Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Labor Migration

Opinion: Russia’s Migration Crackdown Tests Central Asia’s Labor Alternatives

Russia is no longer the unquestioned labor destination it once was for Central Asian workers. That shift is real, but it is easy to overstate. The Times of Central Asia recently reported that labor migration from the region is becoming more diverse. Workers are looking not only to Russia, but also to South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations. The old Russia-centered model is weakening, even if it has not collapsed. The question is scale. It now intersects with two other filters: legal status and banking access. Alternative labor markets can absorb some Central Asian workers, but they cannot yet replace the Russian labor outlet. Russia did not function as an ordinary destination. For years, it acted as the region's largest external labor valve: geographically close, linguistically familiar, legally accessible for some, and large enough to absorb millions of workers across construction, services, logistics, agriculture, and municipal labor. South Korea, the UK, Poland, and the Gulf can offer higher wages and more formal recruitment channels. They can also reduce overdependence on Moscow. But they are more selective, more bureaucratic, and much smaller in immediate absorption capacity. That leaves a more important question: can new destinations expand fast enough to offset a narrowing Russian market? For now, the answer is probably no. Diversification Is Real, but Not Replacement The difference between diversification and replacement is crucial. A worker from Kyrgyzstan leaving for seasonal work in the UK, or a worker from Uzbekistan entering an organized recruitment program in South Korea, represents a genuine shift. These routes can be safer, better paid, and less exposed to the social hostility now facing many Central Asian migrants in Russia. But they cannot absorb workers on the same scale. Russia's labor market absorbed Central Asian workers in very large numbers because it had a combination few other destinations can match: proximity, low entry costs, dense migrant networks, Russian-language familiarity, and long-standing informal labor channels. Even as those channels become more restrictive, they remain embedded in household economies across the region. This is why diversification should be read as a partial adaptation, not a full exit. For governments in Tashkent, Bishkek, and Dushanbe, the search for new labor markets is necessary. It reduces exposure to Russian policy shocks. It gives workers more choices. It also helps governments negotiate better legal recruitment schemes. Yet the structural problem remains. If Russia closes the door faster than alternatives can open, pressure does not disappear. It returns home through unemployment, lower remittances, and frustrated expectations. The EAEU Line Russia's migration crackdown does not affect Central Asia evenly. The most important dividing line is not geography. It is legal status. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which allows the free movement of labor among member states. In practical terms, citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have a different legal status in Russia than citizens of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. They do not face the same work-permit and labor-patent system. That does not...

Historical Research

Opinion: Scents of the Silk Road – Recreating the World of 1001 Nights

Editor’s note: This guest essay is by Efim Rezvan, editor-in-chief of Manuscripta Orientalia and a researcher involved in the Essences of the 1001 Nights project. What was the most valuable cargo carried by medieval caravans crossing Central Asia, or aboard Arab-Muslim ships transporting goods through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea to the Middle East and Europe? Silk? Porcelain? Yes, in terms of overall volume, that is true. But if we compare volume or weight with value, prized incense and aromatic resins rank among the most valuable goods, with some varieties often compared with gold. Historical data and modern zoological studies suggest that a Bactrian camel in a Silk Road caravan could carry about 150 to 300 kilograms. Aromatic resins and other incense materials were often compared with gold, which helps explain why a relatively small load could represent extraordinary value. Of course, merchants would not treat gold and incense as identical cargo: the caravan system, refined over centuries, prioritized the safety and preservation of goods. As today, wars and epidemics influenced trade conditions, but the pricing trend remained the same. Why did people value incense so highly for thousands of years? Answers to this and many other questions may emerge through the scientific and exhibition project Essences of the 1001 Nights, the launch of which was announced by the international academic journal Manuscripta Orientalia. Researchers from the International Center for Islamic Studies at the Kunstkamera and Saint Petersburg State University are studying the history of Eastern fragrances in an effort to “bring medieval manuscripts to life” and, for the first time, present the public with the olfactory dimension of the legendary tales. Modern research now makes it possible to imagine more clearly what scents might have filled, for example, the bedroom of Scheherazade or the library of Shahryar, the protagonists of One Thousand and One Nights. The project promises not only comprehensive academic research. It will also take the form of an innovative exhibition, a journey through time and space, from the oases of Hadramaut in Yemen to the evergreen region of Dhofar in Oman, long associated with frankincense production and trade; from the streets and mosques of Bukhara and Samarkand to the shores of Sumatra and Java; from manuscript libraries to the offices of historians, chemists, and pharmacologists. The project’s main artistic innovation is the use of olfactory storytelling; narrative through scents. Organizers plan to present ten aromatic compositions that will serve as guides into the world of the Islamic Golden Age. [caption id="attachment_50999" align="aligncenter" width="1200"] Incense seller. Sanaa, Yemen.[/caption] Scents of the Islamic Golden Age Why scents? The corpus of One Thousand and One Nights had largely taken shape by the early 16th century. Its oldest roots and many of its plots originated in India. Persian culture served as a bridge between India and the Arab world. It was the Persian collection Hezar Afsaneh (“A Thousand Tales”) that became the direct precursor of One Thousand and One Nights. The framing story of King Shahryar and the...

