Uzbekistan Justice - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 184

Bloggers’ Rights

Uzbekistan’s New Bloggers’ Council Has No Confirmed Leader

Uzbekistan’s Union of Journalists says it plans to help bloggers when officials refuse to provide information or when they face pressure over their work. The proposal follows several prosecutions of bloggers known for reporting on alleged local corruption or criticizing public officials. The initiative immediately encountered a leadership problem: one day after the Creative Council of Bloggers was announced, the blogger expected to lead it said he had declined the position. The Union of Journalists announced the council on August 7, saying the decision reflected the growing role of bloggers in Uzbekistan. According to the union, bloggers increasingly compete with traditional media for audiences and influence public debate. The council is expected to advise bloggers on legal issues, including cases in which officials obstruct access to information or third parties apply pressure. It also plans training in media law and ethics, along with digital security and media literacy. Shukhratjon Oripov, acting chairman of the Union of Journalists, said bloggers had become independent participants in the country’s information landscape. The council’s leadership remains unclear. Journalist and blogger Eldar Asanov was initially named for the post. On August 8, however, Asanov said he had received the offer but declined it. He said he had proposed that the Union of Journalists establish a bloggers’ club instead. Gazeta.uz subsequently corrected its original report. Among the bloggers prosecuted in recent years are Otabek Sattoriy and Olimjon Khaidarov, both of whom had reported allegations of local corruption. Sattoriy, founder of the YouTube channel Xalq Fikri, or People’s Opinion, covered social and economic problems in the Surkhandarya region. Shortly before his arrest, he was reporting on farmers whose land had allegedly been seized by a senior local official and transferred to a company owned by businessman and senator Murtazo Rakhmatov. On May 10, 2021, Sattoriy was convicted on four counts of extortion and one count of slander and sentenced to six and a half years in prison. On February 5, 2024, after about three years behind bars, a court released him and replaced the remainder of his sentence with correctional labor, with 20% of his earnings to be withheld for the state. On December 1, 2023, a court in the Ferghana region sentenced blogger Olimjon Khaidarov to eight years in prison on a large-scale extortion charge and speech-related charges of slander and insult. Khaidarov, who had nearly 30,000 YouTube followers, was known locally for reporting allegations of corruption and criticizing local authorities. One slander charge concerned a claim by the mayor of Kokand that a post about the off-the-books sale of parking spaces had defamed him. Police alleged that Khaidarov had demanded $10,000 from the head of Kokand’s Istiklal bazaar in exchange for withholding negative coverage and said he was detained while receiving the final $2,500. Khaidarov denied wrongdoing and said he had been set up in retaliation for his reporting. Human Rights Watch described his conviction as the latest in a series of criminal cases against bloggers and journalists in Uzbekistan. In Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF)...

Islam and National Identity

Dombra Dispute and Niqab Bans Fuel Religious Debate in Central Asia

Standing before a court in Aktobe in June, 35-year-old Azat Konys apologized to “the entire Kazakh people” for insulting one of the country’s most cherished cultural symbols. Two months earlier, during a TikTok livestream, he had declared the dombra forbidden under Islam, compared the two-stringed instrument to part of the devil’s anatomy and called clerics from Kazakhstan’s official Islamic authority “dogs of hell.” Konys asked the court not to imprison him. The judge instead sentenced him to three years and six months for inciting religious and national hatred. The controversy began when Konys cited the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, the dominant legal tradition among Muslims in Kazakhstan, to argue that the dombra and other stringed instruments, including the guitar and balalaika, were haram, meaning forbidden under Islamic law. The remarks caused particular anger because the dombra is more than a musical instrument in Kazakhstan: it has accompanied oral poetry and storytelling for generations and is officially celebrated as a symbol of cultural heritage and national identity. Police identified Konys after clips from the livestream circulated on social media and detained him in April. The case is an unusually stark example of how online religious disputes are spilling into legal and political life across Central Asia. Arguments that might once have remained within mosques or religious communities are now spreading through social media, forcing governments and official Islamic authorities alike to decide where religious expression ends and attacks on national culture begin. A more recent controversy arose in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan Region, where a 66-year-old guest at a toi, a traditional wedding feast, called for stricter adherence to Islamic law. He urged the organizers to separate men and women and remove music and alcohol from the celebration, while describing musicians as “heralds of Satan.” The video spread rapidly on social media, prompting nationwide debate. The man was detained and placed in a temporary detention facility for incitement of religious and social hatred. In a statement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said that freedom of expression does not extend to statements that degrade the dignity of others or could provoke religious or social hostility. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), the country’s main official Muslim body, later issued its own response. It stated that Islam does not prohibit music in itself and stressed that publicly insulting artists or women is inconsistent with Islamic ethics. Another controversy centered on Nauryz, the spring equinox holiday celebrated throughout Central Asia and across much of the Turkic and Iranian cultural world. In March, a blogger in the Almaty Region described the holiday as “non-Muslim” and argued that it should not be celebrated. Police opened a criminal case against him on suspicion of inciting religious hatred. Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently warned of legal liability for statements attacking Nauryz and other national traditions. The SAMK, meanwhile, publicly celebrated Nauryz as a national holiday promoting social harmony and charitable acts. The debate soon spread beyond social media into politics and the entertainment industry. Producer and television presenter Bayan Alaguzova said...

