed. He cited Tokayev’s September 2025 proposal for a unicameral parliament as an example of such strategic maneuvering, an initiative that caught even senior officials by surprise. Ashimbayev argues that Tokayev’s aim was to sideline speculation about succession by announcing long-term institutional reforms. The president further solidified this strategy by reviving the position of vice president, abolished under Nazarbayev, while proposing the dissolution or merging of overlapping structures such as the Senate, the Assembly of the People, and the Kurultai into a proposed National People’s Council. This consolidation, Ashimbayev notes, serves both symbolic and strategic purposes. “The image of a 'lame duck' has vanished, and a self-confident Uncle Scrooge, so to speak, with complex plans, has returned. Everyone expected the discussions to take a year or a year and a half, but the president decided to seize the initiative again and unexpectedly moved the Kurultai to January, where he announced a huge package of new ideas,” he remarked. The announcement of the vice presidency, one of the most consequential changes, reportedly...

5 months ago

Abraham Accords

Kazakh Diplomacy: Why Tokayev Aligned Kazakhstan With the Abraham Accords

On November 6, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev confirmed that Kazakhstan had formally acceded to the Abraham Accords, aligning the Central Asian state with the U.S.-brokered diplomatic framework. Launched during Trump’s first presidential term, the Abraham Accords seek to expand diplomatic normalization between Israel and Muslim-majority states. Initially signed in September 2020 by Israel and the United Arab Emirates, and separately by Israel and Bahrain, the Abraham Accords were later expanded to include Morocco and Sudan. Within the broader Abraham Accords framework, Washington continues to seek Saudi Arabia’s participation, a step viewed as diplomatically significant given the kingdom’s custodianship of two of Islam’s holiest sites. However, the process was derailed following the outbreak of the Gaza war in late 2023, triggered by a Hamas attack on Israel. Riyadh has since insisted that normalization can only proceed once there is meaningful progress toward establishing a Palestinian state. Kazakhstan, a secular state with a Muslim-majority population, has maintained diplomatic ties with Israel since April 1992. Embassies were opened in 1996, and bilateral relations have expanded steadily, including in trade, defense, and humanitarian fields. In 2016, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Kazakhstan, highlighting the strength of this relationship. These longstanding ties help explain why Kazakhstan’s accession did not mark a shift in its bilateral relationship with Israel. Because Kazakhstan established full diplomatic relations with Israel decades ago, several analysts have described the country’s accession to the Abraham Accords as largely symbolic. Uzbek political scientist Kamoliddin Rabbimov argues that the decision was a calculated gesture rather than a shift in Kazakhstan’s geopolitical orientation. “The question arises: is Kazakhstan really ready to weaken its relations with China, Turkey, and Russia in order to join the American-Israeli alliance? I don’t think so,” Rabbimov said. “President Tokayev most likely just formally supported Trump’s initiative by saying ‘yes’ without putting any real geopolitical meaning into it. Nevertheless, even such a ‘yes’ is capable of slightly upsetting the balance in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.” Giorgio Cafiero, the CEO of Washington-based Gulf State Analytics, views the move as strategic positioning. “Given the Trump administration’s determination to expand the scope of the Abraham Accords, this move by Kazakhstan was a relatively easy way to win the White House’s favor.” German analysts at Kettner Edelmetalle emphasize Kazakhstan’s natural resource wealth as a key factor. “The country has significant deposits of minerals and rare earth elements, resources that are indispensable for modern technologies. By strengthening ties with Washington, Astana apparently hopes to attract more American investment in this strategically important sector.” Eldar Mamedov, non-resident fellow at the Queens Institute and a former senior advisor to the European Parliament, views the development through the lens of geopolitical balancing. “The Abraham Accords are merely a tool in Astana’s deliberate efforts to diversify its geopolitical dependence on Moscow and strengthen its strategic relations with the United States,” he writes. “Perceiving them as the beginning of a new, ideologically defined bloc misinterprets the fundamentally pragmatic and self-interested nature of Kazakhstan’s calculations.” Kazakhstan’s accession to the Abraham Accords reflects...

