Kazakhstan Featurees - The Times Of Central Asia

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Uranium

Kazakh Uranium for Asia: Japan Returns for Fuel, South Korea Expands Cooperation

Kazakhstan accounts for around 40% of global uranium production. China already receives not only raw material from the country but also finished fuel assemblies; Japan is signing new contracts after bringing some of its reactors back online; and South Korea is expanding cooperation with Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry. Kazakhstan itself, which for decades exported almost all of its uranium, is preparing to build its own nuclear power plants. These developments are gradually changing the country’s place in Asia’s nuclear energy sector. In December 2025, Kazatomprom, the world’s largest producer of natural uranium, agreed on new supplies with Kansai Electric Power, one of Japan’s major nuclear power operators. The agreement for the supply of uranium oxide concentrate, U₃O₈, was signed during events connected with a visit by a Kazakh delegation to Japan. This is not finished reactor fuel. U₃O₈, known in the industry as yellowcake, must undergo conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication after mining. For Kansai, the agreement provides another source of raw material for its nuclear fleet, while for Kazakhstan it continues cooperation with the Japanese company that began almost two decades ago. Japanese demand is rising again after a prolonged decline. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in March 2011 led to the gradual shutdown of all the country’s commercial reactors. Restarts began in 2015 after new safety requirements were introduced. In February 2025, the Japanese government approved an energy policy that envisages increasing nuclear power’s share of electricity generation to around 20% by 2040. To achieve this, Tokyo will need not only to restart existing reactors but also to secure their fuel supply. Kansai has a particularly important role in this process. The company operates seven reactors at three sites: Mihama, Takahama, and Ohi. In 2025, it also resumed work to assess the possibility of building a new reactor at the Mihama site. No final decision on construction has yet been made. Kansai’s links with Kazakhstan began long before the current revival of Japan’s nuclear energy sector. In 2006, the company and Sumitomo joined the APPAK uranium mining project in southern Kazakhstan. Kazatomprom currently owns 65% of the company, Sumitomo 25%, and Kansai 10%. APPAK develops the western section of the Mynkuduk deposit in the Turkistan region. For the Japanese company, this provides a presence directly at the source of the raw material. For Kazakhstan, the partnership became one of the first major examples of Asian energy companies participating in its uranium mining industry. China Already Receives Finished Fuel Kazakhstan has gone further with China than simply supplying uranium concentrate. Ulba-FA operates in Ust-Kamenogorsk as a joint venture between the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and China’s CGNPC-URC. The Kazakh side owns 51% and the Chinese side 49%. The plant produces fuel assemblies for Chinese nuclear power plants. Industrial production began in 2021. In December 2022, the first shipment was sent to China, containing just over 30 tonnes of low-enriched uranium in finished fuel assemblies. By the end of 2024, the plant had reached its design capacity of 200 tonnes a year....

