• KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00225
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
17 November 2026

Viewing results 25 - 30 of 1654

Kazakhstan Tiger Reintroduction: Second Amur Tiger Released into the Wild

Kazakhstan has released a second Amur tiger into the wild as part of a program to restore the big cats to Central Asia. The male, named Amur, was freed in the Ile-Balkhash State Nature Reserve in southeastern Kazakhstan on October 31. The first tiger, a female named Umit, was released on July 31. According to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, she is already hunting independently and exploring her new territory. Both animals are being tracked using satellite collars. Tigers disappeared from the wild in Kazakhstan by the middle of the 20th century. Hunting contributed to their local extinction, while the development of river valleys destroyed the dense woodlands and shrublands along rivers in Central Asia's arid regions. Populations of wild boar, deer, and other prey animals also declined. The Turan, or Caspian, tiger once ranged from Central Asia to the Caucasus and northern Iran. Genetic studies have established its close relationship with the Amur tiger, which inhabits Russia's Far East. Conservationists therefore selected Amur tigers for reintroduction to this historical range. In November 2025, Kazakhstan and Russia agreed to transfer four tigers. In May 2026, two adult tigers and two cubs captured in the wild were brought from Russia's Khabarovsk region. They were placed in enclosures to adjust to conditions at the reserve, established in 2018 on the southern shore of Lake Balkhash. Before releasing Amur, specialists assessed his health, ability to find food independently, and response to human presence. The two cubs remain under observation. A decision on their release will be made once they reach an appropriate age and pass the necessary assessments. The return of tigers has raised concerns among some Kazakhstanis. After Umit's release, social media users questioned the safety of tourists and residents around Lake Balkhash. They worried that the tigress might approach settlements or attack livestock, while some said they were reconsidering trips to the lake. The ministry outlined a system of three safety zones around Umit's habitat. A specialized response team is tasked with intervening if a tiger approaches populated areas. Measures include warning residents, driving the animal back to a safe area, and, if necessary, sedating and relocating it. Public access to the reserve is restricted. An AI-generated tiger adjusting to life near Lake Balkhash has become a social media sensation through videos posted by @qreative_qazaq on Instagram. In the videos, the tiger speaks Russian and Kazakh, complains about mosquitoes, searches for a mobile phone signal, and tries to figure out where to find food. By August 11, the first video had attracted approximately 3.2 million views. Other images circulating online have caused confusion. In August, the ministry rejected a photograph purportedly showing a chance sighting of Umit. Officials said the image showed signs of possible AI generation and that specialists knew Umit's actual location through satellite monitoring. To support the tigers' return, conservationists are restoring tugai forests, woodlands that grow along rivers, and increasing populations of wild hoofed animals in the delta of the Ili River, which flows into Lake...

Osinovsky Pass Bypass Opens in Kazakhstan After Years of Delays

A new road bypassing the Osinovsky Pass in eastern Kazakhstan opened to traffic on October 30, offering motorists an alternative to a route frequently subject to winter travel restrictions. The bypass's centerpiece is a 175-meter bridge across the Pikhtovka River, rising up to 45 meters above a gorge. The construction and reconstruction project is valued at 20.9 billion tenge, approximately $46 million. The new bypass, approximately 12 kilometers long, allows motorists to avoid a dangerous winding section of the highway from Oskemen (Ust-Kamenogorsk), the administrative center of the East Kazakhstan region, toward Altai and Katon-Karagay. It forms part of a 28-kilometer section where the main reconstruction work has been completed. The previous route ran along a narrow mountain road with sharp turns. Built in the 1940s, it was closed to trucks with trailers and semitrailers during winter. Snowstorms and avalanche prevention operations could lead to complete road closures, while rockfalls posed a danger in summer. Darkhan Imanashev, chairman of the national road company KazAvtoZhol, told journalists that the bypass shortens the journey and would allow trucks to use the route in winter. The new road is 13 meters wide, compared with approximately six meters on the previous section. The extra width will make it easier for large vehicles traveling in opposite directions to pass each other. The bridge follows a curved alignment designed to accommodate the mountainous terrain. It has seven spans and eight supports, with 79 reinforced concrete beams installed across the structure. Construction work along the route began in 2017. The project was repeatedly delayed, with work suspended over land-use issues before resuming in 2023. Previous contractors also failed to complete the project, leading to legal disputes, Imanashev told Ulysmedia.kz. Crews had to cut a road through rocky terrain, prepare sites for heavy machinery, and transport materials along temporary dirt access roads. These routes often became difficult to navigate after rainfall. Nigmatulla Abdulkhakov, deputy director for bridge construction at contractor OblShygysZhol, described the scale of the excavation work beneath the bridge. "The mountainous terrain here is extremely challenging. We had to move around 100,000 cubic meters of earth just beneath the bridge. This involved excavating foundation pits, removing soil, backfilling, and preparing foundations for the supports. We also had to create special platforms to install the structures, then clear those areas to prepare for the next stages of construction," Abdulkhakov explained. Engineers considered filling the gorge with an earth embankment instead of building a bridge. According to Abdulkhakov, that option would have required moving several million cubic meters of earth. It would also have involved installing a drainage culvert several hundred meters long beneath the embankment. "The question immediately arose of how such a culvert would be maintained and cleaned. That is why building a bridge proved to be the best option. Yes, it was a complex project that required considerable effort, but we managed to complete it," Abdulkhakov said. The final bridge span was installed on September 20, followed by concreting and road paving. According to the...

