Our People > Bruce Pannier

Bruce Pannier

Bruce Pannier is a Central Asia Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the advisory board at the Caspian Policy Center, and a longtime journalist and correspondent covering Central Asia. For a decade, he appeared regularly on the Majlis podcast for RFE/RL, and now broadcasts his Spotlight on Central Asia podcast in partnership with The Times of Central Asia.

Articles

Oil and Gas

Turkmenistan’s Gas Swap Deals Could Be Collateral Damage from Israeli-Iran Conflict

Turkmenistan has the fourth largest reserves of natural gas in the world, but the country has found it difficult to export substantial volumes. Lack of export pipelines are one of the problems and it seemed Turkmenistan had partially solved this dilemma by arranging gas swap deals. Unfortunately for Turkmenistan, these deals involve Iran as the key country, and the Israeli-Iran conflict sheds new doubt on the ability of Iran to fulfill its part in the swap arrangements. So Close Turkmenistan signed a deal to supply 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to Iraq in late October 2024. It was the first major gas export deal Turkmenistan had signed in nearly two decades. That last big agreement was signed with China in 2006. It involved building four gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to China to eventually carry a combined 85 bcm of gas, 65 bcm of which would be Turkmen gas. Since the pipelines cross through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, both of those countries are allotted 10 bcm each of the capacity for their gas exports. The fourth branch that would have carried 30 bcm of Turkmen gas has not been built, leaving Turkmen gas exports to China averaging 35 bcm per year. At the moment, China is the only major customer for Turkmen gas. The second largest buyer of Turkmen gas is Uzbekistan, which only purchases about 2 bcm. Not even 20 years ago, Russia was purchasing more than 40 bcm of Turkmen gas, but by 2023 that had dwindled to 5.5 bcm, still leaving Russia as the second largest buyer of Turkmen gas. In July 2024, after negotiations over price broke down, the two parties chose not to renew that contract. That made the agreement with Iraq all the more important for Turkmenistan. However, there are no pipelines connecting the two countries. Yet So Far The Turkmen-Iraqi agreement calls for Turkmenistan to ship 10 bcm of gas to Iran, with Iran then sending 10 bcm of its gas to Iraq. Iran needs gas for its northern regions that are not connected to the domestic pipeline network that sources gas from the fields of in the south of the country. Turkmenistan has two pipelines to export gas to Iran. Both were built after independence in 1991, and could carry up to a combined 20 bcm. Since January 2017, when the Turkmen government made good on a threat to cut off Iran over unpaid bills for gas, almost no gas has been shipped through these pipelines. The first task is to perform maintenance, repairs, and upgrades on these pipelines so that Turkmenistan can physically send 10 bcm of gas to Iran. The Iranian pipeline to Iraq is functional. Iran was exporting gas to Iraq, but international sanctions on Iran hindered Iraq’s ability to pay for that gas. Prior to the agreement with Iraq, Turkmenistan signed a contract in early July 2024 with Iranian officials for the transfer of gas. It is unclear how far along Turkmenistan is in performing its pipeline...

12 months ago

Electoral Reform

Back to the Old System for Kyrgyzstan’s Future Parliamentary Elections

On June 9, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov signed the law on amendments to the procedures on electing members of parliament. There are some positive and some controversial changes, one of the most significant of which is the diminished role for political parties. Structurally, the new legislation creates 30 electoral districts in Kyrgyzstan. Each district will elect three parliamentary deputies, with the three candidates receiving the most votes becoming the deputies from their district. Currently, there are 90 seats in Kyrgyzstan’s parliament. That number will remain. According to the new law, one of the three candidates from each territorial constituency must be a woman. Kyrgyzstan has had a gender quota rule in place since 2007 whereby at least 30% of the members of parliament should be women. However, in reality that percentage has never been reached. Currently, only 20 of the 90 of the deputies in Kyrgyzstan’s parliament are women. Under the new legislation, a minimum 33% quota for women is guaranteed. Another change dispenses with by-elections in the event an elected deputy steps down from their post. If a seat is vacated, the candidate from that district who received the fourth most votes in elections will receive the empty seat. If the deputy vacating their seat is a woman, the female candidate who received the next highest number of votes in that electoral district will fill the seat. MP Ulan Primov, one of the authors of the amendments, said Kyrgyzstan has spent nearly 200 million som (about $2.29 million) on by-elections since the 2021 parliamentary elections. One of the most controversial changes is the decision to revert entirely to a single-mandate selection of candidates. Kyrgyzstan elected all its deputies via the single-mandate system in the 1995, 2000, and 2005 parliamentary elections. Parties also ran candidates, but in the 1995 elections, 67 of the 105 seats went to independents, in 2000, 73 of the 105 seats were won by independents, and in 2005, after changes to parliament’s structure, 47 of the 75 places in parliament went to independents. In 2007, the system changed, and deputies were elected by party lists. This led to the first-ever ruling party in Kyrgyzstan’s history, the Ak Jol party of then-President Kurmanbek Bakiyev which took 71 of the 90 seats in parliament in the 2007 elections. Parliament’s structure was changed to 120 seats in 2010. The parliamentary elections that year, and in 2015 and 2020 were conducted using party lists. In the last parliamentary elections in November 2021, Kyrgyzstan had introduced a split system whereby 36 deputies were elected in single-mandate districts and the remaining 54 deputies by party lists. In an interview with state media outlet Kabar in February 2025, President Japarov spoke about the coming changes to election legislation, saying, “Perhaps in 40-50 years, if our people and politicians are ready, we will move to a party system of government.” It is a curious comment considering the other Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, all use party lists to elect deputies in...

