• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Our People > Bruce Pannier

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Bruce Pannier

Bruce Pannier is a Central Asia Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the advisory board at the Caspian Policy Center, and a longtime journalist and correspondent covering Central Asia. For a decade, he appeared regularly on the Majlis podcast for RFE/RL, and now broadcasts his Spotlight on Central Asia podcast in partnership with The Times of Central Asia.

Articles

Russia Announces ‘Deportation Regime’ for Migrant Laborers

It has been more than a month since the deadline for migrant laborers working in Russia to complete their registration documents or face expulsion. The anticipated mass deportations have not happened, but Russian State Duma Chairman, Vyacheslav Volodin, indicated on October 13 that could change soon. Volodin warned, “A new migration regime is now in effect… the deportation regime.” The Final Bell Several months ago, Russian officials announced the September 10 deadline for all migrant laborers to legalize their status to work and live in Russia. Russia’s Federal Migration Service created a list in the summer of 2024 of “controlled persons,” those who still did not have all the required documentation to remain in Russia. The list was posted on the service’s website in February 2025. Volodin said those on the list lacked one or more of the following: “documents or certificates required for obtaining migration status or citizenship, registration of a place of stay or residence.” Volodin said the list also included those who failed to complete mandatory procedures such as “annual medical examinations for [their] presence… as well as fingerprinting and photographing” or have failed to show that their “patent, work permits, or employment contract” was renewed. The Duma Chairman said some 35,000 “foreign citizens” had already been expelled between January and August of this year. September 10 arrived, and in the days that followed, there were no reports of Russian law enforcement rounding up migrants and sending them back to their homelands. However, it was clear the Russian government was not bluffing. In his remarks to the Duma, Volodin explained that as of September 1, there were still some 770,000 migrants on the register of controlled persons, and that one-third of them were women and children. If these people have not taken care of their requirements, Volodin said, “They need to leave our country, informing [us] of the date, place, and route of their departure.” The Dwindling Number of Central Asian Migrant Laborers in Russia There are several million foreign workers in Russia, and the largest group is those from Central Asia, though fewer of them work there than was previously the case. The terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March 2024 that left more than 140 people dead was blamed on citizens of Tajikistan. It sparked a wave of xenophobia in Russia aimed at Central Asians, and prompted a raft of new laws and regulations for migrant laborers. Uzbekistan’s citizens have long been the largest group of Central Asian migrant laborers working in Russia, numbering between 4 to 6 million, depending on the season, during 2016. Figures vary for how many Uzbek citizens are working in Russia now, but Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency said at the start of October that it was about 1.3 million, noting the figure fluctuates depending on the time of the year, and that during the warmer months of 2025, it was closer to 2 million. During his recent visit to Tajikistan for a CIS summit and a separate meeting with...

9 months ago

From Gas to Gigawatts: Uzbekistan Powers Ahead with Dual Nuclear Deal

Uzbekistan has confirmed it will be building a large nuclear power plant (NPP) with two 1000-megawatt (MW) reactors as the country prepares for a sharp increase in electricity consumption in the coming years. Uzbekistan’s state atomic energy company, Uzatom, posted on September 26 that a new agreement calls for both a large and small NPP to be constructed at the same site in Uzbekistan. The revised plan for NPPs in Uzbekistan combines agreements the country signed with the Russian state nuclear company Rosatom in 2018 and 2024. Uzbek Prime Minister Abdullo Aripov and his Russian counterpart at the time, Dmitri Medvedev, signed a deal in September 2018 for a large NPP with two VVER-1200 reactors.  However, in late May 2024, during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Uzbekistan, a new agreement was signed for six small reactors, each with a capacity of 55 MW. Preparation work for six RITM-200N reactors started shortly after in the Farish district of Jizzakh Province. In June 2025, Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development said the agreement was restructured. The latest official agreement, signed September 26, 2025, commits to building an integrated NPP with two large VVER-1000 reactors and two small modular RITM-200N units. The Farish facility will be the first to house both a large and a small NPP at the same site. Speaking on the sidelines of the World Nuclear Week conference in Moscow on September 25, Uzatom director Azim Akhmedkhadjaev said, “We are the first in Central Asia to create an innovative solution for the future… (a) project combining advanced small modular reactor technology with time-tested solutions from large-scale nuclear energy.” The new agreement calls for the construction of two VVER-1000 units instead of the original VVER-1200 models. There was no explanation for the change in the type of reactors for the Uzbek facility. Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev was also at the conference in Moscow. Hojayev noted Uzbekistan is seeking to increase renewable energy sources so that by 2030, these sources will produce more than 40% of Uzbekistan’s energy. Khodjaev pointed to solar and wind projects in explaining why the small NPPs are necessary. “Large blocks (reactors) provide stable baseload generation, while small blocks cover peak loads and balance the erratic operation of solar and wind farms,” according to Khodjaev. Essentially, the smaller reactors will help ensure a constant flow of electricity into the domestic grid when there is insufficient wind or sun to keep wind farms and solar power stations operating at full capacity. As Much as Possible and More Khodjaev has said that when both the large and small NPPs are operational in 2035, it will add some 15-billion-kilowatt hours (kWh) to Uzbekistan’s power grid. Electricity production in Uzbekistan has risen from some 59 billion kWh in 2016 to about 81.5 billion kWh in 2024. A relatively small percentage of that is exported to neighbors. A recent agreement with Kazakhstan calls for sending some 900 million kWh of Uzbek electricity to its northern neighbor between March and December 2026....

