• KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760

Viewing results 25 - 30 of 1415

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

Central Asia’s Fuel Squeeze Becomes a Winter Energy Security Problem

Central Asia’s fuel squeeze is moving from filling stations into winter planning. Governments are now tracking gasoline and diesel, gas pipelines, coal deliveries, power imports, jet fuel, and emergency repair crews. Seasonal fuel and power stress is familiar across the region, but the current pressure - tied to Russia, the main supplier for several regional fuel flows - has arrived early. Russia’s own fuel crisis has sharpened the risk. Ukrainian drone attacks and repair work have cut refinery output, while export limits have pushed more Russian supplies back into the domestic market. Reuters reported queues, regional restrictions, and gasoline above 100 roubles a liter at some independent stations. President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the strain on June 28. “You are well aware that problems for drivers and for businesses persist,” he said, adding that “the harvest depends on” keeping seasonal fuel schedules for farms. For Central Asia, Russian shortages travel through contracts, rail slots, import prices, and public nerves. Kyrgyzstan is among the most exposed. The country consumes about two million tons of fuels and lubricants each year, and almost 95% comes from Russia, according to Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov. “Due to the lack of adequate oil and gas production, we remain a country dependent on imports,” Kerimov said. Bishkek has asked Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for help securing supplies. That dependence is now impacting households, farmers, and small transport firms. The cabinet has capped pump prices and set a subsidy mechanism through September 30. Kerimov said importers were seeing offers at several prices, but promised that “there should be no shortage on the domestic market.” Oil traders put AI-92 stocks at 30 to 45 days, while diesel remained available for harvest work. Kyrgyzstan is trying to buy time through domestic refining. The modernized Junda refinery in the Chuy Region has been pressed to raise gasoline output to 24,000 tons a month soon, then 50,000 tons a month by the end of 2026, with finished products directed to the domestic market. Those gains would help, but Russian supply still sets the pace. Uzbekistan has the Bukhara and Fergana oil refineries, the Altyaryk unit of the Fergana refinery, and the Uzbekistan GTL complex, but demand has still moved faster than domestic supply. In January-April 2026, gasoline imports reached 568,700 tons, worth $327.1 million, more than double the same period in 2025. Local refineries produced 417,500 tons over those four months. A shift away from AI-80 gasoline has also pushed drivers toward AI-92 and AI-95. The pressure reached the exchange in late June. AI-92 gasoline climbed to a record 13.919 million soums per ton on June 29, about $1,160, after an 11.8% rise since the start of the month. Jet fuel has become an issue, too. Uzbekistan Airways reduced some Russia flight frequencies in June, citing aviation fuel shortages and higher costs. Tashkent is now preparing for winter in concrete volumes. On July 6, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reviewed measures for the 2026-2027 autumn-winter season. The plan includes replacing 53.7...