1 year ago

agricultural risks

Wildlife Boom Pits Nature Against Farmers in Kazakhstan

Last year, Kazakhstan experienced the worst flooding the area had seen in some 80 years. Reservoirs and creeks that had been dry for decades were suddenly filled. This year, winter was mild, and spring arrived early, creating ideal conditions for an explosion of fauna. The Saiga The unique-looking saiga antelope has roamed the vast steppe of the area that is now Kazakhstan for millennia. About 25 years ago, there were concerns the animal, which usually numbered in the millions, was headed toward extinction. Widespread poaching started after independence in late 1991, and by 2005 there were less than 40,000 saiga left in the country. A ban on hunting saiga helped boost the population to some 250,000 by the mid-2010s, but then bacteria spread through the herds, greatly reducing their numbers again. Renewed efforts to increase the saiga population proved successful, however, perhaps too successful. By 2021 their number had risen to some 842,000, and by the summer of 2022, there were more than 1.3 million saiga antelope in Kazakhstan. Officials were warning back in 2022 that the saiga were competing with farmers’ herds for pastureland. Kazakhstan’s then-Ecology Minister Serikkali Brekeshev noted at the time that the growth rate was worrying as the saiga population was only some 110,000 in 2016. Brekeshev suggested a cull of 80,000 of the antelope was necessary. However, Kazakhstan was receiving a lot of international praise for bringing the saiga off the endangered list. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev reprimanded Brekeshev and ordered the ecology minister to find another way to deal with the problem. Limited culling of saiga was allowed starting in October 2023 but was again banned in February 2024. The saiga population was back in the news at the end of May this year. Kazakhstan’s Mazhilis, the lower house of parliament, discussed the issue on May 27. Deputy Ecology Minister Nurken Sharbiyev told a Mazhilis’ committee on agriculture that the saiga population continued to proliferate, numbering some 2.8 million in 2024 and now totaling nearly 4 million. Herd owners in West Kazakhstan Province say the saiga are taking over pastureland in at least seven districts. There are also concerns that the saiga are mixing with cows and sheep in the fields and infected saiga might be spreading diseases among the herders’ animals. Farmers in Akmola Province have formed groups to try to chase the saiga from agricultural fields but with mixed success. Locals complain that the large herds block roads and linger even when drivers honk their horns. Smaller creatures than the Saiga are also thriving due to the favorable weather conditions. The Usual Suspects The combination of abundant water and warm weather has proven efficacious to the spread of some insects. Locusts are a perennial threat to crops across Central Asia. This year, in some parts of Kazakhstan, they are spreading so quickly that the authorities are having difficulties combating them. Farmers in Aktobe Province say equipment for battling locusts has been breaking down and the pesticides being used are not producing the desired...

1 year ago

Kyrgyz-Kazakh Border

A Resolution to Kyrgyzstan’s Last Border Problem?

