• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10448 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Viewing results 7 - 12 of 1759

Iran Volatility Tests Central Asia’s Overland Corridors

The current escalation around Iran holds the potential for transforming the long-term geopolitical configuration of Eurasia, including Central Asia. In the short and medium term, aside from the security and safety of its citizens, Central Asia's main concern is economic, because it puts stress on overland rail and trucking routes that cross Iranian territory. Central Asian exporters do not ship through the Gulf, so for now the key issue is whether an Iran-crossing land route remains reliable enough, and financeable enough, to serve as a routine outlet for trade. The Iran transit option differs from trans-Caspian reliance on ports and rail interfaces around the Caspian Sea, transiting to onward rail across the South Caucasus and into Europe. The Iran option offers a continuous land arc from Central Asian railheads and road networks into Iran, then onward to Türkiye and connected European rail networks, with the additional possibility of reaching Iran’s southern ports for Indian Ocean-facing trade. Each route has its own chokepoints, paperwork burdens, and exposure to risk premiums. Rail is efficient for bulk and container flows when schedules and documentation are stable. Trucking provides flexibility, short-notice capacity, and last-mile options, but it is more sensitive to security conditions and border clearance delays. Technical capacity at the Iran–Turkmenistan crossings is key. Recent reports of discussions in Sarakhs describe efforts to expand the use of a specialized rail logistics process whereby entire wheel assemblies are replaced on railcars to transition between different track gauges. There is also a need to address customs constraints at Sarakhs and Incheh Borun. Against that operational background, Kazakhstan has signaled diplomatic attention to Gulf partners and Jordan. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has sent messages of support to leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, followed by a similar message to Jordan, and a phone call with Qatar’s emir. The language emphasized solidarity and diplomacy and, in commercial terms, reads as partner-management. It reassures major investors and energy-market counterparts that Kazakhstan is engaged, attentive, and positioning itself for stability rather than escalation. The trans-Iran rail foundation is over a decade old. On December 3, 2014, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran inaugurated the 928-kilometer Uzen–Bereket–Gorgan railway, characterized by RFE/RL (which gave the length as 935 kilometers) as the shortest railway connecting the three states. The International Union of Railways similarly notes the inauguration of the Gorgan–Inche Boroun link on that date as part of the corridor connecting Iran to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Recent reporting suggests renewed efforts to operationalize the Iran option as a westbound channel. Uzbekistan, in cooperation with Türkiye, launched freight rail services along the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Türkiye route in 2022. The Organization of Turkic States described a December 2022 event in Tashkent as the first freight train organized from Türkiye to Uzbekistan, which anchors the same basic idea: make westbound rail via Iran more regular and more visible to logistics markets. The point is not that Iran becomes the sole answer, but that Central Asian exporters and transit states have been...

S&P Global Ratings Expects Kazakhstan’s GDP Growth to Slow in 2026

The international rating agency S&P Global Ratings has affirmed Kazakhstan’s long-term sovereign credit rating at BBB- and its short-term rating at A-3, while maintaining a positive outlook on the long-term rating. At the same time, S&P analysts expect economic growth to decelerate in 2026 and warn of persistently high inflation. According to commentary on S&P’s projections by analysts at the Halyk Finance research center, Kazakhstan’s GDP growth is forecast to slow to 4.1% in 2026. The projected slowdown is attributed to a 4% decline in oil production, weaker fiscal stimulus, and reduced consumer activity amid higher taxes and tighter credit conditions. In the medium term, for 2028-2029, S&P expects GDP growth to remain at around 4% or slightly higher. However, risks persist, particularly those related to geopolitical tensions and the continued sensitivity of Kazakhstan’s budget revenues and exports to fluctuations in global oil prices. For comparison, Kazakhstan’s GDP grew by 6.5% in 2025. In 2026, the government expects growth of 6.2%, a notably more optimistic projection than S&P’s estimate. Other international institutions have offered varying forecasts. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) recently upgraded its 2026 GDP growth forecast for Kazakhstan to 4.7%, up from 4.5%. In contrast, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in January lowered its 2026 growth forecast by 0.4 percentage points to 4.4%. Returning to S&P’s projections, the agency expects inflation to reach 11% by the end of 2026 and forecasts an exchange rate of 540 tenge per $1. Halyk Finance analysts stated that they broadly agree with S&P’s GDP and inflation forecasts. However, they consider the risks of further weakening of the national currency to be greater than the agency anticipates. According to their estimates, the exchange rate in 2026 could depreciate to 580-590 tenge per $1. S&P also expects the Kazakh government to continue fiscal consolidation in the medium term by expanding the tax base and tightening control over public spending, while preserving substantial liquid reserves. Over the next three years, the government does not plan to withdraw additional funds from the National Fund through targeted transfers or bond placements. The guaranteed annual transfer from the National Fund is set at $5.5 billion, half the $11.1 billion withdrawn in 2025. “We share S&P Global Ratings’ positive assessment, provided that the government strictly adheres to its fiscal consolidation commitments and reduces transfers from the National Fund,” Halyk Finance concluded. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the IMF believes Kazakhstan’s current GDP growth rate exceeds the country’s long-term economic potential, thereby increasing inflationary pressures and signaling potential overheating of the economy.