9 months ago

High Praise, Empty Pockets: Turkmenistan May Scrap Benefit Hikes

It seems that average Turkmen citizens will again have to find ways to ration their spending in 2026, and beyond, thanks to a proposal from a member of the country’s Council of Elders. At a session of the Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) on September 19, Elders’ Council member Yazmyrat Atamyradov, who, in fairness, probably drew the short straw before the session started, said that socio-economic conditions in Turkmenistan have reached such a high level that there is no longer a need for cost-of-living increases for salaries, pensions, stipends, and other benefits. "You are bestowing such blessings upon our people, Hero Arkadag!” Atamyradov said in his address. “Our sons and daughters, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren go to school and work without a care in the world. A peaceful, carefree life itself is a priceless treasure and a great asset.” Most of Turkmenistan’s people likely would not agree with Atamyradov’s suggestion, but his words were meant for only one person, Halk Maslahaty Chairman Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who was in attendance and thanked Atamyradov for the recommendation. Most of the effusive praise for Turkmenistan’s alleged astounding socio-economic achievements was also directed at Berdimuhamedov, who served as Turkmenistan’s president from late 2006 until March 2022, when he stepped down and his son Serdar took the helm. Changes to Turkmenistan’s constitution in early 2023 made the Halk Maslahaty chairman the highest post in the country. A Deteriorating Economy There is no basis for Atamyratov’s assertion that living conditions are improving in Turkmenistan. The suggestion to cut annual payment increases more likely means the authorities can no longer afford to continue funding cost-of-living increases. Turkmenistan has the fourth largest reserves of natural gas in the world, and in the early years after independence, in late 1991, then-President Saparmurat Niyazov forecast the country would soon become a second Kuwait and everyone would be driving Mercedes. It has not worked out like that at all. Turkmenistan has a lot of gas, but only a few customers. The steep drop in gas prices in 2015 devastated Turkmenistan’s economy, which is about 80% dependent on revenue from gas sales, and has never recovered. The first food shortages independent Turkmenistan had ever seen started in 2016. Flour, cooking oil, sugar, eggs, and other basic goods were often not available at state stores where goods are sold at a subsidized price, but have always been available at privately-owned stores and at bazaars, where the price is two or three times more expensive. Eventually, rationing was introduced on bread. Customers were limited to two and sometimes only one churek (flat, round bread) per person. In some areas, police were tasked with monitoring sales to ensure no one bought more than their allotment. Often, there were more customers than bread, and in many places, including the capital, Ashgabat, lines started forming outside state stores before the sun came up. The authorities responded by telling people to line up behind the store so they could not be seen from the street. Fast forward to 2025, where in...