In April, Kyrgyzstan signed a border delimitation agreement with southern neighbor Tajikistan, ending a long-running and at times violent feud along the two countries’ frontier. Now Kyrgyzstan is taking steps to resolve its border disagreements with its northern neighbor Kazakhstan. The Joint Project Representatives from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan met in Bishkek on May 22 to discuss the impending construction of an industrial transport-logistics complex on their border. Kazakhstan is building similar complexes along its borders with other neighboring countries (China, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan). The idea for the Kazakh-Kyrgyz facility was approved in May 2024, and work is scheduled to start next year. Economically, it is not a huge project, but symbolically, it could be a breakthrough ending years of aggravation connected to the country’s border crossings. The aim of the complex is “to jointly produce, store and sell medicines, textiles, as well as dairy, meat, and vegetable products.” In itself, the venture is laudable, but the location of the complex is what is interesting. This trade and logistics complex will occupy 3.6 square kilometers of territory in Kazakhstan and 4 square kilometers in Kyrgyzstan at a place not far from the Ak-Tilek (Kyrgyzstan) - Karasu (Kazakhstan) border crossing. Kyrgyzstan’s Ak-Tilek and the other four border crossings with Kazakhstan have been in the news for more than seven years due to long lines of trucks on the Kyrgyz side waiting to cross into Kazakhstan. This has become a sore point in what have usually been good relations between the two countries. The Legacy of Almazbek Atambayev Ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated in late 1991 and the five Central Asian states became independent, relations between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been the best among any two states in Central Asia. This was evident along their border, which compared to the others among the Central Asian states remained lightly guarded and relatively easy to cross. That changed in autumn 2017, due to an incident that was unrelated to the actual Kazakh-Kyrgyz border. Kyrgyzstan was preparing for a presidential election scheduled for October 15, 2017. The president at the time, Almazbek Atambayev, was leaving office, in accordance with the country’s constitution that permitted a president only a single term. Atambayev had picked a successor, Sooronbai Jeenbekov. The leading opponent was popular businessman Omurbek Babanov, who was polling ahead of Jeenbekov in the run-up to the election. In mid-September, Babanov visited Kazakhstan and met with then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Atambayev was furious. On October 7, he said that the “Kazakh authorities want to force their candidate on us.” Atambayev criticized the way Kazakhstan spent revenue, hinting that average Kazakh citizens did not seem to enjoy the fruits of the vast wealth of the country. On October 10, without warning, Kazakhstan closed its crossing points to traffic from Kyrgyzstan. Later, Kazakhstan’s security service said the restrictions were part of a planned border operation and claimed to have registered 112 violations in less than 48 hours. As the line of trucks grew on the Kyrgyz side of...

1 year ago

Social Media

Tajikistan Decriminalizes Likes and Other Reactions to Provocative Social Media Posts

Tajik citizens need no longer fear that they will be imprisoned for clicking “like” on social media posts that the Tajik authorities do not like. Among several laws that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon signed on May 14 was one that decriminalized liking posts on social networks that originate from individuals or organizations the Tajik government considers extremist. Crackdown on Social Media In 2018, President Rahmon signed amendments to Article 179 of the Criminal Code, making it a crime to repost, comment favorably on, or like posts that, in the opinion of Tajik authorities, are public calls to commit or justify acts of violence and terrorism. According to that law, those found guilty of liking such posts face up to 15 years in prison. Since the law came into effect, 1,507 Tajik citizens have been imprisoned. The Tajik authorities often have a broad interpretation of what constitutes public calls to commit or justify serious crimes or acts of terrorism, but it usually boils down to comments that are critical of the Tajik government. Weeks after the law was passed, Alijon Sharipov, a resident of the Vakhsh district in Tajikistan’s southern Khatlon Region, was sentenced to 9.5 years in prison for reposting a video of an interview with the leader of the banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Muhiddin Kabiri. In July 2019, Ibrohim Kosimov from the western Tajik city of Panjakent received the same prison sentence for “pushing ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ on the posts belong[ing] to opposition figures.” An activist of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Rustam Mamajonov, was sentenced to seven years in prison in June 2021 for reposting a video of Sharofiddin Gadoyev, a leader of the banned organization, Group 24. Mamajonov, who was 59 years old at the time, said he did not know how the video appeared on his Facebook page and the repost was a mistake caused by his poor knowledge of how to use the platform. Tajik political activist Abdullo Shamsiddin was deported from Germany back to Tajikistan in January 2023 and was convicted weeks later in March of sedition and sentenced to seven years in prison. Shamsiddin’s trial was held behind closed doors and it was difficult to obtain details about the case, but apparently, he was convicted for clicking “like” on a social network post, though there is no information about what was in the post. Shamsiddinov’s case shows the social network use of Tajik citizens who are outside Tajikistan is also being monitored by Tajik authorities. A Strange Change of Heart The reasons for the decision to decriminalize “posting a like or other sign on social networks,” as it officially reads in the law Rahmon signed, is unclear. Certainly, rights groups have called on the Tajik authorities to overturn the decision to criminalize likes, comments, or reposts of what to the Tajik government are undesirable posts on social networks. However, for years Tajikistan’s government has ignored appeals from rights organizations, the United Nations, and individual governments over the Tajik authorities’ rights abuses....

