Our People > Bruce Pannier

Bruce Pannier

Bruce Pannier is a Central Asia Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the advisory board at the Caspian Policy Center, and a longtime journalist and correspondent covering Central Asia. For a decade, he appeared regularly on the Majlis podcast for RFE/RL, and now broadcasts his Spotlight on Central Asia podcast in partnership with The Times of Central Asia.

Articles

Military

Uzbekistan’s New Emphasis on the Military

Uzbekistan has become Central Asia’s leader in terms of military spending. This raises some questions about why Uzbekistan has boosted its military spending, but it should also get the attention of Uzbekistan’s Central Asian neighbors. According to Global Firepower’s 2025 Military Strength ranking, Uzbekistan’s defense budget was a little more than $2.8 billion, ahead of Kazakhstan which spent just over $2 billion. Kazakhstan still ranked ahead of Uzbekistan in overall military strength, 57th and 58th, respectively, but in 2024, Global Firepower ranked Kazakhstan 58th and Uzbekistan 65th. Voice of America noted in a July 2024 report that military spending was generally increasing across Central Asia, a "development officials link to regional conflicts such as the war in Ukraine.” Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan boosted their military spending after they fought brief but destructive battles against each at the end of April 2021, and again in mid-September 2022. In March 2023, Kamchybek Tashiyev, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s security service, said that since the 2021 conflict, his country had spent some $1 billion on military equipment, including military drones from Turkey. Global Firepower's 2025 report stated that Kyrgyzstan spent $221.8 million and Tajikistan $446 million on defense in 2024. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the poorest countries in Central Asia. Where is the Threat? Uzbekistan and more broadly Central Asia’s increase in defense spending raise the question of why is it necessary. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s surge in military spending was a reaction to the border conflicts of 2021 and 2022. The root cause of that fighting was disputed territories along their frontier, but this year the two countries finally signed a delimitation agreement and relations have improved. The Central Asian states have legitimate security concerns, most emanating from Afghanistan, though not necessarily from the Taliban. Despite occasional saber-rattling, the Taliban are unlikely to ever try to attack or invade any Central Asian country, and presently most of the Central Asian states have established an amiable business relationship with the Taliban. Militant groups operating in Afghanistan are the major concern. These groups based in Afghanistan are the main threats to the Central Asian governments and require the Central Asian states to develop counter-terrorism capabilities, something they have been doing since the late 1990s. The anti-aircraft systems and missiles the Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, are purchasing are ill-suited to counter-terrorism operations. The timing of the significant increase in military spending came not long after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022. Several Russian politicians and political commentators have spoken of reclaiming part of all of Kazakhstan in particular, but Uzbekistan has also been mentioned lately. It would be understandable for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to bolster their defenses in case the day comes when Russia looks to forcibly reincorporate Central Asia back into its empire. But Russia is listed second on Global Firepower’s ranking of military powers and the country’s defense budget in 2024 was some $126 billion. Without outside assistance, it is unlikely Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan could hold out for long against...