9 months ago

Kyrgyz Parliament Votes to Dissolve; Preparations for Early Elections Begin

Deputies in Kyrgyzstan’s parliament voted on September 25 to dissolve parliament, paving the way for early elections that will be conducted under a revised electoral format later this year. Deputies voted 84-0 in favor of dissolving parliament. Five other deputies abstained from voting, and one MP was absent from the session. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov now has five days to name the date for snap parliamentary elections, though speaker of parliament Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu said he expects the date will be November 30. The move was expected as a group of deputies started collecting signatures earlier in September to introduce a motion on dissolving parliament. The chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Central Election Commission (CEC), Tynchtykbek Shaynazarov, said in an interview on September 2 that the CEC is ready to conduct parliamentary elections this year, “if [parliament] takes the decision to dissolve itself.” Shaynazarov explained the reason for advancing elections by one year. “According to the law, and plans, the elections for deputies to the Jogorku Kenesh (Kyrgyzstan’s parliament) will take place in November 2026.”  However, Shaynazarov said, “According to the constitutional regulations, the next presidential election is set for January 2027. If we have (parliamentary) elections… in November 2026, the CEC must release an official tally (of votes) within 20 days.” Shaynazarov continued, “Then there will be those who are dissatisfied with the elections and will file a lawsuit. Thus, the campaign for the election of deputies may drag on until December.” Shaynazarov pointed out this would overlap with campaigning for the presidential election. Member of Parliament Janar Akayev agreed the proximity of the two elections according to the current schedule could negatively impact the work of the CEC. Akayev also noted that Japarov signed a new law on procedures for electing parliamentary deputies in June this year.  That law changed the mixed system of electing deputies Kyrgyzstan used in 2021, whereby 36 MPs were elected in single-mandate districts and 54 by party lists. In the next elections, all 90 deputies will be chosen in single-mandate districts. “Since current MPs support the transition to a new system, new elections should be held,” Akayev said. Kyrgyzstan’s early parliamentary elections, in 1995, 2000, and 2005, were conducted via single-mandate districts. Election by party lists was first used in the 2007 snap elections, and continued to be used in the 2010, 2015, and 2020 elections. The new regulations for parliamentary elections have negative and positive aspects. The non-refundable fee to seek a seat in parliament favors the wealthy. The fee for independent candidates to run remains at 100,000 Kyrgyz som (about $1,115), which is still a high price in a country where the average monthly salary is just a bit over 41,000 som. Political parties can still participate in elections but must pay 9 million som (almost $103,000). Currently six parties have seats in parliament, but 21 parties fielded candidates in the 2021 elections. The prohibitively high cost of registering will make it difficult for many people who aspire to a seat in parliament...

9 months ago

Montenegro Will Not Extradite NeMolchi Founder to Kazakhstan

The authorities in Montenegro have decided that the director of Kazakhstan’s NeMolchi.kz (Don’t be silent) foundation, Dina Smailova (Tansari), will not be deported to Kazakhstan, where she faces charges of knowingly disseminating false information, violation of privacy, and fraud. Smailova’s Legal Battles and Exile Since 2017, Smailova has faced a plethora of criminal cases. In 2021, she left Kazakhstan and relocated to Georgia. After she departed, Almaty police launched new inquiries against her. In June 2022, Smailova said that these investigations were opened “because I criticize the activities of the Almaty police, because I demand the resignation of the leadership, because I do not recognize the police who torture our people in their dungeons!” In early 2024, Smailova left Georgia and requested asylum in the European Union, and in April of that year, she was detained in Montenegro based on an Interpol warrant from Kazakhstan’s Interior Ministry. Kazakhstan and Montenegro do not have an extradition agreement, so Montenegrin officials needed time to consider the Kazakh authorities’ request to repatriate Smailova to Kazakhstan. Smailova was therefore quickly freed from custody but remained in Montenegro, and in July, she and her husband, Almat Mukhamedzhanov, were granted international protection status in the country, signaling that she was unlikely to be extradited. On September 4, Montenegro’s Supreme Court ruled to deny Kazakhstan’s request for her extradition, and on September 12, Smailova wrote on Facebook that the decision had come into force. NeMolchi.kz is an organization that defends the rights of women and children in Kazakhstan and reports on incidents of domestic violence, a problem that has become more visible in the country in recent years. Violence against women has become a priority issue for the Kazakh government, especially since the high-profile murder of a young woman named Saltanat Nukenova in 2023. The Nukenova Case and Public Outcry Saltanat Nukenova was killed in an Astana restaurant by her husband, Kuandyk Bishimbayev, a former Kazakh Minister of National Economy. Bishimbayev was convicted of taking bribes and, in March 2018, was sentenced to ten years in prison. His term was later reduced to four years, and he was eventually released early in December 2020. On November 9, 2023, Bishimbayev and Nukenova went to an Astana restaurant where they had a private room reserved. Bishimbayev and Nukenova quarreled, following which Bishimbayev severely beat his wife, then waited several hours while she lay dying from head injuries he inflicted on her before calling for medical help. Later that same month, it was reported that the police in East Kazakhstan Province had started investigating Smailova for fraud. Police questioned “hundreds” of people who had donated to NeMolchi.kz, on the suspicion that Smailova had used some of the donated money for personal purchases. Before the end of 2023, formal charges were lodged against Smailova, and Kazakhstan put out an international warrant for her arrest. Bishimbayev’s trial was televised and drew a huge audience in Kazakhstan. He was found guilty and sentenced to 24 years in prison. The details of the beating of...

