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Opinion

Opinion: How Europe Balances Conditions and Interests in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has enjoyed preferential access to the EU market under GSP+ since 2021. The program removes tariffs on thousands of products for countries that commit to implementing international conventions on human rights, labor standards, environmental protection, and governance. Uzbekistan is one of two Central Asian countries, alongside Kyrgyzstan, participating in GSP+. Tajikistan receives the less generous standard GSP preferences, while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are outside the scheme because they are classified as upper-middle-income economies. Uzbekistan makes extensive use of the program. In 2024, its preference utilization rate, the share of eligible exports entering the EU duty-free, was 92.2%. EU imports from Uzbekistan nearly doubled between 2021 and 2024. Those benefits come with conditions. The European Commission assesses whether Uzbekistan is implementing the conventions required under GSP+. It must consider findings from the UN and International Labour Organization monitoring bodies, but it can also use evidence from governments, international organizations, civil society groups, and other sources. If the Commission has “reasonable doubt” that Uzbekistan is meeting its commitments, it can open a withdrawal procedure. Uzbekistan can respond and provide evidence of compliance. The Commission then decides whether to close the case or withdraw preferences from some or all products. The system gives Brussels a formal role in assessing whether Uzbekistan continues to meet the conditions attached to preferential market access. It also requires the Commission to decide how different evidence should be interpreted and when shortcomings are serious enough to justify action. There is no automatic formula that produces that decision. The EU–Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or EPCA, creates a separate mechanism. It makes respect for human rights an essential part of the partnership, and a serious breach can lead to partial or full suspension of the agreement. The European Parliament’s May 2026 resolution called for implementation of the agreement’s human-rights and rule-of-law commitments and for those commitments to be assessed within three years. The EU’s own report records setbacks in media freedom, civil society, and judicial independence. It also recognizes progress on labor standards and protections for women and children. The Commission must assess compliance with each required convention; progress in one area does not remove obligations in another. That means the Commission must decide how much weight to give different evidence and when concerns are serious enough to affect trade preferences. Decisions on Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms, however, remain with the Uzbek government. Concurrently, cooperation between the EU and Uzbekistan has expanded. Brussels is pursuing closer ties with Uzbekistan on transport connectivity and critical raw materials. Uzbekistan’s position on regional transport routes, critical raw materials, and access to a growing Central Asian market also gives Tashkent leverage in its dealings with Europe. The new GSP rules apply from January 2027, raising the number of required conventions from 27 to 32. Existing beneficiaries retain their preferences during a transition period and must reapply by the end of 2028. The EPCA has applied provisionally since March 1, 2026, while full ratification remains pending. The next GSP+ review will show how...

Murder Convictions

Uzbek Women Murdered in Istanbul: Two Men Sentenced to Life

Two Uzbek nationals have each been sentenced to life imprisonment in Turkey for murdering two Uzbek women in Istanbul. The investigation began in January after the remains of one woman were discovered and later led authorities to a second victim. The killings sparked protests in Istanbul and Ankara. The Istanbul Anadolu 17th High Criminal Court found Dilshod Turdimurotov, 31, and Gofurjon Kamalkhodjaev, 29, guilty of murdering Durdona Khakimova, 36, and Sayyora Ergashaliyeva, 32. Each man received two aggravated life sentences, Turkey’s most severe form of life imprisonment, which carries stricter prison conditions than an ordinary life sentence, along with two additional seven-year prison terms for theft from a residence after the victims’ deaths. The case drew widespread attention on January 24, when Khakimova’s remains were found in a garbage container in Istanbul’s Şişli district. The two suspects were detained at Istanbul Airport as they attempted to leave Turkey. A second victim was later linked to the case. Sayyora Ergashaliyeva’s family lost contact with her after January 23 and sought assistance from the Association for the Protection of the Rights of Uzbek Women in Turkey. Her relatives traveled to Turkey and filed a complaint with prosecutors on February 6. In February, Uzbekistan’s Consulate General in Istanbul confirmed Ergashaliyeva’s death. Investigators determined that Ergashaliyeva had been at a house in Istanbul’s Ümraniye district. Security camera footage showed her entering the property on January 23, followed by Turdimurotov and Kamalkhodjaev. The next day, the two men were recorded making several trips from the house with black garbage bags before removing a white suitcase. Prosecutors said both women were killed at the house and their remains disposed of in garbage containers in different parts of Istanbul. Khakimova’s remains were recovered, but authorities have not reported finding Ergashaliyeva’s. During the trial, Kamalkhodjaev said he and Ergashaliyeva had been married in a religious ceremony and that he had killed her over what he described as her infidelity. He denied involvement in Khakimova’s killing. Turdimurotov admitted killing Khakimova. In his final statement, he expressed remorse and said he deserved the harshest punishment. Khakimova’s killing prompted protests in Istanbul and Ankara. Women’s rights organizations called for stronger protections against violence, with activists drawing particular attention to the vulnerability of migrant women. On January 30, Khakimova’s remains were repatriated to Uzbekistan, while her two children also returned home. The costs were covered by Uzbekistan’s Consulate General and Migration Agency.