5 months ago

Iran

From Tehran to Tashkent: How Iran’s Crisis and U.S. Tariffs Reverberate Across Central Asia

At the end of 2025, Iran once again emerged as a flashpoint on the global political map. Mass protests erupted across the country, fueled by spiraling inflation and economic hardship. At present, the Iranian rial has plummeted to the point where it is effectively worth less than the paper it's printed on. The current wave of unrest, already the largest and deadliest nationwide unrest Iran has seen since 2022, is not occurring in isolation. U.S. President Donald Trump has renewed what his administration describes as a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, and his administration is now pursuing what observers have characterized as a strategy of “pushing the falling,” a move aimed at reshaping the political order of the Middle East. What might this mean for neighboring Central Asia? Tajik political analyst Muhammad Shamsuddinov argues the crisis must be viewed within a broader geopolitical context. “The situation in Iran is directly tied to Trump’s second-term pressure campaign,” Shamsuddinov said, referencing a string of destabilizing events. “These include the 12-day U.S.-Israel war against Iran and the reimposition of U.N. sanctions in September 2025," he added, referring to the 12-day June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran, during which U.S. forces also struck Iranian nuclear facilities. "All of these have deepened the domestic crisis in Iran.” In a further escalation, on January 12, Trump announced 25% tariffs on countries conducting trade with Iran. The move appears targeted primarily at Russia, China, and India - Iran’s largest international partners, but also has implications for Central Asian economies. In the first nine months of 2025, trade between Kazakhstan and Iran grew by nearly 45%, reaching $310.8 million. Tajikistan, which maintains the closest economic ties to Tehran among Central Asian states, reported trade worth $430.7 million in the first eleven months of 2025, an increase of 28% over the same period in 2024. Uzbekistan, while less directly exposed to Iran than Kazakhstan or Tajikistan, has also moved cautiously in recent years to expand trade links with Tehran, making it sensitive to further sanctions pressure. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, faces its own exposure through gas swap arrangements involving Iran, which could become collateral damage of escalating regional tensions. Iranian investments in Tajikistan are also substantial. Among the most prominent projects is the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric power plant, estimated at $256 million. The Iranian government contributed approximately $180 million, with an additional $36 million from an Iranian contractor. The remainder was financed by Tajikistan. According to official data, roughly 160 companies with Iranian capital are currently operating in Tajikistan across multiple sectors. In Kazakhstan, around 650 Iranian companies are registered, with over 350 operational, primarily in manufacturing, infrastructure, and agriculture. By contrast, trade between Iran and Russia, a strategic partner since the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement in January 2025, increased by only 8% in the first nine months of 2025, according to official figures. Despite modest growth, Russian analysts view the figures optimistically. “Growth is happening under challenging geopolitical conditions, with sanctions, logistical restructuring, and financial hurdles,” said...

5 months ago

Iran

The Trump Factor: Why Central Asia Has Remained Silent on Iran’s Protests

The wave of protests that erupted in Iran in late December and spread to at least 27 of the country’s 31 provinces has become the largest since 2022, when mass demonstrations followed the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s morality police. The unrest has raised new concerns across the region about political stability, energy markets, and the risk of external intervention. Rights monitors say protests have been reported in hundreds of locations nationwide, with death and detention tolls still contested. Human rights groups and independent monitoring organizations estimate that dozens of people have been killed and more than 2,000 detained, while Iranian officials have offered varying accounts and blamed violence on what they describe as “rioters.” In Kazakhstan, observers are drawing comparisons to the country’s own January 2022 unrest, officially labeled an attempted coup that ended in a violent crackdown. But beyond the parallels with Kazakhstan’s ‘Qantar’ events, analysts are focusing on the wider implications, particularly the potential impact of Iran’s domestic turmoil on global oil markets. For Kazakhstan, the stakes are heightened by the country’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports and the sensitivity of global energy markets to supply shocks. Any sharp change in Iranian output, even if temporary, could place downward pressure on prices and complicate budget planning for oil-dependent economies across Central Asia. Kazakh financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov has voiced concern that unrest in Iran could trigger a surge in oil production aimed at funding social spending, a move that could drive down global oil prices and harm Kazakhstan’s oil-dependent economy. “Iran could add half a million barrels a day within six months and cause oil prices to collapse, but it would not do so casually. The Middle East is very sensitive and knows how to negotiate. Still, if the protests persist, Tehran might ramp up production to finance social needs. [This would be] painful for Kazakhstan. If Venezuela is a bear cub, then Iran is a grizzly bear in the bushes with its oil,” Rysmambetov warned on his Telegram channel. While political unrest typically raises oil prices by increasing supply risk, analysts note that Iran’s response could be atypical. Faced with fiscal pressure, Tehran may opt to increase production to stabilize revenues, a move that would push prices lower despite heightened instability. Iran’s chronic social issues, exacerbated by inflation and the collapse of the national currency, have fueled public discontent for more than a decade. While the Iranian authorities acknowledge the severity of the economic crisis and have conceded that some demands are legitimate, they have also warned of further hardships. On January 5, the judiciary announced that no leniency would be shown toward those detained during the protests. Russian experts, meanwhile, have framed the unrest in geopolitical terms. Irina Fedorova of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies cited renewed sanctions, critical shortages of water and electricity, and foreign interference as the root causes. However, she dismissed the likelihood of regime change, pointing to disunity among opposition factions. “The difference...