10 months ago

Gold and Gunfire: Tajik-Taliban Tensions Flare on the Border

Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters have exchanged fire in an area along the Tajik-Afghan border. The incident happened on August 24 and is connected to a Chinese gold mining operation on the Afghan side of the border. The hostilities ended after a rare meeting between local Tajik and Taliban officials, though each side accused the other of harboring enemies. Gold Mining The Tajik authorities have been watching Afghanistan’s Dovang district in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province since the start of a gold mining operation there three years ago. Residents of Tajikistan’s Shamsiddin Shohin district, across the Pyanj River from Dovang, reported rising water levels in their area. Sodikjon Rahmonzoda, the head of the district branch of Tajikistan’s Ministry for Emergency Situations, stated that “On the opposite bank of the river, in Afghanistan, industrial gold mining started…. They built infrastructure (including) dams that direct water to our bank.” The Tajik authorities have been reinforcing the bank on the Tajik side of the river to prevent nearby villages from flooding. It is unclear if the two sides were previously in contact about the problems the diversion of water in the river was causing in Tajikistan. The other four Central Asian governments have all established a dialogue with the Taliban since they returned to power in August 2021. Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbek officials have visited Afghanistan, and Taliban representatives have visited Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (but so far, not Kyrgyzstan). The Tajik government has kept its contact with the Afghan militant group to a minimum, though several border crossing points are working again, and some bazaars on the Tajik side of the frontier have reopened to Afghan customers. Rising Tensions In May, Tajik authorities detained a group of Chinese and Afghans who drove across the river on excavators from the mining site in Dovang into Tajikistan. According to the Tajik authorities, the Chinese and Afghans were seeking to launder money in Tajikistan. On August 24, a group of Taliban arrived at the border area in Dovang. It is not clear what sparked the shooting, but Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters exchanged fire using heavy weapons. One Taliban fighter was reportedly killed, and four others were wounded. There were no reports of casualties among the Tajik border guards. Neither the Tajik government nor Taliban officials have commented on the clash. A Rare Meeting Following the shooting, the commander of the Tajik border guard unit in the Shamsiddin Shohin district led a group of soldiers across the border to Dovang to meet with the head of mining operations and other officials in Badakhshan Province. The two sides discussed the gold mining operation on the Afghan side of the border, but the conversation degenerated into accusations, with each side complaining that the other was sheltering and training their enemies. Both sides are correct. The Tajik government allows members of the National Resistance Front (NRF), including its leader Ahmad Masoud, to travel to and often stay in Tajikistan. The NRF is a group of mainly ethnic...

10 months ago

Rails Through the Mountains: Kyrgyzstan Expanding Network in All Directions

On August 25, in the remote village of Kosh-Dobo in central Kyrgyzstan, construction finally started on Kyrgyzstan’s section of a railway that will connect the country to China and Uzbekistan. It is one of the most important projects in Kyrgyzstan’s 34 years of independence. And it is not the only railway project in Kyrgyzstan, as the country is at last moving to better connect by rail, both internally and with its neighbors. Three Dormant Decades For the first 30 years of independence, no new railway tracks were laid in Kyrgyzstan, but that is now changing. Kyrgyzstan is about 90% mountainous. When Kyrgyzstan became independent in late 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were two railways leading into Kyrgyzstan. Both came from Uzbekistan to the west. A northern line connected Uzbekistan’s capital, Tashkent, through southern Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, and from there continued eastward to Issyk-Kul, a large lake and tourist area in the northeastern corner of the country. The other railway extended only a few dozen kilometers from the Uzbek border to Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan. The length of the two railways combined amounted to some 320 kilometers. Work started on the 186-kilometer Balykchy-Kochkor-Kara-Keche railway at the end of March 2022. Balykchy is located at the western tip of Issyk-Kul. Since Soviet times, it has been the last stop on the train that originates in Uzbekistan and travels through Bishkek. Kochkor is a village in Naryn Province, about 63 kilometers southwest of Balykchy. Some 120 kilometers further to the southwest is Kara-Keche, one of Kyrgyzstan’s primary coal-mining sites and the source of much of the coal used in the thermal power plant that supplies heat and electricity to Bishkek. Chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet of Ministers Adylbek Ksaymaliyev said in May 2025 that there are already plans to connect this railway line to the China-Kyrgyzstan-China line being built through southern Naryn Province. The Eurasian Development Bank recently agreed to fund a feasibility study for extending the railway from Balykchy to the town of Cholpon-Ata, the main tourist town on the north shore of Issyk-Kul, with a stop at the Issyk-Kul airport at Tamchy. As it stands now, people headed to Cholpon-Ata by rail must switch from the train to car or bus at Balykchy to travel the remaining 80 kilometers to Cholpon-Ata. In May 2024, President Sadyr Japarov called for that railway line to eventually reach the town of Karakol, at the eastern end of Issyk-Kul, some 140 kilometers from Cholpon-Ata. Naryn is the biggest province in Kyrgyzstan in terms of territory, but its connections to the rest of the country are tenuous, particularly in the northeastern part of the province where Kochkor and Kara-Keche are located. Kosh-Dobo is in the southern part of Naryn Province, near the borders of the Jalal-Abad and Osh provinces. The village is located on the route of the long-awaited China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway that will run from Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang region to Andijan, Uzbekistan. The project was first proposed some 30...