Illegal Migration

Uzbekistan Proposes Up to 15 Years in Prison for Organizing Illegal Migration

Uzbekistan wants to introduce a separate criminal offense for organizers of illegal migration, carrying penalties of up to 15 years in prison. The proposal comes at a time when large numbers of Uzbeks continue to work abroad, with Russia still the largest destination, even as conditions for migrant workers there become increasingly restrictive and risky. The draft amendments are open for public discussion until September 8. They would create a new criminal offense for organizing or assisting illegal migration for financial gain, including arranging unlawful border crossings or transit through Uzbekistan. Penalties would start at three to five years in prison or restricted liberty and could rise to 10–15 years in the most serious cases, including those involving large sums of money or danger to people’s lives or health. Article 223 of the Criminal Code already criminalizes unlawful border crossings, entry, and departure, but there is no separate article targeting those who organize or facilitate illegal migration for profit. The issue is particularly sensitive for Uzbekistan because of the scale of labor migration. Russia remains the main foreign labor market for Uzbek citizens. According to the latest Uzbek data, around 1.4 million citizens are working abroad, including about 834,200 in Russia. Conditions for migrants in Russia, meanwhile, are becoming more restrictive. Checks on migrants have intensified, while Russian federal and regional authorities have tightened restrictions on foreign workers in a number of sectors. Tashkent has also warned of citizens being recruited into armed conflicts and foreign military service. Such cases are already reaching Uzbek courts. In February 2026, a court sentenced a 38-year-old Uzbek citizen to three years and one month in prison for participating in the war in Ukraine on Russia’s side. The man told the court that after being detained for violating migration rules, he was offered a military contract under threat of deportation. He was found guilty of mercenary activity and entering military or similar service for a foreign state. Tashkent has repeatedly warned its citizens that service in foreign militaries can result in criminal prosecution. At the same time, Uzbek authorities are increasingly having to intervene following migration raids and disputes involving Russian law enforcement agencies. After a raid on a cafe in Khabarovsk in December 2025, where Central Asian migrants were reportedly injured, Uzbekistan sent Russia a diplomatic note requesting an investigation. Remittances remain an important source of income for Uzbek families. In the first half of 2026, Uzbekistan received $9.3 billion in cross-border remittances, up 13% from a year earlier. Tashkent therefore has to balance preserving access to its citizens’ largest foreign labor market, protecting their rights, and combating illegal intermediaries.

Bloggers’ Rights

Uzbekistan’s New Bloggers’ Council Has No Confirmed Leader

Uzbekistan’s Union of Journalists says it plans to help bloggers when officials refuse to provide information or when they face pressure over their work. The proposal follows several prosecutions of bloggers known for reporting on alleged local corruption or criticizing public officials. The initiative immediately encountered a leadership problem: one day after the Creative Council of Bloggers was announced, the blogger expected to lead it said he had declined the position. The Union of Journalists announced the council on August 7, saying the decision reflected the growing role of bloggers in Uzbekistan. According to the union, bloggers increasingly compete with traditional media for audiences and influence public debate. The council is expected to advise bloggers on legal issues, including cases in which officials obstruct access to information or third parties apply pressure. It also plans training in media law and ethics, along with digital security and media literacy. Shukhratjon Oripov, acting chairman of the Union of Journalists, said bloggers had become independent participants in the country’s information landscape. The council’s leadership remains unclear. Journalist and blogger Eldar Asanov was initially named for the post. On August 8, however, Asanov said he had received the offer but declined it. He said he had proposed that the Union of Journalists establish a bloggers’ club instead. Gazeta.uz subsequently corrected its original report. Among the bloggers prosecuted in recent years are Otabek Sattoriy and Olimjon Khaidarov, both of whom had reported allegations of local corruption. Sattoriy, founder of the YouTube channel Xalq Fikri, or People’s Opinion, covered social and economic problems in the Surkhandarya region. Shortly before his arrest, he was reporting on farmers whose land had allegedly been seized by a senior local official and transferred to a company owned by businessman and senator Murtazo Rakhmatov. On May 10, 2021, Sattoriy was convicted on four counts of extortion and one count of slander and sentenced to six and a half years in prison. On February 5, 2024, after about three years behind bars, a court released him and replaced the remainder of his sentence with correctional labor, with 20% of his earnings to be withheld for the state. On December 1, 2023, a court in the Ferghana region sentenced blogger Olimjon Khaidarov to eight years in prison on a large-scale extortion charge and speech-related charges of slander and insult. Khaidarov, who had nearly 30,000 YouTube followers, was known locally for reporting allegations of corruption and criticizing local authorities. One slander charge concerned a claim by the mayor of Kokand that a post about the off-the-books sale of parking spaces had defamed him. Police alleged that Khaidarov had demanded $10,000 from the head of Kokand’s Istiklal bazaar in exchange for withholding negative coverage and said he was detained while receiving the final $2,500. Khaidarov denied wrongdoing and said he had been set up in retaliation for his reporting. Human Rights Watch described his conviction as the latest in a series of criminal cases against bloggers and journalists in Uzbekistan. In Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF)...

