• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10761 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10761 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10761 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10761 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10761 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10761 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10761 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10761 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 339

How Koreans Were Deported to Central Asia: Myths and Reality

The 1937 deportation from the Soviet Far East was the greatest tragedy in the history of Soviet Koreans, Koryo-saram, the self-designation of ethnic Koreans living across the former Soviet Union. It became the first case in Soviet history in which an entire ethnic group was forcibly relocated solely on the basis of ethnicity. Later, Soviet Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, Poles, Kurds, and many other peoples would endure similar repression. For decades, this history remained largely suppressed, giving rise to numerous myths and misconceptions surrounding the deportation. Yet it is inaccurate to claim that Koreans first appeared in Kazakhstan and Central Asia only in 1937. Historical and archaeological evidence points to earlier Korean ties with the region. The 1897 census of the Russian Empire recorded 42 Koreans living in Turkestan, while in 1929 a Korean agricultural cooperative called “Kazakh Rice” was established in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, 1937 marked the beginning of the modern history of Koreans in Central Asia. Myth One: The Deportation Was a Sudden Decision One common belief is that Joseph Stalin suddenly decided to deport Koreans from the Soviet Far East as part of a campaign against Japanese espionage. Reality In fact, plans to relocate Koreans had been discussed since the late 1920s. The Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party repeatedly revisited the issue of the Korean population living in border regions. The joint decree issued by the Soviet government and Communist Party on August 21, 1937 (No. 1428-326ss), was the culmination of a long-term state policy. By the mid-1930s, the Soviet Far East was increasingly viewed as a vulnerable frontier zone. Japan had expanded its military presence in the region, and Soviet authorities feared a possible war. Koreans living in compact settlements near the border, while maintaining cultural and family ties with Korea, came to be regarded as politically unreliable. Ironically, many of them had originally fled to Russia precisely to escape Japanese colonial rule in Korea. Myth Two: The Deportation Was Entirely About Japanese Espionage Officially, Soviet authorities justified the deportation as a measure aimed at preventing Japanese espionage. Reality The espionage threat served more as a pretext than the principal cause. During the years of the Great Terror, Stalin’s regime perceived danger not only in individuals, but also in entire social and ethnic groups. Suspicion replaced evidence, and ethnic origin itself could become grounds for repression. Local officials sought to demonstrate political vigilance, while the state simultaneously pursued broader strategic and economic goals: strengthening military control in the Far East and redirecting labor resources to Kazakhstan and Central Asia, regions devastated by collectivization and famine. [caption id="attachment_48623" align="aligncenter" width="854"] Museum of the History of Russian Koreans (Koryo-saram) in Ussuriysk.[/caption] Myth Three: The Operation Was Chaotic For many deported families, the expulsion felt like a sudden catastrophe, creating the impression of disorder and improvisation. Reality At the state level, however, the operation was carefully organized. Before the deportation, party purges and political repression had already targeted the Korean intelligentsia. Soviet authorities fabricated cases involving alleged...