Bride Kidnapping

Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws

Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law. Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data. The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices. Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage. The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it. The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent. Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies. One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left...

Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border

Kyrgyzstan Uncovers Suspected Smuggling Tunnel on Uzbek Border

Authorities in Kyrgyzstan have uncovered an underground tunnel on the border with Uzbekistan that is believed to have been built for smuggling goods, 24.kg reported, citing the Batken Regional Department of Internal Affairs. According to the police, officers from the department responsible for combating extremism and illegal migration received information that an underground passage was being constructed to move goods illegally across the border. During an inspection of an abandoned house on Mamazhanov Street in the village of Chechelik, Kadamjay District, investigators discovered a tunnel leading toward neighboring Uzbekistan. According to the regional police department, the tunnel is approximately 12 meters deep and 1.5 meters wide. The authorities have not disclosed its total length or confirmed whether it had already been used. The Batken regional police investigation service is examining the circumstances surrounding the tunnel. The discovery follows several similar cases in Central Asia. In April 2024, Kyrgyz authorities uncovered another underground passage in Jalal-Abad Region along the Uzbek border. Officials said the tunnel had been used to smuggle both people and goods, and police arrested an Uzbek citizen who had allegedly crossed the border through the passage. Kazakhstan has also reported similar discoveries. In December 2024, Kazakh and Uzbek authorities dismantled a smuggling operation involving a 450-meter tunnel in Turkistan Region. Investigators said the passage had been used for around two months to transport between five and seven metric tons of fuel into Uzbekistan each day. In July 2025, Kazakhstan’s Financial Monitoring Agency said the investigation had been completed and the case sent to court.