Kazakhstan Resumes Oil Exports Through Russian Pipeline After Drone Attack

Kazakhstan resumed oil shipments through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline on November 3, a day after a drone attack on a Russian transit hub forced pumping to stop. The disruption again exposed the vulnerability of Kazakh exports to attacks on infrastructure beyond the country’s borders. The attack targeted facilities at the Samara Production and Dispatch Centre in Russia. Oil transportation stopped at 6:09 a.m. Astana time on November 2. “As of November 3, 2026, oil transportation through the Atyrau-Samara trunk pipeline is operating normally,” Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry spokesperson Assel Serikpayeva said. Pumping resumed after a technical inspection. The ministry reported no injuries. Atyrau-Samara is Kazakhstan’s second-largest oil export route by volume, after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). It connects western Kazakhstan to Russia’s Transneft network for onward delivery to international markets. Kazakhstan exported approximately 9.2 million metric tons through the route in 2025. Shipments totaled 7.573 million metric tons in the first nine months of 2026, according to KazTransOil data. The Samara hub had already come under attack. Ukraine’s General Staff said its forces struck the pumping complex on October 2, Bloomberg reported. Kazakhstan can divert some shipments through Atyrau-Samara when CPC operations are disrupted, but both routes rely on Russian infrastructure, meaning switching between them leaves exporters exposed to similar risks. The latest stoppage follows repeated disruptions at CPC’s Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk. In July, Kazakhstan condemned drone attacks on tankers near the terminal, including vessels loading Kazakh crude. The summer’s attacks brought fires aboard tankers and repeated evacuations. On July 19, drones struck ASIA and NISSOS IOS while they were loading Kazakh crude at CPC’s offshore moorings. ASIA was loading Tengizchevroil oil, while NISSOS IOS carried crude from Kashagan and Maten. A fire aboard ASIA was extinguished, and loading was temporarily suspended. Further attacks prolonged the disruption, eventually forcing Kazakhstan to cut production. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry called the attacks an infringement on the country’s economic interests and demanded that they stop. It also reserved the right to pursue compensation. CPC alone carried about 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports in 2025, underscoring the country’s dependence on infrastructure within Russia. The interruptions soon affected production at home. An August 7 Reuters report put July CPC loadings more than 20% below schedule, citing sources familiar with the data. Kazakhstan’s oil production fell 14% from June, the sources said. On August 25, Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov cut the annual production plan from 98 million to 96 million metric tons, attributing losses to attacks in January and the summer. Planned maintenance at Tengiz and North Caspian Operating Company fields was postponed until 2027, helping limit the reduction in the annual target. A separate drone incident near the terminal briefly halted loading on September 8. Kazakhstan has been seeking to expand other routes, although their capacity remains far below the volumes moving through CPC. In an interview published on November 2, energy strategist Umud Shokri told The Times of Central Asia that alternatives would take time to develop. “I would describe the route as a...

