• KGS/USD = 0.01157 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09145 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01157 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09145 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01157 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09145 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01157 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09145 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01157 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09145 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01157 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09145 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01157 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09145 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01157 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09145 -0.22%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
26 March 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 144

Opinion: How Central Asia Has Strengthened Ties with the West Since 2022

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed the relationship between Russia and Central Asia. Russia’s decision to invade a neighboring country, and the devastation and destruction that followed, has forced Central Asia to reconsider its relationship with the Russian Federation.  Russia is no longer seen as an “invincible superpower,” meaning it cannot be relied on to protect other members of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization). In addition, the U.S. and European countries have levied heavy sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. Russia has attempted to evade these sanctions by conducting business with third parties, but the international community has warned several organizations and countries not to partake in these relations. Otherwise, should these businesses and countries opt to help Russia, then the international community has said that it will impose stiff penalties on these Russian intermediaries as well. Given these events, the Central Asian states have now been actively pursuing new relationships beyond Russia to bolster national, economic, and energy security within the region. During this process, China has attempted to assert itself as Central Asia’s new ally. Like Russia, China already has a significant trade relationship with Central Asia. In addition, China is Central Asia’s largest gas consumer, meaning the Chinese have attempted to force Central Asia into an economic and energy partnership. Despite this relationship, the countries of Central Asia have opted not to increase their reliance on China. Instead, recent developments have led them to improve their relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. But how has the West strengthened its relationship with Central Asia since 2022? Take, for example, the United States. When Russia’s invasion began in February 2022, the then U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with foreign ministers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to discuss the war. During their meeting, Secretary Blinken stated that the United States supports Central Asia’s “sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.” He also said that the United States will continue to strengthen its relationship with the region. Since this meeting, Blinken has met with foreign ministers from Central Asia on several occasions in 2023 and 2024, where they further discussed how Central Asia can “develop the strongest possible capacities for their own security, their growing economic prosperity, and the strength and resilience of their societies.” Furthermore, U.S. President Joe Biden met with senior officials from Central Asia. During his meeting with his Central Asian counterparts in September 2023, Biden said that the United States would help “invest in and develop Central Asia’s energy infrastructure.” The United States also established a new business initiative with Central Asia, where the United States has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance to the region. Then, during the United States-Central Asia Trade Investment Framework Council in June 2024, the United States and the Central Asian states discussed new investment opportunities and how they could diversify trade. These discussions were well received, and the United States called for future engagements between it and Central...

How Trump’s Trade War on China Affects Central Asia

When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on China and the European Union could have severe consequences not only for Brussels and Beijing, but also for economies around the world. Central Asia is no exception, as it could easily be caught in the crossfire. Although no country in Central Asia sees the United States as its major economic partner, Trump’s trade war with the EU and China is expected to impact all Central Asian nations in one way or another. Their strong economic ties with China and the growing EU presence in the region were once seen as a strategic advantage. Now, it seems to represent a double-edged sword.  As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, all Central Asian states have sought to strengthen economic relations with Beijing and Brussels. Their partnerships with China and the EU have grown through trade and investments, but Washington’s tariffs on Chinese and European goods could result in a reduction in demand for various items in Central Asia.  Trump’s tariff policy could also give Beijing certain leverage over Washington in the strategically important region. According to Mark Temnycky, Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, as a way to counter the impact of U.S. tariffs, the Chinese could increase their trade and energy relations with the countries of Central Asia. “This would further accelerate China’s relationship with Central Asia, and it could result in the regional states becoming more dependent on the Chinese for trade. Given the proximity of China to Central Asia, this may also result in the regional nations reducing their trade relations with the European Union as well as with the United States, as they favor Chinese prices,” Temnycky told The Times of Central Asia in an interview.  U.S. bilateral trade in the region has never been particularly strong. The exception is Kazakhstan – the region’s largest economy – which is the only country in Central Asia whose trade with the U.S. exceeds one billion dollars. According to official statistics, in 2024 America’s total goods trade with Kazakhstan was estimated at $3.4 billion. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan combined have a lower trade volume with the United States than Kazakhstan. But all that is just a drop in the ocean compared to the $89.4 billion trade China reached with Central Asian in 2023. “Trump’s tariff policy could lead to an even greater Central Asian states’ dependency on China, potentially creating a Chinese monopoly on Central Asian trade and energy. In other words, regional countries would no longer have a diversified economy and market, thus tightening China's control over the area,” Temnycky stressed. That, however, does not necessarily mean that Beijing will, in the long term, benefit from Washington’s tariff policy. According to Tyler Schipper, an economist and Associate Professor at the University of St. Thomas, China is “arguably at one of its economically weakest points in the last several decades,” which means that any trade war with the...