6 months ago

Venezuela

The Venezuela Effect: Oil, Sanctions, and Kazakhstan’s Strategic Dilemma

The start of 2026 was marked by political upheaval across two continents: fresh protests in Iran drawing comparisons among some Kazakh analysts to the country’s own Bloody January of 2022, and a U.S. military operation described by Washington as a law-enforcement action in Venezuela. The latter led to the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and what some analysts are describing as a move toward far greater U.S. influence over Venezuela’s oil sector. Beyond its immediate implications for global oil supply and pricing, the geopolitical symbolism of the Venezuela operation is resonating in unexpected places, including Central Asia. Contrary to some early reports, the American intervention in Caracas was not bloodless. At least 40 Venezuelan security and military personnel were reportedly killed during the rapid offensive. Still, Kazakh political scientist Marat Shibutov argues that the perception of a swift and decisive U.S. action, especially in contrast to Russia’s grinding war in Ukraine, is symbolically damaging for Moscow. “This comparison with Russia’s prolonged conflict is not flattering,” Shibutov noted. “It creates a sensitive political backdrop for the Kremlin.” In Kazakhstan, where debates over foreign energy contracts have been simmering for years, the events in Venezuela are being closely watched. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev referenced Astana’s past discussions about reviewing oil agreements with Western companies. “The topic of revising oil contracts is becoming less and less popular. At this rate, it could even be equated with extremism,” he commented ironically, underscoring how sensitive the issue has become. Some experts are also concerned that political shifts in Venezuela and Iran could destabilize the oil market in ways that would hit Kazakhstan’s economy hard. Kazakhstan derives a substantial share of its state budget revenues from the oil sector, making sustained price declines a direct fiscal risk rather than a purely market concern, analysts note. Energy analyst Olzhas Baidildinov points out that Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world, approximately 300 billion barrels, more than 30 times Kazakhstan’s profitable reserves. “If liberal or Western-friendly governments come to power simultaneously in Venezuela and Iran, they could supply an additional 2-3 million barrels per day to the global market within the next 3-4 years,” he warned. Even without full regime change, he noted, easing sanctions or the return of “shadow exports” could push global prices down to $50-70 per barrel. “At such prices, it will be difficult to demonstrate economic growth and maintain momentum in Kazakhstan’s oil sector,” Baidildinov added. Financial analyst Arman Beisembayev offered a more bearish view. “If production volumes increase and the U.S. begins releasing more oil onto the market, including from Venezuela, then I’m afraid prices won’t stay at $60 per barrel. The base case is a drop to $50. A worst-case scenario could see prices at $40, or even lower.” But not everyone believes Venezuela can upend the market. Askar Ismailov, a Geneva-based advisor on Central Asia at the Global Gas Centre, remains skeptical. “Venezuelan crude is extremely heavy, difficult to extract, and expensive to transport. Historically, it depended on a...

6 months ago

Tax Reform

Are Kazakhstan’s Small Businesses Really Leaving Over Taxes?