Gulnara Karimova

Swiss Court Fines Lombard Odier $3.7 Million in Karimova Money-Laundering Case

Switzerland’s Federal Criminal Court has fined Geneva-based private bank Lombard Odier 3 million Swiss francs, or about $3.68 million, after finding that it failed to take adequate organizational measures to prevent money laundering in a case linked to Gulnara Karimova, the eldest daughter of Uzbekistan’s late President Islam Karimov. The court also dismissed criminal proceedings against Karimova without ruling on the allegations against her. The ruling was delivered on July 27 in Bellinzona, following a trial that began in April. Swiss prosecutors had accused Karimova of accepting bribes and leading a criminal organization known as “The Office,” which allegedly channeled hundreds of millions of dollars through Swiss bank accounts between 2005 and 2013. Lombard Odier and one of its former account managers were accused of helping conceal assets derived from the group’s activities. The former employee was found guilty of aggravated money laundering. The court concluded that the bank had failed to take “all reasonable and necessary organizational measures” to prevent the offense. The former account manager, identified only as “C.,” received a fully suspended 24-month prison sentence. The court also ordered the confiscation in Switzerland of more than 400 million Swiss francs in assets originating from the money-laundering offense or controlled by “The Office.” In a statement, Lombard Odier said the case began after it voluntarily reported suspicious transactions to the Swiss authorities in 2012. It maintained that robust anti-money-laundering controls were in place and said it would appeal. The first-instance judgment is not final. The court dismissed the proceedings against Karimova on procedural grounds. The judges concluded that there was no realistic prospect of her release from prison in Uzbekistan or extradition to Switzerland before the limitation period expired. The court did not rule on the allegations against her. Proceedings were also dismissed against another defendant, identified only as “B.,” who lives in Russia and could not travel to Switzerland through no fault of his own. The sentences imposed on Lombard Odier and its former employee were reduced because of the time elapsed since the offenses in 2011 and 2012. Charges covering events before July 27, 2011, were dismissed as time-barred. Karimova, now 54, has consistently denied wrongdoing. She has been imprisoned in Uzbekistan since March 2019, when she was moved from house arrest after the authorities said she had breached its conditions. She is serving a 13-year sentence for offenses including organizing a criminal group, extortion, and embezzlement. The Swiss investigation began in 2012 and concerns conduct dating back more than two decades. In May 2025, the Federal Criminal Court joined the proceedings against Karimova and Lombard Odier. The wider international investigation has involved assets across several jurisdictions. Assets associated with Karimova in Switzerland, France, and the United States have previously been estimated at nearly $1.4 billion. The case has also led to efforts to return confiscated assets to Uzbekistan. In February 2025, Uzbekistan and Switzerland signed an agreement covering approximately $182 million confiscated by the Swiss authorities. The funds are to be transferred through the Uzbekistan...

Internet Restrictions

A Signal from Uzbekistan: How Turkmen Border Villages Reach the Outside World

In Diýýar, a village in northern Turkmenistan close enough to catch Uzbekistan’s mobile signal, a foreign SIM card inserted into a small Wi-Fi router can turn a barely functioning 2G connection into usable home internet. In early July, police reportedly entered around ten households in the village, identified Uzbek-connected routers, and confiscated the SIM cards. Similar inspections have been under way across close to 60 settlements in Dashoguz Province, according to Radio Azatlyk, the Turkmen Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The campaign covers parts of Shabat and Görogly districts, including Kirov, Diýýar, Bedirkent, Aýlak, and Nyýazow, in areas where Uzbek mobile signals cross the border. The Internet Across the Border What the authorities are removing is more than a foreign phone number. Residents told Radio Azatlyk that Turkmen Telecom internet is either unavailable or extremely slow in several border villages. TMCell, the mobile brand operated by the state-owned Altyn Asyr network, often provides only 2G service, while home Wi-Fi is unavailable. Households able to obtain an Uzbek SIM card use networks such as Ucell and Uztelecom, placing the card in a router that supplies internet throughout the home. Residents said YouTube and Instagram become accessible through these connections, although TikTok and many foreign websites still require a VPN. One resident described the Uzbek service as “300 times” faster than the Turkmen alternative, a personal estimate rather than a measured comparison. The cards arrive through an informal chain of traders and other residents who regularly cross into Uzbekistan. A Dashoguz source said they sell for around 200 manats and that sellers also help buyers complete the registration. The arrangement depends on geography, personal contacts, and a signal strong enough to reach across the frontier. One local source said many people from Dashoguz work abroad, including in Russia, Poland, and Germany. For households with relatives overseas, a usable connection can provide a direct link beyond the village. It also opens independent news sites and social platforms that remain blocked or unreliable on Turkmen networks. Residents confronted by police sometimes say they use the internet only to pass the time, reportedly hoping to avoid a fine. A Signal Treated as Suspicion The reported consequences vary. Some first-time offenders receive a warning, particularly when they cannot afford a penalty. Others are threatened with fines of up to 50,000 manats or imprisonment. That amount is about $14,300 at Turkmenistan’s official exchange rate and roughly $2,500 using the widely reported informal rate. Residents said officers described the use of foreign telecommunications services as possible espionage on behalf of another country. The reports cite no court case or published provision under which simply possessing an Uzbek SIM card constitutes espionage. The threat itself, however, raises the stakes around an ordinary household connection. Police and security officers reportedly do not use specialist equipment to locate the routers. Local sources said they rely instead on informants in villages, schools, and local administrations. They allegedly gather information through schoolchildren as well. Residents who travel regularly to Uzbekistan, including small...