Justice - The Times Of Central Asia

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Activist in Exile: Tajikistan Pressures Family Over Political Dissent

Mahmadsobir Abdukakhor, an activist associated with the banned Group 24 in Tajikistan, has accused law enforcement agencies in the Rasht District of pressuring his family. According to Abdukahkhor, authorities are demanding that his relatives persuade him to renounce his political activities and return to Tajikistan. “They came to my parents and brother, demanding that they convince me to return and ask for forgiveness from the authorities. But my parents are not responsible for my actions,” Abdukahkhor told Radio Ozodi on December 16. Abdukahkhor stated that such tactics are not new but reaffirmed that he would not stop his political activities or “repent,” as he does not trust the authorities’ assurances. “If I go back, I will either be killed like Umarali Kuwwatov or arrested like Sukhrob Zafar,” he said, referring to other opposition figures. Attempts by Radio Ozodi to obtain comments from Rasht District law enforcement agencies were unsuccessful. Tajik authorities have placed Mahmadsobir Abdukahkhor and other members of Group 24 — a political movement recognized as an extremist organization and banned in the country — on a wanted list. Abdukahkhor initially moved to Russia in 2012, where he ran a business and became involved in the movement before relocating to Europe. In 2014, Tajikistan amended its Criminal Code, allowing individuals accused of extremism to be exonerated if they return and “sincerely repent.” President Emomali Rahmon instructed law enforcement agencies to facilitate the return of such citizens. However, human rights activists claim that despite promises of amnesty, some returnees — including former members of ISIS and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP) — were subsequently arrested and imprisoned.

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More Than Half of Uzbeks View Nepotism as a Corruption Problem

According to the United Nations, corruption costs developing countries approximately $1.26 trillion annually. Since 2016, Uzbekistan has undertaken significant reforms to combat corruption, including the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Agency, the simplification of public services, and the full digitalization of public procurement systems. A recent study conducted by Uzbekistan's Anti-Corruption Agency, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea sheds light on public attitudes toward corruption. The study used surveys, focus groups, and expert interviews, covering all 14 regions of Uzbekistan and gathering responses from 503 participants. Key Findings The study revealed that public understanding of corruption in Uzbekistan often focuses on bribery and nepotism. Over half of respondents identified abuse of office and nepotism as corrupt practices. However, less than 40% considered valuable gifts a form of corruption, with many viewings them as gestures of gratitude rather than bribes. While bribery is widely condemned - 88.4% of respondents disapproved of it - attitudes toward small gifts for good service were more lenient. Sectors Most Affected The study highlighted the sectors most susceptible to corruption: Healthcare and Education: Particularly in higher education. Local Governance: Frequent opportunities for misuse of authority. Traffic Safety Services, Internal Affairs, Roads, and Construction: Identified as high-risk areas, with rural residents particularly concerned about corruption in road construction. Reporting Corruption Despite witnessing corrupt practices, few respondents report such behavior to authorities. Among respondents: Men: 79.2% were slightly more willing to report corruption than women (70.4%). Women: Showed greater interest in using mobile applications or online portals for reporting (85.2% versus 79.2% of men). Persons with Disabilities: Reported corruption less frequently, but expressed a high willingness to use online tools if made accessible. Trust in Anti-Corruption Institutions Trust in anti-corruption institutions varied significantly: Urban Residents: Trusted the media (20.3%) and bloggers (17.3%) more than rural residents. Rural Residents: Had higher trust in the Anti-Corruption Agency (21.4%). Persons with Disabilities: Showed trust in the Anti-Corruption Agency, media, and bloggers. General Public: Less than 5% said they trust no one to address corruption. Moving Forward The findings suggest that while public awareness of corruption is growing, attitudes toward certain practices, such as gift-giving, remain complex. Efforts to increase transparency, provide accessible reporting tools, and build trust in anti-corruption institutions are critical to further reducing corruption in Uzbekistan.

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Tinker, Tailor, Kazakh Ties: UK Spy Trial Reveals Moscow’s Long Shadow in Kazakh Politics

