• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10515 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10515 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10515 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10515 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10515 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10515 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10515 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00211 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10515 0.48%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 835 - 840 of 3388

Kyrgyzstan’s Parliament Advances Restrictive Version of Media Law

Kyrgyzstan’s parliament has ignored more than two years of work by a special commission and adopted a new media law that preserves restrictions on the registration of media outlets. The version parliament passed in its second and third readings on June 25 requires the mandatory registration of all media outlets, including online publications. The Cabinet of Ministers is given exclusive powers to determine the procedure for registration, re-registration, and the termination of media activities. Back to Square One? There were strong objections from media freedom and rights groups to the mandatory registration of media outlets, including online sites, when the draft bill was introduced nearly three years ago. Since Sadyr Japarov was elected president in January 2021, pressure on independent media outlets has been building. The presidential administration said Kyrgyzstan’s current media law, which dates back to 1992, was outdated, and submitted a draft of a new media law in September 2022. International and domestic criticism was so strong that the bill was withdrawn, and eventually, a commission with representatives of the media community, including independent media outlets, the government, civil society, and legal experts, was formed. The draft just approved by parliament was the sixth version of the bill, and, until June 16, it stated that registration for media outlets would be voluntary. On June 16, however, when the Kyrgyz parliament’s Committee on Social Policy was reviewing the bill, four Members of Parliament, Aibek Matkerimov, Ilimbek Kubanychbekov, Ernis Aidaraliev, and Sovetbek Rustambek uulu, introduced amendments. One of these changes removed voluntary registration for media outlets and replaced that with a clause specifying that a media outlet could only disseminate information after its registration with the Justice Ministry had been confirmed. The Media Action Platform of Kyrgyzstan, a coalition of media outlets and journalists, complained that the changes introduced by the four deputies negated those that had already been reached after negotiations. The Media Action Platform of Kyrgyzstan also questioned why deputies “who did not participate in the working group, were not present at the parliamentary hearings, and have no professional relationship with the media sphere,” were allowed to propose those amendments. These objections were apparently ignored when deputies voted on June 25. The Fate of Foreign-Sponsored Media Another of the changes from the four deputies stated, “a foreign citizen, stateless person, or foreign legal entity, as well as companies with more than 35% foreign participation, cannot act as founders of media and television organizations.” That replaces an article in the earlier text that set foreign participation at 50% or more and said only that they “cannot be founders of television organizations.” There are some 2,740 media outlets registered in Kyrgyzstan, and only a handful receive more than 35% of their funding from foreign sources. One is Radio Azattyk, the Kyrgyz service of the U.S. congressionally-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFERL). Most of Kyrgyzstan’s presidents have expressed a dislike of Azattyk at one time or another, though the outlet continues to enjoy popularity in Kyrgyzstan according to various surveys. President Japarov has made his views...

