Kazakhstan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Russian Influence

Russian Official Says West Is Seeking to Reduce Moscow’s Influence in Central Asia

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin has accused Western countries of attempting to weaken Russia’s position in Central Asia by expanding their economic and strategic influence across the region, according to an interview published by the Russian newspaper Izvestia. Galuzin said the United States and the European Union are seeking greater control over key transport corridors and natural resources in Central Asia, presenting their engagement as efforts to diversify economies and strengthen regional resilience. However, he argued that such initiatives are driven by broader geopolitical objectives. “We note the desire of the United States and the European Union to take control of key transport corridors and natural resources in the region,” Galuzin told Izvestia. He added that Moscow is concerned by what it sees as Washington’s growing involvement in agreements related to critical minerals and rare earth metals. “This is not simply economic competition, but an attempt to push Russia out and create Western-controlled infrastructure near our borders,” Galuzin said. The remarks reflect Moscow’s concern over Central Asia’s multi-vector diplomacy, as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and their neighbors expand ties with the European Union, China, the United States, and Gulf countries while maintaining longstanding relations with Russia. Galuzin also claimed that Western governments are promoting narratives portraying Russia as a security threat in an effort to influence regional policymakers. “We observe how the United Kingdom and some EU states systematically advance the narrative of an alleged danger coming from Moscow,” he said. According to the Russian diplomat, the aim is to encourage Central Asian governments to move away from cooperation with Russia in favor of political and economic incentives offered by Western countries. He argued that regional states are unlikely to support such a shift. “Neither Russia nor our historical friends and strategic partners in Central Asia are interested in such scenarios,” Galuzin said, adding that countries in the region “do not want to become pawns in someone else’s game.”

Middle Powers

Opinion: Middle Powers and the “Voice of the Region” – Is Central Asia Becoming a Coordinated Actor?

Against the backdrop of growing global fragmentation and the weakening of universal international institutions, the role of so-called middle powers is increasing. These are states able to influence regional agendas without possessing great-power status. In this changing system, Central Asia is gradually moving beyond its long-standing image as a geopolitical periphery and is beginning to act more like a region with shared interests. For decades, the region was viewed mainly as a space where the interests of external powers, including Russia, China, the U.S., and others, intersected. Today, that paradigm is beginning to shift. Central Asia is showing greater signs of agency through what may be described as a cluster effect: individually, the countries have limited influence, but collectively they form an important transit hub between Europe and Asia, a growing market, a significant resource base, and a strategic security zone. This creates the conditions for a more coordinated regional position, even if a single regional voice is still emerging rather than fully formed. C5+Azerbaijan as a Foundation for Regional Architecture The institutional foundation of this process is the Central Asian leaders' consultative format, which is now expanding through Azerbaijan's participation. That is turning what was once a C5 dialogue into a looser C5+Azerbaijan, or C6, framework focused on transport, energy, and practical cooperation. Within this framework, the countries of the region are learning to act in a more coordinated manner without supranational pressure. In practice, this process is developing through three main areas. The first is transport and logistics. Azerbaijan's participation has strengthened efforts to make the Middle Corridor more coherent, though the route still faces bottlenecks in capacity, customs coordination, and Caspian crossings. Through tariff coordination, simplified border procedures, and investment in port and rail infrastructure, Central Asia and the Caucasus are increasingly functioning as parts of a single transport artery. That gives the region a faster option for cargo between China and Europe, even if it remains far smaller than traditional maritime routes. Shipping goods via the Suez Canal or the northern route can take between 35 and 45 days, whereas the Middle Corridor can reduce transit times to around 13-21 days under favorable conditions. According to forecasts cited by BCG, shipping volumes along the route could increase three- to fourfold during the current decade. Beyond logistics, the project is creating a new economic framework for the region. Its status as a crossroads is attracting investment in transport hubs and manufacturing facilities along the route, with the potential to turn transit corridors into zones of economic growth. This gives participating countries not only transit revenue but a stronger basis for long-term strategic resilience. The second major area is energy integration, where historical disputes over water and fuel resources are increasingly being supplemented by models of joint development. The Kambarata HPP-1 hydropower project in Kyrgyzstan, being developed with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, has created an important precedent for shared management of water and energy interests. The project is expected to support cleaner electricity generation while helping stabilize irrigation flows...