Kazakhstan Court Ruling Clears Legal Path for Tokayev to Seek Another Term

Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Court has ruled that President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev may seek another term under the country’s 2026 Constitution, effectively resetting the count created under the previous Basic Law while leaving the single seven-year presidential term formally in place. The ruling, issued on July 7 after Tokayev’s request, addressed whether people who held senior offices under the 1995 Constitution could be elected or appointed to those posts under the new Basic Law, adopted in a March 15 referendum and in force since July 1. The offices covered include the president, the chair and judges of the Constitutional Court, the chair of the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor general. The court said restrictions in the 2026 Constitution are linked only to elections and appointments made under the new constitutional order and laws adopted on its basis. It said the new Constitution contains no provision requiring terms, elections, or appointments under the 1995 Basic Law to be counted when the new limits are applied. The court’s official interpretation says people who held those offices under the 1995 Constitution “may be elected or appointed to the corresponding positions after the 2026 Constitution enters into force.” In practical terms, the ruling removes the main legal barrier that had been assumed to prevent Tokayev from appearing on the presidential ballot again. Tokayev was elected in November 2022 to what was presented as a single, non-renewable seven-year term ending in 2029. He has not announced another run, and the ruling does not set a timetable for a presidential election. Speculation has also continued over whether Tokayev could seek a future international role, including as UN secretary-general. According to political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev, the Constitutional Court’s clarification resolves a strategic issue over the president’s term of office. He recalled that Tokayev’s 2022 election followed an earlier constitutional reform that introduced the single seven-year presidential term. A later dilemma emerged because the previous constitutional rules would have required elections to be held in December 2028, almost a year before the end of the seven-year mandate. “In the new Constitution, these formulations were changed, but a new question emerged: does the new Constitution require a review of terms in connection with the reset of political institutions? The text itself contained no relevant provisions. At a press briefing on voting day, Tokayev said the next elections would be held in 2029,” Ashimbayev said, adding that Tokayev’s appeal showed that the issue would be handled through constitutional procedure rather than political assumption. The court, he said, indicated that adoption of the new Constitution does not mean the automatic extension of norms contained in the old Constitution or decisions adopted on its basis. “Thus, the single seven-year term is confirmed, but it will be counted from the moment elections are held. The Constitution, however, prohibits holding presidential and parliamentary elections at the same time, which moves the presidential issue to the autumn,” Ashimbayev said. “It is clear that this is about the right, not the obligation, of the incumbent head of state to...

Tokayev Congratulates Trump as Kazakhstan Marks America’s 250th Independence Anniversary

Tokayev Congratulates Trump as Kazakhstan Marks America’s 250th Independence Anniversary ASTANA — President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev congratulated U.S. President Donald Trump on the 250th anniversary of the independence of the United States, calling the milestone a symbol of the American people’s enduring commitment to freedom, equality and justice. In his message, Tokayev noted Trump’s personal contribution to the continued development of Kazakh-American relations and reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s readiness to further strengthen the expanded strategic partnership between the two countries. The Kazakh leader wished Trump success in his state duties and extended wishes of well-being and prosperity to the American people. The congratulatory message came as Kazakhstan joined U.S. Independence Day commemorations marking America’s semiquincentennial. In a separate celebration of the bilateral relationship, the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan announced that several prominent landmarks would be illuminated in honor of America’s 250th anniversary. The buildings include Astana’s Nur Alem sphere and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy building, as well as Almaty’s Kok-Tobe tower. The U.S. embassy described the illumination as a symbol of the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship, noting that the anniversary also coincides with 35 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. [caption id="attachment_51530" align="alignnone" width="2560"] Nur Alem Sphere and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy building in Astana, July 4, 2026[/caption] The coordinated gestures underscored the steady growth of ties between Astana and Washington, which have expanded across diplomacy, trade, investment, energy, security and people-to-people contacts since Kazakhstan’s independence. For Kazakhstan, the anniversary offered an opportunity to recognize a historic American milestone while also highlighting the durability of its own partnership with the United States. Together, Tokayev’s message and the illumination of landmark buildings in Astana and Almaty placed Kazakhstan among the countries marking the United States’ 250th Independence Day through official greetings and public displays of friendship.

