Ecology - The Times Of Central Asia

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Aral Sea

Aral Sea Restoration Could Prevent 605 Million Tons of CO2 Emissions

The drying of the Aral Sea has created another environmental problem: according to a study, exposed lakebed sediments released about 748 million tons of CO2 into the atmosphere between 1960 and 2022. Organic carbon remains stored in the sediments, and restoring part of the water cover could prevent the release of another 605 million tons of CO2. This gives efforts to restore the Aral Sea region a new climate dimension. The study, conducted by an international team of researchers led by scientists from Spain’s Centre for Advanced Studies of Blanes (CEAB-CSIC), was published in Science on July 16. The findings add another consideration to restoration efforts already underway across the region, from refilling part of the sea in Kazakhstan to planting saxaul and rehabilitating degraded land in Uzbekistan. The Aral Sea’s Carbon Legacy When the Aral Sea was still a fully-fledged body of water, plants and algae absorbed carbon dioxide, while some organic matter settled on the lakebed. As the water retreated, those sediments were exposed to the air, organic matter began to decompose, and the stored carbon started returning to the atmosphere as CO2. At the same time, winds carry salt and dust from the newly formed Aralkum Desert, spreading the consequences of the sea’s disappearance far beyond its former shoreline. In 2022, researchers conducted an expedition to the dried Aral Sea bed, collecting sediment samples and measuring how much CO2 was being released. Combined with satellite data, this allowed them to estimate carbon losses as the sea retreated. According to the researchers’ calculations, exposed sediments lost about 204 million tons of carbon between 1960 and 2022, equivalent to roughly 748 million tons of CO2. New vegetation growing on the dried lakebed has offset less than 1% of those emissions. A significant amount of organic carbon remains in the sediments. The researchers estimate that restoring water cover could prevent the release of another 605 million tons of CO2. The authors also considered the economics of such an effort. Using 2024 voluntary carbon market prices for land-use and forestry projects as a benchmark, they estimate that the avoided emissions could potentially be worth $3.6 billion to $18 billion in carbon credits. That money could theoretically become one source of funding for ecosystem restoration. Researchers estimate that about $9.7 billion in water-management improvements could increase inflows enough to restore roughly half of the area covered by the Aral Sea in 1960, while potentially generating about 323 million tons of CO2-equivalent carbon credits. Restoring the Entire Aral Sea Is No Longer the Goal Under current conditions, fully restoring the sea is widely considered unrealistic. The central issue is water. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya flow through several Central Asian countries. Significantly increasing the amount of water reaching the Aral Sea would be impossible without basin-wide agreements, irrigation modernization, and reductions in water losses. This is why restoration of the Aral Sea remains a regional issue rather than solely an Uzbek or Kazakh one. Central Asian countries coordinate part of this work...

Regional Ecological Summit

Regional Ecological Summit in Astana Produces Ecology Declaration and Broader Regional Agenda

Central Asian leaders have adopted the Astana declaration on ecology and sustainable development, giving the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana a formal political outcome while a wider package of biodiversity, climate, and pollution initiatives takes shape around it. Kazakhstan’s environment ministry says the five heads of state adopted the document, titled “Ecological Solidarity of Central Asia,” during the April 22 to 24 Summit. The declaration sets out a common regional position on several of Central Asia’s biggest environmental pressures. According to the ministry summary, the text calls for closer coordination in climate negotiations, glacier preservation, the mountain agenda, biodiversity, chemical and waste management, plastic pollution, air quality, land degradation, and desertification. It also presents the declaration as a contribution to ecological sustainability, inclusive economic growth, and a sustainable future for the region. Water runs through the document, but the language is careful. The declaration welcomes work on an interstate program to conserve the Caspian Sea and expresses concern about declining water levels and the shallowing of lakes in Central Asia. It also notes Kazakhstan’s proposal for a possible International Water Organization within the United Nations system, but stops short of endorsing its creation. The summit’s outcome does not rest on a single document. On April 24, the United Nations Environment Programme said the Astana meeting had launched new regional partnerships on circular economy and glaciers, while countries established common approaches on biodiversity, climate action, and air pollution. UNEP also said a regional climate and ecology investment portfolio was set up to widen access to international finance for environmental projects. A separate biodiversity track had already produced its own result earlier in the week. On April 22, UNDP in Kazakhstan said Central Asian countries had signed a regional declaration on biodiversity conservation during a high-level plenary session in Astana. According to UNDP, the document envisages an umbrella programme and action plan, as well as a regional resource mobilization plan to be presented at COP17 in Armenia. Outside confirmation of the main declaration has also become clearer. EFE reported on April 22 that the five Central Asian republics had approved the Astana Declaration of Ecological Solidarity, linking it to Tokayev’s focus on water security, the Aral Sea, and the Caspian. Put together, the Astana summit now looks like a broader regional attempt to turn shared ecological pressure into a workable political agenda. The summit’s next test will be whether these declarations and partnerships are followed by funding, coordination, and cross-border implementation.