1 year ago

Trade Routes

The Abu Dhabi-Kazakhstan Connection

Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan led a delegation of officials and businessmen from the United Arab Emirates on a visit to Kazakhstan to attend the Kazakhstan-UAE Business Forum on May 12. During the visit, Kazakhstan and the UAE signed deals worth some $5 billion and not surprisingly, three of the nine agreements were with Abu Dhabi Ports Group. Building a new trade route to the south Abu Dhabi Ports Group (AD Ports Group) has been leading the way in connecting Kazakhstan to the Middle East, and in turn, the UAE company is looking to take advantage of Kazakhstan’s key position along the Middle Corridor trade route. In early August 2023, Davud Tafti, the head of AD Ports Group subsidiary Simatech Shipping & Forwarding, met with Kazakhstan’s Minister of Trade Serik Zhumangarin to discuss the shortest direct route for shipping “Kazakh export cargo the markets of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Pakistan, India and the coast of East Africa.” The route goes from Kazakhstan’s Caspian port of Kuryk to the Iranian Caspian port at Amirabad. From there goods are shipped to the Iranian Persian Gulf port at Bandar Abbas and loaded onto ships heading to UAE ports at Khalifa and Fujairah. The total time from Kuryk to Bandar Abbas is three days. By the time Tafti and Zhumangarin met, AD Ports Group had already purchased four ships with a capacity of 7.500 tons each for transportation of bulk, container, and general cargo along Caspian Sea routes. Tafti said there were plans to buy ten more similar vessels with Amirabad being used as their home port. Simatech Shipping & Forwarding also bought two barges, each capable of transporting 350 trucks, with plans to purchase 1,000 trucks for shipping goods between Amirabad and Bandar Abbas. AD Ports Group signed a strategic partnership agreement with state oil and gas company KazMunaiGas (KMG) in January 2023 aimed at developing Kazakhstan’s tanker fleet in the Caspian and Black seas. The parties formed a joint venture called Caspian Integrated Maritime Solutions (CIMS). CIMS announced in December 2023 that working with KMG subsidiary KazMorTransFlot, Kazakhstan’s national shipping company, it had acquired two oil tankers for use in the Caspian Sea. AD Ports Group reached an agreement in January 2024 to construct a facility on Kazakhstan’s Caspian coast for building and repairing ships. Work started in early 2025 on two container vessels, each with the capacity to carry more than 500 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) and built especially for use on the Caspian Sea. AD Ports Group also formed a joint venture with state railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy in December 2023 with the aim of improving logistics operations for transferring goods using rail and maritime routes. At the moment, the CIMS route is by far the fastest way for Kazakhstan to trade with the Middle East. In May 2025, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy sent the first shipment of wheat via Turkmenistan and Iran to Bandar Abbas, and from there by sea...

1 year ago

Electricity supply

Kazakhstan Has a Deal for Tajik Electricity, Now the Wait Begins

In the latest sign of Central Asian regional cooperation, Kazakhstan has signed a long-term deal to import electricity from Tajikistan. However, that electricity might not reach Kazakhstan anytime soon, as there are some important details that need to be worked out by Tajikistan before supplies can begin. Kazakhstan’s energy problems Kazakhstan has been experiencing severe energy deficits for several years now, particularly during winter months. Kazakh Senator Suyindik Aldashev said in late February this year that Kazakhstan would be short some 5.7 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity in 2025, which would be a 46% increase in the country’s electricity deficit compared to 2024. Kazakhstan was forced to import electricity from Russia during the winter of 2024 to help alleviate energy shortages. These shortages contributed to Kazakhstan's decision to hold a referendum to approve the construction of the country’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). To date, however, there has been no announcement of which company will build the NPP, so additional electricity from that source could be a decade or more away. This has led Kazakhstan to explore importing energy resources from its Central Asian neighbors. The head of Turkmenistan’s Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov just visited Kazakhstan and met with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev with Turkmen gas exports to its northern neighbor high on the agenda. Kazakhstan has been in discussions with Tajikistan about electricity shipments for months, and the agreement was finalized toward the end of April. Rogun The source of the electricity Tajikistan intends to export to Kazakhstan is the Rogun Hydropower Plant (HPP) on the Vakhsh River, some 110 kilometers east of the Tajik capital Dushanbe. The Rogun HPP has a history of controversy. It was conceived in the 1960s when Tajikistan was a Soviet Republic. Construction on the project started in 1976, but not much had been done by the time the USSR collapsed in late 1991, and work ground to halt shortly thereafter. Russian company RUSAL signed an agreement in 2004 to invest more than $1 billion and finish building Rogun, but disputes over the project led the Tajik government to cancel the contract in 2007. One of the main differences between the two parties was RUSAL’s insistence the dam wall at Rogun be no higher than 285 meters, whereas the Tajik authorities wanted the original height of 335 meters. At 285 meters, the HPP’s output would have been 2400 megawatts (MW), while at 335 meters, the output would be 3600 MW. Russia’s Inter RAO EES was in talks with Tajikistan about the Rogun project in 2008, but in the end, nothing came from those negotiations. With no hope of foreign backing, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon started portraying Rogun as a project of national salvation, the key to energy independence. Rahmon’s government called on citizens to help finance construction of the HPP and when public support in the poorest country in Central Asia proved insufficient, citizens were pressured into buying shares in the project. The government in neighboring Uzbekistan objected to Rogun’s construction,...