Opinion: As Kazakhstan-China Trade Booms, Tokayev and XI Strengthen Relations

On June 16th, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping and the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Astana at the second China-Central Asia Summit. The six countries signed the 'Treaty of Permanent Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation', which reinforced their strategic cooperation in multiple areas, particularly in trade and investment. Aggregate China-Central Asia trade is up 10.4% this year. Kazakhstan is a pivotal player in transcontinental Eurasian trade and integration. Its geographic location, multimodal transport networks, and strategic partnerships with neighboring countries, particularly China, position Kazakhstan as Central Asia’s primary overland gateway to Europe and West Asia. It’s no surprise, therefore, that President Xi Jinping visited Astana – his sixth trip to Kazakhstan and sixteenth to Central Asia. Over the past two decades, Kazakhstan has reclaimed its historic role as a nation of merchants and intermediaries, revitalizing trade routes like the middle corridor and logistics hubs such as Khorgos Gateway—a dry port facilitating container transshipment between Chinese and Kazakh railways en route to Europe. These are just two examples of infrastructure projects in Kazakhstan; there are many more in development. In Astana, Presidents Tokayev and Xi underscored the importance of further socio-economic progress arising from enhanced economic linkages. Tokayev reiterated Kazakhstan’s support for mutually beneficial business opportunities, emphasizing the principle of national sovereignty and independence. Recent trade figures reflect the robust economic ties in infrastructure and connectivity. Kazakhstan’s construction sector, driven by investments in transport, are poised to increase by 6.8% in 2025, according to Kazakhstani economists. Sino-Central Asian trade, according to China’s General Administration of Customs, reached $94.8 billion in 2024, with Kazakhstan accounting for 46% of that total—$43.8 billion—making it China’s largest partner in the region. This contrasts with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan's combined total of $28.1 billion, and Kyrgyzstan’s $22.7 billion, driven largely by re-exports and gold. Kazakhstan remains the anchor economy in Central Asia – the strategic hinge between China and the West – as confirmed not only by the volumes of freight entering and leaving Kazakhstan, but by its upstream and downstream economic benefits, causing a multiplier effect across the country. Over 80% of land cargo from China to Europe passes through Kazakhstan. What factors have led to this development? A key factor has been global demand for raw materials, but that’s only part of the story. What stands out as the principal driver of Kazakhstan’s success in boosting trade over the past 20 years was its commitment soon after independence in 1991 to invest in transport and logistics, while creating a regulatory and legal framework in parallel to facilitate operability. In other words, Kazakhstan’s success is no accident. It was the country in Central Asia to embrace economic liberalization not as ideology, but as a pragmatic approach to address the inefficiencies of a centralized command economy. This visionary approach facilitated economic liberalization, including getting rid of oppressive centralized planning and embracing private capital and deregulation without relinquishing sovereignty. Kazakhstan also pushed ahead in developing a banking sector that over time provided a...

Kazakhstan Launches Sweeping Reform of Law Enforcement System

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has announced a major reform of Kazakhstan’s law enforcement system, signaling a new phase in his broader political modernization agenda. Experts view the initiative as a natural progression of his previous institutional reforms. Crime Rates Decline, But Challenges Remain At an expanded meeting of law enforcement agencies on June 23, President Tokayev tasked his administration and the Security Council with conducting a comprehensive analysis of the sector within one week. The resulting report is expected to openly identify shortcomings and offer targeted solutions. Tokayev noted that since 2019, Kazakhstan's streets have become "calmer and safer." Overall, criminal offenses have nearly halved. Robberies, thefts, and hooliganism have decreased fourfold, and the murder rate has dropped by 30%. Crimes in public places have declined by 80%. The president also highlighted progress in combating domestic violence. A 2024 law introduced harsher penalties, contributing to a 30% decrease in crimes against women and children in 2025. Over five years, crimes violating women’s rights have halved. “The most important thing is that public awareness is changing. Our citizens show zero tolerance for cruelty and tyranny in the family. Victims of aggression and violence receive the necessary support,” Tokayev said. Law enforcement agencies also intensified operations against drug-related crime this year. Eighty-three drug laboratories were dismantled, and drug seizures rose by 84%. Sentences for narcotics production have been strengthened, including the possibility of life imprisonment. Despite progress, Tokayev acknowledged persistent gaps that pose risks to national security. Economic Transparency and Anti-Corruption Measures The share of the shadow economy has declined from 23% of GDP in 2019 to 16%. While the figure remains high, Tokayev emphasized that the government continues to support law-abiding entrepreneurs while addressing unjustified criminal prosecutions of domestic businesses. The president also underscored that the General Prosecutor’s Office is monitoring hundreds of infrastructure projects involving foreign investment, totaling 34 trillion tenge ($66 million). Anti-corruption efforts remain a cornerstone of Tokayev’s agenda. Court-ordered funds confiscated from corrupt officials have financed public infrastructure: over the past three years, 150 billion tenge have been allocated to build 89 schools. Amnesty and Penal Reform In honor of the 30th anniversary of Kazakhstan’s Constitution, Tokayev announced an amnesty for more than 15,000 inmates. The clemency applies primarily to women, minors, and the elderly. Excluded are those convicted of corruption, terrorism, extremism, sexual crimes against minors, and other grave offenses. Tokayev noted several recent judicial reforms, including the creation of a Constitutional Court, expanded powers for the human rights commissioner, and the abolition of the death penalty. The president also advocated for adopting international best practices in rehabilitating convicts. “Their return to normal life will be the best proof of the success of prison reform,” he said, citing international models where inmates can earn “credits” toward early release through good behavior, education, and participation in cultural and athletic programs. Tokayev called on local entrepreneurs to open production facilities in correctional institutions. “Such mutually beneficial partnerships are widespread abroad. The money earned will allow convicts to get back...