Iran

Kazakhstan Signals Nuclear Diplomacy Role as Iran Uranium Dispute Intensifies

Kazakhstan is seeking a place in the next phase of the Iran nuclear dispute, not as a direct mediator between Washington and Tehran, but as a possible technical partner if talks turn to the handling of enriched uranium. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has said Kazakhstan is ready to assist if international agreements are reached. The offer reflects Astana’s long effort to turn its Soviet nuclear legacy, disarmament record, and nonproliferation infrastructure into diplomatic capital. The dispute has become more urgent as U.S.-Iran talks come under growing strain. According to Iran’s Fars News Agency, Washington has demanded the transfer of approximately 400 kilograms of enriched uranium and major restrictions on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Tehran, in turn, has insisted on sanctions relief, the unfreezing of foreign assets, compensation for wartime damage, and security guarantees. U.S. President Donald Trump has described Iran’s demands as “unacceptable.” He later said he had postponed a possible military strike on Iran following appeals from the leaders of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, citing what he called ongoing “serious negotiations.” Against that backdrop, Tokayev said during a May 11 meeting with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira that Kazakhstan was ready, “as a gesture of goodwill,” to help resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. He said any such role would depend on relevant international agreements being reached and carried out in practice. According to Akorda, Tokayev also reiterated Kazakhstan’s commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under International Atomic Energy Agency oversight. The statement did not amount to an offer to mediate directly between Washington and Tehran. It was narrower and more practical. Kazakhstan is presenting itself as a state with broad international trust, technical experience, and nuclear infrastructure to support a settlement should the main parties agree on one. Tokayev placed that argument directly into the Iran debate at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in April. “The core issue is the proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons. This must remain the central subject of negotiations in the context of the situation surrounding Iran,” he said. For Kazakhstan, that distinction is central to the way it presents itself internationally. The country has built much of its post-Soviet foreign policy identity around nuclear nonproliferation. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan’s anti-nuclear stance is not only a diplomatic position, but part of the country’s modern national identity. The Soviet Union conducted 456 nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site between 1949 and 1989, leaving long-term environmental and public health damage in eastern Kazakhstan. After independence, Kazakhstan transferred its inherited nuclear warheads to Russia and joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Kazakhstan has direct technical experience with sensitive nuclear material. In 1994, under Operation Sapphire, roughly 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium were removed from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk and transferred to the United States. TCA previously reported that the operation remains one of the strongest examples of Kazakhstan’s role in practical nonproliferation work. Kazakhstan has been involved...

Organization of Turkic States (OTS)

OTS Summit in Turkistan Reveals Strains Beneath Turkic Unity

Last Friday, the Kazakh city of Turkistan, officially promoted as the “spiritual capital” of the Turkic world, hosted an informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The official theme was artificial intelligence and digital development, but the meeting also highlighted older questions about the OTS’s political identity, its relationship with Russia, and Ankara’s influence within the Turkic world. Because the gathering was informal, much of what took place remained behind closed doors. Yet public statements, official readouts, and subsequent commentary offered clues about the tensions and competing agendas within the organization. The summit brought together the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, as well as Tufan Erhurman, president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is recognized only by Turkey. The meeting followed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s state visit to Kazakhstan, during which the two countries signed 15 agreements, including a Declaration on Eternal Friendship and an Enhanced Strategic Partnership between Kazakhstan and Turkey. In Turkistan, summit participants visited the mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi, where Erdoğan donated a handwritten Quran manuscript to the historic site. Leaders also launched the construction of a Center for Turkic Civilization. The presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan separately visited a newly built mosque donated to Turkistan by Tashkent. Despite the atmosphere of symbolism and fraternity, however, the summit also exposed clear differences between Ankara’s wide-ranging vision for the OTS and Astana’s insistence that the organization should remain a practical cooperation platform. Those differences became especially visible in President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s speech at the summit. “Recently, opinions have been voiced portraying our organization as a military alliance. It is obvious that those spreading such speculation pursue malicious goals and seek to sow discord. Kazakhstan considers it necessary to reject such positions,” Tokayev said. “The Organization of Turkic States is neither a geopolitical project nor a military organization. It is a unique platform aimed at strengthening trade, economic, technological, digital, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation among brotherly nations.” Kazakh political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev argued that Tokayev’s remarks reflected a growing internal debate within the OTS. “On the one hand, some media interpreted his words as a response to foreign experts warning about the emergence of a ‘Turanic NATO.’ On the other hand, it should be noted that some fellow presidents within the OTS persistently promote the development of military cooperation. Kazakhstan is equally persistent in defining which forms of interaction it considers acceptable within the organization,” Ashimbayev wrote. Another analyst, Andrei Chebotarev, also argued that the core message of Tokayev’s speech was to frame the OTS primarily as a platform for economic, technological, digital, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. “In this context, he rejected the idea of transforming the organization into a military-political bloc. This sent a signal both to pan-Turkic political forces interested in such a transformation and to political elites in countries that view the organization’s activities with caution,” Chebotarev said. Chebotarev also noted that Tokayev referenced the “OTS+” format launched at the organization’s previous summit in Azerbaijan and voiced support...