Opinion: The U.S. Still Doesn’t Know Where Central Asia Belongs

Washington cannot decide where Central Asia belongs. Is it part of Europe? Asia? The Middle East? The confusion is on full display in how the House of Representatives has reassigned the region across subcommittees in rapid succession. In the 116th Congress, which convened in 2019, Central Asia fell under the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment. Two years later, in the 117th Congress, it was moved to the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and Nonproliferation. That arrangement barely settled before the 118th Congress shifted it again—this time to the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. Now, in the 119th Congress, it has been relocated to the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia. On the banks of the Potomac, Central Asia has taken on a nomadic life of its own—constantly on the move, never quite settling in one place. At the State Department, Central Asia is grouped under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs alongside Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. At the Pentagon, by contrast, the Middle East team oversees relations with Central Asia, alongside countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan. These mismatches are not just clumsy; they are strategically dangerous. By misplacing Central Asia, Washington is misreading the geography of China’s rise. It is time for Washington to stop the bureaucratic musical chairs and place Central Asia within a coherent grand strategy. Far from being an afterthought, the region is one of the most consequential pieces of the geopolitical puzzle facing the United States: how to respond to China’s strategy. This is because Central Asia sits at the heart of China’s decades-long effort to move its critical lifelines away from the Indo-Pacific and onto the Eurasian landmass. Over the past 15 years, China has quietly reoriented its energy routes, reducing reliance on maritime pathways vulnerable to U.S. naval dominance—particularly chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—and expanded overland imports across Eurasia. Today, China imports significant volumes of natural gas via pipelines from Turkmenistan and Russia, as well as crude oil from Kazakhstan. These continental routes are largely insulated from maritime interdiction, giving Beijing strategic resilience. Central Asia should be understood through this lens. For China, the region is not peripheral—it is essential. The pipelines, railways and trade corridors that underpin China’s resilience all pass through Xinjiang and Central Asia. In this sense, Central Asia is not merely adjacent to China; it is embedded in China’s vision of the future. This is why Washington’s practice of grouping Central Asia with South Asia misses the mark. The two regions operate under fundamentally different strategic logics. South Asia is centered on the Indian subcontinent, shaped by maritime dynamics and the India‑Pakistan rivalry. Central Asia, by contrast, is a continental crossroads—defined by overland connectivity, energy flows and great‑power competition across Eurasia. India, meanwhile, is geographically constrained—lacking direct land access to Central Asia due to territory administered by Pakistan and separated from China by the Himalayas—leaving it...

Opinion: A New Southern Gate – How the EU-Armenia Summit Unlocks a Critical Branch for the Middle Corridor

For the first time in its history, the European Union held a full summit with Armenia. The meeting, which took place in Yerevan on 4–5 May 2026, was not merely a diplomatic milestone for Armenia. It also sent a signal to governments thousands of kilometers away in Central Asia that the trade route linking Asia to Europe through the South Caucasus is becoming more real, and more politically backed, than ever before. The centerpiece of the summit saw the signing of a “Connectivity Partnership” between Brussels and Yerevan. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, described Armenia as "uniquely positioned" to connect Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Under the EU's Global Gateway program, investments in Armenia are expected to reach €2.5 billion. A further €3 billion is earmarked specifically for the Middle Corridor – the trade route that runs from China across Central Asia, over the Caspian Sea, through the South Caucasus, and into Europe. “We will support your integration into key transport networks like the Trans-Caspian Corridor. It is a route that is also of strategic importance for Europe, given the growing flows of trade between our two regions,” von der Leyen stated. A Route That Is Already Moving Fast The Middle Corridor, formally known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has grown at a pace that few predicted. Cargo volumes rose 70 percent in the first nine months of 2024 alone, reaching 3.4 million tons. By the end of that year, the total had climbed to 4.1 million tons – up from just 350,000 tons in 2021. The World Bank projects that the route could handle up to 11 million tonnes a year by 2030. It's important to maintain some perspective. These numbers are small fry when compared to the billions of tons of trade that moves between Europe and Asia by sea. However, the Middle Corridor does offer important diversification, particularly given the spillover effects of wars in the Middle East and piracy in the Red Sea. [caption id="attachment_48602" align="aligncenter" width="1274"] Image: Trans Caspian International Transport Route and it’s southern part, China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway project. Source: middlecorridor.com[/caption] Where Uzbekistan Stands For Uzbekistan, the Middle Corridor is both an opportunity and a work in progress. In January 2025, President Mirziyoyev signed a decree to upgrade road and rail connectivity, and in September 2024, Tashkent co-founded the Eurasian Transport Route Association alongside Austria, Azerbaijan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkey. In December 2024, Uzbekistan sent its first block train all the way to Brazil – through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and the Georgian port of Poti – proving the route is operationally viable. But costs remain a challenge. Shipping a 40-foot container via the Middle Corridor currently costs between $3,500 and $4,500, compared to $2,800–$3,200 on the Northern Corridor through Russia. Europe, meanwhile, accounts for only around 3 percent of Uzbekistan's exports and 13 percent of its imports — a share that Tashkent wants to grow significantly. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway — a $8 billion, 573-kilometre project whose...

