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Demographics

Kazakhstan’s Demographic Shift Puts Labor Market Under Strain

Kazakhstan’s population surpassed 20.5 million in the spring of 2026, but the country’s rapid demographic growth is increasingly being accompanied by structural economic imbalances. Kazakhstan is simultaneously facing the effects of declining birth rates, population aging, and a widening gap between the education system and labor market needs. Economists warn that the country is entering a phase in which the large generation born during the baby boom of the 2000s is placing growing pressure on the labor market, even as the share of the working-age population gradually declines. According to Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics, the number of births peaked in 2021, when 446,500 children were born. By 2025, this figure had fallen to 335,000, the lowest level in the past five years. The total fertility rate also declined to 2.57 children per woman, marking the lowest level since 2009. The decline in births has occurred despite a growing number of women of reproductive age. By early 2026, their number had reached a record 4.79 million. Analysts note that the drop in the overall birth rate to 16.43 births per 1,000 people, the lowest level in more than two decades, points to changing household behavioral patterns. In Kazakhstan’s largest cities, including Almaty and Astana, families are increasingly postponing childbirth because of high housing costs and rising debt burdens. The average age of motherhood has approached 30 years, reaching 29.9. High inflation is adding further pressure on households. Annual inflation remained in double digits in early 2026, which, combined with mortgage expenses, has made raising large families significantly less affordable for the urban middle class. Kazakhstan’s demographic dynamics are also becoming increasingly uneven. In the southern and western regions, fertility rates remain above the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. However, in northern regions, fertility has declined to between 1.63 and 1.75, approaching levels more typical of Eastern European countries. Population growth is still supported by rising life expectancy and relatively low mortality, around 6.64 deaths per 1,000 people over the past four years. Nevertheless, demographers warn that the current increase in population masks a gradual future decline in the labor force. One of the key risks is the shrinking share of the working-age population. Over the past decade, it has fallen from 64% to 57.7%, increasing pressure on employed citizens to finance pension and social welfare systems. Experts warn that a decline in the number of contributors paying mandatory social contributions creates long-term risks for Kazakhstan’s Unified Accumulative Pension Fund and the Social Health Insurance Fund. At the same time, an aging population is increasing state healthcare expenditures. Businesses are already facing labor shortages in some industrial and agricultural regions. In the North Kazakhstan Region, employers have reported shortages in agriculture, manufacturing, and other key sectors. Kazakhstan adds more than 350,000 new labor market entrants each year, thanks to the generation born in the early 2000s. However, instead of entering industry or agriculture, many young people are increasingly choosing jobs in the urban service economy, including taxi services, delivery...

Animal Rights

Kazakhstan Renews Debate Over Stray Animals After Parliament Approves Euthanasia Amendments

Kazakhstan has once again found itself at the center of a heated public debate over how the state should address the country’s growing stray animal problem. Recently approved parliamentary amendments allowing the euthanasia of dogs after a short holding period have triggered strong criticism from animal rights activists, volunteers, and private shelter owners, who argue that the new measures fail to address the root causes of the crisis and instead merely conceal its consequences temporarily. For many involved in the debate, the issue goes beyond animal welfare and points to deeper problems in state governance. For years, responsibility for stray animals in Kazakhstan has effectively been left to private initiatives, including small shelters and volunteer networks that operate largely on personal funds and donations. One such initiative is the Amigo shelter near Almaty, which currently houses around 200 dogs and 80 cats. The shelter did not begin as a business or long-term charitable project, but rather as a spontaneous effort to rescue several animals from capture facilities and the streets. Over time, the number of animals grew, and temporary assistance evolved into a permanent struggle for survival. [caption id="attachment_48766" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: TCA[/caption] “We never planned to create a shelter. It all started with a few rescued animals, and then it became impossible to stop because they were completely dependent on us,” Amigo representatives told The Times of Central Asia. That dependency has become one of the defining features of Kazakhstan’s private shelter system. Unlike many Western countries, where large numbers of animals are adopted through well-developed adoption programs, animals in Kazakhstan often remain in shelters for years; sometimes for the rest of their lives. According to Amigo’s owners, society still approaches shelter animals with caution, while a culture of responsible adoption is only beginning to emerge. The financial burden on such organizations is enormous. In addition to food and veterinary care, shelter owners must independently pay for land, kennel construction, transport, fuel, generators, heating, water supply, sterilization, vaccination, and staff salaries. In many cases, infrastructure must be built entirely from scratch. Amigo’s own history reflects this instability. The shelter was initially located on a small property in Baiserke, but the growing number of animals and expanding residential development made continued operations impossible. The owners took out loans to purchase land near the village of Zhetygen, where they personally built enclosures and installed utilities. Later, after Zhetygen was incorporated into the new city of Alatau, they faced the threat of land seizure for state needs and were once again forced to search for a new location and finance another relocation through debt. [caption id="attachment_48767" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: TCA[/caption] According to shelter representatives, Kazakhstan still lacks a clear legal status for such facilities. Agricultural land is formally designated for livestock rather than cats and dogs, meaning that even privately purchased plots do not guarantee long-term security. For shelters, relocation means far more than changing addresses, it requires transporting hundreds of animals, rebuilding infrastructure, and effectively starting over. Against this backdrop, discussions...