Islam and National Identity

Dombra Dispute and Niqab Bans Fuel Religious Debate in Central Asia

Standing before a court in Aktobe in June, 35-year-old Azat Konys apologized to “the entire Kazakh people” for insulting one of the country’s most cherished cultural symbols. Two months earlier, during a TikTok livestream, he had declared the dombra forbidden under Islam, compared the two-stringed instrument to part of the devil’s anatomy and called clerics from Kazakhstan’s official Islamic authority “dogs of hell.” Konys asked the court not to imprison him. The judge instead sentenced him to three years and six months for inciting religious and national hatred. The controversy began when Konys cited the Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, the dominant legal tradition among Muslims in Kazakhstan, to argue that the dombra and other stringed instruments, including the guitar and balalaika, were haram, meaning forbidden under Islamic law. The remarks caused particular anger because the dombra is more than a musical instrument in Kazakhstan: it has accompanied oral poetry and storytelling for generations and is officially celebrated as a symbol of cultural heritage and national identity. Police identified Konys after clips from the livestream circulated on social media and detained him in April. The case is an unusually stark example of how online religious disputes are spilling into legal and political life across Central Asia. Arguments that might once have remained within mosques or religious communities are now spreading through social media, forcing governments and official Islamic authorities alike to decide where religious expression ends and attacks on national culture begin. A more recent controversy arose in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan Region, where a 66-year-old guest at a toi, a traditional wedding feast, called for stricter adherence to Islamic law. He urged the organizers to separate men and women and remove music and alcohol from the celebration, while describing musicians as “heralds of Satan.” The video spread rapidly on social media, prompting nationwide debate. The man was detained and placed in a temporary detention facility for incitement of religious and social hatred. In a statement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said that freedom of expression does not extend to statements that degrade the dignity of others or could provoke religious or social hostility. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), the country’s main official Muslim body, later issued its own response. It stated that Islam does not prohibit music in itself and stressed that publicly insulting artists or women is inconsistent with Islamic ethics. Another controversy centered on Nauryz, the spring equinox holiday celebrated throughout Central Asia and across much of the Turkic and Iranian cultural world. In March, a blogger in the Almaty Region described the holiday as “non-Muslim” and argued that it should not be celebrated. Police opened a criminal case against him on suspicion of inciting religious hatred. Kazakhstan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently warned of legal liability for statements attacking Nauryz and other national traditions. The SAMK, meanwhile, publicly celebrated Nauryz as a national holiday promoting social harmony and charitable acts. The debate soon spread beyond social media into politics and the entertainment industry. Producer and television presenter Bayan Alaguzova said...

Bride Kidnapping

Bride Kidnapping in Central Asia: Why the Practice Persists Despite Tougher Laws

Bride kidnapping for the purpose of forcing women into marriage remains one of the least visible forms of gender-based violence in Central Asia. Although abduction and coercion into marriage are punishable under criminal law across the region, the offenses are defined differently from country to country. Their true scale is difficult to measure. Many victims never report the crime, while some cases are still viewed as a continuation of tradition rather than a violation of criminal law. Over the past decade, governments across Central Asia have begun revising their approaches to the problem. Kyrgyzstan strengthened criminal penalties following several high-profile cases. Kazakhstan did not close a legal loophole that allowed many perpetrators to avoid prosecution until 2025. Uzbekistan has a specific criminal provision covering the abduction of women for marriage, while Tajikistan does not appear to define bride kidnapping as a separate offense. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, however, assessing the prevalence of the practice remains particularly difficult because of limited research and incomplete official data. The term “bride kidnapping” has not always referred to the same practice. Anthropologists note that historically it covered a range of marriage customs, from mutually agreed elopements and staged abductions to the violent kidnapping of women. Contemporary researchers stress that the presence or absence of a woman’s free consent is the key distinction between these practices. Comparable customs once existed among a number of Central Asian peoples. One documented motive has been the desire to avoid kalym, the traditional bride price paid by the groom’s family to the bride’s relatives. Economic motives, however, did not alter the nature of the crime when a woman did not consent to the marriage. The issue has been studied most extensively in Kyrgyzstan. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2015–2016 by the National Statistical Committee with support from UN Women, UNFPA, and the International Organization for Migration found that 22.1% of marriages involved some form of bride abduction. Of these, 16.3% were reported as taking place with the woman’s consent, while 5.8% occurred without it. The frequently cited claim that more than one in five Kyrgyz marriages begins with bride kidnapping therefore combines consensual and non-consensual practices. It should not be presented as an estimate of forced abduction. The figures were based on respondents’ accounts and may not capture every form of family or social pressure surrounding consent. Known locally as ala kachuu, or “grab and run,” the non-consensual abduction of a woman for marriage is a criminal offense in Kyrgyzstan. In 2013, the penalty for abducting an adult woman for marriage against her will was increased to between five and seven years in prison. The corresponding sentence when the victim was under 17 was increased to between five and ten years. Tougher penalties, however, have not prevented further tragedies. One of the best-known cases was the 2018 murder of Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy, a 20-year-old medical student. After she was abducted, her family contacted the police. Officers brought both Burulai and her abductor to a police station but left...