Kazakhstan’s Carbon Black: Finding Value in Mining By-Products

London-listed Ferro-Alloy Resources (FAR) is developing a large vanadium deposit in Kazakhstan, as The Times of Central Asia reported in July, and operates a smaller concentrate-processing plant that recovers vanadium, molybdenum and nickel from purchased concentrates. The project could supply growing markets for vanadium and other critical materials. Beyond its core business, FAR has found additional value in by-products already present in the ore. These include its proprietary Carbon Black Substitute (CBS), a rubber-reinforcing filler that the company says is commercially viable, as well as uranium and rare earth minerals, which are not yet in the project economics and could add to future earnings if they prove profitable. Nicholas Bridgen, FAR’s CEO until October 26 and now its non-executive deputy chairman, told TCA: “Our ore gives us multiple sources of revenue. The vanadium pays for the mine and much else, while the carbon and silica left behind, not to mention rare earth metals, become products in their own right.” At an 8% post-tax discount rate, FAR’s Phase 1 delivers a $748 million net present value (NPV) and a 22% internal rate of return (IRR), the company reports, rising to US$931.6 million and 31% on lower capex (November 2025). These figures already include the original CBS, made from vanadium-plant tailings; FAR’s New CBS, made from waste rock, is excluded and would be additional. Rubber manufacturers represent 93% of carbon black demand, making them a potential market for CBS. FAR estimates that the product could sell for about 60–74% less than the conventional carbon black prices cited below and have approximately 90% lower production emissions. Carbon black Carbon black is a reinforcing filler found in most rubber goods, including tires, hoses, conveyor belts, and shoe soles. Its primary particles, only tens of nanometers wide, fuse into aggregates with very high surface area, and rubber chains attach to that surface through both physical and chemical bonds. This makes the rubber stronger, harder, and more resistant to wear. Amorphous silica performs a comparable role, with its surface silanol groups linked to the rubber by silane coupling agents, and it is frequently used alongside carbon black. Unlike graphite, a naturally occurring, highly ordered crystalline carbon prized for conductivity, lubrication and batteries, carbon black is an engineered, near-spherical amorphous carbon made in a furnace for rubber reinforcement. The global carbon black market stood at 15.15 million tonnes in 2025 and is forecast to reach 21.83 million tonnes by 2034, expanding at a CAGR of 4.14%. Rising demand for tires and automotive products is driving much of the growth. Why it is costly Barry Angeline, chemical engineer and polymer physicist, explains that “more than 95% of carbon black is manufactured through the oil-furnace process, which heats and decomposes hydrocarbon feedstocks at high temperatures. The resulting microscopic carbon particles,” he continued, “are quenched, separated from exhaust gases, then processed into pellets for use primarily as a reinforcing agent in rubber. Roughly 1.5 tonnes of fossil feedstock is consumed per tonne of carbon black, and 2.5 tonnes or more of...