1 year ago

RFE/RL

Opinion: What the Loss of RFE/RL Would Mean for Central Asia

The decision to terminate the federal grant agreement funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a crushing blow for hundreds of millions of people. These people know their governments are not telling them the full truth about what is happening in their countries or in the world outside. The objective information provided by RFE/RL has been important to people such as these. Perhaps as important, since the end of the Cold War, was the platform RFE/RL provides, whenever possible, for people in these countries to explain their views to the outside world. I know, because I worked at RFE/RL for 25 years covering Central Asia. RFE/RL was founded in 1950, and I didn’t show up there until 1997. I can only speak about what I saw and heard when I was an RFE/RL employee. My understanding of my tasks as an RFE/RL employee was that we were supposed to keep close track of what was happening in Central Asia, cover as many of the important topics of the region as possible, and make objective and accurate information on these topics available to the people in Central Asia. During Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, for example, RFE/RL’s Tajik service, Radio Ozodi, was the most trusted source of information for the people of Tajikistan. During the Coronavirus pandemic, the Turkmen government would not even allow the word COVID to be spoken and denied there were any cases of the virus in the country, leaving RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, Azatlyk, as one of the only sources of information for Turkmenistan’s people about the illness. I lived in Central Asia before joining RFE/RL, so I had some idea of what was important to people there. Calling for respect for fundamental rights is a big part of RFE/RL’s work. Read the constitutions of any Central Asian country and you will see enshrined there the right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to freely receive or disseminate information, and much more. In practice, these rights are not always observed in Central Asia. In such a situations RFE/RL’s Central Asian services are a voice for those who, with good reason, are afraid to speak out publicly, or more importantly, for those who did speak out and are punished for that. At RFE/RL we looked for “impact stories,” testimony from people of the region about unfulfilled government promises, abuses, or state mismanagement that were hurting communities and individuals. Central Asian government officials are among the most faithful RFE/RL listeners, and often RFE/RL reports that raised social issues led officials to rectify the situation. Ramshackle buildings or schools were suddenly repaired, electricity or running water became accessible to city districts and rural areas, sufficient food became available to communities. The pleas of average citizens too often fell on deaf ears in government halls, but the criticism of an international organization such as RFE/RL, which was broadcasting to the entire country and Central Asian region, was too embarrassing for officials to ignore. This made RFE/RL unpopular with Central...

1 year ago

Kyrgyz-Tajik Border

Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Agreement Seeks to End Years of Hostility

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement on March 13 that aims to put an end to tensions that have made their border the deadliest area in Central Asia for more than a decade. Underscoring the significance of this breakthrough was Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon making his first state visit in nearly twelve years to the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek to sign the deal on the delimitation of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. A Long-Standing Dispute Marking the border in the mountainous, sparsely inhabited eastern section of the two countries’ border was not difficult, and by 2011, some 520 kilometers had been demarcated. Reaching a final agreement on the western 487 kilometers, located in the Ferghana Valley and more densely populated, however, was far more complicated due to roads and canals that passed through both countries’ territories. Rahmon’s visit in May 2013 came a month after hundreds of residents of border communities clashed near the Kyrgyz village of Ak-Sai and Tajikistan’s Vorukh enclave. Such incidents were increasing, though at that time they were limited to fistfights, throwing sticks and stones, and vandalism of property, usually vehicles. In May 2013, Rahmon and then Kyrgyz President, Almazbek Atambayev, discussed measures to ease tensions along the border, but along the frontier, the meeting of the two presidents in the Kyrgyz capital made little difference. In January 2014, a Kyrgyz construction crew started work on a bypass road around the Tajikistan’s Vorukh enclave, and an argument broke out between border guards of the two countries. Insults led to an exchange of fire, during which Tajik border guards reportedly used grenade launchers and mortars. Five Kyrgyz and two Tajik border guards were wounded in the fighting. It was the first time weapons were used during border conflicts, but from that time on, disputes increasingly involved gunfire, increasing the number of casualties and sometimes resulting in deaths. Both governments sent additional troops and military equipment to the border area, adding fuel to the fire. On July 26, 2019, four days after another clash near the Vorukh enclave left one person dead and 27 injured, Rahmon met with then-Kyrgyz President Soronbai Jeenbekov in the Vorukh enclave. Again, there were promises of new steps to defuse tensions and hasten an agreement on border delimitation, but as had happened previously, it was not long before fights erupted, adding to the growing casualty list along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. From Bad to Worse On April 28, 2021, Kyrgyz villagers spotted a group of Tajik citizens setting up a camera on a water intake station near the Kyrgyz village of Kok-Tash. An argument quickly led to large-scale clashes that spread along several sections of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Armed forces from the two countries used heavy machine guns, mortars, and armored vehicles. Tajikistan even sent helicopter gunships to attack one area in Kyrgyzstan. The fighting only lasted two days, but when it was over, 54 people were dead, hundreds were wounded, thousands were forced to flee the area, and there was damage to homes and other buildings....

