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Tinker, Tailor, Kazakh Ties: UK Spy Trial Reveals Moscow’s Long Shadow in Kazakh Politics

London's Central Criminal Court, known as the Old Bailey, is currently hearing the trial of several Bulgarian nationals accused by the British authorities of spying for Russia’s intelligence services. The case is likely being scrutinized not only in Moscow but also in Astana, as at least two of the six alleged operations relate to Kazakhstan. A Favor for Nazarbayev The defendants, five Bulgarian citizens, are accused of planning six espionage operations, one of which centers around Bergey Ryskaliyev, a former senior Kazakh official during the presidency of Nursultan Nazarbayev.The accused filmed Ryskaliyev in his London home and plotted to alternately dress up as DHL or Deliveroo drivers, or use a fake ambulance as a cover to access his premises. Ryskaliyev served as akim of the oil-rich Atyrau region from 2006 to 2012, before leaving Kazakhstan amid serious corruption allegations. Both he and his brother Amanzhan - an ex-deputy of the Mazhilis - have been wanted in their homeland for over a decade, facing charges of large-scale corruption, organized crime, false entrepreneurship, and money laundering. Public opinion in Kazakhstan attributes the Ryskaliyev brothers’ prosecution to their alleged involvement in the December 2011 Zhanaozen uprising. According to reports, the uprising was intended to culminate in Nazarbayev’s resignation through a symbolic “march to Astana.” By the summer of 2012, Nazarbayev seemed wary of Ryskaliyev, publicly thanking him for his service during a visit to Atyrau. Shortly after, Ryskaliyev resigned for "health reasons,” while Amanzhan stepped down as a Mazhilis deputy. The brothers remained in hiding for years, with their lawyers claiming in a 2019 trial that their whereabouts were unknown. However, reports later surfaced that Ryskaliyev had filmed and leaked a video of Nazarbayev in London’s Hyde Park, allegedly using it to blackmail the former president. Ryskaliyev denied this, characterizing his actions as a “small rally” outside Nazarbayev’s residence. Despite these allegations, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court ruled in 2020 to return some of Ryskaliyev’s confiscated assets, including land, money, and shares in various companies, and to reverse property seizures which had affected their spouses. Prosecutors in the London trial allege that Ryskaliyev’s case was part of an operation to foster stronger ties between Moscow and Astana, with Russia suggesting that Kazakhstan might benefit from pursuing him. If accurate, this initiative likely predated January 2022, when Nazarbayev retained significant influence despite stepping down as president. Targeting Tokayev? The second alleged operation appears to have been directed at Kazakhstan’s current president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Prosecutors claim the defendants planned a staged protest outside Kazakhstan’s embassy in London in September 2022, intending to pass information about the “organizers” to the Kazakh authorities. This, they argue, was another effort to bolster Russian-Kazakh relations. However, details reported by Germany’s Der Spiegel suggest a more specific objective. According to the report, the FSB instructed the operatives to stage a protest and send a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, ostensibly from a fabricated group critical of Tokayev. Plans also included splashing fake blood or pig’s blood on the...

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Uzbek Deputy Proposes Introducing Visa Regime With Russia

Russian politician Leonid Slutsky has proposed establishing a comprehensive set of mandatory rules for foreign workers in Russia, called the “Migrant Code.” Developed in coordination with diasporas and law enforcement agencies, the code outlines guidelines for migrants seeking legal employment in Russia. According to Slutsky, the Migrant Code will require foreign workers to learn Russian and ensure their families also acquire language skills if residing in Russia. Migrants, he says, must respect Russian culture and traditions, adhere to public behavior standards, obtain official employment, and pay taxes. Additional requirements include securing insurance against deportation or expulsion, undergoing fingerprinting, genomic registration, and mental health testing. In response, Alisher Qodirov, chairman of Uzbekistan’s Milli Tiklanish (National Revival) party, suggested introducing a visa regime with Russia to address potential instability and a rise in migration flows. Qodirov underscored the importance of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries implementing stricter entry and exit controls to Russia, alongside enhanced requirements for job seekers. He emphasized the need for migrants to respect their host country’s language, culture, and laws while reaffirming the significance of national values. He further stated that educating Uzbek workers on their rights and responsibilities would help mitigate social, political, and economic challenges for Uzbekistan. It would also protect citizens from exploitation and discrimination abroad, reinforcing the nation’s commitment to safeguarding its people.