As Kazakhstan prepares for tax reforms set to take effect in 2026, a new wave of panic has surfaced in the national discourse, one suggesting that small businesses are facing a stark choice: shut down or relocate to neighboring countries promising more favorable tax environments. This narrative has gained traction twice in the second half of 2025. The first wave came in mid-autumn, triggered by reports suggesting that Kazakhstani entrepreneurs were looking to move operations to Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan. These claims quickly spread across Kazakh social networks, particularly Threads. However, early signs indicated that the alarm was not being sounded by small businesses themselves, but by representatives of the B2B services sector, especially consultants and accountants. Media outlets amplified comments that stirred fear, reinforcing what increasingly appeared to be media-driven panic. One such moment came in late September when the Kazakhstan Association of Tax Consultants hosted a presentation by its chairman, Saken Karin, titled “Tax Reality 2026: Opportunities and Risks.” Karin warned that the proposed reforms would “tear apart the B2B and B2C sectors,” criticizing state approaches to tax administration. Even then, experts argued that large-scale relocation of Kazakhstani businesses made little practical sense. “Which Kazakhstani businesses can realistically relocate to Kyrgyzstan? Probably only IT companies, which are location-independent. Most SMEs in Almaty rely on the quasi-public sector or the domestic market, which is considerably larger and wealthier than that of our neighbors,” said financier Rassul Rysmambetov. The numbers back this up: in 2024, the economy of Almaty alone reached $60 billion, compared to Kyrgyzstan’s national GDP of approximately $17.5 billion. Despite this, a second wave of panic is now gaining momentum, this time shifting focus to Uzbekistan as a destination for potential business migration. Once again, social networks, particularly Threads, are amplifying the noise, citing interviews such as one with tax expert Maxim Baryshev, who praised the tax systems of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Baryshev represents the professional accounting organization Uchet.kz. His colleague, Uchet.kz manager Timur Abiev, has previously spoken out against what he views as unfounded panic surrounding tax reform. Despite growing anxiety on social media, government officials have yet to launch a strong counter-narrative. This lack of response reinforces the idea that panic is being stoked by peripheral sectors rather than the business community itself. When Finance Minister Madi Takiev was asked about claims of a mass relocation of small businesses to neighboring countries, he dismissed them as unfounded. He argued that tax thresholds and turnover requirements in those countries are broadly comparable to Kazakhstan’s and noted that businesses relocating abroad would still be subject to domestic taxation if their economic center of interest remained in Kazakhstan, making such moves economically unviable. As for the accounting industry, its vocal opposition to reform may be tied to structural weaknesses. Kazakhstan’s accounting sector has been slow to adapt to changing demands and is struggling to train enough professionals to meet market needs. The number of established training institutions remains small. A recent government meeting focused on SME support included plans...

6 months ago

Sports

Kazakhstan vs. Uzbekistan: A Footballing Derby with an Uncertain Outcome

The Uzbekistan national football team has qualified for the 2026 World Cup, which will take place across three North American countries: the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Meanwhile, one of Kazakhstan’s leading clubs, FC Kairat Almaty, continues to gain experience competing in the UEFA Champions League. Football in Central Asia has become a mirror of the region’s growing economic and political ambitions, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the forefront. Their rivalry, which dates back to the Soviet era, has adapted to this new chapter. Kazakhstan and the Road to Europe Matches between Almaty's Kairat and Tashkent's Pakhtakor were once marquee events during the Soviet era, filling stadiums and energizing fans across the republics. Following the collapse of the USSR, however, the footballing paths of these two historical rivals began to diverge. Initially, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), which includes countries from across Asia and parts of the Pacific, including former Oceania Football Confederation members such as Australia and Guam. Kazakhstan became a full member of the AFC in 1992, followed by Uzbekistan in 1994. However, Kazakhstan soon grew disillusioned with the level of competition within the AFC and began to explore other avenues. Its early attempts to join UEFA were rebuffed in the mid-1990s. Rakhat Aliyev, then head of the Football Union of Kazakhstan and son-in-law of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, later described the process as being dismissed “without really getting to the heart of the matter.” Despite this, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan quickly showed they were a cut above most AFC members at the time. Kazakhstan won the inaugural Central Asian Cup in 1992, while Uzbekistan claimed gold at the 1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima, defeating China 4-2 in the final. Eventually, Kazakhstan succeeded in joining UEFA. Spearheaded by Aliyev, the Football Union of Kazakhstan (FSC) lobbied hard for admission, culminating in meetings with FIFA and UEFA presidents Lennart Johansson and Joseph Blatter in Moscow in late 2000 and early 2001. The AFC issued a statement on May 10, 2001, allowing Kazakhstan to make its own decision, and five days later Johansson confirmed that UEFA would welcome Kazakhstan as its 52nd member. "Joining UEFA has given all of us who work in football a powerful boost," Aliyev said at the time. "We will strive to use this momentum to raise the level of our national football." Uzbekistan and the Central Asian Football Association Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan chose to remain in the AFC, where it has steadily risen in prominence. In 2014, it became a founding member of the Central Asian Football Association (CAFA), a regional sub-group within the AFC. Officially operational since 2015, CAFA also includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The organization is currently chaired by Rustam Emomali, son of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon. Uzbekistan is ranked second in the CAFA, behind Iran, and has consistently reached the quarterfinals of the AFC Asian Cup in 2004, 2007, 2015, and 2023. Much of this success is due to sustained investment in youth development, training...