Opinion: What May 9 Means to a Generation Without War Memories

One evening, sitting beside my grandmother, we opened an old photo album, the kind with thick pages and photographs tucked carefully beneath thin plastic sheets. We turned the pages slowly. At one photograph, she stopped. It showed her as a young girl beside a close relative she rarely speaks about, a man who never came home from the war. The mood changed almost instantly. For her, May 9 is not simply a date. It belongs to a family story shaped by absence, grief, and survival. For me, it is inherited. For many people of my generation, May 9 is no longer a memory of war itself, but a memory passed down by those who lived closer to it. That distance is changing the meaning of Victory Day in Kazakhstan and across much of Central Asia. The day still carries enormous symbolic weight, but the link between public commemoration and private family memory is becoming less direct. What older generations remember, younger generations are increasingly asked to learn. What Remains for Those Who Remember For older generations, May 9 remains deeply personal. It is tied to lives shaped by loss, names repeated year after year, stories retold within families, and the enduring presence of those who never returned. The meaning of the day is not abstract for people who lived through the war or grew up in its immediate aftermath. It is part of their family history. In many households, remembrance is expressed less through public slogans than through quieter acts: visiting memorials, keeping photographs, passing down names, or sharing stories that do not need much explanation. For those generations, the past has not fully receded. It remains close to the surface of the present. A Generation That Learns, Not Remembers For younger people, the connection is often weaker and less detailed. The war may still be respected, but it is no longer remembered in the same way. It is encountered through family fragments, school lessons, monuments, ceremonies, and public language rather than through the direct emotional force of lived experience. This generational gap is visible in recent polling. A 2025 survey by the Center for Social and Political Research “Strategy,” based on 1,100 respondents across nine regions of Kazakhstan, found that 46% of people aged 18-24 knew someone in their family had participated in the war but could not recall any details. Another 33% had no information at all. Among respondents over 55, only 13% reported similar uncertainty. The same survey found that many respondents could not identify a significant historical figure connected to the war, while nearly one in five could not name a single wartime event. These gaps suggest more than a decline in historical knowledge. They point to a weakening personal connection to what was once a defining collective experience. When Memory Exists Without Experience As lived experience gives way to inherited knowledge, remembrance changes form. Historical events are preserved through families, schools, state ceremonies, monuments, and media, but the emotional connection becomes harder to sustain. A...