Kazakh Activists Slam PACE Member’s Allegations

Kazakh civil activists have strongly criticized a written declaration signed by 20 of the 306 members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), labeling it a “defamatory document.” Their response, representing various non-governmental organizations and public associations across Kazakhstan, accuses PACE signatories of bias, double standards, and a lack of objectivity in its assessment of human rights and democratic practices in the country. The contentious declaration, published on the PACE website on February 5, 2025, alleges that Kazakhstan has imprisoned eight political dissidents and is repressing another five individuals living abroad. However, Kazakh civil society representatives argue that these claims are misleading and politically motivated. A key point of contention is the alleged connection between the individuals named in the declaration and Mukhtar Ablyazov, a notorious figure accused of embezzling $8-10 billion during his tenure as chairman of BTA Bank. Ablyazov has been the subject of multiple legal judgments in the UK and US, with liabilities exceeding $5 billion, including two jury trial verdicts in the Southern District of New York in 2022 and 2024 with regard to the laundering of the stolen funds. The activists assert that the individuals referenced in the PACE declaration are not political prisoners but rather individuals convicted of ordinary criminal offenses. In their February 24 response, the Kazakh civil society representatives expressed concern over what they perceive as an attempt by certain PACE members to “militarize” Europe’s democratic agenda against Kazakhstan. “We are deeply concerned about how individual PACE representatives are attempting to ‘militarize’ Europe’s democratic agenda in relation to Kazakhstan,” the statement reads. “We have every reason to believe that the authority of PACE is being actively used by criminal elements to advance their interests - among whom we include Mukhtar Ablyazov and his supporters.” While the PACE declaration called for an investigation into Kazakhstan, the civil activists countered by urging European law enforcement agencies to investigate potential abuses of office by PACE representatives. They accused PACE of turning a blind eye to systemic corruption, such as the “Qatargate” scandal, and questioned whether connections between those implicated in “Qatargate” and individuals shaping PACE’s stance on Kazakhstan are fueling a biased agenda. [caption id="attachment_29119" align="aligncenter" width="683"] According to its website, the National Endowment for Prosperity is an "organization dedicated to the protection of human rights, strengthening democracy and developing civil society, implementing a wide range of projects and initiatives in these areas."[/caption] The rebuttal, titled “Response of representatives of civil society of Kazakhstan to the declaration of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,” was signed by 20 prominent figures from Kazakh civil society. These include Marlen Imangaliyev from the "Veterans of military operations who took part in the settlement of the interethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus region" public association; Usen Suleimen and Marat Sarsembayev from the “National Endowment for Prosperity”; Salamat Kabidayev from the "Eurasian Peace and Accord" institution; and Dauyl Togzhan from the "Alash Ulandary" public foundation. The response underscores the activists’ belief that the actions...

What Awaits Central Asia When the War in Ukraine Ends?