6 months ago

Politics

Kazakh MP Sarym Proposes Legal Measures Over Social Media Posts on Pipeline Strike

A Kazakhstani lawmaker has proposed criminal liability for social media posts that express support for attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure. During a recent session of the Mazhilis (lower house of parliament), MP Aidos Sarym called for posts endorsing Ukrainian military strikes on oil infrastructure to be examined under existing laws on terrorism and high treason. The proposal follows a November 29 incident in which Ukraine’s armed forces reportedly targeted the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal in Novorossiysk, Russia. The attack damaged the CPC’s VPU-2 offshore loading terminal and temporarily halted operations. Addressing Prosecutor General Berik Asylov and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balaeva, Sarym said the incident had sparked public commentary online that he believes exceeds the boundaries of protected speech. He called for investigations into such posts and suggested they may warrant legal action. “Such actions clearly go beyond the constitutional right to freedom of speech and directly harm national interests,” Sarym said, proposing that the government also launch an information campaign to discourage rhetoric supporting violence against critical infrastructure. The initiative coincides with broader debates in Kazakhstan over how to manage public discourse surrounding the war in Ukraine, amid concerns that expressions of support for either side could have diplomatic implications. Kazakhstan maintains relations with both Ukraine and Russia and has sought to preserve a neutral stance throughout the conflict. Sarym’s remarks were interpreted by some political analysts as a broader signal to members of parliament, following earlier comments by fellow deputy Yermurat Bapi. Bapi had previously characterized Ukrainian strikes on CPC facilities as part of a legitimate military strategy, a position that Sarym suggested could fall under legal review. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov noted that approximately 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports transit through the CPC. While the pipeline includes Russian ownership, most shares belong to companies based in Kazakhstan, Europe, and the U.S., he said, countering claims that the CPC is solely a Russian asset. Kazakhstan is accelerating the repair of the VPU-2 terminal, now aiming for completion by January 2026. The Ministry of National Economy is currently assessing the economic impact of the disruption. Oil and gas analyst Olzhas Baidildinov estimated the production loss at 480,000 tons, equating to about $210 million in revenue over two weeks. He forecast monthly losses exceeding $400 million, including an estimated $150 million shortfall in budgetary revenue. Baidildinov expressed support for Sarym’s proposal, describing it as part of efforts to safeguard internal stability amid external geopolitical uncertainty. The proposal has not yet led to formal legislative action, and no prosecutions have been reported. Further discussion on the issue is expected as part of Kazakhstan’s broader approach to managing public discourse and national security in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

