Kazakhstan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 1075

Armenia

Pashinyan Victory Points to New Transport Options for Central Asia

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev congratulated Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on June 8 after Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won Armenia’s parliamentary election. The message came through Akorda. Tokayev said the vote, in the preliminary view of most international observers, was open, followed Armenian election law, and allowed citizens to express their will. Armenia’s Central Electoral Commission has released preliminary results from all 2,005 polling stations, giving Civil Contract 727,160 votes, or 49.81%. Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia bloc took 23.29%, while former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance took 9.94%. Turnout stood at 59%. Pashinyan is on course to form another government, but doesn’t have the two-thirds strength needed to change the constitution without a referendum. That limits his room for maneuver on a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan, since Baku still wants Yerevan to alter constitutional language it sees as a claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. [caption id="attachment_50178" align="aligncenter" width="1535"] A stall in Tsaghkadzor, Armenia, selling Nikol Pashinyan paraphernalia. Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Kazakhstan has built a close political track with Armenia over the past two years. In November 2025, Tokayev and Pashinyan elevated ties to a strategic partnership during Pashinyan’s official visit to Kazakhstan. The two sides discussed trade, transport, agriculture, digitalization, education, and culture. Armenian government readouts from the visit also linked Kazakh wheat shipments to regional route openings through the South Caucasus. This is the practical Central Asian stake in Pashinyan’s victory: a durable Armenia-Azerbaijan peace settlement would add another layer to westward routes from the Caspian. In October 2025, Azerbaijan removed all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev told Tokayev in Astana that a shipment of Kazakh grain through Azerbaijan to Armenia was the first such consignment since transit stopped in the late Soviet period. Kazakhstan already uses the Caspian and South Caucasus to reach Turkey and Europe, but that network depends on a limited number of crossings, ports, and rail links. If Armenia and Azerbaijan reopen transport ties, Astana gains another way to reduce chokepoints and strengthen its position. Pashinyan’s victory also sends a political signal. The vote tested whether Russian pressure could set the limits of Armenia’s domestic politics. International observers said the June 7 election offered voters a genuine choice in a well-run process. They also cited pressure from abroad through trade restrictions and security threats aimed at pushing voters toward the opposition. The same assessment warned of uneven campaign opportunities and perceptions of selective justice inside Armenia. However, Pashinyan still won in a “landslide” despite years of public anger over the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, a split with old security partners, and strong pressure from opposition groups with better ties to Moscow. The two main pro-Russian opposition forces won a combined 31%. The election came against a backdrop of Armenia’s break with Russian security organizations. When Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 as Russian peacekeepers stayed on the sidelines in the breakaway territory’s dormant airport, Armenia concluded that Moscow would not protect it. In February 2024, Pashinyan said...

C5+1

From Culture to Critical Minerals: C5+1 Opens Busy U.S. Week in Central Asia

The United States and Central Asia moved another part of the C5+1 agenda into a working-level form on June 5, when culture officials from the five Central Asian states and Washington met in Tashkent. The meeting came just days before a separate C5+1 critical minerals session in Astana, giving the week a wider agenda: cultural heritage, public diplomacy, mining, investment, and supply chains are now moving forward in the same regional format. The Tashkent meeting brought together Uzbekistan's Minister of Culture Ozodbek Nazarbekov, Kazakhstan's Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balayeva, Kyrgyzstan's Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy Mirbek Mambetaliev, Tajikistan's Minister of Culture Matluba Sattoriyon, Turkmenistan's Deputy Minister of Culture Gurbanmurad Miradaliev, and Sarah Rogers, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The agenda covered cultural and humanitarian cooperation, joint cultural projects, creative exchanges, and the protection and promotion of cultural heritage. Participants discussed a permanent C5+1 Working Group on Culture, a C5+1 Culture and Innovation Forum, closer cooperation in the creative industries, and more places for Central Asian cultural professionals in U.S. education and exchange programs. Uzbekistan also proposed joint English for Culture centers with U.S. partners at cultural education institutions. In practical terms, that could mean joint training for museum staff, touring exhibitions, film and music exchanges, English-language programs for curators and cultural managers, and U.S.-backed workshops for people working in heritage, tourism, and the creative industries. For Uzbekistan, the proposed centers would give the agenda a physical base inside cultural education institutions rather than leaving it at the level of declarations. The meeting ended with a protocol, which reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the cultural heritage agenda adopted after the Washington summit in November 2025. The International Institute for Central Asia said it covered cooperation through joint events and festivals in art, literature, theater, cinema, and music. Kazakhstan's side also tied the discussion to museum partnerships, digitization of heritage, professional exchanges, tourism routes, and digital projects. The Tashkent talks grew out of the C5+1 leaders’ meeting in Washington, where culture joined a wider list of priorities. That summit marked ten years of U.S. engagement with the region through the format, which began in 2015 and has since expanded from foreign-minister meetings to expert groups and presidential-level summits. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the November 2025 summit shifted the format from broad diplomacy toward deliverable agreements, with critical minerals, aviation, supply chains, and business ties among the main areas of focus. Culture fits into that agenda, as Central Asian governments see heritage, tourism, film, music, museums, and the creative industries as economic sectors as well as identity markers. For the United States, public diplomacy gives Washington a way to stay active in the region outside security and energy talks. It also gives the C5+1 a soft-power layer, using language programs, museum links, heritage projects, and creative exchanges to build influence without framing the relationship only around security or resources. Heritage protection has a security side as well. Trafficking...