1 year ago

Women's rights

Feminists in Kazakhstan Under Pressure Ahead of International Women’s Day

On March 8, the world marks the annual International Women’s Day, and in Kazakhstan’s commercial capital, Almaty, the authorities are again working to prevent public gatherings sponsored by feminist or LGBT groups. Since early February, several members of the feminist group, Feminita, have been detained in Almaty. Preemptive Measures Late March 3, an Almaty court sentenced Aktorgyn Akkenzhebalasy of the feminist group Feminita to ten days in jail after finding her guilty of violating the law on organization of peaceful assemblies. The charge dated back to May 2024, when six members of Feminita held an unsanctioned march in downtown Almaty, demanding a life sentence for former Minister of National Economy Kuandyk Bishimbayev. Bishimbayev beat his wife to death in a private room in an Almaty restaurant in November 2023. His trial from March to May 2024 was broadcast over television and widely watched by the public in Kazakhstan. Akkenzhebalasy was not the only Feminita activist to be jailed for participating in the May 2024 march. On February 28, Feminita co-founder Zhanar Sekerbayeva was jailed for ten days, meaning she would not be freed from jail until March 10, two days after International Women’s Day. Sekerbayeva and another Feminita co-founder, Gulzada Serzhan, were detained on February 13 after Bagila Baltabayeva, the leader of a group called Kazakhstan’s Union of Parents, and several other women burst into a Feminita meeting. Baltabayeva is also the author of a widely circulated petition against LGBT propaganda. Feminita activists said Baltabayeva called the police and complained that participants in the meeting were corrupting minors and had no permission to conduct their meeting. Kazakh independent media outlet Vlast cited witnesses as saying Baltabayeva also struck Akkenzhebalasy. All 25 of the Feminita members at the meeting were detained but quickly released except Sekerbayeva and Serzhan, who were kept at the police station for several hours and eventually charged with conducting public activities of an unregistered social organization. Baltabayeva and those who accompanied her to disrupt the meeting were not detained. On February 14, Feminita tried to have another meeting, but a group of women from the charity fund Rahym interrupted, calling the Feminita activists “foreign agents” and demanding they “get out!“ Again, police questioned the Feminita activists but not the Rahym members who burst into the meeting. On February 19, an Almaty court found Sekerbayeva and Serzhan guilty of holding a meeting of an unregistered organization and were each fined 393,000 tenge (about $1,500). The Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law released a statement noting Feminita had tried repeatedly to register with authorities but was always rejected. The statement also mentioned that Feminita activists had been attacked during meetings in other cities in Kazakhstan and that “All this happened with complete inaction or direct connivance of the police against the aggressors.” Women’s Day vs Women’s Rights There are no reports indicating that the authorities in Almaty, or officials in any other city in Kazakhstan, have approved any requests from feminist groups to conduct public...