6 months ago

Cultural Ties

From Medieval Persia to Modern Kazakhstan: Decolonizing History

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent visit to Kazakhstan might have appeared routine amid a series of diplomatic engagements by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2025. Yet one element of the visit stood out for Tokayev, a gift of 27 ancient Persian manuscripts, which were immediately put on public display in Astana’s National Museum. Together, the two presidents opened the exhibition titled The History of the Great Steppe in Iranian Sources, highlighting long-standing historical ties between Persian states and the Kazakh steppe. Speaking at a joint briefing, Tokayev emphasized the significance of the manuscripts, which he said contain historical accounts affirming the Kazakhs as a "brave people" and detailing diplomatic relations between the Kazakh khans and Iranian shahs. “Close relations were established between Tauke Khan and Shah Sultan Hussein,” Tokayev noted. “Records show embassies met in Moscow, and the Iranian ambassador visited the Kazakh steppe. Abul Khair Khan sent an envoy to Nadir Shah to foster diplomatic ties,” he said, underlining the depth of historical relations. Tokayev also referenced the cultural and linguistic connections between the two peoples. The taikazan (large ceremonial cauldron) in the mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi in Turkestan, he noted, was crafted by the Iranian master Abdul-Aziz Sharafuddin Tebrizi. Persian has left a linguistic imprint on the Kazakh language, with estimates suggesting Persian-origin words comprise 4% of the vocabulary, including astana (capital), paida (benefit), oraza (fast), and dәri (medicine). Tokayev further cited the Persian epic Shahnameh by Ferdowsi as culturally significant to the peoples of Turan, adding that Kazakh poet Abai was familiar with Persian literature. According to Tokayev, the newly acquired manuscripts contain historical analyses of the socio-economic and political conditions of the 18th-century Kazakh Khanate, including interactions with neighboring powers, records on Turkestan, and reports on Russian imperial activities in the region. The documents also reference resource extraction, coal, iron, copper, lead, and turquoise, on Kazakh territory. [caption id="attachment_40893" align="aligncenter" width="750"] Image: Akorda[/caption] “This is a very valuable gift. We will present this exhibition to the Kazakh public and promote it widely in the media,” Tokayev told reporters. “The documents contain previously unknown historical material. I think this will be useful for our compatriots.” The Ministry of Culture and Information, which organized the exhibition, confirmed that the manuscripts substantiate centuries-old ties between Kazakhstan and Iran, including evidence of trade and diplomatic exchanges along the Silk Road and archival references to intergovernmental negotiations and ambassadorial visits. Tokayev’s enthusiasm for the manuscripts is closely linked to Kazakhstan’s broader effort to “decolonize” its national history. The country is currently preparing a new seven-volume historical account under the editorial leadership of State Advisor Yerlan Karin. This project aims to reposition Kazakhstan not simply as a site of ancient states, but as an independent cultural and political center that influenced the broader region. “Kazakhstan is presented as a hub for civilizational development,” Karin explained. “This is our methodological innovation.” Previously, Kazakhstan’s history was largely framed within the narrative of the Russian Empire and Soviet rule. The current academic effort seeks to...

6 months ago

devaluation

Devaluation in Kazakhstan: Grim Forecast or Financial Strategy?

Expectations of a potential devaluation of Kazakhstan's national currency, the tenge, are gaining momentum in the country, despite its recent strengthening against the dollar. While the government projects stability, some financial players and experts openly support a weaker tenge. But are these fears grounded in economic reality, or do particular interests drive them? Kazakhstan’s currency is particularly sensitive to global market shifts because around half of the country’s export revenues come from oil and other raw materials. When commodity prices fall or external demand weakens, pressure on the tenge increases. The currency is also affected by high import dependence: many consumer goods, industrial inputs, and food products are priced in foreign currencies, making the economy highly responsive to exchange-rate movements. One of the most vocal proponents of a free-floating tenge is economist Aidarkhan Kusainov, a former adviser to the head of the National Bank. A long-time advocate for a free-floating tenge, Kusainov maintains that the currency remains overvalued. In 2021, he predicted the exchange rate would reach 500 tenge to the $1. As of now, the rate hovers around 510. Kusainov has recently gained broader attention following his criticism of rising taxes and utility tariffs during an appearance on a YouTube podcast hosted by Senate Speaker Maulen Ashimbayev. “Today, the singer of devaluation, a well-known but unpopular economist, woke up as a competent people’s professional (judging by the comments),” Kusainov wrote, replete with smiling emojis in assessing his newfound popularity on his Telegram channel. His prediction of a $1-to-1,000-tenge exchange rate has indeed gone viral. “If our National Fund runs out today, the exchange rate will instantly soar above 1,000. As soon as we stop injecting petrodollars and transfers into the economy, the tenge will drop to 800–900, and then quickly weaken to beyond 1,000. I've always advocated for these measures," he said in an interview with Ulysmedia. These debates are unfolding against a backdrop of persistent inflationary pressure. Although headline inflation has moderated from its earlier peaks, price growth in consumer-credit-driven segments remains elevated. Any significant weakening of the tenge would likely feed directly into consumer prices, especially for imported goods, which still account for a large share of household consumption. Kusainov's projection is not shared by the majority of analysts, however, who see such a scenario occurring only under the weight of severe external shocks. In contrast, the National Bank’s forecasts remain more conservative. According to analysts surveyed by the Central Bank in November 2025, the exchange rate is expected to reach 525.8 tenge by the end of 2025. For 2026 and 2027, the tenge is projected to weaken gradually to 548.2 and 565, respectively. Economist Serik Kozybaev, among others, rejects the idea of a sharp devaluation. He has attributed the tenge’s recent strength to currency interventions by the National Bank: “There are no serious reasons for such a significant weakening. On the contrary, over the past month, the exchange rate improved from 540 to 518 due to announced interventions. I expect this trend to continue, possibly bringing...

7 months ago

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