Water Security

Megaprojects Instead of Quotas: How Central Asia’s Water Diplomacy Is Changing

Central Asia’s water politics are moving beyond Soviet-era quotas. As glaciers in the Tien Shan retreat and climate pressure increases, river management has become a question of energy security, food production, and regional stability. The Soviet-era system of river-water allocation has reached its limits, forcing Central Asian states to look beyond traditional negotiations and toward joint ownership of strategic water infrastructure. Even as regional governments learn to cooperate more closely, a new challenge is emerging on Central Asia’s southern frontier, one that could disrupt the region’s hydrological balance. The Illusion of Control Formally, Central Asia’s water resources are governed through a network of interstate institutions. The principal mechanisms are the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). On paper, the system appears effective. Twice a year, ahead of the spring-summer irrigation season and the autumn-winter period, representatives of the region’s countries meet to approve water-withdrawal quotas from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. At the end of 2025, for example, officials meeting in Ashgabat agreed on water allocations for 2026, setting total withdrawals from the Amu Darya at nearly 55.4 billion cubic meters. This framework has helped prevent open interstate conflicts by providing a permanent forum for dialogue. However, its foundation remains the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which essentially preserved a Soviet-era quota system designed for a single centrally planned state rather than a group of independent countries with competing interests. The greatest weakness of the system is the absence of any meaningful enforcement mechanism. If one country exceeds its agreed allocation during a drought year, there are no legal or economic penalties. Disputes are instead resolved through emergency negotiations between ministries or, in some cases, direct interventions by heads of state. A system dependent on political goodwill and personal relationships is increasingly fragile in an era of climate stress. Turning Water Disputes Into Joint Investments As the quota system shows signs of strain, Central Asian countries have begun experimenting with a more pragmatic approach: shared ownership of infrastructure. The central paradox of the Syr Darya basin is that upstream and downstream countries need water at different times of the year. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the river’s headwaters, require releases in the winter to generate electricity and heat their cities. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, need that same water in summer to irrigate millions of hectares of farmland. Winter releases often flow downstream when demand is low, while shortages emerge during the peak agricultural season. The proposed solution is the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant on Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn River, a project now estimated to cost around $4.2 billion. What makes the project unusual is its ownership structure. Under a 2024 agreement, Kyrgyzstan will hold a 34% stake, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will each own 33%. By investing billions of dollars in infrastructure located outside their territory, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are effectively purchasing seats at the decision-making table. As shareholders, they gain a direct role in determining reservoir operations, helping ensure water is...

U.S.-Central Asia Engagement

Washington Links TRIPP and Jackson-Vanik Repeal in Push Toward Central Asia

A notable strategic shift is taking place in U.S. foreign policy, one that could have a long-term impact on the economic architecture of Eurasia. After decades in which Central Asia and the South Caucasus were viewed largely through the lens of security, counterterrorism, and competition with Russia and China, Washington is increasingly emphasizing trade, investment, transport routes, and access to critical minerals. One of the clearest signs of this shift came during a recent hearing before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Senator Steve Daines and Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the implementation of the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) framework, as well as the need to remove the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions. At first glance, these may appear to be separate issues: the peace process in the South Caucasus and Cold War-era trade legislation. In reality, however, they are closely connected. Together, they point to a broader U.S. effort to link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Western markets through trade, transport, and investment. In recent years, Republican Senator Steve Daines of Montana has emerged as one of the most active advocates of expanding America’s presence in Central Asia. As co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus and one of the leading proponents of legislative efforts to repeal Jackson-Vanik restrictions, Daines has consistently argued for stronger trade and investment ties between the United States and the countries of the region. During the hearing, Daines placed particular emphasis on the importance of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, describing it as one of the most underappreciated diplomatic efforts of recent years. According to the senator, resolving the conflict could open the door to a large-scale economic transformation of the wider region. Particularly noteworthy was his reference to a geopolitical concept associated with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. In Daines’ formulation, Central Asia represents the “bottle,” while Azerbaijan serves as its “cork.” Opening transport routes through the South Caucasus, he argued, would allow flows of oil, gas, critical minerals, and other resources to move toward Western markets rather than toward Russia, China, or Iran. Daines said this approach helped address some of the most difficult issues in the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement process and laid the foundation for what he called a “landmark agreement” after nearly four decades of conflict. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described TRIPP as an initiative capable of fundamentally transforming Armenia’s economic role in the region. According to Rubio, the framework not only addresses the issue of transport access, which had long been a source of disagreement between Baku and Yerevan, but also creates an opportunity for Armenia to become a major trade and logistics hub connecting Europe and Asia. Rubio described TRIPP as central to the Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement framework, emphasizing that the project could generate substantial investment flows and attract U.S. companies to infrastructure and transport projects across the region. Washington’s argument is that trade, transit, investment, and infrastructure can give the political settlement a stronger economic base. Unlike many previous peace...

