Kazakhstan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Transport & Logistics

Kazakhstan and Iran Expand Port Access to Boost Cargo Transit

Iran is ready to provide Kazakhstan with access to its port infrastructure to support cargo shipments to international markets, Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh said during talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin. The meeting took place in Astana, where transport and logistics cooperation topped the agenda. The two sides discussed the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor, port infrastructure, bilateral trade, and transport links between Kazakhstan and Iran. Iranian officials said procedures had been finalized to allocate a land plot to Kazakhstan at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas, Iran’s main southern port on the Persian Gulf. According to Sadegh, the site will be transferred to Kazakhstan once the remaining legal procedures are completed. Tehran also offered Kazakhstan the opportunity to operate at Chabahar Port, Iran’s strategic deep-water hub on the Gulf of Oman, which provides direct access to markets in South and Southeast Asia. Chabahar is one of the key nodes of the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia, Iran, India, and other countries. According to Sadegh, construction of the Chabahar-Zahedan railway, which would connect Chabahar to wider rail networks used for regional cargo transport, is more than 90% complete and is expected to be launched in the coming months. Once operational, the railway is expected to integrate Chabahar into an international rail network linking the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, and Europe. Kazakhstan, in turn, said it was ready to consider offering Iran port facilities, berths, and terminals at the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk to support Iranian logistics operations. The two sides also highlighted the recently signed five-party railway agreement between China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey, as well as an upcoming four-party tariff agreement between Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Iran, aimed at boosting regional trade and transit. “Strengthening cooperation is a strategic task set by our heads of state,” Zhumangarin said. “In 2025, trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Iran grew by 26.4% to $430.2 million. This confirms significant potential for further expansion, including within the framework of the roadmap to increase mutual trade to $3 billion and thanks to the free trade agreement signed between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union.” Sadegh said her visit was focused on implementing previously reached agreements and expanding transport and logistics cooperation, which she said had gained importance amid current geopolitical changes. Officials also noted that cargo volumes along the North-South corridor rose by 12% in 2025 to reach 3.5 million tons, while railway freight traffic between Kazakhstan and Iran increased by 69%. To increase the corridor’s potential, Zhumangarin proposed developing a joint roadmap for transport infrastructure modernization, which he said could increase the route’s capacity to 20 million tons annually. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Iran have continued expanding economic ties despite recent tensions involving Iran. Iranian investors are moving forward with industrial projects in Kazakhstan, including Solico Group’s planned cheese production plant in the Almaty region, while Kazakh vegetable...

