• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09735 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09735 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09735 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09735 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09735 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09735 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09735 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00196 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09735 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 695

Cuts to USAID Leave Central Asia Facing Development Challenges

When American President Donald Trump announced a freeze and overhaul of his country's foreign aid in early 2025, the move sparked concern across Central Asia. For more than three decades, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had been a key contributor to development in the region, supporting education, healthcare, agriculture, and environmental protection. Support for Weaker Economies USAID’s role was particularly critical in economically vulnerable countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its sudden withdrawal now leaves local governments scrambling to compensate with limited domestic resources. The cuts have not been uniform, but the overall impact has been profound. According to the Center for Global Development, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan lost 78 percent and 69 percent of their USAID-backed programs, respectively. In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, nearly all aid programs were discontinued. Foreign aid to the region has often reflected shifting geopolitical dynamics. In Uzbekistan, for example, support surged from $6 million to $40 million in 2016 following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power. Kyrgyzstan received $75 million in 2010 amid negotiations over the U.S. military base there. In contrast, aid to Turkmenistan fell to just $2.8 million by 2024. Limited Time to Adjust While Kazakhstan’s more robust economy allowed for a gradual reduction in U.S. assistance, American companies remain active in its vital oil sector. Yet the abrupt nature of the broader aid pullback has disrupted numerous projects with little warning. Health and education initiatives were halted, as were efforts to bolster trade and cross-border infrastructure, critical for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as they seek to deepen global economic ties. Environmental initiatives also suffered. With Central Asia especially vulnerable to climate change, USAID had funded resilience-building programs focused on water access and renewable energy. These efforts have largely ceased, raising concerns among farmers and local communities who had come to rely on them. Civil Society Under Strain Some governments in the region may quietly welcome the cuts, particularly those wary of foreign-backed NGOs. USAID frequently partnered with local civil society organizations and media outlets, entities that Central Asian authorities often view with suspicion. The loss of U.S. support has left these groups increasingly exposed to state pressure. Tajikistan offers a telling case. In 2020, USAID partnered with the Aga Khan Foundation during the COVID-19 pandemic. But two years later, following unrest in the country's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, the government launched a crackdown on the foundation. This underscores how some aid programs, especially those linked to civil society, are perceived as threats. Although USAID did not operate programs directly, its funding empowered local partners. With that backing gone, and less pressure from Washington, several Central Asian governments have tightened their control over independent organizations. Seeking Alternatives Replacing USAID’s role will not be easy. The European Union and countries such as France and Germany have long supported development in Central Asia, but their resources are stretched, especially with increased attention and funding directed toward Ukraine. Despite EU pledges of investment via the Global Gateway initiative, support for democracy, civil society, and human rights...

Russia: Thousands of Central Asia-Born Russians Sent to Ukraine Front Line

A senior Russian official has said that thousands of migrants from Central Asia who became Russian citizens were sent to fight in Ukraine after they tried to dodge conscription. "Our military investigations directorate conducts regular raids,” Alexander Bastrykin, head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, said on Tuesday in remarks that were reported by the Russian state-run TASS news agency. “So far, we've tracked down 80,000 such Russian citizens who didn't just avoid the front lines — they wouldn’t even show up at military enlistment offices. We’ve registered them for military service, and about 20,000 of these 'new' Russian citizens, who for some reason no longer want to live in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, or Kyrgyzstan, are now on the front lines," Bastrykin said at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum. Bastrykin’s comments contributed a piece to the often murky picture of the involvement of people from Central Asia in Russia’s war effort in Ukraine in the last three years. In addition to conscription measures, Russia has also sought to replenish its ranks by offering contracts and other incentives to foreigners willing to fight. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are among Central Asian countries that ban their nationals from fighting in foreign conflicts and there have been several high-profile prosecutions of citizens who fought for Russia and returned home. It is a sensitive political matter in Central Asia, a region that seeks to project neutrality in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Kazakhstan has said it is reviewing a report by a Ukrainian institution that said about 661 Kazakh citizens have fought for Russia since it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The I Want To Live center, which is run by the Ukrainian security services and assists with surrender requests from soldiers fighting for Russia, published a list of what it said were the Kazakh nationals. Of the 661, at least 78 have been killed, according to the center. Without providing details, it said it received the list from its own sources within the Russian military. Uzbekistan is conducting a similar investigation based on data from the Ukrainian group.