Kazakhstan to Focus on Skilled Migrants in New Migration Policy

Kazakhstan is shifting toward a more pragmatic migration policy aligned with the needs of the national economy. The government’s newly approved Migration Policy Concept through 2030 prioritizes attracting in-demand highly skilled professionals and encouraging internal migration to regions experiencing labor shortages. According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, the number of foreign labor migrants in Kazakhstan reached 16,100 in 2025. Minister of Labor Askarbek Yertayev said that greater emphasis will be placed on assessing the professional qualifications of foreign workers. Priority will be given to specialists with relevant education, work experience, and competencies sought in the domestic labor market. By 2030, the share of skilled workers among labor migrants is expected to increase to 95%. To support these objectives, the ministry has launched a pilot project on the digital platform migration Enbek.kz. The initiative introduces a comprehensive scoring system to evaluate applicants when issuing permanent residence permits and granting kandas status, a designation for ethnic Kazakhs returning to their historical homeland. A draft law has also been prepared that includes revising fees for hiring foreign labor, tightening regulation of private employment agencies, and formally integrating the digital scoring mechanism into migration decision-making processes. The quota for attracting foreign workers in 2026 has been set at 0.25% of the total national workforce, according to official data. The main countries of origin for officially employed foreign nationals remain China, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and India. At the same time, the government is strengthening measures to manage internal migration. In 2025, 14.7% of participants in state-supported interregional resettlement programs relocated to northern regions of the country. Major cities such as Almaty and Astana continue to attract young people from less economically developed regions, exacerbating territorial imbalances.

Kashagan and Karachaganak: Will Kazakhstan’s Claims Lead to Changes in the Shareholder Structure?

The beginning of 2026 has been marked by a new round of confrontation between Kazakhstan and the international consortia developing the country’s largest oil and gas fields, North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (Kashagan) and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (Karachaganak). Below is an overview of the current situation and the possible scenarios. Arbitration proceedings initiated in early 2023 have expanded from $16.5 billion to more than $170 billion. Over three years, Kazakhstan has secured preliminary victories on several claims, enough, in my view, to suggest that the era of foreign oil consortia dominating Kazakhstan’s strategic projects may be coming to an end. Ecology and NCOC Violations This week, Bloomberg reported in its article “Oil Majors Seek Arbitration Over $5 Billion Kazakh Sulfur Fine” that the NCOC consortium is filing in international arbitration to challenge a Kazakh court decision to collect 2.3 trillion tenge (KZT). The Bloomberg headline, however, presents the issue inaccurately. Environmental violations, including the excessive storage of approximately 1 million tons of sulfur, were identified during an inspection in March 2023, when the exchange rate stood at 451.71 KZT per $1. The rate later rose to 520-540 and currently stands at around 500 KZT per $1. According to investment forecasts, it may reach 600 KZT per $1 by the end of 2026. As a result, the dollar equivalent of the fine has decreased significantly. At the March 2023 rate, 2.3 trillion KZT amounted to approximately $5.1 billion. At 500 KZT per $1, it equals about $4.6 billion. At 600 KZT per $1, it would fall to roughly $3.8 billion, a difference of about $1.3 billion. After my earlier publications arguing that foreign consortia should be fined in foreign-currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of filing, the proposal was also raised in Parliament. Such an approach would be logical: the consortia export their oil and receive revenue in foreign currency, yet fines are imposed in tenge. After several rounds of appeals, the consortium lost what became the largest environmental dispute in Kazakhstan’s history, initially involving more than 20 systematic violations of environmental legislation. Correspondence between consortium members published in Western media indicated they were aware of the violations but considered remediation and compliance financially costly. NCOC’s annual revenue is approximately $10 billion. Media reports also stated that the consortium offered around $110 million, roughly 50 times less than the fine, for regional social programs in exchange for waiving environmental claims. Neither NCOC nor the Kazakh government confirmed such negotiations. In 2010-2011, similar environmental and tax claims against the Karachaganak consortium resulted in Kazakhstan receiving a 10% stake in the project. The current ownership structure of NCOC is: ENI (Italy) - 16.81% ExxonMobil (U.S.) - 16.81% CNPC (China) - 8.33% INPEX (Japan) - 7.56% TotalEnergies (France) - 16.81% Shell (UK) - 16.81% KazMunayGas (Kazakhstan) - 16.88% Total investment in Phase One of Kashagan is estimated at $60 billion. By analogy with Karachaganak, the environmental fine could hypothetically lead to an increase in Kazakhstan’s share by 5-7 percentage...

