Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Opinion

Turkmenistan and the New Geopolitics of Silicon

Central Asia is not foreign to the emerging geopolitics of silicon and artificial intelligence (AI). Kazakhstan especially has made itself noticed, joining the US-led Pax Silica initiative in June and the Chinese-led World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) in July. Kazakhstan is the only country participating in both initiatives, which is characteristic of Astana’s multi-vector diplomacy. Whilst other Central Asian states have joined WAICO, Turkmenistan, consistent with its permanent neutrality stance, has joined neither. Neutrality, however, does not prevent economic participation, and a case has to be made for Turkmenistan. Two Frameworks for International Cooperation Although both initiatives respond to the same underlying reality - the growing strategic importance of artificial intelligence - they differ in scope and emphasis. Pax Silica is built around the material and economic foundations of AI, focusing on securing and coordinating the physical supply chains that make computation possible and aiming implicitly to reduce reliance on China. WAICO, by contrast, is centered on the political and normative dimension of AI, prioritizing governance, safety standards, and international coordination, where Beijing could push its rhetoric in favour of open-source artificial intelligence as a model for AI development. Taken together, they reflect two complementary but distinct ways of structuring the emerging AI order: one rooted in industrial capacity and supply-chain control, the other in multilateral rules. On that matter, Turkmenistan's possible relevance does not lie in software, semiconductor fabrication or AI regulation, but much further upstream: silicon metallurgy. From Gas to Silicon Silicon is abundant in nature, but transforming it into industrial materials is an energy-intensive process. Quartz or quartzite is used to produce both silicon ferroalloys and silicon metal. Ferrosilicon is principally consumed by the iron and steel industries, where it serves as a deoxidizing and alloying agent. Silicon metal, meanwhile, is used in aluminum alloys and chemical production, while a small share is further purified into the extremely high-purity silicon required by the semiconductor industry. Ferrosilicon should not be presented as a material that goes directly into AI chips. But establishing competitive ferrosilicon production can constitute a first industrial step into the broader family of silicon metallurgy. And Turkmenistan has already begun considering precisely that. In 2020, the Turkmen authorities reported that the Ministry of Industry was studying the production of metallurgical-grade silicon using local resources. Practical tests had already been conducted using quartz sand, metal mixtures and petroleum coke, while the government presented the development of domestic mineral resources as part of a broader strategy of industrialization and export diversification. The ambition became more concrete in January 2024. Turkmenistan's Ministry of Industry and Construction Production launched an international tender for a feasibility study for a ferroalloy plant intended to manufacture ferrosilicon, silicon carbide, and technical silicon. A 2024 feasibility study for such a project envisions a plant in Balkan Velayat capable of producing 15,000 tons of FeSi75 ferrosilicon annually. The proposed complex would operate two 12,500 kVA furnaces. Rather than depending exclusively on domestic raw materials, the study envisages sourcing quartzite from nearby Iran and...

Opinion

Kazakhstan’s Mineral Future Still Carries an Oil Risk Premium

In June, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev went to Brussels with a future-facing offer: Kazakhstan could become Europe’s non-Chinese option in critical minerals. Astana presented the country as a base for processing, long-term offtake, and industrial cooperation, rather than another source of ore. A month later, Kazakhstan’s older vulnerability reappeared. Drone attacks near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal at Novorossiysk disrupted loadings and forced production cuts in Kazakhstan. By July 27, loading had resumed, with tankers receiving crude supplied by Tengizchevroil. The interruption was brief, but it exposed a structural problem. Kazakhstan’s future mineral offer still rests on an economy whose main export artery runs through Russia and the Black Sea. That is the central tension in Kazakhstan’s new resource diplomacy. Astana wants Europe to help build a future supply chain. Its present still depends on an oil corridor it does not fully control. Kazakhstan is asking Europe to make future demand bankable. A mineral deposit does not become part of a European supply chain when officials announce it in a joint statement. It needs geological confirmation, financing, processing technology, reliable power, water, logistics, and customers prepared to sign contracts years before the first shipment. This is why offtake sits at the heart of Tokayev’s proposal. Long-term purchase commitments can turn European concern over Chinese dominance into financeable projects. If Europe wants another source tomorrow, it must help fund extraction, processing, and internationally accepted standards today. Kazakhstan says it is ready to supply 21 of the 34 materials on the EU’s critical raw materials list. It also wants more of the value chain to remain at home. European capital and technology would support local processing, laboratories, skills, and higher-value production instead of simply moving raw materials abroad. Europe has good reason to listen. China dominates the processing of many minerals used in batteries, advanced manufacturing, digital infrastructure, and defence. European industry wants alternatives, but diversification cannot be improvised after a supply shock. Mines and processing plants take years to finance, permit, construct, and qualify. For Kazakhstan, the minerals offer is also an attempt to upgrade an older relationship. Western companies already know the country through Tengiz, Kashagan, and decades of oil investment. Astana now wants to move from extraction towards processing and a stronger position in industrial supply chains. But the old oil story still prices the new minerals story. The CPC episode showed why. The pipeline carries crude from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak through Russian territory to Novorossiysk. It handles more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports and ties much of the country’s hard-currency income to a route outside Astana’s full control. A short halt was enough to cut output sharply at fields more than 1,500 kilometres away. Tokayev’s call in Omsk to freeze the war in Ukraine should be read partly in that context. It reflected more than the diplomatic caution expected from a neighbour of Russia. The war is now touching Kazakhstan’s export system through tanker security, insurance risk, production schedules, and investor confidence. Astana wants European finance for...