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Central Asia Braces for Return of Radical Islamists Amid Syrian Turmoil

According to experts, the recent collapse of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria raises concerns about potential destabilization in Central Asia. This development may force regional governments to repatriate citizens who were lured by Islamist propaganda, while the future of the Astana format negotiations on Syria remains uncertain. The swift coup d'état in Syria saw opposition forces capture Damascus and much of the country within days. Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, leaving a chaotic landscape dominated by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, often described as a successor to ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The situation has plunged Syria into further instability. The Impact of Operation Zhusan Kazakhstan has firsthand experience dealing with the repercussions of Syria's instability. Between 2013 and 2017, hundreds of Kazakh citizens succumbed to Islamist propaganda, crossing borders illegally to join the conflict, often with their families. In response to the humanitarian crisis, Kazakhstan launched Operation Zhusan ("Wormwood") in January 2019 to repatriate citizens trapped in Syria. The operation, conducted in five stages and completed by February 2021, repatriated 607 citizens, 37 men, 157 women and 413 children (34 of whom were orphans). The government set up a rehabilitation center near Aktau on the Caspian Sea to provide treatment, restore documents, and offer vocational training for adults and education for children. All 37 repatriated men were detained and later convicted of terrorism-related activities, receiving sentences ranging between 6 and 14 years, whilst 18 women faced prosecution. Despite the operation’s success, many in Kazakhstan fear the returnees and their children might spread radical ideologies within the country. Lessons from the Region Other Central Asian countries have also grappled with the challenge of repatriating citizens from Syria. Bakhtiyor Babadjanov, an expert from the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under Uzbekistan’s president, detailed the experiences of Uzbek women lured to conflict zones. These women often found themselves deceived and abandoned in dire conditions, as described in an interview. "The 'happy caliphate' turned out to be a myth," Babadjanov explained, recounting stories of women and children abandoned without food or shelter during battles in Mosul. Survivors reported forced marriages, child abuse, and exploitation under the guise of religious duty. The Uncertain Future of the Astana Process Another significant connection between Central Asia and Syria has been the Astana process, a series of negotiations aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict. Since 2017, Kazakhstan has hosted 22 rounds of talks, including discussions on hostages, missing persons, and settlement efforts. However, the recent escalation in Syria casts doubt on the process. In late November and early December, armed opposition groups launched a large-scale offensive, capturing key cities, including Aleppo and Damascus. Despite this upheaval, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov insisted the Astana process remains relevant as a platform for dialogue and consultation, notwithstanding the fact that Assad is now in Moscow. Heightened Risks of Destabilization Experts in Kazakhstan and Central Asia have warned that the fall of Assad's regime could lead to prolonged anarchy, ethnic and religious conflicts, and a refugee crisis. Political scientist,...

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Young Uzbek Men Dominate Russia’s Migrant Workforce in 2024

A recent analysis by the "Migrant Service" platform has outlined the profile of the average migrant worker in Russia for 2024. According to the study, the typical migrant is a 28-year-old married man from Uzbekistan, residing in or near Moscow. The survey, which included approximately 63,000 participants, revealed key demographic trends among migrant workers in Russia. Most respondents identified as Muslim men aged 28, though the age range spanned from 18 to 37 years. Uzbekistan Leads Migration Statistics The majority of migrant workers in Russia come from Uzbekistan, accounting for 55.4% of the total. Tajikistan follows with 39.89%, while Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan collectively contribute 4.82% of the migrant population. “For migrants, family and children are the highest priorities,” the analysts noted. This focus is reflected in remittance patterns: 67% of respondents send money to their families once a quarter, and 41% remit more than 50% of their income. Growing Demand for Migrant Labor The survey also highlights the increasing reliance on Central Asian migrants to address labor shortages in Russia. This trend, as previously reported by the Times of Central Asia, has been exacerbated by Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine, which has intensified the demand for additional workers.

