Our People > Andrei Matveev

Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

Power Struggle

Kyrgyzstan Faces Elite Realignment as Tashiyev Network Comes Under Pressure

In the last week, political tensions in Kyrgyzstan have risen following the arrest of Shairbek Tashiyev, the brother of Kamchybek Tashiyev, the former head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). Shairbek, a former member of the Jogorku Kenesh, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament, was detained on April 1 following questioning at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The case unfolds against the backdrop of a widening rift between President Sadyr Japarov and his once long-time ally Tashiyev, who played a key role in helping Japarov consolidate power following the political upheaval of October 2020. After coming to power, President Japarov and Tashiyev built one of the most consolidated political tandems in Kyrgyzstan’s post-Soviet history, concentrating authority across the presidency, parliament, and security structures. In February, Tashiyev was removed from his position, followed by what observers described as a broader sidelining of his allies within security structures and parliament. This fueled speculation about a breakdown in the political partnership that had underpinned relative stability in recent years. Shairbek Tashiyev is now a central suspect in a corruption investigation involving the state-owned company Kyrgyzneftegaz. The Ministry of Internal Affairs announced the criminal case on March 17, following materials released by the State Tax Service alleging financial misconduct within the company. According to investigators, former executives of Kyrgyzneftegaz and affiliated private entities were detained shortly after the case was opened. A criminal case was initiated under Article 336 of the Criminal Code, alleging “Corruption.” Among those detained was former National Bank head Melis Turgunbayev, whose pretrial detention was later changed to house arrest by a court in Bishkek. It later emerged that another of those initially detained was Baigazy Matisakov, identified as a nephew of Kamchybek Tashiyev. He was subsequently released after reportedly reaching an agreement with investigators. On April 2, a court ordered Shairbek Tashiyev to remain in custody until May 16, 2026. His lawyer stated that he denies the charges and considers them unfounded. The investigation, led by the State Tax Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, covers Kyrgyzneftegaz’s operations from 2021 to 2025. Authorities allege total financial violations amounting to 4.1 billion soms (approximately $46.5 million), including lost profits and unpaid taxes. Investigators have outlined three main alleged schemes that they are continuing to investigate. The first involved intermediary companies allegedly linked to individuals close to the Tashiyev family, which resold oil to the Kyrgyz Petroleum Company refinery. The second involved the write-off of raw materials, with around 20,000 tons of oil reportedly classified as “technological losses” beyond established norms. The third concerned preferential sales, with diesel and fuel oil allegedly sold at below-market prices to favored companies. The case is being watched closely in Kyrgyzstan, where elite reshuffles have historically signaled broader political realignments rather than isolated legal actions. It remains unclear whether the investigation will expand further and implicate additional individuals connected to Tashiyev or what the potential impact could be on the broader political environment within the country.