Opinion: The Specter Is Back – A Kazakh Warning to America

I was educated and began my career under Soviet communism in Kazakhstan. For many Americans, communism may sound like a policy argument. For us, it is also family memory — famine, confiscation, repression, camps and fear, all justified in the language of equality and justice. When communism returns to the American political debate, people from Kazakhstan listen carefully. “A specter is haunting Europe, the specter of communism.” That is how The Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels began in 1848. Nearly two centuries later, the specter has not disappeared. It has changed its vocabulary, its political costumes and its geography. But the old temptation remains. It promises justice by concentrating power. In late June, U.S. President Donald Trump warned that communism was the greatest threat to the United States, greater, he said, than World War I, World War II, Pearl Harbor, or September 11. His language was characteristically blunt. Critics were right to say that democratic socialism is not the same thing as Soviet communism, and that the word “communist” should not be used carelessly in ordinary partisan debate. Still, the historical concern behind the warning should not be dismissed. Not every welfare program is communism. Not every democratic socialist is a Bolshevik. Every modern state helps its citizens in some form. The real question is when help becomes control. When does compassion become coercion? When does the state begin claiming the right to decide prices, property, production, speech and moral legitimacy in the name of “the people”? People who lived under communism know the danger. Why a Kazakh Voice Belongs in This Debate For an outside observer, it may seem strange that socialism and communism are again being debated in the United States, the stronghold of advanced capitalism, as Soviet theorists once described it. Yet the explanation is not mysterious. Congressional elections are approaching. Recent primary victories by candidates who identify with democratic socialism have brought these questions back into mainstream American politics. Of course, this does not mean the United States is on the eve of a Bolshevik revolution. America has elections, courts, private property, constitutional limits, and a free press. The Soviet Union had none of these in any meaningful sense. That distinction should be kept clear. But the first words of any political movement should be taken seriously. The early promises are usually humane. They speak of fairness, dignity, affordability, workers, tenants, food, and peace. Only later does society discover how much power must be handed to the state to make those promises real. The Democratic Socialists of America describes itself as the largest socialist organization in the United States and says working people should run “both the economy and society democratically” to meet human needs rather than profits. To many Americans, that may sound compassionate. To those of us trained in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, it also sounds familiar. I am not a political scientist or a specialist in party-building. I am simply a person who, because of my age, studied under the communists and...

Kazakhstan’s New Kurultai Elections: What the 30% Quota Could Mean for Women in Parliament

Kazakhstan’s new Constitution entered into force on July 1. On August 23, voters will elect the country’s first unicameral Kurultai, a 145-member legislature that replaces the former Mazhilis and Senate. Political parties are already submitting their lists, with nominations open from July 2 to July 13. Those lists must meet an inclusion requirement that has taken on new significance under the new electoral system: at least 30% of candidates must come from three combined categories, women, young people, and people with disabilities. How many women will actually enter the new parliament will become clear only after the votes are counted. But it is already possible to assess what the rule can achieve, and where its weaknesses lie. What the Law Requires The quota is less straightforward in practice. It does not guarantee that 30% of seats will go to women. The rule sets a combined 30% target that includes women alongside young people and people with disabilities. A party could comply with the rule while doing relatively little to increase women’s representation, if enough candidates from the other eligible categories are included. The rule carries added weight because Kazakhstan’s new Kurultai will be elected through a nationwide proportional party-list system. Under this model, placement on party lists can count as much as the overall number of women nominated. Kazakhstan has also lowered the threshold for registering political parties from 40,000 to 20,000 members, a change intended to make it easier for new political forces to participate. Seven parties have been cleared to compete in the August 23 election. Kazakhstan’s Starting Point Before the transition to the new unicameral legislature, women’s representation in Kazakhstan’s parliament remained limited. By the end of 2025, women held 17 seats in the Mazhilis, or 17.3% of the chamber. As of July 2025, women held 10 of 50 seats in the Senate, or 20%. By comparison, the global average for women’s representation in national parliaments stood at 27.5% at the end of 2025, after rising by just 0.3 percentage points over the year. Kazakhstan enters its first Kurultai election from a position below the global average. How Neighboring Countries Have Addressed the Issue The region already offers examples of how differently gender quotas can work. In Uzbekistan, the quota for women candidates in elections to the Legislative Chamber was raised from 30% to 40% and applied for the first time in the 2024 elections. Unlike Kazakhstan’s rule, Uzbekistan’s quota applies specifically to women rather than to a combined group. The result was noticeable: the number of women MPs rose from 48, or 32%, to 57, or 38%, out of 150 seats. As of July 2025, women also held 16 of 65 Senate seats in Uzbekistan, or 24.6%. An even sharper increase took place in Kyrgyzstan. In the 2025 parliamentary elections, women’s share of seats rose by 12.9 percentage points, the largest increase among countries that renewed their parliaments that year. The change came from a redesign of the electoral system rather than from a symbolic quota....