TRIPP

The 43 Kilometers That Could Rewire Eurasia

The Caspian Policy Center’s Trans-Caspian Forum 2026 convened U.S. and regional officials at the National Press Club in Washington on June 10 for a discussion of peace, economic security, and durable partnerships. The forum framed a short Armenia-based link as part of a wider effort to turn the Middle Corridor into a working route for cargo, energy, data, and capital. The strategic dialogue was chaired by Dr. Eric Rudenshiold, CPC research director and senior fellow. Speakers included Aryeh Lightstone, Senior Advisor to the Board of Peace and to Ambassador Steve Witkoff; Hikmet Hajiyev, Assistant to Azerbaijan’s president and foreign-policy department head; Yerzhan Kazykhan, Kazakhstan’s presidential representative for U.S. negotiations; Javlon Vakhabov, deputy adviser to Uzbekistan’s president on foreign policy; and Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s ambassador to the United States and presidential special envoy. The meeting came as Washington tries to turn the Armenia-Azerbaijan thaw, the C5+1 critical minerals agenda, and private-sector interest into routes that can move cargo, energy, data, and capital across the Caspian. The discussion cast the Middle Corridor as the main strategic alternative linking Central Asian production to western markets. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) refers to a planned 43-kilometer link through southern Armenia’s Syunik province, near Meghri and the Arax River, that would connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. With rail, road, energy, and digital infrastructure, TRIPP is intended to plug into the wider Trans-Caspian route from Central Asia through Azerbaijan and Türkiye to Europe. Aryeh Lightstone opened by placing connectivity inside the Trump administration’s peace and economic-security agenda. His remarks tied Armenia-Azerbaijan diplomacy, the Board of Peace, and the Abraham Accords to the claim that commerce can reinforce peace where standard diplomacy stalled. Lightstone shifted the subject from maps to execution. Customs, regulatory harmonization, digital trade platforms, border procedures, and bankable investment vehicles will decide whether the Middle Corridor becomes a reliable system, he said. His reference to a TRIPP Plus Enterprise Fund pointed to U.S. structures that can move from declarations to projects. Hikmet Hajiyev presented Azerbaijan as the hinge of that system. The Caspian, he argued, does not separate Azerbaijan from Central Asia, but unites them. His line that C5+1 was mathematics while the C6 was chemistry captured Baku’s framing. Azerbaijan is positioning itself as a logistical and strategic extension of Central Asia, connected through Turkic institutions, energy routes, rail, ports, aviation, and digital links. Hajiyev described the Middle Corridor as moving from a supplementary transit route into a strategic geoeconomic system, linking Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail capacity, Baku port, Nakhchivan, TRIPP, and the planned Trans-Caspian fiber-optic cable with Kazakhstan. Ambassador Kazykhan presented Kazakhstan’s strategic value as something built over time and backed by material capacity, not diplomatic positioning alone. Kazakhstan is by far the region’s largest economy, with the IMF projecting 2026 GDP of about $360 billion. Kazykhan said more than 600 American companies operate in Kazakhstan and cumulative U.S. investment has surpassed $100 billion. Kazakhstan also supplies about 24% of U.S. uranium imports and has reserves or production capacity linked...

Iran

U.S.-Iran Framework Could Reopen Central Asia’s Southern Route

The United States and Iran said on June 15 that they had reached a framework to end their war, halt the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports, and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The sides said a memorandum of understanding could be signed on June 19 in Switzerland. The exact terms were not immediately known, with Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief left for later talks. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said the pact called for “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” Trump posted, on Truth Social, “Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” Brent crude fell by more than 4% in early trading, and Asian stock markets advanced. Reuters later said shippers remained cautious after one LNG tanker passed through Hormuz on June 15. A reopened strait would not restore normal traffic immediately, with freight flows depending on mine clearance, insurance rules, port inspections, and shipping guidance for vessels entering the area. Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian state to publicly welcome the latest announcement. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev praised the political will of the parties, saying they had helped “restore trust and mutually acceptable solutions.” Azerbaijan also issued a supporting statement praising Pakistan’s mediation and saying further talks could support “lasting peace and stability.” Central Asian governments had previously welcomed the U.S.-Iran ceasefire in April, with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan calling for de-escalation and diplomacy. For Central Asia, oil prices are only part of the story. The larger question is whether de-escalation can reopen practical access to southern trade routes, ports, and markets beyond the Caspian. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the region has paid closer attention to alternatives to routes through Russia. Iran offers one of its shortest paths to the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, Türkiye, and India. But sanctions, banking risk, war insurance, and U.S. policy shifts have kept that path fragile. Chabahar is the clearest example. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year contract with Iran to develop and operate the port on the Gulf of Oman. India’s shipping minister, Sarbananda Sonowal, called Chabahar “a vital trade artery connecting India with Afghanistan and Central Asian Countries.” The port allows Indian cargo to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia without crossing Pakistan, and gives Central Asian exporters another route toward India and the Indian Ocean. The sanctions picture remains uncertain. On October 30, 2025, Washington granted India a six-month waiver that allowed operations at Chabahar to continue. No public replacement had been announced by June 15. The new framework could make another waiver easier to justify, but banks and insurers will wait for signed text, U.S. guidance, and proof that Hormuz and Iranian ports are safe. Reuters cited a senior Iranian official who said the draft framework included no new U.S. sanctions before a final deal, a temporary oil sanctions waiver, and the release of $25 billion in frozen Iranian assets. The same source said Iran would refrain from further enrichment and...