3 months ago

Power Struggle

Kyrgyzstan Moves Toward Power Consolidation Ahead of 2027 Election

Kyrgyzstan has changed leaders more often than any other country in Central Asia, with power shifts since independence driven by both elections and unrest. With less than ten months remaining before the next presidential vote on January 24, 2027, recent political developments suggest the authorities are now moving to consolidate control well ahead of the contest. Against this backdrop, Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, citing sources in Kyrgyzstan, has suggested that recent political decisions, including the sudden removal of Kamchybek Tashiyev on February 10, may be linked to efforts to manage regional and institutional tensions within the country. In particular, discussions since that decision have focused on the long-standing dynamics between northern and southern elites. This dynamic has historically shaped political competition in the country. Recent personnel changes within state institutions have targeted individuals previously associated with former officials. Such administrative reshuffling is not uncommon ahead of major political milestones, including elections, and may reflect efforts to consolidate governance structures ahead of the upcoming election cycle. Kyrgyz political analyst Kanat Nogoybaev, speaking to a Kazakhstani outlet, commented on a petition signed by a group of public figures calling for early presidential elections. He noted that such initiatives typically reflect broader political maneuvering within elite circles. Since the petition was signed, some reports indicate that several individuals connected to this petition have faced legal scrutiny, though details remain unclear. President Sadyr Japarov has addressed the removal of Tashiyev, emphasizing the importance of maintaining stability within state institutions and avoiding internal divisions among public servants. “I believe that by making a swift decision, I ensured stability within the system,” Japarov said in earlier remarks, stressing that unity within government structures remains a priority. Separately, there have been discussions in political circles regarding the review of past high-profile legal cases. Former Jogorku Kenesh (parliamentary) deputy Iskhak Masaliev has suggested reassessing certain cases from recent years. One such case involves journalist Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy, whose legal proceedings have attracted significant public attention. In March, the Supreme Court remanded her case for retrial, and her pretrial detention was changed to house arrest. The case is part of a broader investigation involving media professionals detained in January 2024 on charges related to public unrest. Judicial proceedings in these cases remain ongoing. Economic developments have also intersected with recent political discussions. Investigations involving the state company, Kyrgyzneftegaz, have led to the detention of several individuals, including company executives and former officials. The Kyrgyz authorities have stated that these actions are part of broader efforts to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of state assets. Officials from the State Tax Service have addressed the case, noting that new conditions allowed for a comprehensive audit of the company. Subsequent legal actions were taken following the findings. These developments add an economic dimension to the broader political shifts underway. In parallel, Kyrgyzneftegaz has announced a general shareholders’ meeting scheduled for April 16 in Kochkor-Ata. The agenda includes governance changes, amendments to internal documents, and financial restructuring measures. While the...

3 months ago

Oil Exports

Drone Strikes on Russian Baltic Ports Raise Risks for Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports

Drone attacks on Russian Baltic ports have heightened concerns about potential risks to Kazakhstan’s oil export routes. Ukrainian drone strikes targeted the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga in Russia’s Leningrad Oblast earlier this week, disrupting operations at both major oil export hubs. Primorsk has an estimated capacity of around one million barrels of crude oil and approximately 300,000 barrels of diesel fuel per day. Large fuel storage facilities are also located at both ports. Further strikes were reported on March 25, when drones again targeted both ports. Media reports indicated that shipments of oil and petroleum products were suspended, and that fires broke out at Ust-Luga. As of March 26, loadings at both ports were reportedly still suspended following the latest strikes, with no confirmed return to normal operations. Kazakhstan has increasingly used Baltic routes for part of its oil exports following periodic disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system. Commenting on the situation, Kazakh oil and gas journalist Oleg Chervinsky said that the port of Ust-Luga has been used to export Kazakh crude marketed under the KEBCO brand, with volumes rising after earlier challenges affecting CPC shipments. Kazakhstan’s national pipeline operator, KazTransOil, transports crude through Russian pipeline infrastructure under agreements with Russia’s Transneft. From there, oil can be delivered to Germany, shipped via Baltic ports such as Ust-Luga, or exported through Black Sea terminals, including Novorossiysk, which has also been targeted by drone attacks in the past year. According to open-source intelligence analysts cited in international media, energy infrastructure in the Ust-Luga industrial zone, including facilities linked to NOVATEK’s gas processing complex, was affected by the latest strike. The Ust-Luga site is located roughly 850 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. A similar attack on infrastructure in the Ust-Luga area was reported in August 2025. At that time, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy stated that Kazakh oil exports had not been affected. As of March 26, the ministry had not publicly commented on the latest incidents. Officials have previously emphasized the importance of diversifying export routes amid geopolitical risks and infrastructure disruptions.

3 months ago

Caspian

Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia

Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,”...