Abai Qunanbaiuly

Abai Day in Kazakhstan: The Enduring Legacy of a National Poet

Nearly two centuries after his birth, Abai Qunanbaiuly remains a symbol of Kazakh identity, with his poetry and music still familiar across Kazakhstan. Often described as the founder of modern Kazakh written literature, he has been compared in Kazakhstan to Alexander Pushkin in Russia and William Shakespeare in England. On August 10, the country marks the 181st anniversary of his birth and the seventh official Abai Day. Abai wrote about 170 poems and 56 translations. His best-known prose work, Kara Sozder (Words of Edification), consists of 45 short pieces of philosophical and moral reflection. He was also a composer, and his song Közimniñ Qarasy (The Apple of My Eye) remains among his best-known works. Poet and Public Figure Born Ibrahim Qunanbaiuly on August 10, 1845, at the foot of the Shyngystau Mountains near Semipalatinsk, Abai came from the Tobykty clan of the Argyn tribe. His grandfather Oskenbai and great-grandfather Yrgyzbay were prominent biys, or judges. His father, Qunanbai Oskenbaiuly, was a powerful local leader. His grandmother Zere gave him the nickname Abai, commonly translated as “attentive” or “cautious.” At age 10, Abai was sent to the Ahmad Riza Madrasah in Semipalatinsk, where he studied religious subjects in Arabic and Persian and read Eastern literature. During his final year there, he also briefly attended a Russian parish school. His father brought him home at 13 and involved him in administrative and judicial affairs. Abai later deepened his study of Russian and European literature and formed close ties with political exiles in Semipalatinsk. He died in 1904 and was buried at Zhidebai. Abai’s Views Abai read Nizami Ganjavi and Alisher Navoi, among other Eastern classics. His translations into Kazakh included work by Alexander Pushkin and Mikhail Lermontov. He also translated Ivan Krylov and Lord Byron. A poem by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe reached Kazakh through Abai’s rendering of Lermontov’s Russian version. Education and productive work recur throughout Abai’s writing. He criticized corruption and abuses of power, including bribery and sycophancy. He also opposed polygamy and bride price and argued for greater equality for women. His ideas influenced the emerging Kazakh intelligentsia. Leaders of the Alash movement regarded Abai as an intellectual predecessor. His engagement with Russian culture later became a subject of debate over how his work had been interpreted during the Soviet period. International Recognition and New Translations In 1995, Abai’s 150th anniversary was commemorated under UNESCO’s auspices. TURKSOY declared 2020 the Year of Abai to mark the 175th anniversary of his birth. His works have been translated into numerous languages, and monuments to him stand in Kazakhstan and abroad. In Almaty, his statue stands at the beginning of Abai Avenue, with the mountains behind it. His name also reached readers in the United States in the late 19th century through American journalist George Kennan, who referred to Abai after visiting Semipalatinsk in 1885. Debate over how Abai should be translated has continued in the post-Soviet period. In 2021, Kazakh poet and translator Yerbol Zhumagul presented a new Russian translation of...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Black Sea Risks Elevate Azerbaijan and Turkey in Kazakhstan’s Export Strategy

Bloomberg reported on August 8 that the Turkish authorities were withholding or delaying transit permission for some vessels bound through the Dardanelles for Novorossiysk. Some applicants were reportedly told that permits were not being issued, while others faced additional review. The practice appeared selective: vessels bound for some other Black Sea destinations continued to transit, while some Ukraine-bound vessels were also reportedly affected. On August 9, however, Turkish officials told Reuters that shipping through the Turkish Straits was proceeding smoothly and described the actions as temporary security measures rather than an ongoing restriction. The reported restrictions followed a sharp increase in attacks on commercial shipping around the Black Sea, including Turkish-linked vessels near Novorossiysk. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry expressed concern after attacks on the Turkish-owned Yaşar and Nadezhda and called on Russia and Ukraine to ensure navigational safety. Novorossiysk is especially important for Kazakhstan, because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal there handles the overwhelming majority of its oil exports. Although the CPC pipeline itself remains operational, the episode showed how quickly traffic serving Kazakhstan’s principal oil-export outlet could face an additional constraint. The events shed light on an export strategy Kazakhstan began developing several years before the current problems. Tokayev’s July 2022 instructions addressed both oil-export diversification through the Trans-Caspian route and alternative transport chains for other cargo. In particular, he called for greater use of Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports and the development of alternative railway routes. Later that year, KazMunayGas (KMG) and SOCAR established a framework for moving Kazakhstani oil from Aktau across the Caspian Sea and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, initially for up to 1.5 million tons annually. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey also adopted a 2022–2027 roadmap to remove bottlenecks along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan continued to develop transport links with Russia and China as it expanded Trans-Caspian routes through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The strategy extended Kazakhstan’s longstanding geopolitical multi-vector policy, which balances relations with partners in multiple directions, into the geoeconomic sphere. Tokayev made the combination explicit in his 2023 State of the Nation address. Relations with Turkey had meanwhile been elevated to an enhanced strategic partnership in May 2022, including transport cooperation and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan deepened their strategic and allied cooperation later that year, likewise emphasizing transport and logistics. Closer ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey widened Kazakhstan’s options without displacing established routes through Russia. The CPC pipeline remains so dominant in Kazakhstan’s oil exports that no other existing route approaches its present scale. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, the Energy Ministry reported the volume moving through the CPC pipeline at 64.8 million tons (the CPC itself reported about 63 million tons), meaning that more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s exported oil depended on the CPC system. Kazakhstan moved only about 1.4 million tons through the Aktau–Baku–Ceyhan (ABC) route in 2024, and about 1.3 million tons in 2025. Diversification cannot at present mean replacing CPC. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline gives Kazakhstani oil a westbound egress...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