1 year ago

Identity

Only Turkmen Names Allowed

Ethnic minorities in Turkmenistan are reportedly being told they must give their newborn children tradition Turkmen names. The process of “Turkmenization” has been underway in Turkmenistan for many years, but until recently it had not affected the proper names of non-Turkmen citizens. According to a recent report from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Turkmen service, known locally as Azatlyk, officials in the eastern Lebap Province were previously urging the Uzbek and Tajik communities in the province to give their newborns Turkmen names. Now this is no longer a suggestion, but a requirement. Lebap borders Uzbekistan. Many Uzbeks and Tajiks lived in this area long before Soviet mapmakers finally drew borders that after the collapse of the USSR in late 1991 became the frontier of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan for Turkmen [caption id="attachment_30930" align="aligncenter" width="1115"] stat.gov.tm[/caption] The credibility of official statistics from the Turkmen government has been called into question many times over the years, and the size and ethnic make-up of the population are no exception. According to the most recent census figures (released in 2023), Turkmenistan’s population is just over seven million people, though the real figure is almost certainly less than that, and could be as low as four or five million. Turkmenistan has been experiencing significant economic problems for some ten years, and many citizens have left the country. For example, as of December 2024, more than 205,000 Turkmen citizens are officially registered as living In Turkey, and that figure could be three times higher or more, including those Turkmen citizens who are illegally residing there. The census released by the Turkmen authorities lists the populations of 14 specific ethnic minority groups. Roughly one million Turkmen citizens are ethnic minorities. The top three are Uzbeks, numbering 642,476, Russians, 114,447, and Baluch, 87,503. These figures might be lower soon, however, at least officially. Authorities in Lebap are also reportedly recommending people from non-Turkmen groups give their nationality as Turkmen in their documents. Being an ethnic Turkmen matters when seeking employment in Turkmenistan, so there is an added incentive for minorities to claim they are Turkmen in official documents. Turkmenistan would not be the first country in Central Asia to have rules on naming newborns. Authorities in Tajikistan banned children from being given foreign names some eight years ago. The Language and Terminology Committee of Tajikistan’s Academy of Science produced a list of more than 3,000 approved Tajik names for children; however, that rule applies only to ethnic Tajiks. Minority groups in Tajikistan are free to name their children as they wish. Azatlyk reports that the authorities are also warning ethnic Turkmen about giving their children non-Turkmen names. Turkish names were becoming popular among Turkmen in Turkmenistan, and some Turkmen families living near Uzbekistan were giving their children Uzbek names. The difficulties in obtaining information from Turkmenistan make it difficult to know if the naming policy being enforced in Lebap exists in other parts of the country. Turkmenistan’s government has, to the greatest extent possible, sealed the country off from...