After High Hopes, Central Asia Views Iran Trade Routes with More Caution

Like some Central Asian neighbors, Uzbekistan is urgently reviewing possible changes to some trade routes because of conflict in the Middle East, even though that could entail sharply higher transport costs. The contingency planning follows a surge in trade talks between officials from Iran and countries in Central Asia earlier this year, prior to the intense strikes that Israel and Iran launched at each other this month. A ceasefire between Israel and Iran appeared to be holding on Wednesday, but questions remain about Iran’s ability to build a nuclear bomb even after the U.S. attacked Iranian nuclear sites. U.S. President Donald Trump said the sites were “obliterated,” but, according to some Western media organizations, a preliminary U.S. intelligence report concluded that the U.S. attacks may have only set back Iran’s nuclear program by months. A June 25 statement by the Central Intelligence Agency says that “Iran’s nuclear program has been severely damaged by the recent, targeted strikes.” Against this murky backdrop, and the partial uncertainty over Central Asia’s extensive web of trade links, Uzbekistan is reviewing transport and logistics arrangements to keep its economy and connections with international partners running as smoothly as possible. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev discussed options with key advisers at a meeting on Monday. “The military actions that have taken place in the Middle East in recent days have further aggravated the already unstable situation. This cannot but affect Uzbekistan's foreign economic relations and access to world markets,” Uzbekistan’s presidential office said. “In particular, the need to diversify export routes and redirect cargo to other, safer ports was noted. According to preliminary estimates, this could lead to an increase in transportation costs by up to 30%. In this regard, instructions were given to coordinate alternative routes with partner countries and support export-oriented enterprises,” the presidency said. It said the trade and transport ministers, as well as other key officials, have been instructed to help business groups with export-import operations and finding new sales markets. Maintaining price stability in the domestic market and sustainable production rates are also key concerns. Last month, Uzbek and Iranian officials met in Tehran and agreed to expand trade between their countries to an annual $2 billion, four times the current amount. Iranian ports offer Central Asian exporters access to the Indian Ocean and international markets beyond. “The five Central Asian republics — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan — are increasingly seeking alternatives to the traditional transit routes that have tied them to Moscow or made them dependent on Chinese infrastructure,” said a commentary posted by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, an Israel-based group that studies Mideast security and foreign policy. “Iran offers an appealing option: a gateway to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, access to European markets via Turkey, and industrial and technological partnerships that diversify the region’s economic relationships,” said the analysis, which was published on June 4, shortly before the recent round of fighting between Israel and Iran. Officials in Kazakhstan have warned of disruption to southern...