Cuts to USAID Leave Central Asia Facing Development Challenges

When American President Donald Trump announced a freeze and overhaul of his country's foreign aid in early 2025, the move sparked concern across Central Asia. For more than three decades, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had been a key contributor to development in the region, supporting education, healthcare, agriculture, and environmental protection. Support for Weaker Economies USAID’s role was particularly critical in economically vulnerable countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its sudden withdrawal now leaves local governments scrambling to compensate with limited domestic resources. The cuts have not been uniform, but the overall impact has been profound. According to the Center for Global Development, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan lost 78 percent and 69 percent of their USAID-backed programs, respectively. In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, nearly all aid programs were discontinued. Foreign aid to the region has often reflected shifting geopolitical dynamics. In Uzbekistan, for example, support surged from $6 million to $40 million in 2016 following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power. Kyrgyzstan received $75 million in 2010 amid negotiations over the U.S. military base there. In contrast, aid to Turkmenistan fell to just $2.8 million by 2024. Limited Time to Adjust While Kazakhstan’s more robust economy allowed for a gradual reduction in U.S. assistance, American companies remain active in its vital oil sector. Yet the abrupt nature of the broader aid pullback has disrupted numerous projects with little warning. Health and education initiatives were halted, as were efforts to bolster trade and cross-border infrastructure, critical for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as they seek to deepen global economic ties. Environmental initiatives also suffered. With Central Asia especially vulnerable to climate change, USAID had funded resilience-building programs focused on water access and renewable energy. These efforts have largely ceased, raising concerns among farmers and local communities who had come to rely on them. Civil Society Under Strain Some governments in the region may quietly welcome the cuts, particularly those wary of foreign-backed NGOs. USAID frequently partnered with local civil society organizations and media outlets, entities that Central Asian authorities often view with suspicion. The loss of U.S. support has left these groups increasingly exposed to state pressure. Tajikistan offers a telling case. In 2020, USAID partnered with the Aga Khan Foundation during the COVID-19 pandemic. But two years later, following unrest in the country's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, the government launched a crackdown on the foundation. This underscores how some aid programs, especially those linked to civil society, are perceived as threats. Although USAID did not operate programs directly, its funding empowered local partners. With that backing gone, and less pressure from Washington, several Central Asian governments have tightened their control over independent organizations. Seeking Alternatives Replacing USAID’s role will not be easy. The European Union and countries such as France and Germany have long supported development in Central Asia, but their resources are stretched, especially with increased attention and funding directed toward Ukraine. Despite EU pledges of investment via the Global Gateway initiative, support for democracy, civil society, and human rights...

Kazakhstan Extends Border Crossing Closure with Uzbekistan Until September

The Tajyen-Daut Ata border checkpoint between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will remain closed to pedestrians, passenger vehicles, buses, and light cargo transport until September 1. The extension was agreed upon by both governments, according to Kazinform, citing Kazakhstan’s State Revenue Committee under the Ministry of Finance. Officials explained that the continued closure is necessary to ensure traveler safety and facilitate the progress of major construction and renovation work at the site. Ongoing repairs include the installation of metal structures, engineering systems, and the comprehensive refurbishment of buildings. In parallel, from May through August, Kazakhstan’s national road company, KazAvtoZhol, will construct a new road in the neutral zone separating the Tajyen (Kazakhstan) and Daut Ata (Uzbekistan) checkpoints. Uzbekistan is expected to carry out similar infrastructure upgrades on its side of the border. The checkpoint was originally closed on February 1, to accommodate the reconstruction project. Kazakhstan subsequently proposed extending the closure for an additional four months, a request that was supported by Uzbek authorities. Officials have advised citizens of both countries to factor in the closure when planning their travel and transport routes. This development aligns with broader efforts by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to upgrade regional transport and trade infrastructure. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, both nations are investing in projects aimed at enhancing regional connectivity, including transit links to Pakistan. Kazakhstan is also positioning itself as a key player in the Middle Corridor, part of the larger Trans-Caspian International Transport Route connecting Central Asia with South Asia and Europe.