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Turkmenistan to Boost Gas Exports to Neighbor Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has agreed to purchase more natural gas from Turkmenistan, though the amount of additional gas and the price remain unclear. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev spoke by phone with the chairman of Turkmenistan’s Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council) and leader of the country Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov on December 5 to discuss the deal. According to Turkmen state news, Berdimuhamedov “agreed to the increase” of Turkmen gas to Uzbekistan, and it would not be surprising if Berdimuhamedov was quietly dancing in celebration on the other end of the line. Anxious to Sell Turkmenistan has the fourth largest gas reserves in the world, some 17.5 trillion cubic meters, at least. To put that in perspective, the 27 countries of the European Union, combined, used 350 billion cubic meters of gas in 2022, meaning Turkmenistan has enough gas to meet all the EU’s gas needs, at current levels, for 50 years. Unfortunately, more than 33 years after becoming independent, Turkmenistan still does not have many customers for its gas. There is China, which buys the most Turkmen gas, some 35 billion cubic meters (bcm), Uzbekistan, which in recent years has been purchasing 1.5-2 bcm annually from Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, which gets 1-1.5 bcm of Turkmen gas via a swap arrangement involving Iran. Turkmenistan’s only successful recent export deal is with Iraq for 10 bcm, which involves a swap arrangement with Iran that will require maintenance work and repairs on Turkmenistan’s and Iran’s pipelines. Turkmenistan just lost Russia as a customer after the contract for Russia to purchase up to 5.5 bcm of Turkmen gas expired at the end of June 2024. The expiration of the agreement with Russia meant Turkmenistan lost its second biggest buyer, but that might now turn out to be good news for Uzbekistan. Anxious to Buy The jump in the number of people and accompanying expansion of service infrastructure have combined with Uzbekistan’s gross failure to increase domestic gas output to make Uzbekistan a net gas importer. In late January 2023, Uzbek media reported the country produced some 51.7 bcm of gas in 2022 and said plans called for increasing that to 56.3 bcm in 2023. Instead, gas production fell to 46.7 bcm in 2023, and it is set to decrease further in 2024. Uzbekistan signed its first contract for Turkmen gas in December 2022. That deal was for 1.5 bcm annually, but in August 2023, the two countries agreed to boost that to 2 bcm. However, that was not enough to fill Uzbekistan’s growing gas consumption needs. In June 2023, Uzbekistan signed a two-year agreement to import up to 2.8 bcm of gas from Russia, but by March 2024, reports showed Uzbekistan looking to increase Russian gas imports to 11 bcm starting in 2026. It looks like some of the 5.5 bcm Turkmenistan was until recently selling to Russia will instead be sent to Uzbekistan, so for Turkmenistan, the gas deal with Uzbekistan only recovers some of the revenue lost with the expiration of the contract with Russia....

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Tracing Ties: Donald Trump’s Diplomatic Legacy with Kazakhstan

Away from his business dealings, the official relationship between U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and the Central Asian republic began under the first president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. On January 17, 2018, Trump received Nazarbayev at the White House on an official visit, praising the existing relations between the two nations. “I’m thrilled that you’re here. Everyone deeply respects you. We have a wonderful relationship between our countries. Now, Kazakhstan is in a perfect situation. It is a great honor for us to receive you. What you have done for your country is truly remarkable,” Trump stated. It is widely-believed that during this visit, Nazarbayev warned Trump of the upcoming transition of power in Kazakhstan, naming Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as his successor. On June 25, 2019, following Kazakhstan’s presidential election, Trump sent a congratulatory telegram to Tokayev. “We have made great progress in our bilateral relations over the years, and I am confident that the spirit of our cooperation will continue to strengthen. It is gratifying that American businesses continue to open new opportunities to expand economic cooperation with Kazakhstan,” Trump wrote. According to the Akorda press service, the White House head noted that the U.S. intended to continue collaborating to promote an expanded strategic partnership with Kazakhstan. “I look forward to working with you to advance our deepened strategic partnership to counter common challenges; the United States values a strong partnership with Kazakhstan. It will continue to work with you and the people of Kazakhstan to advance our shared interests in Central Asia and globally. I wish you every success in your work,” Trump said in his message. Summarizing the Trump presidency’s impact on Central Asia in February 2021, renowned Kazakh economist, Zhandos Temirgali, emphasized his opinion that the “Trump administration has been prudent enough to maintain and develop the C5+1 format for cooperation with Central Asia, initiated in 2015 by the Obama administration, which was established in response to China’s One Belt, One Road initiative, and soon proposed a more global alternative: the Blue Dot Network. Over the years of Trump’s presidency, the C5+1 format has established itself as a reliable platform that unites the region’s states at the highest level in their pursuit of strategic cooperation with the leader of the [United States.].”