Iran–Israel War Highlights Central Asia as Zone of Strategic Stability

The explosive conflict between Iran and Israel, including coordinated U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, has drawn global attention to the Persian Gulf and Levant. The escalatory spectacle, however, has blinded most observers to a quieter structural shift. This is the rising indispensability of Central Asia, including its linkages with the South Caucasus. Unaligned in rhetoric and untouched by spillover, Central Asia's very stability quietly threw into relief its increasing centrality to Eurasian energy and logistics calculations. As maritime chokepoints came into question and ideological rhetoric became more inflamed, Central Asia offers a reminder that the most valuable nodes in a network are the ones that continue operating silently and without disruption. Neither Israel nor Iran has real operational depth in Central Asia, and this has made a difference. Unlike Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen — where proxy networks or ideological leverage allowed Tehran to externalize confrontation — no such mechanisms exist east of the Caspian Sea. Iran’s efforts in Tajikistan, grounded in shared linguistic heritage and periodic religious diplomacy, today remain cultural and informational rather than sectarian and clientelist. The influence of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Central Asia is minimal; Israeli presence, while diplomatically steady in places like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, is neither controversial nor militarized. There are no significant arms flows or dual-use infrastructure for either side to use. As a result, Central Asia has remained untouched by the conflict. Although the Iran–Israel conflict is relatively geographically localized, it has shed light on global systems far beyond the immediate zone of combat. Although not so far from the missile trajectories and nuclear facilities, Central Asia and the South Caucasus are remarkably insulated from their effects. Rather than becoming another theater of contestation, they have demonstrated their value as stabilizing elements at a time of heightened geostrategic volatility. It is no longer optional to take into account the Central Asian space, which geoeconomically includes Azerbaijan, now a permanent fixture at the region's summits. As the war now produces a phase of reactive adaptation in international geoeconomics and diplomacy, the region has become a control parameter of the international system rather than a fluctuating variable dependent upon it. The Iran–Israel conflict has drawn new attention to the vulnerability of maritime energy corridors, especially the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes. While contingency planning has focused on naval logistics and airpower deterrents in the Gulf, the Eurasian interior has remained materially unaffected, reflecting its structural indispensability. Central Asia and the South Caucasus, particularly Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, offer existing and potential overland alternatives that bypass maritime chokepoints entirely. Kazakhstan’s oil continues to flow via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline to the Black Sea, while Azerbaijan’s infrastructure, anchored by the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) corridor, links Caspian energy to Mediterranean terminals. These routes are not replacements for Persian Gulf volumes, but, as redundancies, they acquire significance as stabilizing arteries as well as increased relevance in moments of system stress. The war has thus sharpened a fact...

Structural Barriers Continue to Hamper Industrial Growth in Tajikistan

Despite recent gains in industrial output, Tajikistan’s full industrial potential remains largely unrealized. Analysts point to a combination of systemic issues that continue to constrain the sector's sustainable development. Growth Driven by Extractive Industries According to the Statistical Agency under the President of Tajikistan, industrial production totaled 18.9 billion somoni in January, April 2025, marking a 25.2% increase compared to the same period in 2024. However, this growth was overwhelmingly fueled by the extractive sector, which surged by 90%. In contrast, manufacturing expanded by just 3.5%. While 121 new enterprises were launched during the first four months of the year, disruptions in existing operations and the narrow structure of industrial growth highlight deeper systemic problems. Idle Enterprises and Obsolete Equipment Minister of Industry and New Technologies Sherali Kabir reported that 92 industrial enterprises remained non-operational as of August 2024. Over half have been idle since 2008-2018, with the rest inactive since 2019-2022. The reasons range from financial difficulties and pandemic-related business closures to outdated equipment and low competitiveness. Rising input costs and limited market access further compound the problem. Some sectors, such as textiles and garments, could potentially resume operations, but only with significant modernization. Although some light and food industry enterprises have diversified, others, such as the porcelain factory in Tursunzade, have failed to adapt to changing market conditions. Raw Material Shortages Insufficient raw material supply remains a major bottleneck for several subsectors. The vegetable oil industry, for instance, requires approximately 833,000 tons of oilseeds to produce 100,000 tons of oil. However, domestic output is under 100,000 tons, limiting production to just 25,000 tons, four times below the national requirement. The canning industry faces similar constraints due to an inconsistent supply of fruits and vegetables. Energy Shortages Power outages continue to disrupt industrial output, especially in winter. Cotton processing plants produced 980 tons less fiber in the first half of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024 due to energy shortages. At the Azot plant in Levakant, production losses translated to a 7.3 million somoni revenue shortfall. Agricultural infrastructure has also been affected: the Land Reclamation Agency reported 130 pump station failures in 2023 alone, caused by voltage surges and sudden power cuts. Declining Cement and Coal Exports Despite advances in cement production, Tajikistan’s export volumes have declined sharply. From January to April 2025, the country exported just 154,000 tons of cement, down from 655,000 tons during the same period in 2024. This marks a 30.4 percent decline compared to the same period in 2023. The decline stems largely from reduced demand in key markets. Uzbekistan’s new cement plants have fulfilled domestic needs and displaced Tajik exports to Afghanistan. Coal exports have also suffered due to increased transit fees. Afghanistan raised its transit tariff from $7 to as much as $50 per ton, leading to a 15,000-ton decline in exports to Afghanistan and a 65,000-ton drop to Pakistan. High Production Costs Undermine Competitiveness High production costs across all sectors continue to undermine Tajikistan’s industrial competitiveness. For example, the...