1 year ago

Human rights

Complaint against Tajik Officials Filed with International Criminal Court

For many years now, Tajikistan’s government has been ruling the country as it wishes and ignoring all criticism of the many rights violations being committed in Tajikistan. On April 10, two NGOs -- the Ukrainian Fund of International Volunteers and Freedom for Eurasia -- and the banned Tajik opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) filed a complaint with the international Criminal Court (ICC). The complaint accuses Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and his government of committing crimes against humanity. IRPT leader Muhiddin Kabiri said, “We hope the (ICC), (after considering) our complaint, will begin procedures for opening a criminal case and arresting the perpetrators, including the top leadership of Tajikistan.” A Big Problem That’s Getting Worse Evidence provided in the complaint covers the period from 2002 to 2024, but events only in the last few years tell the story of the impunity with which Tajik authorities have acted toward their citizens inside and outside Tajikistan. In May 2022, the Tajik government responded to peaceful protests in eastern Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) by implementing a counter-terrorism operation that saw dozens, at least, of locals killed, and hundreds detained. Tajik authorities arrested people who were not involved in the protests: lawyers, activists, artists, and journalists. More than a dozen Pamiris were detained in Russia and forcibly deported back to Tajikistan where they were immediately detained and soon after, convicted and imprisoned. GBAO is home to the Pamiris, a group of more than 200,000 who have been living in the remote Pamir Mountains for centuries. They are Shiite Muslims, not Sunnis as most ethnic Tajiks are. Pamiris have their own languages and a unique culture. GBAO has been a restive area since Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, mainly because the Pamiris prefer to govern their territory according to their own age-old customs and have been resistant to the government’s attempts to exert control over the region. Less than three years since the counter-terrorism operation, Pamiri culture is in danger of disappearing. Pamiris are followers of the Aga Khan. During more than 30 years of Tajikistan’s independence, the recently deceased Aga Khan IV Prince Karim spent more than $1 billion on projects in GBAO, which is the poorest region in Tajikistan. Since 2022, the government has seized or is currently trying to seize nearly everything the Aga Khan Development Network built or established in GBAO. The hotels, schools, including the University of Central Asia in the GBAO capital Khorog, a medical center, the park in Khorog, and other objects financed by the Aga Khan are all coming under state control. Locals are forbidden from having portraits of the Aga Khan in their homes. Rahmon is preparing his eldest son, Rustam Emomali, to become Tajikistan’s next president. In advance of the widely-expected transfer of power, Rahmon has been clearing away any potential opposition. The IRPT was banned and declared by a Tajik court to be an extremist group a decade ago, despite the party having been part of the government during the previous 18...

1 year ago

Khujand Summit

Historic Khujand Summit Paves Way for Peace in the Ferghana Valley

The presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan gathered in the northern Tajik city of Khujand on March 31 for a meeting that is decades overdue. Among the agreements the three signed were one fixing the border where their three countries meet. Prior to Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s arrival, Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov and Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon exchanged ratified documents of the border agreement between the two countries. Rahmon and Japarov, via video link, also launched the Datka-Sughd power transmission line, a major step in the CASA-1000 project that aims for both their countries to supply electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan. These agreements might not seem monumental, but they represent a major departure from the troubled past the three governments have had in their border areas. Trouble in Paradise The three countries share the Ferghana Valley, an area roughly the size of Costa Rica that is home to more than 20% of Central Asia’s population. Since the Central Asian states became independent in late 1991, the Ferghana Valley has also been the region’s hotbed of tension. The Ferghana Valley is the cradle of ancient Central Asian civilization. Some living there today say it was the location of the Garden of Eden, and it is not difficult to see why. The Valley is abundant in fruits and vegetables and has extensive arable and grazing land. It is surrounded by mountains to the north, east, and south, and the rivers that flow from these mountains supply ample water. Since independence, the Ferghana Valley has been the most dangerous place in all of Central Asia. The arbitrary borders Soviet mapmakers drew to divide Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan left many problems for the three after they became independent states. Agreement on where Kyrgyz-Uzbek border is came only in late 2022, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan just signed the agreement on delimitation of their border on March 12. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan The roots of Islam lie deep in the Ferghana Valley. There were already calls for Shari’a law in Uzbekistan’s section of the valley just months after Uzbekistan declared its independence. The most serious security threat to Central Asia to date originated in the Ferghana Valley in 1999 and 2000. In early August 1999, a group of some 20 armed militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) appeared in southern Kyrgyzstan, captured a village, and took the villagers and subsequent government negotiators hostage. The IMU leaders were from the eastern Uzbek city of Namangan. They were connected to the protests in Uzbekistan in late 1991 and later joined the Islamic opposition in neighboring Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war. The peace accord that ended the civil war called for opposition fighters to either join the Tajik armed forces or disarm. There was no longer any need for the opposition’s foreign fighters, and the final phase of disarmament was underway by the summer of 1999. In mid-August, the Kyrgyz government paid a ransom for the hostages’ release and the departure of the IMU militants, but this...

1 year ago

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