London's Central Criminal Court, known as the Old Bailey, is currently hearing the trial of several Bulgarian nationals accused by the British authorities of spying for Russia’s intelligence services. The case is likely being scrutinized not only in Moscow but also in Astana, as at least two of the six alleged operations relate to Kazakhstan. A Favor for Nazarbayev The defendants, five Bulgarian citizens, are accused of planning six espionage operations, one of which centers around Bergey Ryskaliyev, a former senior Kazakh official during the presidency of Nursultan Nazarbayev.The accused filmed Ryskaliyev in his London home and plotted to alternately dress up as DHL or Deliveroo drivers, or use a fake ambulance as a cover to access his premises. Ryskaliyev served as akim of the oil-rich Atyrau region from 2006 to 2012, before leaving Kazakhstan amid serious corruption allegations. Both he and his brother Amanzhan - an ex-deputy of the Mazhilis - have been wanted in their homeland for over a decade, facing charges of large-scale corruption, organized crime, false entrepreneurship, and money laundering. Public opinion in Kazakhstan attributes the Ryskaliyev brothers’ prosecution to their alleged involvement in the December 2011 Zhanaozen uprising. According to reports, the uprising was intended to culminate in Nazarbayev’s resignation through a symbolic “march to Astana.” By the summer of 2012, Nazarbayev seemed wary of Ryskaliyev, publicly thanking him for his service during a visit to Atyrau. Shortly after, Ryskaliyev resigned for "health reasons,” while Amanzhan stepped down as a Mazhilis deputy. The brothers remained in hiding for years, with their lawyers claiming in a 2019 trial that their whereabouts were unknown. However, reports later surfaced that Ryskaliyev had filmed and leaked a video of Nazarbayev in London’s Hyde Park, allegedly using it to blackmail the former president. Ryskaliyev denied this, characterizing his actions as a “small rally” outside Nazarbayev’s residence. Despite these allegations, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court ruled in 2020 to return some of Ryskaliyev’s confiscated assets, including land, money, and shares in various companies, and to reverse property seizures which had affected their spouses. Prosecutors in the London trial allege that Ryskaliyev’s case was part of an operation to foster stronger ties between Moscow and Astana, with Russia suggesting that Kazakhstan might benefit from pursuing him. If accurate, this initiative likely predated January 2022, when Nazarbayev retained significant influence despite stepping down as president. Targeting Tokayev? The second alleged operation appears to have been directed at Kazakhstan’s current president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Prosecutors claim the defendants planned a staged protest outside Kazakhstan’s embassy in London in September 2022, intending to pass information about the “organizers” to the Kazakh authorities. This, they argue, was another effort to bolster Russian-Kazakh relations. However, details reported by Germany’s Der Spiegel suggest a more specific objective. According to the report, the FSB instructed the operatives to stage a protest and send a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, ostensibly from a fabricated group critical of Tokayev. Plans also included splashing fake blood or pig’s blood on the...

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Uzbek Government Files Criminal Case Against Citizen Over Jihadi Activities in Syria

The Uzbek Ministry of Internal Affairs has instigated a criminal case against Khudoyor Nuriddinov, also known as Abu Walid, who is accused of being a member of an international terrorist organization. The announcement was made via the ministry’s press service. Born in 1994 in the Rishtan district of Ferghana, Nuriddinov faces multiple charges under Uzbekistan’s Criminal Code, including: Article 155-2: Training or travel for the purpose of terrorist activities, Article 159: Undermining the constitutional order of Uzbekistan, Article 223: Illegal travel abroad or entry into Uzbekistan, Article 244-2: Creation, management, or participation in extremist, separatist, or banned organizations. According to the authorities, Nuriddinov left for Russia in 2016 as a labor migrant, where he became influenced by international terrorist ideologies. He later traveled to Idlib, Syria, where he engaged in propaganda activities. The Uzbek authorities report that his actions led to the deaths of several Uzbek citizens who were recruited and killed in fighting in Syria. Nuriddinov continues to promote jihad through social networks and YouTube, giving a religious pretext for his activities. His accounts and pages are banned in Uzbekistan, and those found storing, distributing, or transporting his content face legal action.

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Capital Over Confinement in Sentencing of Raimbek “Millions” Matraimov