UNAMA

Opinion: Why the Next Head of UNAMA Should Come from Central Asia

A recent briefing on Afghanistan before the United Nations Security Council again showed that the country’s challenges can no longer be viewed only through humanitarian assistance or debates over recognition of the Taliban government. Afghanistan remains a deeply complex domestic issue, but it is increasingly becoming a regional one as well. The discussion now extends beyond human rights and political dialogue with the de facto authorities. It now includes the return of millions of people from neighboring countries, pressure on cities and rural communities, shortages of jobs and water, cross-border trade, security, and the future of regional transport corridors. Against this backdrop, the question of who should lead the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is no longer only a personnel decision. It has become part of a wider debate about what international policy toward Afghanistan should look like in its next phase. The catalyst for this discussion was the recent briefing delivered by Georgette Gagnon, the UN Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, before the Security Council. According to Gagnon, the de facto authorities maintain control over both Afghanistan’s territory and administrative structures. At present, they face no significant armed or political challenge. The Taliban themselves view the restoration of security across Afghanistan as one of their principal achievements. Yet this does not mean the situation is stable. Gagnon pointed to a fundamental contradiction within the current system of governance. There are rigid ideological policies that place considerable pressure on society. There are also more pragmatic approaches that have so far allowed the system to function and survive. In other words, Afghanistan appears to have achieved a form of managed stability, but without a clear vision of where that system is ultimately headed. Stability Conceals Deep Structural Problems The economic picture is equally mixed. Afghanistan has recorded positive growth in absolute terms. Fiscal stability has improved, revenue collection has increased, and several infrastructure projects are moving forward. The country has also largely maintained the gains achieved through the reduction of opium poppy cultivation. Yet beneath these signs of stabilization lie significant challenges. According to Gagnon, nearly 5.9 million people have returned to Afghanistan since 2023. This represents a population increase of more than 10%. Another 2.8 million Afghans could return during 2026 alone. Many returnees arrive with no savings, no employment, and limited prospects for rebuilding their lives. For a country with a fragile economy, this creates enormous pressure. Cities and rural communities are struggling to absorb new arrivals. Jobs, housing, water resources, and social services remain in short supply. The humanitarian situation remains severe. In 2026, approximately 21.9 million people, around 45% of Afghanistan’s population, are expected to require humanitarian assistance. Another major concern is demographics. More than half of Afghanistan’s population is under the age of 25. This generation is growing up amid limited opportunities. While the challenges facing girls have received international attention, boys increasingly face difficulties as well. Employment opportunities are scarce, household incomes are declining, and competition for livelihoods is intensifying. Environmental pressures...

C5+1

U.S. Convenes Critical Minerals Dialogue with Central Asian Officials in Kazakhstan