10 months ago

Melon Pyramids and Empty Pantries: Tajik and Turkmen Feasts Amid Everyday Shortages

Pyramids of various kinds of melons, fruits laid across the ground to form intricate, traditional patterns, as well as an abundance of fruit, dried fruit, nuts, and bread overflowing from tables, and even fountains, surrounding the edible ground arrangement, and grapes hanging from poles. As an advertisement for national products, a background for international events, or a gift for an ally, Tajikistan is gaining fame for elaborate displays of fruit. It is an amazing sight, with fruits and nuts arranged in patterns that cover large areas of the pavilions and gardens where foreign guests are being entertained. However, as good as these lavish presentations look and taste, these cornucopias are being exhibited in some of Central Asia’s poorest countries, and, unsurprisingly, there has been some discontent and some scandals. For Sale On August 16-17, there was an exhibition of Tajikistan’s products and crafts in the Kazakh capital, Astana, with melon pyramids taking center stage in an exhibition that also featured “over a thousand tons of products: fresh fruits and vegetables, nuts, [and] dried fruits.“It was a return performance for the Tajik “masters” who arrange the exhibitions. Astana hosted a fair of Tajik products in August 2023 that drew a big crowd, some of whom were overly anxious to get their hands on the goods. Dozens of people started taking melons and grapes from the pyramids, breaking shelves and decorations in the process. [caption id="attachment_35359" align="aligncenter" width="1597"] Tajik fair in Astana, 2023; image: public domain[/caption] Impress the Guests One of the most memorable grand displays of fruit occurred when Tajikistan hosted the summit of leaders from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on September 27, 2018. On the eve of the summit, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon walked his guests through a garden flanked by enough food to feed a small town for a month. It was the first time such a spread had been laid out for guests at an international gathering, with Rahmon seeming to appreciate having an agricultural background when hosting a diplomatic event. In July 2019, Rahmon met with then-Kyrgyz President Sooronbai Jeenbekov in the northern Tajik town of Isfara. Conflicts along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border were becoming increasingly deadly, and the two presidents met to discuss ways to ease tensions and resolve the festering problems along the frontier. While the two presidents talked, Rahmon guided Jeenbekov through “6 pyramids… of watermelons and melons, as well as almost 20 types of national breads.“ [caption id="attachment_35360" align="aligncenter" width="960"] Sooronbay Jeenbekov and Emomali Rahmon in Isfara; image: press service of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan[/caption] When Dushanbe hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in September 2021, the feast on the eve of the summit was every bit the equal of the CIS summit in 2018 and featured “huge pyramids of fragrant melons and watermelons, carpets of fresh fruit, grapes cascading like a waterfall, and even fountains of melons.” Rahmon brought his fruit feast to St. Petersburg in October 2022 when CIS leaders gathered for an informal CIS summit...