Kazakhstan Detains Ten Over Alleged Plot to Change Constitutional Order

Kazakhstan's security service has detained ten people in the western city of Atyrau over an alleged plan to change the constitutional order by force. Investigators also say the suspects operated three underground educational centers for children and teenagers. The National Security Committee (KNB) announced on November 2 that the arrests took place on October 30. The operation was coordinated with the prosecutor's office, and all ten suspects were detained simultaneously. Investigators suspect the detainees of creating, leading, or participating in an extremist group. The allegations also include promoting terrorism and inciting religious discord. According to the KNB, the group sought to “forcibly change the foundations of the constitutional order” in western Kazakhstan. The authorities have not identified the group or disclosed a specific plan of attack. Officers searched the suspects' homes and seized firearms, drugs, religious items, literature, and other materials, the committee said. It released images and video from the operation, showing armed officers taking suspects into custody. The three educational centers are a notable element of the investigation. The KNB said the suspected group established the facilities for children and teenagers and that officers had stopped their activities. The committee gave no attendance figures or details of what the children were being taught. It also said several suspects had previously been convicted of terrorism-related or other criminal offenses. In its announcement, the KNB cited Article 201 of Kazakhstan's Criminal Procedure Code, which restricts the release of information during a pretrial investigation. The suspects' identities have not been released. Earlier Extremism Investigations The Atyrau case follows a series of security operations involving alleged extremist propaganda and recruitment across Kazakhstan. The authorities have increased investigations into the distribution of extremist material, including through social media. In a June 12 statement, the KNB reported eleven arrests during April and May, including operations in the Atyrau region. The detainees included two foreign nationals and three Kazakh citizens extradited from abroad. Investigators in those cases alleged the distribution of extremist materials online and among acquaintances. They also cited calls to travel to areas of terrorist activity and use violence against people who held different beliefs. The same report listed 13 prison sentences in terrorism and extremism cases. An Astana resident received eight years for urging travel to areas of terrorist activity. In another case, a Shymkent man was sentenced to seven years after advocating for a theocratic state and spreading terrorist ideas. A subsequent KNB update reported that 19 people were convicted of terrorism and extremism offenses between June and August. Another 28 were detained on suspicion of related offenses over the same period. The KNB has repeatedly carried out raids in Atyrau and other regions. In February 2024, it conducted 49 searches across several regions and detained 23 suspects, according to a TCA analysis of the government's intensifying campaign against extremism. That reporting also examined expanded powers for the committee to monitor online activity. The authorities have not announced formal indictments or court dates, and the allegations against the ten detainees remain...

Interview with Umud Shokri: Can Kazakhstan Reduce Its Dependence on Russian Oil Export Routes?

Kazakhstan sent more than four-fifths of its oil exports in 2025 through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which crosses Russia to the Black Sea. Repeated disruptions have exposed the risks of relying so heavily on a single route. While alternative shipments across the Caspian Sea are growing, volumes remain small. Falling water levels and higher transport costs complicate efforts to expand these alternative routes, while tensions around Iran pose risks to routes farther south. These challenges extend beyond Kazakhstan. The country is Central Asia’s largest oil producer, and its export decisions affect trade and energy infrastructure across the Caspian region, the South Caucasus and Europe. Meanwhile, plans to export renewable electricity across the Caspian could create new connections between Central Asia and European energy markets. To examine the region’s options, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Dr. Umud Shokri, a Washington-based energy strategist and Visiting Senior Fellow at George Mason University. He is the author of U.S. Energy Diplomacy in the Caspian Sea Basin (Springer, 2021) and is preparing two books: Hormuz and the Geopolitics of Eurasian Energy Infrastructure (Routledge) and Iran’s Energy Transition Under Constraint: War, Sanctions, and Systemic Vulnerability (Springer). TCA: How is Central Asia’s role in Eurasian energy security changing, and where does Kazakhstan fit into this shift? Umud Shokri: I think the biggest change is that Central Asian countries are looking beyond the routes they have relied on for decades. Oil and gas still move mainly through Russia and China, but governments are also exploring connections across the Caspian and south through Iran. They want more choices and greater control over how their resources reach markets. Kazakhstan is central to this shift. It is the region's largest oil producer, and its location gives it links to Russia, China, the Caspian and the South Caucasus. However, its heavy dependence on a single major oil export route remains a significant vulnerability. There is also a growing focus on electricity. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are working on plans for a green-energy corridor across the Caspian. Commissioning of the Central Asia–Azerbaijan link is planned to begin in 2032, while the separate Caspian–Black Sea–Europe corridor is expected to reach full capacity by 2040. These are long-term goals; neither corridor is operating yet. Kazakhstan is therefore both a major energy supplier and a country seeking to broaden its options. Its relationships with Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye and its neighbors all matter. But diplomacy alone is not enough. The region needs investment in pipelines, ports, power lines and domestic grids to turn diversification plans into reliable alternatives. TCA: Kazakhstan relies heavily on the CPC pipeline. Can the route through Azerbaijan and Türkiye become a substantial alternative? Umud Shokri: The CPC is still Kazakhstan's main oil export route. It carried 64.8 million metric tons of Kazakh oil in 2025, or about four-fifths of the country's exports. That volume cannot be shifted elsewhere quickly. But repeated disruptions have shown why Kazakhstan needs alternatives. The route through Azerbaijan and Türkiye is already operating. Kazakh oil...