Opinion

Uzbekistan’s Heritage Did Not Stop With the Silk Road

When people think of Uzbekistan’s architectural heritage, the images are familiar: the turquoise domes of Samarkand, the madrasas of Bukhara, Khiva’s walled city, and the monuments of Shakhrisabz. But Uzbekistan’s history did not stop with the Silk Road. At its 48th session in July, UNESCO inscribed “Tashkent Modernist Architecture. Modernity and Tradition in Central Asia” on the World Heritage List. The new site brings together ten buildings and urban complexes constructed between the 1960s and the early 1990s, during the period in which Tashkent was dramatically rebuilt following the 1966 earthquake. The inscription deserves to be celebrated. More importantly, it expands the definition of what Uzbek heritage can be. [caption id="attachment_52926" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Kosmonavtlar Metro Station, Tashkent; photo: Mathieu Lemoine[/caption] These buildings do not belong to the world of caravanserais and Timurid courts. They represent another layer of the country’s history: the ambitious and highly creative transformation of Soviet-era Tashkent. For decades, Central Asian heritage has often been viewed through a chronological hierarchy. The older a monument, the easier it is to recognize as heritage. Timurid architecture is obviously precious. A concrete building from the 1970s can appear more expendable. Tashkent shows why that distinction is too simple. UNESCO notes that the architecture developed after the earthquake combined industrialized construction and seismic engineering with local climatic, cultural and material conditions. The result was not simply Soviet modernism transplanted to Central Asia, but a distinct architectural language adapted to Tashkent. This broader understanding of heritage comes at an important moment. Uzbekistan is modernizing rapidly. Its cities are growing, tourism is expanding, infrastructure is improving and redevelopment is transforming urban space. Much of this change is necessary and welcome. Historic neighborhoods cannot be expected to function as open-air museums. Residents need reliable drinking water, sewage systems, heating, electricity, internet access, waste collection, accessibility, safe streets and comfortable housing. A leaking pipe is not “authenticity.” The more difficult question is how modernization takes place. [caption id="attachment_52925" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Tashkent Modernist State Museum of History; photo: Mathieu Lemoine[/caption] Uzbekistan has already experienced how delicate that balance can be. In Shakhrisabz, large-scale redevelopment substantially altered the historic urban fabric. The historic center was placed on UNESCO’s List of World Heritage in Danger in 2016 and remains there today. The experience offers an important lesson: preserving monuments is not necessarily the same as preserving a city. A city can retain its most famous madrasa, mosque or mausoleum while losing part of its heritage if the streets, neighborhoods, businesses and communities surrounding them disappear. The pressure is not only architectural. As tourism grows and historic centers become more desirable, economic incentives change. Houses can become hotels and restaurants. Businesses serving residents can give way to businesses serving visitors. Traditional workshops can struggle with higher costs. Redevelopment can create pressure on residents to relocate. Bukhara illustrates why this is important. Its identity rests not only on monumental architecture but on a living economy of craftsmanship. Gold embroidery, ceramics, jewelry, woodwork and other trades remain sources of employment as well as cultural identity....