10 months ago

From Boom to Bust: Kyrgyzstan Grapples with Falling Birth Rate

The population of Central Asia when the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991 and the five Central Asian republics became independent countries was some 50 million people. Thirty-four years later, the population of the region is about 80 million. However, in Kyrgyzstan, the birth rate has been declining in recent years, and it has officials confused and alarmed. The Data Kyrgyz parliamentary deputy Dastan Bekeshev raised the matter on August 7, noting the country has seen a steady fall in the number of babies born from 2019, when it reached a record of some 173,000, to about 140,000 in 2024. Bekeshev was responding to recently released figures from Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Committee that showed the birth rate for 2020 was 156,112, for 2021 it was 150,164, climbing a bit to 150,225 in 2022, then dropping to 145,977 in 2023, and 140,419 in 2024. According to the Health Ministry’s chief specialist on demography, Raisa Asylbasheva, there are currently some 1.8 million women in Kyrgyzstan considered to be of childbearing age. Asylbasheva said it could be cyclical and “in five years, possibly, there will be an increase.” Bekeshev, however, has pointed out that if the trend continues, “In 15-20 years, there will be fewer young people in the country who can work, pay taxes, and provide for pensioners.” The Reasons Among the statistics cited on birth rate, one catches the eye immediately: the average age of a mother giving birth in Kyrgyzstan in 2024 was 28.4 years old. Traditionally, people marry young in Central Asia, and new mothers are often in their late teens or early 20s. It is not uncommon, especially in rural areas, to encounter grandmothers who are not even 40 years old. Many factors potentially play into the reasons for this decline in birth rate, but the general consensus is that socio-economic conditions are the primary cause. Asylbasheva said young people are concentrating on their careers and choosing to marry later than was previously the case. “The literacy rate of the population is growing; young people are already planning a family, trying to create conditions for a child,” Asylbasheva explained. Asylbasheva also mentioned that difficulties in obtaining a family-sized flat or house are causing some young couples to wait before having children. Baktygul Bozgorpoyeva, director of the Alliance for Family Planning, said state support for young families is sorely lacking and there needs to be government programs to help mothers and fathers raise their children “from adolescence to adulthood.” According to Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Committee, the average monthly wage in Kyrgyzstan in 2025 is a little more than 40,000 som (about $458), though many people receive considerably less than that amount. Kyrgyzstan’s authorities do offer some financial help. Under the “Balaga Suyunchu” (Happy for a child) scheme established in 2018, the state provides a one-time payment to parents of 4,000 som (about $46) after the birth of each child. In the event of triplets or more babies, the state gives a one-time payment of 50,000 som (about $572) for...

11 months ago

Potential Mass Expulsion of Migrants Looms in Russia

Russia introduced new regulations for foreign citizens in the country on February 5, and started keeping a list at the Interior Ministry of foreigners who are living or staying in Russia without proper documentation, the “controlled persons registry.” The rules are aimed at migrant laborers working in Russia, many of whom come from Central Asian countries. Russia has set a September 10 deadline for foreigners in the country to clear up all their paperwork with the authorities or face expulsion with a ban on re-entry. Judging by recent comments from Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to Russia, Kubanychbek Bokontayev, many might not make that September 10 deadline. Needed but Not Desired Over the course of the last two decades, millions of citizens from Central Asian countries have worked in Russia. Most are from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The remittances they send home have grown to the point where this money now accounts for nearly 40% of the GDP in Tajikistan, 24% in Kyrgyzstan, and 14% in Uzbekistan. Most of these remittances come from Russia. Russia badly needs the extra workers, and, until recently, the arrangement seemed to suit all parties. But the March 2024 terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall changed the situation. The Russian authorities detained and charged a group of Tajik nationals for the attack, and the always simmering xenophobia in Russia, particularly toward Central Asians, boiled over. New rules and restrictions have been imposed on migrant workers. Those that came into force in February this year were only the latest in a series of changes that already included mandatory fingerprinting and photographs upon entry to Russia, a reduction in the term of stay from 180 to 90 days, and an increasing list of infractions that provide grounds for deportation. In 2024, Russia expelled some 157,000 migrants who were in the country illegally, which, according to Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, was an increase of some 50% over 2023. The Clock Is Ticking At the start of February, just before the latest regulations came into effect, Russia’s Deputy Interior Minister Aleksandr Gorovoi said there were some 670,000 foreigners living illegally in Russia. Gorovoi added that more than half were women and children, “those who entered, but we do not see that they received a patent registered with the migration service… [or] that an employment agreement was concluded with them.” On July 24, Kyrgyz media outlet AKIpress published an interview with the Kyrgyz Ambassador to Russia, Bokontayev, in which he said that at the start of July, there were some 113,000 Kyrgyz citizens on the controlled persons registry, which he referred to as the “gray list.” He also said there were some 80,000 Kyrgyz citizens on the “black list” of people barred from entering Russia. In a separate interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Kyrgyz Service published on July 25, Kyrgyzstan’s General Consul in Russia, Bakyt Asanaliyev, said that about 30% of the Kyrgyz citizens on the gray list are children. Ambassador Bokontayev said Kyrgyzstan’s embassy is working to make sure...

11 months ago