U.S. Reportedly Secures Ukrainian Pledge to Avoid Strikes on CPC Infrastructure

Turkey has begun restricting some commercial vessels from entering the Black Sea on voyages to Novorossiysk, adding a potential new obstacle to Kazakhstan’s oil exports through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium amid reports that Ukraine has agreed to spare CPC infrastructure and qualifying non-Russian tankers from attack. Turkey’s Directorate-General of Coastal Safety has told multiple ships bound for Novorossiysk that it is not currently issuing transit permits for those voyages or needs more time to review applications through the Dardanelles. The authorities have not publicly explained the measure. Some vessels were told the restriction also applied to ships heading to Ukraine, while traffic bound for Bulgarian and Turkish ports continued. There is no confirmation that any tanker scheduled to load Kazakh crude at the CPC terminal has been denied passage. The measure nevertheless comes at a difficult point for CPC, where repeated attacks and stoppages have already made some shipowners reluctant to accept voyages to the terminal near Novorossiysk. On August 7, Reuters reported that CPC loadings fell more than 20% behind schedule in July, to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. That removed about 400,000 barrels a day of CPC Blend from the international market. Loadings averaged roughly 1.1 million to 1.2 million barrels per day in the first week of August, while Kazakhstan’s oil production has fallen 14% from June. CPC normally handles around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day and carries more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Four tankers completed loading after the July 30 attacks, but operations remained intermittent as tanker availability and security concerns continued to limit the recovery. The Turkish restrictions emerged on the same day as a potentially important change in the security picture around CPC. According to an unnamed U.S. government official cited by Bloomberg, Ukraine has agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or qualifying non-Russian vessels bound for the terminal, provided they are not under Ukrainian sanctions, are not carrying Russian cargo, and are not owned by Russian individuals or entities. Ukraine has also established points of contact through which commercial shippers can provide vessel information and seek safe passage. The arrangement follows months of U.S. pressure over the exposure of Kazakhstan-origin crude and Western commercial interests at CPC. During a July 29 call, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev discussed the need for “reliable and uninterrupted” exports of Kazakhstan-origin oil through the system. The commitment could reduce one source of risk for ships serving CPC, but it does not immediately resolve the commercial disruption. Previous attempts by companies to identify vessels that should not be targeted did not prevent all attacks, while war-risk insurance and charter costs have risen sharply. Ankara has become increasingly vocal as attacks spread across the Black Sea. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said the Turkish-owned civilian vessels Yaşar and Nadezhda were attacked by drones on August 3 after leaving Novorossiysk, injuring crew members including Turkish citizens. It warned that further escalation could have broader consequences, including...

Succession

The Tradition of Power – Why Political Succession in Central Asia Follows Its Own Rules