3 months ago

Kazakhstan's Constitutional Referendum

New Constitution Backed by Majority as Kazakhstan Reports Record Referendum Turnout

Kazakhstan’s Central Referendum Commission has announced the official results of the nationwide vote on the draft of a new constitution. According to the commission, voter turnout reached 73.12%, with a total of 9,127,192 citizens participating. Preliminary results show that 7,954,667 voters or 87.15%, supported the proposed amendments. A further 898,099 citizens voted against, while 146,558 ballots were declared invalid. On 15 March Kazakhstan held a national referendum, proposed by President Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev, on whether to adopt a new constitution. The draft constitution introduces major institutional reforms, including replacing the country’s bicameral parliament with a single chamber, restoring the post of vice-president (abolished in 1996), and creating a new People’s Council (Kurultai) with powers to initiate legislation and referendums. The reforms also allow the president to appoint key officials, and redefine some constitutional provisions, including the definition of marriage. Critics say the changes could strengthen presidential authority and potentially affect future term limits. Regional voting patterns reveal several notable trends. First, Pavlodar region recorded the highest level of support, with 94.14% of voters backing the amendments. Traditionally, Kazakhstan’s northern regions have demonstrated more moderate support for decisions initiated by the central authorities. This tendency was reflected in the Karaganda and North Kazakhstan regions, where support stood at around 83%. Second, two western regions, Aktobe (93.96%) and Mangistau (93.40%), also showed some of the strongest support for constitutional reform. Mangistau was widely regarded during the era of former president Nursultan Nazarbayev as one of the country’s most protest-prone areas. The unrest in January 2022 began with a strike by oil workers in the city of Zhanaozen. Third, residents of Almaty demonstrated a higher share of protest voting than those in the country’s other major cities, Astana and Shymkent, with nearly 30% voting against the amendments. Voter turnout in Almaty reached 33.43%, significantly higher than the slightly more than 25% recorded during the 2024 referendum on the construction of a nuclear power plant. Among those who cast ballots in Almaty, 71.36% supported the 2026 constitution. In Astana and Shymkent, just over 86% voted in favor. Turnout figures had already been analyzed a day earlier by Almaty-based political analyst Andrei Chebotarev on his Telegram channel. He cited preliminary data from the Central Referendum Commission indicating that 9,126,850 citizens, or 73.24% of the electorate, had participated in the vote. Chebotarev compared these figures with turnout in previous referendums. He noted that 7,985,769 citizens (68.05%) took part in the referendum on constitutional amendments held on June 5, 2022, while 7,820,204 voters (63.66%) participated in the October 6, 2024 referendum on the construction of a nuclear power plant. “It is evident that the increase in participation was primarily driven by the political significance of the referendum’s subject matter, namely, the draft of a new Constitution. The relatively frequent use of referendums in Kazakhstan over the past four years may also have contributed,” Chebotarev suggested. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev also highlighted the high turnout, noting that participation exceeded the 70% threshold for the first time. He argued that the...

3 months ago

Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov

Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov’s U.S. and Germany Trip Draws Attention to Diplomatic Reshuffle

In mid-February, Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov, former president of Turkmenistan and current chairman of the Halk Maslahaty (the People's Council of Turkmenistan), visited the United States. State media reported extensively on the trip, although some details of the visit and its outcomes were not publicly clarified. Shortly after Berdymuhamedov’s return, President Serdar Berdymuhamedov, his son, dismissed Turkmenistan’s ambassador to the United States and the country’s permanent representative to the United Nations. No official explanation for the change was provided. According to official reports, Berdymuhamedov held meetings with executives of Nicklaus Companies, including its leadership, as well as representatives of the Turkmenistan-U.S. Business Council. The company was founded by American golfer Jack Nicklaus. During the visit, Berdymuhamedov also toured several golf facilities and visited an equestrian complex, where he was briefed on horse care and training practices. He additionally met with a number of U.S. business figures, including entrepreneurs Steve Wynn and Isaac Perlmutter, as well as William Koch, chairman of Oxbow Group. Discussions were also held with representatives of agricultural equipment manufacturer John Deere regarding potential cooperation in Central Asia. Golf and equestrian projects Interest in golf has been growing in Turkmenistan in recent years. The Ashgabat Golf Club, opened in 2017, is promoted by officials as a flagship recreational facility in the capital. Plans have also been announced to expand golf infrastructure in the Avaza National Tourist Zone, where Berdymuhamedov has previously instructed authorities to consider the construction of additional courses. On his return journey from the United States, Berdymuhamedov made a stop in Germany, where he reportedly discussed preparations for the 2026 FEI World Equestrian Championships in Aachen and an Akhal-Teke horse beauty contest scheduled to take place in the Netherlands. Unconfirmed reports and diplomatic changes Some media outlets reported that Berdymuhamedov’s visit coincided with a weekend stay by U.S. President Donald Trump at his Mar-a-Lago residence. Reports also suggested that a planned meeting did not take place, although no official confirmation has been provided. Separate reports by independent Turkmen media claimed that Berdymuhamedov’s aircraft sustained technical damage during the trip and that another government aircraft was dispatched from Ashgabat. These claims have not been officially confirmed. Personnel changes in Turkmenistan’s diplomatic service followed the visit. Veteran diplomat Aksoltan Atayeva was relieved of her post as the country’s representative to the United Nations, while Esen Aidogdyev was reassigned to the embassy in Washington. Independent media have also previously reported allegations regarding property holdings by former ambassador Meret Orazov in the United States. These claims have not been publicly addressed by Turkmen authorities.