Artificial Intelligence

Kazakhstan AI Infrastructure: Can It Become a Regional Hub?

Computing infrastructure for artificial intelligence has joined fossil fuel reserves and transport corridors on the list of the world's most valuable strategic assets. The United States, Gulf states, and China are investing tens of billions of dollars in vast data-center projects. Kazakhstan has also joined the race, developing computing capacity with an eye on neighboring markets. For a country traditionally associated with commodity exports, the idea may seem unexpected. Yet the modern AI economy requires vast computing resources, specialized processors, reliable data centers, and, above all, large amounts of electricity. The AI market is therefore creating revenue opportunities not only for those who develop models, but also for countries able to provide the conditions in which they operate. From Digitalization to Infrastructure In 2024, Kazakhstan ranked among the world’s top 25 countries for e-government development and was also among the 10 countries with the broadest public access to government services. The focus of state digital policy is now shifting. Kazakhstan has begun investing more in the infrastructure needed for artificial intelligence. In 2025, the state-owned Samruk-Kazyna fund and the UAE-based company Presight AI developed a national supercomputing cluster. The project placed Kazakhstan 86th in the global ranking of countries operating the world’s most powerful computing systems. This year, the government announced a partnership with NVIDIA and Firebird to develop high-performance computing infrastructure and build modern data centers. A national AI ecosystem is also being developed around Astana Hub, while telecommunications and cloud companies are expanding their own data-processing facilities. Digitalization in Kazakhstan was previously focused mainly on the delivery of public services. The country is now building infrastructure that can be used by research institutions, businesses, and government agencies. At sufficient scale, it could serve not only the domestic market but also users elsewhere in Central Asia. Factors Working in Kazakhstan’s Favor If Kazakhstan intends to enter the regional market, an obvious question arises: what can it offer data-center operators and cloud-service providers? The country’s relatively modest domestic market is not the decisive factor. For such projects, the cost and reliability of electricity, the quality of digital infrastructure, international connectivity, and conditions for long-term investment matter far more. Kazakhstan lies between Europe and Asia and is gradually becoming part of new transregional digital routes, including the Trans-Caspian fiber-optic link. For cloud-service providers, this could mean lower data-transfer latency and easier access to customers in several countries. The Astana International Financial Centre also offers foreign investors a legal framework based on English common law, reducing uncertainty for long-term infrastructure projects. Electricity prices are another important factor. They remain competitive compared with many neighboring countries, while energy is one of the largest operating costs for modern data centers. Kazakhstan’s geography, digital connectivity, investment framework, and energy resources together give it a chance to become a regional location for computing infrastructure. Not Algorithms but Megawatts Artificial intelligence is often associated with software, algorithms, and increasingly sophisticated language models. In reality, AI has become just as much an infrastructure business. Training and operating systems...