U.S. President Donald Trump seems resolute in his goal to end, or at least freeze, the war in Ukraine. To achieve such an ambitious objective, he is using a strategy of gradually normalizing relations with Russia, with his recent talks with Russian leader Vladimir Putin playing an important part. But how will Trump’s Russia policy impact Central Asia – a region that has traditionally been in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit, but is now aiming to develop closer ties with the West? Ever since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, on February 24, 2022, Kazakhstan – the region’s largest country – has been offering its services as a mediator. Astana hoped to eventually host peace talks between Russian and Ukrainian representatives. Such a possibility, at least at this point, does not seem very realistic, given that Putin and Trump are reportedly scheduled to meet in Saudi Arabia, and Kyiv and Moscow still refuse to negotiate directly.  In the month since Trump returned to the White House, he has not focused on Central Asia. That, however, does not mean that Kazakhstan, as well as the other Central Asian countries, will not play a significant role in the post-war period.  Several Russian analysts claim that Washington’s ultimate goal is to “turn Russia against China” and use Moscow as an instrument against Beijing in a potential new Cold War between the United States and the People’s Republic. Given the strategic importance of Central Asia for both Russia and China, in the long term, the region could very well become a theater for various proxy conflicts.  For the time being, however, such a scenario does not seem very probable, as there is no strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Russia, and Central Asian nations are determined to continue pursuing their “multi-vector” foreign policies, rather than picking a side in global conflicts. Thus, once the Ukraine war comes to an end, regional actors will undoubtedly seek to strengthen their political, economic, and military positions, aiming to avoid being involved in another Great Game.  Although economic indicators in Central Asia are trending upwards in many respects, higher wages in areas such as construction and the broader services sector can still be earned outside the region. Although Russia has traditionally been the top destination for Central Asian migrants, that might soon change. Faced with the growing anti-migrant sentiment that came as a result of the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in 2024, and the fact that Russia is actively recruiting labor migrants to fight in Ukraine, many of them are expected to look for new destinations, where they can find safer conditions and better opportunities. A post-war Ukraine could be one of them. According to Vasily Voskoboynik, President of the All-Ukrainian Association of Companies for International Employment, in 2023 Ukraine needed 4.5 million migrant workers, while the International Organization for Migration and the International Labor Organization believe that it will need 8.2 million laborers. In Voskoboynik’s view, it is necessary to consider countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and India, as...

Why Kazakhstan’s Tokayev Was Right About Diplomacy in Ukraine

When the history of the war in Ukraine is written, one question demanding extended treatment will be why diplomacy remained sidelined for so long. Conflicts involving major powers and their proxies have in recent decades (think of Korea, Vietnam, and the Balkans) finished mainly not in outright military victories but in negotiated settlements. Now, with reports of U.S. President Donald Trump reaching directly out to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, it is important to reassess why the long-standing insistence on diplomacy by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was not met with more support.  Tokayev’s early insistence on negotiations was instead met with scepticism. As the war ground on, Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive (planned and mandated by Western advisors) failed while Russia’s entrenchment in the occupied territories continued. The fact that a Trump–Putin call has taken place, bypassing European leaders, underscores the shift of view in Washington. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy approach to the war in Ukraine has been dictated by its unique geopolitical position. As a founding member of both the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Kazakhstan’s economic and security ties to Russia are extensive. At the same time, its leadership has consistently pursued a multivector foreign policy, balancing engagement with China, the European Union, and the United States. Tokayev’s refusal at the June 2022 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum to recognize the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics signalled Kazakhstan’s commitment to sovereignty and neutrality. In November 2022, Kazakhstan began to reduce Moscow’s leverage over its energy sector by sending oil for export via the Caspian Sea, into pipelines in the South Caucasus, bypassing the established route through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium via southern Russia. Had global policymakers taken Tokayev’s warnings more seriously in 2022 and 2023, certain escalations might have been mitigated. Kazakhstan was not alone in advocating for negotiations. Turkey brokered a grain shipment deal in 2022, and the Vatican attempted discreet backchannel diplomacy. However, Kazakhstan’s deep historical and economic ties to Russia gave its perspective unique weight. Kazakhstan’s approach was pragmatic. Western states viewed engagement as legitimizing Russian aggression. From Central Asia, however, the view was that indefinite warfare would destabilize Eurasia and inflict mounting costs on all stakeholders, not least Moscow. The West dismissed calls for diplomacy as naïve or as concessions to Moscow. Western leaders continued to believe military pressure, coupled with economic sanctions, was the only viable means of deterring Russian aggression. This may have been true if the military pressure had been an order of magnitude stronger from the beginning, rather than a slow drip of weapons systems that never had a chance of making a decisive difference. The reluctance of Western leaders to consider early diplomacy was not entirely unfounded. The atrocities committed by Russian forces in Bucha and Mariupol made any engagement politically fraught. Ukraine, emboldened by Western military aid, had every reason to resist diplomatic settlements that would lock in its territorial losses. Smaller states often possess a more acute awareness of the dangers of prolonged...