Foreign Investment

Opinion: Why Deals Go Quiet – Contracts, Trust, and Business Development in Central Asia

The meeting had gone well. The counterpart had nodded at the right moments, asked sensible questions, and shaken hands warmly at the door. There had been no objection, no pushback, no obvious red flag. Then nothing happened. No follow-up call. No revised term sheet. No polite email explaining what had changed. Just silence, stretching from weeks into months, until the deal that had seemed close was quietly, undeniably dead. Foreign executives who have spent time in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or elsewhere in Central Asia may recognize this pattern. It is often filed away as bad luck, an unresponsive partner, or a market that “just isn’t ready.” Sometimes those explanations are partly true. But in many cases, something more basic is at work: the parties are operating with different assumptions about trust, commitment, communication, and timing. There is a way to put this more precisely. In many Western commercial settings, the contract gives the commercial relationship its legal form: it records binding obligations, allocates risk, and defines what each side can enforce. In Kazakhstan, and in many business settings across Central Asia, the broader business relationship often remains the framework within which the contract is negotiated, performed, and sustained. Neither approach is irrational. The trouble begins when either side assumes its own is simply how serious business works everywhere. The issue is not that contracts are meaningless or unenforceable. It is that many deals do not close. They stall because the relationship, the people who actually back the deal, or trust around the transaction was never strong enough to carry it forward. In many Western commercial settings, the contract is treated as the main container of trust. Negotiation builds toward a signature, and the signature defines what each party now owes the other. After that point, performance is supported by process: lawyers, clauses, deadlines, courts, regulators, and dispute mechanisms. The relationship matters, but it is often understood as something that produces the contract. In Kazakhstan and across much of Central Asia, business development can work differently. The relationship often remains the container in which an agreement sits. A memorandum of understanding (MOU), for example, may be seen less as the end of the conversation than as one stage in a longer process of confidence-building. A foreign negotiator may believe the signature closes the matter. A local counterpart may believe it has only moved the relationship into a new phase. Neither approach is irrational. Both are ways of managing uncertainty. The difficulty begins when either side assumes its own approach is simply how serious business works everywhere. This is one of the details foreign investors often miss: failure rarely announces itself. There is no confrontation, no dramatic breakdown, no final meeting in which the deal is formally pronounced dead. It shows up instead as an absence. A phone that stops ringing. A term sheet that does not move. A relationship that goes quiet without explanation. A Western team may read silence as the absence of a problem. No news is good news. In...

Water Security

Opinion: The Amu Darya Stress Test – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Politics of Agricultural Adaptation

Central Asia’s water crisis is usually discussed as a problem of rivers, reservoirs, and diplomacy. But in 2026, the Amu Darya is also becoming something else: a test of state adaptation. The river basin entered the irrigation season under acute pressure. According to data cited by Kabar, the flow of the Amu Darya stood at only 66.8% of its normal level as of February 11, compared with 101.8% a year earlier. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the river’s flow could fall to around 65% of its historical norm, raising risks for food security and agriculture across downstream states. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s Qosh-Tepa Canal is advancing. The canal, one of the Taliban government’s most ambitious infrastructure projects, is designed to divert water from the Amu Darya to irrigate large areas of northern Afghanistan. Carnegie Politika has estimated that, once fully operational by 2028, it could take up to 10 cubic kilometers of water annually from the river. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the implications are direct. Both rely heavily on Amu Darya water. Both inherited agricultural systems shaped by Soviet-era irrigation, cotton production, and centralized planning, and both are now facing a combination of climate stress, upstream extraction, and aging water infrastructure. Yet their responses are increasingly different. The emerging contrast is not simply between two agricultural policies; it is between two institutional logics: adaptation and control. Uzbekistan’s Adjustment Strategy Uzbekistan is one of the most exposed countries in the region. Its population is large, its agriculture remains water-intensive, and some of its most vulnerable regions, including Khorezm and Karakalpakstan, sit near the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. For decades, the old model relied on large-scale irrigation, cotton, rice, and the assumption that water would continue to move through the regional system much as it had before. That assumption is now weakening. Tashkent’s response remains costly and far from complete. Uzbekistan still faces serious water losses, degraded land, salinization, and uneven implementation of reform. But the direction of travel is visible: the state is trying to reduce exposure by changing crops, infrastructure, and diplomatic behavior. Rice is one example. Traditional flooded rice cultivation is extremely water-intensive, and water shortages have already pushed some Uzbek rice farmers away from traditional Amu Darya regions toward areas with more stable access to water. Uzbekistan has also begun experimenting with less water-intensive methods. In Karakalpakstan, UNDP has supported the introduction of upland rice, which can reduce water consumption by up to 40% compared with traditional rice cultivation. Separately, Uzbekistan has announced plans to expand resource-efficient rice cultivation, including drip irrigation and drought-resilient rice varieties. The state is no longer treating the old water-intensive model as untouchable. In 2026, Uzbekistan allocated significant public financing for water-saving technologies. Government-linked reporting has described plans to expand drip irrigation, sprinkler systems, and laser land leveling across hundreds of thousands of hectares, with a broader target of expanding water-saving technologies to 3.5 million hectares by 2028. Laser leveling may sound technical, but its use reflects a shift from simply demanding more...