1 year ago

Bilateral Relations

Uzbekistan Sees Opportunities in Afghanistan

Uzbekistan’s business relations with neighboring Afghanistan are booming. In 2024, Uzbek-Afghan trade came to some $1.1 billion, and more than $1 billion of that was Uzbek exports to Afghanistan. It seems after the February 22-23 visit of Taliban acting Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdul Ghani Baradar to Uzbekistan, that figure is likely to continue climbing. Baradar met with Uzbek Prime Minister Abdullo Aripov and Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khojayev to discuss trade and investment, which is essentially the basis of Uzbekistan’s relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The immediate results of these talks were modest, but projects due to start in the near future offer substantial profits for both Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Uzbekistan agreed to lift restrictions on imports of Afghan agricultural goods, which facilitated another agreement establishing a free economic zone in Uzbekistan’s border area that would have factories for processing pine nuts and cotton from Afghanistan. Agricultural goods are the bulk of Afghanistan’s exports to Uzbekistan, which is not surprising since more than 40 years of war have prevented Afghanistan from building many plants and factories for producing finished goods. A report from November 2024 said in the first ten months of the year, Uzbekistan’s exports to Afghanistan came to some $855.9 million, while Afghan exports to Uzbekistan amounted to only some $28.3 million. Power On Uzbekistan is the leading exporter of electricity to Afghanistan, supplying nearly 60% of Afghanistan’s electricity imports, and that amount could increase soon. Baradar’s delegation discussed progress on the 500 kV transmission line from Uzbekistan’s Surkhan region to Dashti-Alvan, near the Baghlan provincial capital Pul-e-Khumri, which will increase Uzbekistan’s electricity exports to Afghanistan by some 70%. Construction of the 260-kilometer transmission line started in 2018 and has been repeatedly delayed. Baradar said Uzbek officials agreed to cut the cost of building the transmission line from $252 million to $222 million. Turkmenistan is also considering building a 500 kV transmission line to Dashti-Alvan. Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Khojayev and Baradar reviewed progress at Afghanistan’s Toti-Mardan gas field, just south of the border with Turkmenistan, which is believed to contain vast reserves of natural gas. In November 2024, Uzbekistan signed a ten-year contract to develop the gas field, pledging to invest $100 million in the project each year. According to reports about Baradar’s recent visit, drilling at the site is expected to begin soon. Prime Minister Aripov said Uzbek investors were already preparing to start construction of a cement plant in Afghanistan’s Samangan Province. Taliban officials have been offering Uzbek companies opportunities in Afghanistan’s mining sector for months. The Taliban acting minister of mines and petroleum, Hidayatullah Badri, was part of Baradar’s delegation and he met with Uzbek officials to discuss cooperation in developing Afghanistan’s mineral resources. The Afghan delegation again proposed Uzbek participation in developing mining sites, but there was no word in reports on any agreements. Aripov mentioned Uzbekistan was interested in the exploration and extraction of oil and gas, both of which Uzbekistan needs for domestic consumption, but did not mention mining....

1 year ago

Society

Central Asia’s Growing Domestic Drug Problem

It’s in the headlines every few days now in Central Asian countries. February 1 – Uzbekistan’s law enforcement agencies report raiding a laboratory producing synthetic drugs, and seizing narcotics worth more than $800,000. February 3 – Uzbek law enforcement announces that their latest counter-narcotics operation has resulted in the seizure of 111 kilograms of illegal drugs. February 10 – police in Kyrgyzstan’s northern Chuy region seize 1.5 kilograms of hashish and 1 kilogram of marijuana. February 11 – Kazakhstan’s Committee for National Security (KNB) announces it had uncovered a laboratory in Almaty region that was producing synthetic drugs. More than 15 kilograms of these synthetic drugs were seized and 200 liters of precursor materials. In the first decade after the five countries of Central Asia became independent in 1991, many of the reports from foreign media were about Central Asia being a major transit route for narcotics coming out of Afghanistan that were for buyers in Russia and Europe. Thirty years later, drugs are still coming into Central Asia from Afghanistan, but it is no longer just opium and heroin. And now it seems a good portion of these illicit narcotics are being consumed in Central Asia. Made in Central Asia Drug-producing laboratories are multiplying, and while there are no precise figures for the number of addicts, it is clear an increasing number of young people in Central Asia are using drugs. Ashita Mittal, the regional representative of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Central Asia, said in January 2025 that during the “last several years in just Kazakhstan, law enforcement agencies have uncovered and destroyed 87 laboratories producing synthetic drugs, and in Kyrgyzstan about 11-12.” Law enforcement agencies in Kazakhstan said earlier in January that they had destroyed 63 laboratories producing illegal narcotics just in 2024. Tajikistan’s Agency for Narcotics Control said at the end of its Kuknor-2024 counter-narcotics campaign in December 2024 that it had confiscated more than 1 ton of synthetic drugs. The synthetic drugs most often mentioned in these seizures are mephedrone, a type of amphetamine and stimulant that causes euphoria, and a-PvP, another stimulant. However, there are many types of synthetic drugs now available in Central Asia. Batum Estebesova, director of Kyrgyzstan’s Sotsium drug rehabilitation center, said the variety of synthetic drugs is increasing quickly. “We can’t keep up with all the new drugs to add them to the list of prohibited substances,” Estebesova said. UN Office on Drugs and Crime representative Mittal said part of the problem comes from Afghanistan. Mittal noted in 2023, there was a 95 percent reduction in heroin production in Afghanistan, but at the same time there was an “exponential growth” in the production of methamphetamines crossing into the bordering Central Asian countries – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In May 2023, Uzbek border guards noticed some strange marking on several boxes of pomegranate juice coming from Afghanistan. Testing showed bottles of juice in those boxes contained methamphetamine. Apparently, the buyers intended to evaporate the liquid and then collect...