Central Asia’s Population Could Reach 96 Million by 2040, Raising Infrastructure Pressures

Central Asia’s population could grow to 96 million by 2040, a trend expected to stimulate economic expansion while placing significant strain on infrastructure, energy systems, and water resources across the region, according to Russia’s state news agency TASS. In an interview with TASS, Nikolai Podguzov, Chairman of the Management Board of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), said demographic growth would be one of the defining factors shaping Central Asia’s long-term development. “By 2040, according to our estimates, the population of Central Asia may reach 96 million. This should become a driver of economic growth, but at the same time such numbers will create enormous pressure on infrastructure,” he said. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Central Asia’s population exceeded 84 million in 2025, continuing a rapid upward trend after surpassing 80 million in 2024. Projections indicate that the population could exceed 100 million by 2050, underscoring the scale of demographic and economic transformation facing the region in the coming decades. Podguzov added that the region would require significant progress in energy efficiency, modern transport systems, and water management to ensure sustainable development. He described Central Asia as one of the regions of the world most vulnerable to climate change. According to EDB forecasts, water shortages are expected to intensify, with an annual deficit potentially reaching between 5 and 12 cubic kilometers by 2028. A substantial portion of water resources is already lost due to outdated irrigation and distribution systems. Podguzov said the bank is financing projects to modernize irrigation networks, introduce water-saving technologies, and implement digital water accounting mechanisms across the region. To address these challenges, the EDB has proposed a Eurasian Transport Framework, a network of transport corridors aimed at lowering logistics costs and accelerating trade flows. While existing routes predominantly run east to west, Podguzov emphasized the growing importance of north-south connections, including the potential Trans-Afghan corridor, which could provide access to markets in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. The bank projects that the combined economies of Central Asia’s five countries will reach approximately $600 billion in 2026, positioning the region among the fastest-growing globally. However, Podguzov stressed that demographic expansion, transport development, and water security are closely interconnected challenges that require coordinated policy responses.  

The World Bank Backs Kazakhstan’s Rail Shortcut

On February 19, 2026, the World Bank Board approved an $846 million IBRD guarantee to help the state-owned railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) mobilize $1.41 billion in long-term commercial financing. The financing is linked to a KTZ reform program under the umbrella “Transforming Rail Connectivity in Kazakhstan (Middle Corridor Development)” initiative. The purpose is to expand rail connectivity and upgrade logistics on Kazakhstan’s segment of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, Middle Corridor). The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will add a $564 million co-guarantee that shifts the financing away from a classic sovereign-loan model and toward private credit backed by multilateral risk coverage. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) presents this operation as part of a wider World Bank Group approach that pairs corridor capital expenditure with steps to strengthen the operator’s financial sustainability and commercial viability. The operation is structured as a two-part package. First, it finances a new 322.3-kilometer railway on a new segment between Mointy and Kyzylzhar in central Kazakhstan. This segment is meant to remove a major network detour, shorten the TITR route within Kazakhstan by 149 kilometers, ease congestion on heavily used sections, and support double-stack container operations. The line is planned with modern signaling and telecommunications, plus design provisions for later expansion and electrification. Second, it ties the construction to a reform program at KTZ, including tariff reform, exploration of alternative financing mechanisms, stronger financial and environmental management, and preparatory work for a potential initial public offering. The World Bank is structuring delivery through a Multi-Phase Programmatic Approach with the stated aim of tripling freight volumes and halving end-to-end transit times on Kazakhstan’s Middle Corridor segment by 2030. Why This Segment Matters for the Middle Corridor Inside Kazakhstan, the Mointy–Kyzylzhar line is a central connector in the Trans-Kazakhstan east–west trunk carrying traffic from the China-facing gateways at Dostyk and Khorgos toward the Caspian outlets at Aktau and Kuryk. Mointy itself is a pivotal junction where train paths, locomotives, and crews are redistributed across multiple directions; as a result, any congestion there propagates quickly into corridor-wide delays. In early 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev directed acceleration of the Trans-Kazakhstan corridor. KTZ says the expected benefits include decreased pressure on heavily used central segments, fewer locomotive changeovers at key junction points, and, on some routings, the potential to cut more than a day from transit time between the Chinese border and Aktau. The World Bank’s 2023 Middle Corridor study stressed that the corridor’s most durable growth driver is regional trade among the core corridor economies: China–Europe movements remain important, but they compete with multiple alternatives, above all maritime shipping. An infrastructure upgrade adds economic value only if it reduces variability at the handoff points where delays accumulate, including rail-to-port interfaces, Caspian coordination, and national borders. Relieving the domestic bottleneck in Kazakhstan is economically meaningful only insofar as it stabilizes arrival times to Caspian terminals, creates more room for dispatching, and helps logistics providers offer shippers more predictable end-to-end service along the TITR. The emphasis is...