Italy Raises the Bar in Central Asia: What to Expect from Giorgia Meloni’s Visit

In recent years, Italy has emerged as one of the European countries most keen to maintain close relations with the countries of Central Asia. In mid-April, confirmation arrived that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni would be travelling to the region this spring. The purpose of the trip is to visit Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and attend a summit in Astana with the presidents of the five countries.  Meloni's visit is scheduled for the end of May, although the exact dates are not yet known. Italy was the first European country to involve the Central Asia region in a "1+5" summit. The first meeting was held in Rome in December 2019, and involved the then Italian Foreign Minister, Luigi Di Maio, and all Central Asian Foreign Ministers. This meeting took place a few months after Italy, the first and only EU country to take this step, signed a memorandum of understanding with China on the Belt & Road Initiative (in 2023, Rome decided to withdraw from the project). Central Asia is one of the regions at the heart of the original BRI project: the launch was announced in Kazakhstan in 2013. The most recent meeting at foreign minister level took place in May 2024, again in Rome, and was attended by the current Italian Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani. But now Italy has decided to raise the bar and directly involve Meloni and her Central Asian counterparts. The multilateral forum is complemented by frequent visits to Italy by leaders from the region: Uzbekistan's Mirziyoyev in June 2023, Kazakhstan's Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in January 2024 and Tajikistan's Emomali Rahmon at the end of April 2024. For Italy, President Sergio Mattarella visited Uzbekistan in November 2023 and Kazakhstan in March 2025. Italy is one of the main economic partners in the region, and especially in Kazakhstan; the country ranks third (behind only China and Russia) in terms of trade with Astana. Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Italy rose 25% in 2024 and reached almost $20 billion. The relationship is particularly strong in the energy sector, with over $18 billion accounted for exports of Kazakh oil and petroleum products in 2024. The Italian national oil and natural gas company Eni has been present in Kazakhstan since 1992, where it is a co-operator of the Karachaganak oil field and participates in the North Caspian Sea PSA consortium responsible for operations at the Kashagan oil field. Other significant sectors of trade between Italy and Kazakhstan are those of agricultural machinery and agricultural production. One area that could be subject to greater cooperation is defense, as demonstrated by the visit to Italy by Kazakhstan's Minister of Defense, Ruslan Zhakssylykov, in March this year. The potential is truly remarkable: during Mattarella's aforementioned flash visit to the country this March, with a meeting with Tokayev held directly at Astana airport, the Italian president emphasized the potential for further deepening the strategic partnership between Rome and Astana, which has been in place since 2011. Speaking of official documents, in June 2023, Italy and Uzbekistan...

Astana International Forum: Not Just Another Davos

Kazakhstan’s Astana International Forum (AIF) has quietly entered a new phase in its development. Set to convene again this month, it began in 2008 as a targeted economic forum. Over time it has gradually evolved into a broader diplomatic platform aspiring to serve the so-called “Global South” as a whole. The AIF seeks to offer a deliberately open space for structured yet flexible dialogue across economic, political, and security domains, in a world full of international gatherings either overdetermined by legacy institutions or narrowly focused on crisis response. The AIF does not model itself on any existing institution. It is meant neither to replicate global summits nor to impose consensus, nor to replace regional blocs or legacy mechanisms. Rather, it reflects Kazakhstan’s own diplomatic philosophy — what President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev calls “multi-vector foreign policy” — seeking to extend this philosophy outward through a forum that prioritizes engagement over alignment and dialogue over doctrine. The AIF’s early period, from 2008 through roughly 2015, was defined by foundational work. Then called the Astana Economic Forum, it brought together central bankers, financial policymakers, and development agencies. The scope was technocratic, focusing on macroeconomic modernization and public-sector reform. Even in this limited format, however, the initiative revealed Kazakhstan's national aspiration to connect with wider global trends in institutional development and governance. Those formative years correspond to what, in terms of complex-systems theory, might be called the Forum’s phase of “emergence”: a period of assembling functions, testing formats, and learning the rhythms of international convening. These years were not marked by geopolitical ambition, but they did set in motion a process of institutional self-recognition. Kazakhstan was not just hosting events; it was experimenting with a type of global presence that would grow more distinct in later years. From 2015 to 2022, the Forum entered a more self-defining stage. It retained its core economic focus, but it increasingly attracted participants from beyond financial and development sectors. This broadened its scope to include questions of connectivity, regional stability, and sustainable development. The shift was not an accident. It accompanied Kazakhstan’s growing involvement in regional diplomacy and its active participation in a range of other multilateral structures. During this second period, the Forum took on the character of an institution with internal momentum. (This is what complex-systems theorists might term “autopoiesis,” i.e., the ability of a system to reproduce and maintain itself.) By adapting to a wider field of participants and issues, the AIF began to articulate a mission no longer limited to showcasing Kazakhstan’s domestic reforms but extending toward the creation of new transnational linkages. The rebranding of the old Astana Economic Forum as the Astana International Forum affirmed this shift in mandate, scope, and ambition. That rebranding marked the beginning of what now appears to be a critical inflection point. The cancellation of the 2024 edition due to catastrophic flooding created a rupture; but the organizers, rather than rush a replacement, deferred the Forum and used the intervening time to clarify its structure and message. The...