3 months ago

Organization of Turkic States (OTS)

Informal OTS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Tests Limits of Turkic Coordination

Escalating tensions linked to the widening conflict in the Middle East have tested the political cohesion of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), according to Kazakh political commentator Dzhanibek Suleyev. Recent incidents affecting both Azerbaijan and Turkey — including drone strikes in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and a missile intercepted by Turkish air defenses — have raised security concerns across the wider region. Suleyev argues that developments of this scale might normally prompt an urgent summit of heads of state. Instead, Turkey convened an informal meeting of foreign ministers and senior diplomatic representatives from OTS member states. The gathering took place on March 7, when officials convened at the invitation of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. According to Turkish media, ministers later met with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during their visit. Speaking to The Times of Central Asia, Suleyev drew attention to how the meeting was covered in the media of Central Asian member states. “In the Uzbek press, coverage was limited, and even on the website of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is not a single word about the informal summit of OTS foreign ministers. Kazakhstan, moreover, was represented not by Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev but by his deputy Alibek Bakayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry issued four notes about the trip of its minister Jeenbek Kulubaev to Istanbul, three of which were devoted to the summit, but without any particular details,” Suleyev said. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry published a short summary of the meeting, noting in broad terms that representatives discussed cooperation among Turkic states and regional developments. According to Suleyev, the joint statement adopted after the meeting was difficult to find outside of Azerbaijani media. One of the few outlets to publish the text in full was Azerbaijan’s APA news agency. Much of the statement focused on the incidents affecting Azerbaijan and Turkey, stressing that “any threat to the security of OTS member states causes concern for the entire Organization… The ministers strongly condemned the attacks carried out from the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of the Republic of Azerbaijan, including strikes against civilian facilities and the territory of the Republic of Turkey,” the statement continued. “The rest of the statement boils down to destabilization in the Middle East could lead to a global economic crisis, the Palestinian conflict must be resolved taking into account UN resolutions, and so on,” Suleyev told TCA. One notable event during the meeting was the foreign ministers’ reception by President Erdoğan. Official summaries released by participating governments described the discussion in diplomatic terms. “Kazakh sources wrote that ‘prospects for the development of cooperation within the framework of Turkic cooperation were discussed,’” Suleyev said. Kyrgyz statements used similar language, stating that the “President of Turkey… noted the importance of regular dialogue on current regional and international issues and expressed interest in further developing multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Organization.” “In short, these are streamlined diplomatic formulations without specific details,” Suleyev said. According to a press...