ASTANA — The United States opened a new round of high-level critical minerals talks with Central Asian governments in Astana on June 10, with U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor saying Washington is placing new emphasis on a region it sees as central to global commerce, connectivity, and secure supply chains. Speaking at the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, Gor said Central Asia “has not gotten the attention it deserves from the United States,” and that the Trump administration had decided to change that. “We care about this region, we want to be involved with this region, we want to identify win-win situations for the United States and your nations,” Gor said. The meeting, held at The Ritz-Carlton in Astana, brought together officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the United States. The program included sessions on geological exploration, surveying and mapping, mining and processing, and global value and supply chains, followed by a government-business networking reception. Gor thanked Kazakhstan for hosting what he described as the first in-person C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue and said he had met with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev shortly before the session. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said that ahead of the dialogue, Gor and Kazakh Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev had discussed economic and investment partnerships, innovation, artificial intelligence, education, transport, logistics, and critical minerals. The ministry also said the sides discussed the implementation of agreements reached between Tokayev and U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House in November 2025. Gor framed the Astana meeting as part of a broader increase in U.S. engagement with Central Asia following the C5+1 leaders’ meeting in Washington last year. He said critical minerals are now a central part of that engagement because they are essential to infrastructure, advanced technologies, industry, and national defense. “Our economic security depends on our ability to diversify our access to critical minerals,” Gor said. “Ensuring reliable access to these materials requires not only expanding production, but also building resilient, transparent, and market-driven supply chains in close partnership with trusted partners.” He added that the Central Asian states represented at the table were exactly the partners Washington wants to work with. “There’s a reason we’re sitting at this table and not at another table around the world,” Gor said. “It’s because this is where we want to work. This is where we have identified trusted partners.” Gor highlighted the role of U.S. commercial and development-finance tools in supporting investment, saying Washington is prepared to back American companies working in the region. “The United States government stands behind American companies,” Gor said. “There is no such thing as a deal too small.” Gor also pointed to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, saying it was preparing to “invest and build” in the region and saw potential in critical minerals, telecommunications, and Trans-Caspian infrastructure. He said DFC saw “potential to transform the region’s rich deposits of critical minerals into the foundation of a new wave of industrialization.” “President Trump understands the importance of...

Armenia

Pashinyan Victory Points to New Transport Options for Central Asia

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev congratulated Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on June 8 after Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won Armenia’s parliamentary election. The message came through Akorda. Tokayev said the vote, in the preliminary view of most international observers, was open, followed Armenian election law, and allowed citizens to express their will. Armenia’s Central Electoral Commission has released preliminary results from all 2,005 polling stations, giving Civil Contract 727,160 votes, or 49.81%. Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia bloc took 23.29%, while former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance took 9.94%. Turnout stood at 59%. Pashinyan is on course to form another government, but doesn’t have the two-thirds strength needed to change the constitution without a referendum. That limits his room for maneuver on a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan, since Baku still wants Yerevan to alter constitutional language it sees as a claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. [caption id="attachment_50178" align="aligncenter" width="1535"] A stall in Tsaghkadzor, Armenia, selling Nikol Pashinyan paraphernalia. Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Kazakhstan has built a close political track with Armenia over the past two years. In November 2025, Tokayev and Pashinyan elevated ties to a strategic partnership during Pashinyan’s official visit to Kazakhstan. The two sides discussed trade, transport, agriculture, digitalization, education, and culture. Armenian government readouts from the visit also linked Kazakh wheat shipments to regional route openings through the South Caucasus. This is the practical Central Asian stake in Pashinyan’s victory: a durable Armenia-Azerbaijan peace settlement would add another layer to westward routes from the Caspian. In October 2025, Azerbaijan removed all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev told Tokayev in Astana that a shipment of Kazakh grain through Azerbaijan to Armenia was the first such consignment since transit stopped in the late Soviet period. Kazakhstan already uses the Caspian and South Caucasus to reach Turkey and Europe, but that network depends on a limited number of crossings, ports, and rail links. If Armenia and Azerbaijan reopen transport ties, Astana gains another way to reduce chokepoints and strengthen its position. Pashinyan’s victory also sends a political signal. The vote tested whether Russian pressure could set the limits of Armenia’s domestic politics. International observers said the June 7 election offered voters a genuine choice in a well-run process. They also cited pressure from abroad through trade restrictions and security threats aimed at pushing voters toward the opposition. The same assessment warned of uneven campaign opportunities and perceptions of selective justice inside Armenia. However, Pashinyan still won in a “landslide” despite years of public anger over the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, a split with old security partners, and strong pressure from opposition groups with better ties to Moscow. The two main pro-Russian opposition forces won a combined 31%. The election came against a backdrop of Armenia’s break with Russian security organizations. When Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 as Russian peacekeepers stayed on the sidelines in the breakaway territory’s dormant airport, Armenia concluded that Moscow would not protect it. In February 2024, Pashinyan said...