TRACECA

Kazakhstan’s TRACECA Chairmanship Pushes Transit Corridor Expansion

Kazakhstan has assumed the chairmanship of the Intergovernmental Commission of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), following a decision adopted during the organization’s 18th annual meeting in Astana on May 15. The TRACECA program was launched in 1993 with support from the European Union and the participation of post-Soviet states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Today, TRACECA includes 14 member states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport, Astana intends to focus its chairmanship on further developing the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor and strengthening the region’s transit potential. One of the organization's immediate priorities is to finalize its 10-year development strategy for 2027-2036, which officials aim to complete before the group's next forum, scheduled to take place in Bishkek in 2027. According to officials, the document intends to incorporate trends towards digitalization, evolving international supply chains, and emerging transport and logistics technologies, as well as accommodate the ever-increasing growth in transit traffic. An important step toward that goal came with the initial signing in Astana on May 15 of the Agreement on a Single Transit Permit for TRACECA member states. The agreement allows road freight carriers to conduct transit transportation through participating countries without obtaining separate national permits, significantly simplifying international cargo transport and improving the efficiency of transport routes. The plan is for single transit permits to be issued electronically through a unified digital information system. For now, the document has only been signed by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. While this is expected to simplify border crossings in Central Asia and across the Caspian, it has not solved the problems further down the line towards Europe. Other TRACECA member states are continuing domestic procedures required for future accession to the agreement. Kazakhstan's TRACECA chairmanship is seen by authorities in Astana as providing additional momentum for the development of international transport corridors and strengthening transport connectivity between Europe and Asia.

Iran

Kazakhstan Sends Humanitarian Aid to Iran

Kazakhstan has dispatched 30 railway wagons of humanitarian aid to war-ravaged Iran, the country’s Foreign Ministry announced on May 16. The shipment – which included staple food supplies such as canned meat, sugar, flour, as well as medicines – is intended to support the Iranian population and help meet essential social needs. A diplomatic handover ceremony to mark the occasion was arranged at Serakhs railway station, on Turkmenistan's border with Iran. Those present included Ontalap Onalbayev, Kazakhstan's ambassador to Iran; representatives of the Iranian Red Crescent Society; and the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s representative office in its northwestern province of Razavi Khorasan. “Friends are revealed in difficult times. Kazakhstan has consistently supported the people of Iran in times of hardship,” said Ambassador Onalbayev. Kazakhstan has attempted to tread a careful line towards Iran since the US/Israeli offensive which began on February 28. Astana had gone out of its way to court the Trump administration, with President Tokayev describing his US counterpart as "sent by heaven" in November 2025. Tokayev has also signed Kazakhstan up to Trump's Board of Peace initiative. Meanwhile, Iran is seen as an important part of Kazakhstan's future infrastructure links to the outside world, with its Indian Ocean ports viewed as a valuable alternative to land-based routes via Russia and China. Kazakhstan and Iran continue to maintain trade and economic cooperation. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan began exporting vegetable oil to Iran via the Caspian Sea in spring 2026. That said, in April, Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Issetov noted that several joint projects between Kazakhstan and Iran had been frozen because of military tensions in the region. A representative of the Iranian Red Crescent Society thanked Kazakhstan for the humanitarian assistance and said the gesture would help strengthen bilateral relations and mutual support between the two countries.