4 months ago

Iran

Middle East Conflict Tests Central Asia’s Trade Routes and Energy Security

The escalating conflict between Iran, the United States, and their regional partners is raising economic concerns across Central Asia. Turkmenistan shares a long border with Iran, while other Central Asian economies depend on energy markets and trade routes that pass through or around the Persian Gulf. A wider conflict there could ripple across Central Asia through higher fuel prices, disrupted logistics, and pressure on key transport corridors. For countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the most immediate risk is rising fuel prices. Both depend heavily on imported fuel. Kyrgyz security expert Taalaibek Jumadylov has warned that Kyrgyzstan could face rising prices for food, clothing, and other essential goods. For Tajikistan, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would significantly increase import costs. Tajik media reports that trade between Tajikistan and Iran has grown rapidly over the past five years. Tajik-Iranian trade turnover increased from $377.7 million in 2024 to approximately $484 million in 2025, a rise of around 28%. Tajikistan’s exports totaled about $113 million, while imports from Iran exceeded $371 million, giving Iran a 4.5% share of Tajikistan’s total foreign trade turnover. If global oil prices rise significantly, Tajikistan could also face additional pressure on its budget. There are indirect risks as well: a slowdown in the economies of Russia, China, or other major partners could affect Tajikistan through trade, investment flows, and remittances. In Uzbekistan, analysts note that in recent years Iran has actively pursued transport diplomacy with Central Asia, seeking to strengthen its position as a regional logistics hub. Uzbek analyst Nargiza Umarova says this trend aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Iran and China signed a 25-year cooperation agreement in March 2021, a deal widely described as deepening Iran’s role in Belt and Road-linked connectivity. Kazakh economist Almas Chukin highlighted the logistical advantages of transport routes through Iran. “If we take the point where the Turkmenistan railway connects with Iran and the route to the Persian Gulf, it is about 1,200-1,500 kilometers. This is comparable to the distance from Astana to Almaty. Once you cover this distance, you reach the Persian Gulf and its major ports, where you can handle anything from oil transshipment to grain shipments. From there, sea transport to Rotterdam takes about three to four weeks,” he stated. Chukin added that such routes could simplify exports compared with transporting oil through Russia to Novorossiysk and then via the Black Sea, the Bosphorus Strait, and the Mediterranean. According to his estimates, a rail route to Europe through Iran would be about 3,500 kilometers from the Turkmen border. The economist suggested that if Iran’s political system changes and sanctions are lifted, Central Asia could benefit significantly. “This would be a huge shift for Central Asia: a region with a population of 80 million, abundant resources, and a young workforce, but constrained by geography, suddenly gaining direct access to global markets,” Chukin argued. Some analysts also point to emerging competition among regional transport corridors. In the South Caucasus, a proposed Zangezur corridor has been promoted...

4 months ago

Iran

Escalation with Iran at the Epicenter: How Central Asian Countries Are Reacting

Over the past weekend, the Middle East has once again become a focal point of global tensions. At the center of the escalation is Iran, a country with which Central Asian states intensified engagement last year following the visit of President Masoud Pezeshkian to the region. As events unfold, the potential regional and economic consequences have become a key concern for Central Asian leaders. Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev responded swiftly on February 28, as Iran was reportedly preparing a retaliatory strike targeting not only Israel, which, together with the U.S., had assumed responsibility for the latest escalation, but also several Arab states in the Persian Gulf. On February 27, Tokayev received U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Julie Stufft. According to the official readout, the sides exchanged views “on further cooperation within the framework of the Board of Peace.” While it remains unclear whether the meeting was directly linked to impending military developments, Kazakhstan’s leadership moved quickly the following day. On February 28, the president instructed Security Council Secretary Gizat Nurdauletov, together with the heads of law enforcement agencies and relevant ministries, to prepare an emergency action plan in light of the escalating situation around Iran and potential risks to domestic stability. All law enforcement agencies were placed on heightened alert, and a special monitoring group was established within the government under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Regional governors were instructed to assess potential risks stemming from developments in the Middle East. Late on March 1, presidential press secretary Aibek Smadiyarov announced that Tokayev had sent personal messages to the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, expressing solidarity and support during what he described as a difficult period. Tokayev strongly condemned military actions that undermine the sovereignty and security of states friendly to Kazakhstan. “Our country consistently advocates resolving complex international problems and armed conflicts exclusively through diplomatic means,” Tokayev stated. He also expressed Kazakhstan’s readiness to provide assistance if necessary and reaffirmed the importance of maintaining working contacts with regional leaders. Subsequently, Tokayev held telephone conversations with Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In both calls, Tokayev expressed serious concern over the escalation and reiterated Kazakhstan’s support and solidarity. During the conversation with the UAE president, Tokayev also noted reports that civilian infrastructure had been damaged and stated that attacks on civilian targets deserve strong condemnation. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan thanked Kazakhstan for its support and expressed appreciation for its readiness to assist in overcoming the crisis. Uzbekistan Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, suspended flights to several Middle Eastern destinations, with some aircraft reportedly turning back after departure. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued emergency contact information for Uzbek diplomatic missions and urged citizens abroad or planning to travel, to closely monitor official updates from host countries and Uzbek embassies. The ministry advised citizens to maintain communication with diplomatic missions, register with consular services when necessary,...