Raimbek Matraimov, infamously known as “Millions” for his tremendous wealth, once wielded immense power in Kyrgyzstan. Rising to prominence as deputy chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Customs Service from 2015 to 2017, Matraimov’s tenure became synonymous with corruption and organized crime. His activities, alleged to have funneled monumental sums of money through shadowy operations, fashioned him not only as a dominant figure within the Customs Service but also as a key player in Kyrgyzstan’s criminal underworld. The Rise of Raimbek Matraimov During his time in the Customs Service, Matraimov amassed an extraordinary fortune. His influence extended beyond bureaucratic corridors, infiltrating the political landscape of Kyrgyzstan. Whispers of his role as an organized crime leader were persistent, yet his wealth and connections left him virtually untouchable in those years. Speculation about his political influence peaked after the dramatic rise of Sadyr Japarov to Kyrgyzstan’s presidency in October 2020. Japarov’s elevation, from prison to the highest office amidst a tide of civil unrest, prompted many to suspect that Matraimov’s financial backing played a decisive role in the ascent. However, despite Japarov-appointed head of Kyrgyzstan’s State National Security Committee (GKNB), Kamchybek Tashiyev once describing him as a “good guy,” if Matraimov hoped to shelter under Japarov's influence, his expectations were soon dashed. The Turning Point Japarov’s administration showed no hesitation in targeting Kyrgyzstan’s entrenched criminal networks. With Matraimov having bounced in and out of jail since October 2020, by October 2023, the GKNB had escalated their crackdown on organized crime, culminating in the death of Kamchybek Kolbaev, the country’s top crime kingpin - a member of the “Bratva” linked to heroin trafficking - during a security operation in Bishkek. Sensing the shifting winds, Matraimov fled Kyrgyzstan shortly after Kolbaev's death. However, his flight only seemed to intensify the resolve of the government in his homeland, where the authorities began seizing Matraimov's assets and investigating his allies. Among those implicated was Matraimov’s brother, Iskender, a parliamentary deputy with significant political connections. Extradition and Arrest In late March 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s crackdown on Matraimov escalated when the GKNB detained five Azerbaijani nationals in Bishkek. These individuals, suspected members of a transnational organized crime group, were allegedly dispatched by Matraimov from Azerbaijan to assassinate top Kyrgyz government officials. This accusation - one of countless similar claims regarding assassination attempts made by the Kyrgyz authorities this year alone - led to diplomatic action, and March 26, 2024, Matraimov along with three of his brothers were extradited from Baku to Kyrgyzstan. Upon his arrival, Matraimov was immediately taken into custody. The legal net tightened further as the case against him unfolded, with allegations of illegal border crossings, hooliganism involving weapons, money laundering, and broader accusations regarding his criminal empire. Asset Seizures and Financial Settlements Prior to his sentencing, Matraimov had reportedly returned $200 million to the state budget, equivalent to over 17 billion Kyrgyz som, to be released from custody to house arrest pending his trial. Authorities also confiscated significant assets, including a 14-story business center in...

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Kazakhstan’s Path to Judicial Reform and Transparency

Kazakhstan is implementing reforms to enhance judicial independence, modernize its institutions, and address contemporary challenges according to Aslambek Mergaliev, Chairman of the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan, who detailed these initiatives aimed at strengthening the rule of law and increasing transparency in the judicial system. Strengthening Judicial Independence Central to these reforms is ensuring judges’ independence by depoliticizing their roles and holding them accountable only to the law. Judges are prohibited from affiliating with political parties, and personnel matters have been fully transferred to the Supreme Judicial Council. Key advancements include transparent selection procedures for judges and the introduction of new professional standards. A pivotal guarantee of independence is the new funding model, which allocates at least 6.5% of the state apparatus budget to the judiciary, reducing financial dependence on other government branches. Judges’ professional performance is now evaluated by their peers, supported by the "Electronic File of a Judge," an automated service designed to minimize bias. Additionally, the authority to approve special operational and investigative measures against judges has been transferred to the Prosecutor General. Introduction of Administrative Justice Kazakhstan established an administrative justice system in 2021, primarily aimed at protecting citizens' rights and improving public administration. This system has significantly increased the number of cases involving housing, tax, and land disputes, reflecting growing public trust in the judiciary. The percentage of court decisions in favor of citizens has risen from 15% to over 60%. Jury trials have also expanded, with the number of cases tried by jury more than doubling in recent years. Digital Transformation of the Judiciary Kazakhstan is leveraging digital technology to modernize its judicial processes, earning the country 4th place among 47 nations in reviews conducted by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) on the judicial systems of Council of Europe member states. Tools such as Digital Analytics of Judicial Practice and a robotic assistant help reduce judges’ workloads, predict case outcomes, and optimize adjudication. Additionally, the Supreme Court has initiated the broader use of electronic surveillance as an alternative to detention, favoring house arrest with electronic bracelets. International Recognition At the IX Congress of Judges in October 2024, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev engaged with representatives from CEPEJ and the International Association for Court Administration (IACA) to discuss the progress of judicial reforms. Special emphasis was placed on expanding cooperation in human rights protection. The Union of Judges of Kazakhstan has established partnerships with organizations such as UNDP, OSCE, the Council of Europe, USAID, and the International Bar Association, among others. Future Steps Looking ahead to 2025, Kazakhstan plans to establish three courts of cassation and introduce a “continuous cassation” system. The Supreme Court will prioritize ensuring uniformity in judicial practice, with cases reviewed only at the initiative of the highest judicial authority.