Korean Culture

K-Pop in Central Asia: Why Korean Pop Culture Has Captured a Generation

On weekend afternoons in Almaty, Tashkent, or Bishkek, groups of teenagers practice synchronized dance routines in parks, shopping centers, and university courtyards, their clothes echoing the polished style of Korean idols. BTS, BLACKPINK, Stray Kids, NewJeans, aespa, SEVENTEEN, and many other groups fill their playlists and social media feeds. Some are filming dance covers for TikTok, others are preparing for local competitions, while many simply gather with friends who share the same enthusiasm. K-pop in Central Asia has become much more than a foreign music genre. It forms part of the broader Korean Wave, or Hallyu, encompassing television dramas, films, fashion, cosmetics, cuisine, tourism, and language learning. For many young people, Korean culture represents modernity, creativity, and participation in a global cultural space. Korean popular culture began entering Central Asia in the late 1990s and early 2000s through serial dramas. With their emphasis on family values and interpersonal relationships, Korean dramas often felt culturally closer to local audiences than many Western productions. The digital era dramatically accelerated this process. Psy’s “Gangnam Style” crossed linguistic barriers in 2012 and became one of the first truly global viral music videos. What initially appeared to be a novelty proved to be a turning point in the international expansion of Korean popular culture. BTS later built an enormous international following through highly synchronized performances and songs addressing insecurity, ambition, self-acceptance, and the pressures experienced by young people. BLACKPINK connected K-pop with fashion, luxury branding, and a new image of female confidence. Today, K-pop has become one of South Korea’s strongest cultural brands. According to the 2025 Overseas Hallyu Survey, 17.8% of respondents identified K-pop as the first thing they associate with South Korea, while 70.3% expressed a favorable view of Korean cultural content. The global Hallyu community has also continued to expand. Organized Hallyu fan communities exceeded 225 million members worldwide by the end of 2023, spanning 119 countries. Central Asia represents only a small share of that global audience, but enthusiasm across the region is unmistakable. Kazakhstan has developed one of Central Asia’s largest and most organized K-pop communities. Almaty and Astana host dance-cover groups, fan meetings, cultural festivals, and Korean-language clubs. The country’s comparatively strong consumer market, widespread digital connectivity, and extensive presence of Korean businesses and institutions have helped Hallyu gain momentum. Kazakhstan’s long-established Koryo-saram community has also reduced the cultural distance between the two countries. Although contemporary K-pop differs greatly from the traditions preserved by ethnic Koreans whose ancestors were deported to Central Asia during the Soviet period, the diaspora continues to serve as an important bridge between Korean and Central Asian societies. Almaty is home to the State Republican Academic Korean Theatre, one of the oldest Korean-language theaters outside the Korean Peninsula. Together with cultural centers and educational institutions, it has helped sustain interest in Korean culture for decades, while younger generations have embraced contemporary Korean entertainment through digital media. In June 2025, Almaty hosted the Central Asia K-Pop Cover Dance Champion, bringing together performers from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and...

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Could Vanadium Be Kazakhstan’s Next Breakout Critical Metals Story?

Vanadium is viewed as a critical mineral by the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and many other countries because of its importance to energy storage and industrial alloys. At the Astana Metals & Metallurgy (AMM) Congress, Ferro-Alloy Resources CEO Nicholas Bridgen discussed the company’s assets, strategy, and valuation with The Times of Central Asia, noting that the company appears undervalued amid supply chain disruptions and the rising strategic importance of vanadium. The discussion highlighted vanadium’s emerging demand-supply imbalance and efforts to better align market perception with fundamentals. Of the critical metals that will define the next half-century, vanadium has perhaps the strongest claim to indispensability: it hardens the steel in our infrastructure and defense systems, and it stores the energy that our grids will increasingly depend on. Yet the market has consistently failed to price that future in, and nowhere is that mispricing more visible than in the vanadium deposits of Kazakhstan. In 1941, with the Second World War raging, Soviet geologists fanned out across Central Asia looking for strategic minerals. Around 180 kilometers east of Almaty, in the foothills of the Tian Shan mountain range along the borders with China and Kyrgyzstan, they found tungsten at the Boguty deposit. At roughly the same time, they were delineating what would become the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits. The geology was well understood, and the resource was real, but nothing happened for the better part of 75 years. The deposits sat idle not because tungsten was unimportant, but because there was no pressing reason for, first, the Soviet Union or later the West to develop them. That changed when the scale of China's dominance in critical metals became impossible to ignore. By the early 2020s, China was producing over 75% of the world’s tungsten output, alongside similarly dominant shares of rare earth elements and a range of other strategic minerals. This concentration of supply was not accidental. It was the product of decades of deliberate industrial policy, patient capital, and a willingness to operate at low margins long enough to drive out competitors. The Tungsten Lesson Chinese mining company Jiaxin International Resources Investment Ltd. moved in 2014 to acquire Boguty for an undisclosed sum, almost certainly a modest one. The deal further consolidated China’s grip on global tungsten supply. Jiaxin then spent approximately $300 million developing the deposit and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at a valuation in excess of $600 million. The investment thesis seemed straightforward enough at the time. In 2025, it looked positively prescient: China imposed export controls on tungsten, and key prices outside China more than doubled. According to the Financial Times, Jiaxin’s market capitalization stands at close to HKD 22.3 billion, equal to $2.84 billion, approximately 9.5 times the stated development expenditure. [caption id="attachment_52262" align="aligncenter" width="1432"] Image: Kaz Resources[/caption] Meanwhile, Skyline Builders Group Holding Ltd. and Cove Kaz Capital Group LLC (“Cove Kaz”) have moved to acquire the two other formerly dormant tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan, Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty. On this...