In January 2027, Kyrgyzstan will hold a presidential election, an event that is anything but routine for the Central Asian republic. Over the past three decades, political crises, often surrounding disputed elections, have repeatedly ended in the removal of presidents. Kyrgyzstan remains an outlier in the region, although it, too, has gradually been moving towards a political model that has long become the norm across the rest of Central Asia. This year marks 35 years since the Soviet republics embarked on independent political lives following the collapse of the USSR. Yet many of the mechanisms governing the transfer of supreme power, shaped during the Soviet era, continue to define politics across the independent states. In Central Asia, three decades of independence have produced a distinctive model of political succession. The final years of the Soviet Union became known as the era of the so-called "gun-carriage race." As one ageing General Secretary after another passed away, an unwritten rule appeared to emerge: the official who chaired the state funeral commission for the deceased leader often became his successor. A remarkably similar pattern later emerged in Central Asia – first in Turkmenistan, then in Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, died in December 2006. The state funeral commission was chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who simultaneously became acting president. It was during those funeral ceremonies that the wider public was introduced for the first time to the family of Turkmenbashi. Under the constitution, parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev should have assumed the presidency. Instead, he was stripped of immunity and arrested, clearing the way for Berdimuhamedov to take the acting presidency. After assuming the presidency in 2007, Berdimuhamedov gradually abandoned the more eccentric elements of his predecessor's personality cult while building a political system centered on his own leadership. If Niyazov styled himself Turkmenbashi – Leader of All Turkmens – his successor adopted the title Arkadag, or Protector of the Nation. In February 2022, Berdimuhamedov unexpectedly announced that he would step down following an early presidential election scheduled for March 12. He explained the decision by saying it was time to "give the younger generation an opportunity to govern the country." Few doubted that he was referring to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedov, who by then had already occupied most of the key positions within the state hierarchy. That is precisely what happened. Serdar Berdimuhamedov became president, while his father moved to the chairmanship of the Halk Maslahaty, retaining the title of National Leader of the Turkmen People. Uzbekistan followed a similar pattern, although under different circumstances. Islam Karimov built a highly centralized presidential system that left virtually no room for political competition. This applied not only to political opponents, but also to those closest to the president. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was placed under house arrest while her father was still alive. Following his death, she was convicted and remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan. When Karimov died in September 2016, reports of his death circulated for several days...

Middle Corridor

Aral–Caspian Highway Project Advances Kazakhstan’s Bid for Eurasian Logistics Leadership

Kazakhstan has begun building an 800-kilometer highway that will give freight moving east and west a shorter road connection to the Caspian ports of Aktau and Kuryk. The government says the project could cut nearly 1,000 kilometers and up to three days from journeys between Europe and China, while improving Kazakhstan’s access to European and regional markets. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev launched construction of the Beineu–Saksaulsk highway on August 3, and ordered its completion by 2029. He proposed calling it the Aral–Caspian Highway because it will run from Saksaulsk, near the Aral Sea, west to Beineu and the road network serving Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports. At Saksaulsk, three routes meet. The Kyzylorda road runs southeast to the Western Europe–Western China highway. The Ulgaysyn road continues northwest toward Aktobe. The new highway will run west to Beineu, from where roads lead to Aktau and Kuryk. The result is a more direct connection between southern Kazakhstan, the Aktobe corridor, and the Caspian coast, as outlined in the government’s wider road program. The government is reconstructing and expanding the Kyzylorda–Saksaulsk and Ulgaysyn–Saksaulsk sections alongside the new highway. The three projects cover a combined 1,574 kilometers. The authorities expect annual freight volumes along the routes to rise 2.5-fold to 13.2 million tons and say construction will create more than 10,000 jobs. Tokayev described the change as adding “horizontal connections” to Kazakhstan’s historically “vertical transportation networks.” His stated goal is to transform Kazakhstan into “one of the leading logistics hubs connecting Europe and Asia.” The road will feed into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor. Goods can move west from Kazakhstan across the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, or east along the same route into Central and East Asia. The corridor gives European companies another path into Central Asian markets and gives Kazakhstan additional options for reaching Europe. The corridor is often presented as a China–Europe land-bridge, but the World Bank’s analysis expects most of its future traffic to be generated within the corridor region. Its modeling projects trade between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and the European Union to rise by 28% by 2030, while intercontinental freight remains below 40% of total volume. The commercial case therefore includes Kazakh exports moving west, European goods moving east, and regional cargo that never travels the full distance between Europe and China. Europe is already supporting parts of the network. The EU’s €30 million Trans-Caspian transport program backs preparatory work for the modernization of the Beineu–Saksaulsk road and improvements at Aktau. In June, Kazakhstan and European partners announced $462 million in transport agreements, including financing for the Aktobe–Ulgaysyn road and cooperation with A.P. Moller-Maersk on container shipping along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan also enters the competition with infrastructure already in use. It has a direct border with China, established railways carrying freight across the country, and operating Caspian ports. Uzbekistan is advancing the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and other routes, but The Times of Central Asia has previously reported that Kazakhstan retains the stronger position for now because several of...