1 year ago

Natural gas

Turkmenistan to Start Natural Gas Shipments to Turkey

Long-discussed shipments of Turkmen natural gas to Turkey could be just weeks away. Several options have been discussed for bringing gas to Turkey, but news since February 10 indicates Turkmenistan and Turkey chose a swap agreement involving Iran. Turkmenistan’s state information agency TDH reported the head of the country’s Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian by phone. During that call, Berdimuhamedov “announced the agreement with (Turkey’s) BOTAS company on the transit of Turkmen natural gas through Iran to the Republic of Turkey..." Since there is no pipeline connecting Turkmenistan to Turkey, the agreement involves a swap deal whereby Turkmenistan ships its gas to Iran and Iran makes a like amount of its gas available to Turkey. However, on February 11, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar posted on X (formerly Twitter) confirming an agreement between BOTAS and Turkmengaz. Bayraktar said “… gas flow is planned to start on March 1, 2025.” There were no details about the volume of gas to be delivered, but Turkish officials have previously been mentioning an initial volume of some 2 billion cubic meters (bcm). Turkish officials have been pushing for this deal for more than two years, with the ultimate aim of turning Turkey into a gas hub to shipments to Europe. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev traveled to Turkmenistan in December 2022 to meet with Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov (the son of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov). Erdogan and Aliyev were hoping for an agreement on construction of a pipeline to carry Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan and from there to Turkey. Those talks were inconclusive, but did lead to a series of other meetings of officials of the three countries to discuss alternative means to ship Turkmen gas to Turkey. The swap arrangement involving Iran was one of the possibilities raised during these meetings. However, Turkey is still clinging to the plan for construction of a pipeline that would eventually boost Turkmen gas supplies to Turkey up to 15 bcm. Turkish Ambassador to Ashgabat Ahmet Demirok said in September 2024 that his country was looking to purchase 300 bcm of Turkmen gas over the next 20 years. The agreement is good news for Turkmenistan, but it also shows again how dependent Turkmenistan is becoming on Iran for gas exports. When Turkmenistan became independent in late 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the only gas pipelines in Turkmenistan led north to Russia. Turkmenistan was exporting gas to Russia for most of the years after independence, but in 2024 the latest agreement between the two countries expired and both countries indicated they would not renew Turkmen gas exports. The first post-Soviet pipeline built in Turkmenistan connected to Iran. That pipeline started operations at the end of 1997. Another pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran was launched in 2010. The two pipelines have a combined capacity to carry some 20 bcm, but a pricing dispute between Turkmenistan and Iran in late 2016 led Turkmenistan to...

1 year ago

Starlink internet

The Twilight of Starlink in Kazakhstan?