Middle Powers

Kazakhstan’s Middle Power Moment: From Balancer to Regional Organizer

In “What Is the Status of Middle Powers?”, Michel Duclos of the Institut Montaigne presents Kazakhstan as a test case for whether middle powers can still influence outcomes in an era of intensifying great power rivalry. Writing after the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana, which brought together nine heads of state around President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Duclos notes that Kazakhstan “plays a leadership role” among states navigating pressures between China and Russia. He also argues that Tokayev, drawing on his experience as a former senior UN official, is seeking to elevate Kazakhstan into an intermediate power on multilateral issues. That is a useful lens for understanding Tokayev’s foreign policy. Rather than treating Kazakhstan’s position between larger powers as a liability, he has sought to turn geography, energy resources, logistics, diplomatic reliability, and convening power into regional agency. The result is an emerging model of middle power leadership rooted not in confrontation, but in coordination, credibility, and practical cooperation. That assessment places Tokayev’s foreign policy in a broader category than traditional balancing. Kazakhstan’s importance does not rest only on its raw assets — uranium, oil, minerals, logistics, or its position along Central Asian land routes. It also rests on how Astana uses those assets: as a convening state, a reliable partner, and a practical organizer of regional cooperation. Under Tokayev, multi-vector diplomacy has become less a defensive posture than an operating strategy, aimed at keeping Kazakhstan open to multiple partners while building platforms others have reason to use. In that sense, Kazakhstan is being presented not simply as a state located between great powers, but as one increasingly able to give structure to the space between them. Moving from “balancer” to “regional organizer” is only possible if Kazakhstan turns geography, resources, and diplomacy into practical systems others have reason to use. The clearest operational evidence of this shift is transport. Kazakhstan’s geography has often been described as a constraint. It is landlocked, vast, and positioned between larger powers. But the growth of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, allows Astana to recast that geography as a strategic advantage. In the first quarter of 2026, 125 container trains transited Kazakhstan via the Middle Corridor, a 34.4% increase from the same period in 2025. The Times of Central Asia also reported that freight volumes along the route through Kazakhstan have grown more than fivefold over seven years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.5 million tons annually. These figures show that Kazakhstan is not simply selling potential; it is building operational value into the corridor. This is where the idea of Kazakhstan as a regional organizer becomes concrete. A balancing state tries to avoid overdependence on any single power. An organizing state builds systems that others have a reason to use. If Kazakhstan can make the Middle Corridor faster, more predictable, more digitalized, and more commercially reliable, it is not merely balancing Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye, and the South Caucasus. It is creating connective tissue between them. World Bank analysis suggests that infrastructure...

EAEU

As Armenia Looks West, Could Uzbekistan Move Closer to the EAEU?

Armenia’s increasingly uncertain future within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to have entered a new phase. On May 29, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement calling on Yerevan to clarify whether it intends to pursue deeper integration with the European Union or remain committed to the Eurasian bloc. The four leaders announced that members of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council would present a report at the next meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2026 outlining the possible consequences of suspending Armenia’s participation in the EAEU treaty framework. “We share the view that the Republic of Armenia should, within the shortest possible timeframe, hold a nationwide referendum on joining the European Union or continuing its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union,” the statement said. Speaking to journalists after the summit in Astana, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew parallels between Armenia’s current trajectory and the developments that preceded the crisis in Ukraine. “I have mentioned this before: the crisis in Ukraine began with attempts to join the EU,” Putin said. He added that significant differences between European and EAEU standards, particularly in agriculture and industry, make simultaneous participation in both integration projects difficult. “Combining the two is practically impossible,” Putin said. “Therefore, we would be forced to curtail much of our economic integration work with Armenia.” The following day, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations amid Yerevan’s growing engagement with the European Union. According to Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, the move was a clear diplomatic signal of Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the pro-European course pursued by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government and indicated a downgrading of bilateral relations. Dubnov also argued that Armenia’s representative at the Astana summit, Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, avoided harsher criticism from Putin partly because of the position taken by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Kazakhstan itself signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2020,” Dubnov noted, suggesting that arguments about Armenia’s European integration harming the EAEU are largely political rather than economic in nature. One recent poll appears to reinforce confidence within Armenia’s ruling camp. A survey conducted ahead of parliamentary elections indicates that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party could secure nearly 65% of decided voters, positioning it for a convincing victory and a substantial parliamentary majority. Against that backdrop, Moscow’s pressure on Yerevan may be less about influencing the outcome of Armenia’s elections than about preparing for a longer-term strategic realignment. Supporters of Pashinyan increasingly associate his political project with closer ties to Europe, a perception reinforced not only by European leaders but also by U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently expressed support for Pashinyan’s re-election campaign. For his part, Pashinyan appears focused on a broader regional recalibration. Speaking via Facebook Live on May 31, he emphasized the importance of normalizing relations with neighboring states. “I am convinced that we will achieve the goal of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye,” he said. “This means that a balanced and balancing...