Trump 2.0: Security Implications for Central Asia – Diplomats and Analysts Weigh the Risks for Regional Stability

Narxoz University’s Eurasian Institute for Economic and Legal Research and the School of Economics and Management convened distinguished diplomats, military analysts, and academics from the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), The National Institute for Defense Studies (Japan),  George Mason University (US), and Maqsut Narikbayev University (Kazakhstan) to analyze the geopolitical and security implications of a second Donald Trump presidency in Central Asia. Professor Ikboljon Qoraboyev, Director of the Center for Global and Regional Governance at Maqsut Narikbayev University, argued that Trump’s pragmatism will drive him to exploit every available opportunity to advance the financial and political interests of himself, his loyal corporate allies, and the United States. This approach, characterized by a “nothing-personal-just-business” mindset, makes his actions inherently unpredictable, keeping both allies and rivals on edge. Trump thrives on calculated ambiguity, using surprise as a strategic tool to gain the upper hand in negotiations and exert maximum pressure on his counterparts. [caption id="attachment_28674" align="aligncenter" width="936"] Image: Daniyar Kosnazarov[/caption] Professor Erzhan Issabayev, Deputy Director of the Eurasian Institute for Economic and Legal Research at Narxoz University, agreed that this unpredictability could shape a second Trump presidency, particularly in terms of global power dynamics. In Central Asia, where political stability and a carefully maintained multi-vector foreign policy are crucial, Trump’s erratic decision-making presents a significant challenge for regional leaders. Professor Issabayev suggested that if Trump escalates efforts to counter China globally or if negotiations to end the war in Ukraine falter, Central Asia could become an unintended yet significant geopolitical battleground. Building on this perspective, Olzhas Zhorayev, a World Bank Group Consultant and Doctoral Researcher at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, examined the potential consequences of deepening U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China confrontations. According to Zhorayev, heightened tensions could push Central Asia further into Moscow’s and Beijing’s political and economic orbit, restricting the region’s strategic flexibility. However, Zhorayev also presented another possibility; if Russia and Ukraine reach a peace agreement, the Kremlin may redirect its focus and resources toward Central Asia, increasing its influence and reshaping the regional balance of power. Expanding on this idea, Marek Jochec, Associate Professor of Finance at Narxoz University, explored the varying perceptions of major global powers in Central Asia. Jochec noted that attitudes toward China and Russia are shaped by a combination of historical experiences, economic ties, and political considerations. While Chinese investment is often viewed as a driver of infrastructure and economic growth, concerns over dependency and influence persist. Russian engagement, deeply rooted in historical and cultural connections, continues to play a significant role, though perceptions vary across different countries. These contrasting views add layers of complexity to the region’s geopolitical positioning, making strategic decision-making increasingly delicate. Ultimately, the expert discussion at Narxoz University highlighted that Trump’s leadership — whether defined by unpredictability, pragmatism, or strategic maneuvering — will have a significant impact on Central Asia. As the region faces shifting geopolitical pressures, governments will need to adapt quickly, reassessing their alliances and economic strategies to...