Aral Sea

Uzbekistan Installs 37 Air Monitoring Stations in Aral Region as Environmental Cooperation Expands

Authorities in the region of Karakalpakstan have installed 37 automated air quality monitoring stations to track pollution levels in the Aral Sea region, according to Uzbekistan’s National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change. The project was implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The system measures fine particulate matter, including PM2.5 and PM10, as well as gases such as carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and hydrogen sulfide. It also records key meteorological indicators, including temperature, humidity, air pressure, and wind speed. Data is transmitted in real time through the Aurisgreentech system, which officials say reduces human error and improves accuracy. During a recent visit to the region, UNDP's representative in Uzbekistan Akiko Fujii reviewed the work of the regional ecology committee's Situation Center, where monitoring results are processed. According to official reports, she also inspected a laboratory equipped to analyze air, water, and soil samples in line with international standards. “The United Nations will continue to support projects aimed at improving the environmental situation in Karakalpakstan,” Fujii said, noting the importance of reliable data in assessing pollution and forecasting ecological risks. The initiative comes as regional cooperation on environmental challenges gains momentum. From April 22 to 24, Astana will host a regional ecological summit bringing together UN agencies, international organizations, and government representatives from Central Asia and the Caspian region. The summit will include a ministerial session led by the World Health Organization focusing on the health impacts of environmental degradation in the Aral Sea area. Discussions are expected to address the links between pollution, public health, and the need for coordinated responses across borders.

Access to Clean Water

Water Stress: Will the Summer of 2026 Become a Turning Point for Central Asia?

The summer of 2026 is projected to be a critical and potentially decisive period for Central Asia in the context of water stress. The region is entering the growing season with significantly lower water reserves in its main river basins, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, compared to previous years. The combined impact of climate change and rising consumption is expected to exacerbate irrigation shortages, threatening crop yields and food security. A Region Under Pressure: Water as a Strategic Factor For Kazakhstan, water is taking on an increasing strategic importance in 2026. The southern regions, Kyzylorda, Turkestan, and Zhambyl, have already entered a phase of persistent low water availability. Estimates suggest that the irrigation deficit could reach up to 1 billion cubic meters. The situation in the Syr Darya basin remains critical. Inflows are expected to fall 3.2 billion cubic meters below normal, and by the start of the growing season, total water volume may reach only 1-2 billion cubic meters, far below demand. The Shardara Reservoir, a key regional storage facility, is currently at roughly half of its design capacity. Uzbekistan faces an even more vulnerable position due to its high population density and large agricultural sector. The flow of the Amu Darya is projected to fall to 65% of its historical norm, putting food stability at risk. Tashkent is accelerating investments in canal reconstruction, as water losses during transport reach up to 40%. Against this backdrop, tensions between upstream and downstream countries could become more pronounced. Kyrgyzstan, acting as the region’s “water tower,” faces a difficult trade-off between energy security and its obligations to downstream neighbors. Low accumulation levels in the Toktogul Reservoir have constrained hydropower generation, leading to winter energy shortages and reduced summer water releases, precisely when Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan require them for irrigation. This cyclical dependency turns each growing season into a complex round of “water-for-electricity” negotiations, with diminishing room for maneuver. Tajikistan faces a similar situation in the Amu Darya basin. The Nurek Hydropower Plant is operating under strict conservation principles as reservoir levels remain several meters below previous norms. For Dushanbe, the priority remains fulfilling the Rogun project, which, under low-water conditions, raises justified concerns among downstream states. These tensions are compounded by the accelerated melting of Pamir glaciers, which currently increases water flows but poses a long-term risk of severe depletion. Turkmenistan is also expected to experience acute water stress in 2026. In the Ahal and Mary regions, pasture degradation and limited irrigation are reducing livestock numbers and grain yields. The government is investing in dredging the Karakum Canal and constructing small desalination plants, but these measures only partially offset declining Amu Darya flows. An additional destabilizing factor is Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal project. By summer 2026, its impact on the Amu Darya basin is expected to become physically noticeable. Estimates state that unregulated water withdrawals could reduce downstream flows by 15-25%. Afghanistan’s absence from regional water-sharing agreements creates a legal vacuum that existing mechanisms cannot address. As a result, Central Asia is...

Oil and Gas

Kashagan and Karachaganak: Will Kazakhstan’s Claims Lead to Changes in the Shareholder Structure?