Opinion: Hormuz Crisis Pushes Afghanistan Aid Routes Toward Central Asia

The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is usually viewed through the lens of energy security or military escalation. But it also has another, less visible, humanitarian dimension. A recent article in The Guardian, “Calls for humanitarian corridor through Strait of Hormuz as Iran war hits vital aid,” points to a critical shift: because of the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, along with instability around Hormuz, traditional humanitarian supply routes are beginning to break down. For Afghanistan, this is no longer a theoretical concern but an operational reality. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), cited by The Guardian, the cost of delivering food to Afghanistan has tripled. Cargo that previously moved by sea through Hormuz and onward to Pakistani ports must now travel overland across multiple countries, adding weeks to delivery times. The consequences are felt most acutely by vulnerable populations, particularly children. Predictability is one of the core requirements of any humanitarian system, and that predictability is now disappearing. Some shipments are stranded in regional hubs. Routes are constantly changing. Fuel costs continue to rise. Even modest increases in oil prices significantly raise operational expenses for humanitarian agencies. For Afghanistan, the implications are severe. The country has been in a prolonged food crisis for several years, with millions dependent on external aid. Delays of even one or two weeks can directly affect malnutrition and mortality rates. According to United Nations estimates, around 3.7 million Afghan children are currently suffering from wasting, nearly one million of them from severe wasting, a condition associated with sharply elevated mortality risks. UNICEF estimates that in 2026 alone, 1.304 million children aged 6-59 months will require treatment for acute malnutrition, including severe cases and other high-risk groups. Another 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are also suffering from acute malnutrition. Under these conditions, even temporary disruptions in aid deliveries become a direct threat to human life. The situation is being compounded by several overlapping factors. First, instability around the Strait of Hormuz has made maritime routes both more expensive and riskier. Second, the Pakistani corridor, previously the main overland route, has become unreliable, as repeated border closures and restrictions have tied humanitarian deliveries to the fluctuating political and security relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Third, Iran has imposed restrictions on food exports and has itself become part of the conflict zone, undermining its role as both a supplier and transit route for Afghanistan. Together, these developments are creating what can be described as a “triple crisis” for humanitarian logistics into Afghanistan. The previous aid delivery system is effectively ceasing to function. In response, the WFP is restructuring its logistics network. One solution has been increased use of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor: Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Although this route is longer and more expensive, it offers predictability and an alternative to disrupted maritime pathways. The key issue is no longer which route is cheapest, but which is reliable. This shift places Central Asia increasingly at the center of...

Opinion: The Regional Ecological Summit and the Making of a Central Asian Voice

On 22–24 April, Astana hosted the Regional Ecological Summit—a gathering of governments, international organizations, financial institutions, and civil society that marked a new level of ambition in Central Asia’s environmental diplomacy. Fifty-eight sessions were held across three days at a moment when Central Asia’s ecological agenda is becoming inseparable from its political and economic future. The opening ceremony was attended by the presidents of all five Central Asian states. The summit adopted the Astana Declaration on Ecological Solidarity in Central Asia and brought renewed attention to the need to reform the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Taken together, these developments signal more than procedural diplomacy. They point to growing political momentum. The region has never lacked shared history or channels of communication. Russian remains a practical language of intergovernmental exchange, and borders, economies, rivers, energy systems, and labor markets have tied these countries together long before contemporary climate diplomacy gave this interdependence a new vocabulary. For decades, much external analysis of Central Asia expected this interdependence to produce confrontation, particularly around water and energy. Those risks remain real. Yet the Astana summit showed a more complex trajectory. Climate change, biodiversity loss, water insecurity, land degradation, and food security are not separate national problems neatly contained within borders. Addressing them is becoming one of the fields through which regional coherence is being built. The significance of the Summit lies less in ceremonial language than in the consolidation of multiple ecological agendas into a visible diplomatic architecture. Through its panels and high-level discussions, the Summit placed Central Asia’s natural heritage not at the margins of development but at its center. Ecosystems, rivers, glaciers, mountains, and landscapes are not only environmental assets. They are conditions for prosperity, stability, and resilience. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of IFAS reopened the question of whether the Fund, long criticized for its limitations, can be reworked rather than left as a symbol of failed regional environmental governance. Kazakhstan’s proposal for an International Water Organization should be read in the same frame: it is not merely a technical proposal about water governance but an attempt to move a Central Asian concern into the language of global institutional reform. Kyrgyzstan’s mountain agenda and Tajikistan’s glacier diplomacy also belong to this broader pattern. They are not just isolated national branding exercises. Together with Uzbekistan’s increasingly active regional posture, they form a wider mosaic: each country brings a distinct ecological priority, but these priorities are becoming legible as parts of one regional perspective, and its voice carries more weight when presented as such. This is particularly important in the current geopolitical moment. As larger powers turn inward, compete over corridors, or speak about Central Asia through the old grammar of influence, the region is attempting to define itself not as terrain for another “Great Game" but as a pole of its own. This does not mean distance from external partners. On the contrary, the United Nations was a strategic partner of the Summit, and many formats involved major international organizations, European...