Income Growth Plan

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s New Income Growth Plan – Administrative Measures Against Market Realities

Kazakhstan’s government has unveiled a Comprehensive Plan to Increase Household Incomes for 2026-2029. The Ministry of National Economy says it contains 59 measures. The stated goals include higher wages and lower inflation. The plan also aims to ease household debt. The full text of the plan has not yet been published in open access. First Vice Minister Azamat Amrin presented its main provisions at a Government press conference on June 11. The central contradiction lies in the fact that guaranteed income growth applies to only a small segment of the population. The plan creates fundamentally different conditions for the public and private sectors. It provides for mandatory salary indexation for civil servants. Their wages will be revised every three years based on accumulated inflation. According to labor market data, this category includes about 85,000 to 90,000 people less than 1% of the country’s total workforce of around 9.3 million. It is this narrow group that receives a reliable long-term mechanism of financial protection. Indexation is also planned for employees of national companies and natural monopolies. This group includes around 700,000 to 800,000 people, or 8-9% of the labor market. Employees in the social sector, teachers, doctors, and others, receive their salaries directly from the state budget. This category numbers around 1.2 million to 1.3 million people, or 13-14% of the workforce. Under Kazakhstan’s law on public service, these workers are not considered part of the state administrative apparatus. The plan does not introduce automatic three-year indexation for them; their incomes are raised through separate government decrees, usually on an annual basis depending on budgetary capacity. More than 7 million people work in the competitive private sector, small and medium-sized businesses, as well as the self-employed, accounting for more than 75% of the workforce. For this dominant category, the plan offers no direct mechanisms for income growth. Instead of financial guarantees, the document proposes using an administrative lever: officials will hold talks with private business owners to encourage them to raise wages. The only basic indicator directly affecting the incomes of low-paid private sector workers is the minimum wage. However, the government has postponed revising the minimum wage until August 2026. Private business bears the main market risks and forms the country’s tax base. It is these taxes that finance guaranteed incomes in the public sector, which in total accounts for around a quarter of the labor market, while the overwhelming majority of working citizens, about three-quarters, have no comparable protection. Economist Murat Temirkhanov, an adviser to the chairman of Halyk Finance who took part in expert discussions of the government’s plan, says this approach distorts market relations. A directive requirement to raise wages could push businesses away from formal hiring and into the shadow economy to cut costs. In his view, the plan ignores the only real source of income growth: higher labor productivity. The document devotes only one point to this factor, even though international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have directly recommended...

Data Sovereignty

Opinion: Data Sovereignty Will Decide Central Asia’s Critical Minerals Moment

The critical minerals conversation across Central Asia still too often begins in the wrong place: with what lies beneath the ground. It should begin with who controls the knowledge of what lies beneath it. For more than a century, the resource bargain usually ran in one direction. Foreign companies arrived with the instruments, surveys, and models. Host governments arrived with the territory. The resulting terms were often shaped by information asymmetry: not only who owned the rock, but who owned the data about the rock. That asymmetry is easier to narrow than it used to be. Airborne geophysical surveys, satellite-based mapping, modern geochemistry, and national geological databases can now give governments a clearer picture of their mineral endowment before the first serious investor meeting. The decisive question is not simply whether data can be generated. It is who owns it, who validates it, and who is allowed to use it when concessions, joint ventures, and infrastructure commitments are being negotiated. Capital is the reason this matters now. Critical minerals are no longer a specialist mining issue; they sit at the center of debates over energy security, electric vehicles, grid infrastructure, semiconductors, and defense supply chains. The IEA's Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 tracks how demand and supply are shifting across copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements. The U.S. C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue and the EU's strategic partnership with Kazakhstan show that Central Asia is already part of this conversation. But attention is not the same as leverage. Governments that negotiate from outdated maps, fragmented archives, or company-controlled exploration data will struggle to turn geopolitical interest into durable national benefit. They may still attract investors, but they will be negotiating through someone else's lens. A country that arrives at the table with modern, independently verifiable geological intelligence has more options. It can better value concessions, compare competing proposals, set clearer environmental and infrastructure expectations, and decide which resources are strategic enough to develop slowly rather than quickly. Data does not guarantee a good agreement. It does make a bad agreement harder to excuse. This is sovereignty in a practical form. The point is not to close the door to foreign capital or technical expertise. Central Asia will need both. The point is to ensure that the public side of the table has a master copy of the evidence. When the state owns the underlying data, investors can still compete on capital, technology, processing capability, logistics, and market access. What they should not control is the government's basic understanding of its own resource base. There is also a diplomatic dimension. The Minerals Security Partnership Forum is built around responsible, diverse, and resilient value chains, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan among its members. For Central Asian governments, that creates an opening to ask not only who will mine, but who will build capacity - and who will leave the country with stronger institutions than before. Geological data, mining cadastres, processing plans, environmental baselines, and contract terms are all part of the...