4 months ago

Society

Weaponizing the Past: Russian Commentators Invoke Famine in Attacks on Kazakhstan

The concept of a “besieged fortress,” adopted by the Kremlin in the second half of the 2010s, increasingly conflicts with Russia’s earlier foreign policy doctrine, under which post-Soviet states were expected to remain within Moscow’s sphere of influence. That doctrine relied on alliances across the post-Soviet space, with Central Asia often described as an area of privileged interest. By contrast, the “besieged fortress” narrative assumes encirclement by enemies and frames external communication less in diplomatic than in military terms. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, officially termed a “special military operation” by Moscow, has now lasted longer than the Soviet Union’s involvement in World War II, undermining earlier assumptions that some post-Soviet economies would remain dependent on Russian loans and access to the Russian market. In the integration sphere, Kazakh political analyst Marat Shibutov has argued that Russia is effectively “reducing its participation in the EAEU by reinstating permanent customs controls on the borders with Kazakhstan and Belarus.” Such assessments reflect growing debate within the region over the future of integration mechanisms. At the same time, segments of the Russian media space have adopted increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward Kazakhstan. In recent weeks, television host Vladimir Solovyov suggested the possibility of extending a “special military operation” to Central Asia, remarks that triggered strong reactions in Kazakhstan. Political commentator Dmitry Verkhoturov followed with statements directed specifically at Astana, invoking the sensitive historical subject of Asharshylyk, the term used in Kazakhstan for the famine of the early 1930s that followed forced collectivization under Joseph Stalin. In Ukraine, the same period is referred to as the Holodomor and is recognized there as a genocide. Kazakhstan’s official terminology does not classify the famine in those terms. Last year, the inscription on a memorial in Astana dedicated to the victims of collectivization was revised. The earlier wording referred to “victims of the Holodomor,” while the updated plaque reads “victims of the famine of 1932-1933.” The change was widely interpreted as aligning the memorial with Kazakhstan’s established historical framing. Despite this, Verkhoturov warned that further public discussion of Asharshylyk could be dangerous for Kazakhstan “from the point of view of statehood,” suggesting that such debates might escalate into armed confrontation. He also stated that Kazakhstan was “too weak and small” to oppose Russia, remarks that were widely perceived in Kazakhstan as dismissive and offensive. Particular outrage was sparked by comments contrasting Ukrainians and Kazakhs, "for us, Ukrainians are very close relatives, they are practically our own people. And yet, yes, they have brought us to a situation where we have started to fight them, while Kazakhs are not quite our own people for Russians. Yes, you can be friends with them and all that, but they are still distant people, and, as they say, they will be beaten more willingly and, it seems, more harshly than the Ukrainians," the Russian political scientist said. Kazakh political analyst Gaziz Abishev characterized the comparison as “hard-to-hide racism.” He argued that the tragedy of the famine is not exclusively a Kazakh or...

4 months ago

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