For every country in the world, the appearance of the internet has presented vast possibilities but also formidable challenges. This was especially true in Central Asia where the governments are obsessed with controlling information that can be accessed by the public. Kazakhstan is unique among the Central Asian states in that the Kazakh government has expended significant energy and resources to make Kazakhstan a modern country with a tech savvy population. Control over the internet remains an issue and has sparked a debate in Kazakhstan about the use of foreign telecommunications satellites. Countrywide Connections In late 2024, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Digital Development stirred controversy by proposing new regulations on imports of telecommunications equipment. One proposal would ban the use of equipment from foreign companies that do not have control centers inside Kazakhstan. In December 2024, the Digital Development Ministry specifically named Inmarsat, Thuraya, Iridium, and Starlink as targets for a usage ban. Kazakhstan actually has a national security law that “prohibits the establishment and operation of communication networks within Kazakhstan if their control centers are based outside the country.” However, Kazakhstan is a large country with most of its population living in roughly the eastern third of its territory. Cities, towns, and villages scattered across the western two-thirds of Kazakhstan are poorly connected to the internet and Kazakh authorities started discussions with Musk’s SpaceX about use of Starlink, a subsidiary of SpaceX with a network of satellites. In October 2023, Kazakh authorities “introduced broadband internet in ten rural schools using Starlink technology in a test mode.” The pilot project envisioned sending Starlink terminals to 2,000 schools. By April 2024, the system was already connecting 447 rural schools to the internet, and by August the number had climbed to 1,731 schools. Kill Switch Required In November 2023, the director of the Ministry of Digital Development’s Telecommunications Committee, Dias Tolegenov, warned citizens that private use of Starliink terminals was illegal in Kazakhstan. The “current version” of Starlink “violates current (Kazakh) legislation, as it does not meet safety requirements,” Telugenov said. This ban is still In effect. In May 2024, the director of Kazakhstan’s Kokterek Space Communications Center, Roman Ermashov, reiterated that according to Kazakhstan’s laws, “projects using foreign satellite communication systems in non-geostationary satellite orbits,” such as Starlink, must have “a gateway (interface) station on the territory of Kazakhstan.” SpaceX refused to install the station in Kazakhstan. “This is about safety,” Ermashov said, “Because if any information security incident occurs, such as a data leak, everyone turns to the state.” This comment by Ermashov cuts to the heart of the matter. During the mass unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022, authorities cut off the internet around the country to prevent protesters from coordinating their actions or releasing information about what was happening to the world outside Kazakhstan. Later that same year, Tajikistan ‘s government cut off the internet connection to the eastern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast during unrest, and Uzbek authorities did the same to the western Karakalpakstan Republic when violence broke out...

1 year ago

Organized Crime

Did Kyrgyzstan’s Security Chief Order an Assassination?

The head of Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB), Kamchybek Tashiyev, has been waging a campaign against organized criminal groups in his country for the last few years and it seems he believes in fighting fire with fire. Speaking to representatives of Kyrgyzstan’s education sector on January 16, Tashiyev referred to the fight against organized crime, specifically mentioning the slain reputed crime boss Kamchybek Kolbayev. “I had to take the decision to liquidate the thief in law,” Tashiyev said, “for the sake of the state. And I made this decision, and we eliminated him.” He quickly regretted such candor after his comments received wide coverage and has revised his version of events leading up to Kolbayev’s killing. The Gangster Kamchybek Kolbayev, aka Kolya Kyrgyz, was allegedly the kingpin of Kyrgyzstan’s criminal world. The term “thief in law” originated in Soviet prisons among inmates who were high-ranking figures in organized criminal groups. This tradition continued after the fall of the USSR and the “Brothers’ Circle” of top thieves in law connects criminal organizations in former Soviet republics. Kolbayev seemed indeed to be a thief in law and according to the U.S. State Department, he was part of the Brothers’ Circle, and back in 2007 it was said that Kolbayev was the “leader of the most influential criminal group” in Kyrgyzstan. Kolbayev had been imprisoned more than once, though his prison conditions were not harsh. While in prison in late 2020, a video was posted of Kolbayev and other prisoners enjoying a small feast and singing. He seemed untouchable. The Raid On October 4, 2023, the GKNB’s special Alfa unit raided the Blonder Pub in Bishkek, looking for Kolbayev. Reports from that day said the GKNB intended to detain Kolbayev as a suspect in murder of another criminal figure in July 2022. According to the GKNB, Kolbayev offered armed resistance and was shot dead when the GKNB commandos returned fire. Given the lenient treatment Kolbayev had so often received from Kyrgyz authorities, it seemed strange he chose to open fire on law enforcement officers rather than submit to being gently detained, as he had been before, and possibly incarcerated in luxury prison conditions. However, Kolbayev was an odious figure in Kyrgyzstan, greatly feared by many and the circumstances of his death did not seem to matter to most people, so long as he was gone. A ‘Hit’? On January 16, Tashiyev explained to deputy education and science ministers, university rectors, and other directors of institutions of higher learning that the organized crime structure in Kyrgyzstan had grown strong and had extended across the country. Tashiyev said the criminal network was preying upon businesses and individuals. “We were forced to take necessary measures,” Tashiyev declared, and then stated he had given the order for Kolbayev to be eliminated. He added that the GKNB’s campaign against organized crime was a success. Kyrgyzstan had become “the only country in Central Asia… and probably in the post-Soviet countries, that does not have organized crime.” It...