The beginning of 2026 has been marked by a new round of confrontation between Kazakhstan and the international consortia developing the country’s largest oil and gas fields, North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (Kashagan) and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (Karachaganak). Below is an overview of the current situation and the possible scenarios. Arbitration proceedings initiated in early 2023 have expanded from $16.5 billion to more than $170 billion. Over three years, Kazakhstan has secured preliminary victories on several claims, enough, in my view, to suggest that the era of foreign oil consortia dominating Kazakhstan’s strategic projects may be coming to an end. Ecology and NCOC Violations This week, Bloomberg reported in its article “Oil Majors Seek Arbitration Over $5 Billion Kazakh Sulfur Fine” that the NCOC consortium is filing in international arbitration to challenge a Kazakh court decision to collect 2.3 trillion tenge (KZT). The Bloomberg headline, however, presents the issue inaccurately. Environmental violations, including the excessive storage of approximately 1 million tons of sulfur, were identified during an inspection in March 2023, when the exchange rate stood at 451.71 KZT per $1. The rate later rose to 520-540 and currently stands at around 500 KZT per $1. According to investment forecasts, it may reach 600 KZT per $1 by the end of 2026. As a result, the dollar equivalent of the fine has decreased significantly. At the March 2023 rate, 2.3 trillion KZT amounted to approximately $5.1 billion. At 500 KZT per $1, it equals about $4.6 billion. At 600 KZT per $1, it would fall to roughly $3.8 billion, a difference of about $1.3 billion. After my earlier publications arguing that foreign consortia should be fined in foreign-currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of filing, the proposal was also raised in Parliament. Such an approach would be logical: the consortia export their oil and receive revenue in foreign currency, yet fines are imposed in tenge. After several rounds of appeals, the consortium lost what became the largest environmental dispute in Kazakhstan’s history, initially involving more than 20 systematic violations of environmental legislation. Correspondence between consortium members published in Western media indicated they were aware of the violations but considered remediation and compliance financially costly. NCOC’s annual revenue is approximately $10 billion. Media reports also stated that the consortium offered around $110 million, roughly 50 times less than the fine, for regional social programs in exchange for waiving environmental claims. Neither NCOC nor the Kazakh government confirmed such negotiations. In 2010-2011, similar environmental and tax claims against the Karachaganak consortium resulted in Kazakhstan receiving a 10% stake in the project. The current ownership structure of NCOC is: ENI (Italy) - 16.81% ExxonMobil (U.S.) - 16.81% CNPC (China) - 8.33% INPEX (Japan) - 7.56% TotalEnergies (France) - 16.81% Shell (UK) - 16.81% KazMunayGas (Kazakhstan) - 16.88% Total investment in Phase One of Kashagan is estimated at $60 billion. By analogy with Karachaganak, the environmental fine could hypothetically lead to an increase in Kazakhstan’s share by 5-7 percentage...

Lake Issyk-Kul

Kyrgyzstan Draws International Attention to Climate Risks for Lake Issyk-Kul

Speaking at the World Governments Summit in Dubai on February 4, Bakyt Torobaev, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Water Resources, Agriculture, and Processing Industry, highlighted the growing threat climate change poses to Lake Issyk-Kul, the country’s largest lake, a unique ecological reserve, and one of Central Asia’s leading tourist destinations. Torobaev described Issyk-Kul as a unique ecosystem of regional significance and a vital socioeconomic and environmental resource for Kyrgyzstan. However, in recent decades, the lake has experienced serious climate-related pressures, according to the Ministry of Water Resources. Since the mid-19th century, the lake’s water level has dropped by nearly 14 meters, while its total volume has decreased by approximately 85 billion cubic meters. The number of rivers flowing into the lake has also significantly declined, largely due to melting glaciers and increased agricultural water use. Torobaev warned that further declines in Issyk-Kul’s water level could lead to severe environmental and socioeconomic consequences, including threats to biodiversity, the lake’s tourism potential, and the well-being of the local population. Kyrgyzstan, he said, sees the preservation of Issyk-Kul as part of the broader global climate and water agenda, calling for a shift from short-term measures to long-term, science-based, and investment-driven solutions. He urged the international community to strengthen partnerships in sustainable water resource management, integrate climate, water, and ecosystem approaches, and support joint initiatives aimed at preserving ecologically significant natural sites. In December 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet of Ministers approved the Concept for the Sustainable Development of the Ecological and Economic System of Lake Issyk-Kul until 2030, along with a corresponding Action Plan. The initiative aims to safeguard the lake and its surrounding biosphere from mounting environmental and human pressures while enhancing long-term economic resilience in the region. Torobaev also addressed the broader issue of water scarcity, which is becoming an increasingly critical factor for regional stability, food security, and sustainable development in the context of climate change. As a mountainous country that serves as a key source of Central Asia’s rivers, Kyrgyzstan bears particular responsibility for the sustainability of the region’s water ecosystems, he said, and consistently advances the water agenda at international forums. Also on February 4, Torobaev participated in a Global Councils on SDGs meeting at the summit, where he proposed greater global attention to the challenges facing mountain regions. He said that mountain ecosystems are among the most vulnerable to climate change. Melting glaciers, shifting precipitation patterns, and more frequent extreme weather events pose long-term risks to water resources, agriculture, and energy security in Central Asia and beyond. Kyrgyzstan, he said, advocates for recognizing mountain regions as special zones for sustainable development and ensuring their prioritized access to climate finance, adaptation technologies, and environmental monitoring systems. According to Torobaev, the sustainability of mountain regions is directly linked to the water and food security of millions of people, underscoring the need for systemic and coordinated international responses.