1 year ago

Oil and Gas

KazMunayGaz Looking to Buy Another European Oil Refinery

Kazakhstan’s KazMunayGaz (KMG) is seeking to acquire an oil refinery in Bulgaria from Russia’s LUKoil at a bargain price. The purchase of Lukoil Neftohim Burgas, the largest oil refinery in the Balkans, would, according to some media sources, more than double [KMG’s] European refining capacity.” KMG reported a bid of $1 billion for the refinery, which one outlet stated “seems small.” Pressured Out The Burgas refinery was built in the early 1960s and “joined the LUKoil Group” in 1999. The European Union decision to impose a ban on Russian oil imports after the Kremlin launched its full-scale war on Ukraine deprived Lukoil Nefthohim Burgas of its major source of crude oil. According to a Financial Times report from November 2024, the Bulgarian government pressured LUKoil to sell the refinery, hitting the Russian company “with a 60% tax on profits in an effort to force out its owners” and prohibiting the “export of Russian crude-based products from Lukoil Neftohim Burgas.” In turn, LUKoil complained about “discriminatory laws and other unfair, biased political decisions toward the refinery.” KMG reportedly lost interest in the refinery in late 2024, but BNN Bloomberg reported on January 7 that the Kazakh company was still among the bidders for the Bulgarian refinery. Advantage KMG When the EU banned Russian oil imports, Lukoil Nefthohim Burgas compensated by purchasing oil from Kazakhstan and the Middle East. If KMG buys the Bulgarian refinery, presumably most or all of the crude processed there will come from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan exported some 70.5 million tons of oil in 2023, and expects figures will be slightly less in 2024, some 68.8 million tons, due to maintenance at the Tengiz and Kashagan fields. Some 80% of those oil exports are shipped from Kazakhstan through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline to Russia’s Black Sea port at Novorossiysk. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU purchased about 50% of the Kazakh oil shipped through the CPC pipeline, but that amount has risen to 80% since the ban on Russian oil imports was imposed. Kazakhstan is also increasing the amount of oil it exports through Azerbaijan to Georgia’s Black Sea port at Batumi, where KMG subsidiary KazTransOil owns the oil terminal. Kazakhstan has a deal to ship 1.5 million tons of oil annually through Azerbaijan, but Kazakh Energy Minister Abdusalam Satkaliyev said in November 2024 that his country was looking to boost that to 20 million tons. Kazakhstan currently has two Aframax-class oil tankers (deadweight 80,000 tons each) operating in the Black Sea, but plans to bring this number to 12 during the coming years. The Lukoil Nefthohim Burgas refinery has a capacity to process some seven tons of oil annually. KMG International already owns two oil refineries in Romania. The Petromidia refinery, with an annual capacity of some five million tons, is located 20 kilometers from the Black Sea port city of Constanta, and the much smaller and older Vega refinery, north of Bucharest, with an annual capacity of some 350,000 tons....

1 year ago

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