IPO

IPO as a Lifeline: Who Will Pay for Kazakhstan Railways’ Growing Debt?

The planned IPO of Kazakhstan’s national railway operator, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), once presented by the authorities as one of the largest public offerings in Central Asia, is increasingly being viewed as an attempt to stabilize the company’s balance sheet amid rapidly rising debt. The share sale, expected in late 2026, may turn out to be less a growth story than a mechanism for refinancing the obligations of the state-owned carrier. During parliamentary hearings on April 24, company executives acknowledged that one of the key objectives of the IPO is to raise funds to service KTZ’s growing debt burden. According to official company and government data, KTZ’s nominal debt has risen sharply. It stood at about $5.7 billion in early 2024, and roughly $8 billion by 2025. By April 2026, it had reached 4.7 trillion tenge, or about $10.4 billion. The increase reflects heavy borrowing for rolling stock, infrastructure modernization, and the expansion of Kazakhstan’s transit capacity, including projects linked to the Middle Corridor. It also reflects the cost of maintaining below-market tariffs for socially important domestic freight. Kazakhstan’s Supreme Audit Chamber warned as early as 2024 about risks related to the company’s financial sustainability. However, the authorities and KTZ management argue that large-scale borrowing was necessary to prevent an infrastructure crisis. According to official estimates, borrowed funds include about $4.9 billion for renewing rolling stock, including locomotives and railcars, and about $2.3 billion for modernizing railway infrastructure. The currency structure of the debt represents an additional vulnerability. More than half of the company’s obligations are denominated in foreign currencies, making KTZ highly sensitive to fluctuations in the tenge. Any weakening of the national currency automatically increases debt servicing costs and reduces the operator’s profitability. Potential investors face another challenge: historically, KTZ has served not only as a commercial company but also as an instrument of state social policy. A substantial share of revenues from China-Europe transit freight is used to subsidize unprofitable domestic passenger transport and the transportation of socially important goods within Kazakhstan. This cross-subsidization mechanism limits the company’s ability to generate free cash flow. Grain transportation under regulated tariffs alone generated losses of approximately $95 million (44 billion tenge) for KTZ in 2024. In an effort to improve the company’s attractiveness ahead of the IPO, KTZ has initiated large-scale tariff increases for mainline railway services. Beginning in April 2026, transportation tariffs for coal, grain, and iron ore were doubled. However, the move risks adding to costs in Kazakhstan, where railway tariffs directly affect the cost of food, electricity, and industrial goods. Annual inflation stood at 12.2% in January 2026, adding to concerns that higher railway tariffs could feed into wider price pressures. Additional inflationary pressure may come from the expiration of the government’s moratorium on utility tariff increases, after which household utility bills in some regions could rise by 10-20%. Against this backdrop, analysts do not rule out a return to tighter state regulation of tariffs, a development that could once again limit the ability of natural...

Oil Prices

Opinion: Kazakhstan, Oil, the Iran War and Dutch Disease

In 1977, The Economist coined a new term for the (potential) negative consequences of a short-term boom in natural resources: “Dutch disease.” The phenomenon got its name from an analysis of the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands following the 1960s natural gas discoveries at Groningen, in the northeastern Netherlands. The theory was that a surge in the price of a natural resource like oil or gas would likely cause currency appreciation, making imports cheaper and other sectors, like manufacturing, less competitive. Whether the recent spike in oil prices will contribute to Dutch disease in oil-rich Kazakhstan will likely depend on the length of the Iran war’s effect on oil prices (which could last well beyond the end of the conflict itself) and the government’s stewardship of Kazakhstan’s economy. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev deserves credit for the government’s efforts to diversify the national economy. Investing in the nation’s manufacturing base, especially SMEs, educating the Kazakh workforce, and improving healthcare are all helping broaden the Kazakh economy and reduce the country’s dependence on oil. But oil is the main driver of Kazakhstan’s wealth, and while other sectors are increasing their share of Kazakhstan’s economy, oil and the wider extractive sector remain central to public finances, accounting for over 40% of government revenues. So, let’s do a deep dive on Kazakhstan’s oil. Most of Kazakhstan’s oil comes from the west of the country, including the Tengiz field near the Caspian Sea and the offshore Kashagan field in the northern Caspian. The Tengiz oil field is one of the deepest and largest oil fields in the world, while Kashagan, an offshore deposit, ranks as one of the largest global oil discoveries since the 1960s. Kazakhstan’s main export blend, CPC Blend, is a light, sweet crude, a desirable oil type that’s easy to refine into gasoline and diesel. Because the Iran war and restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted tanker traffic and raised fears of supply shortages, global oil prices have climbed. And while high oil prices are generally a net positive for Kazakhstan, the current price - Brent crude was trading above $100 per barrel in mid-May 2026 - could present problems. In the short term, high oil prices tend to boost government revenues and budget surpluses. They can increase inflows to Kazakhstan’s National Fund, depending on production, tax receipts, transfers, and government withdrawal policy, and provide resources for government spending on infrastructure and social programs. They can also stimulate demand in related sectors, boosting Kazakhstan’s oil-related industries. And since oil exports typically make up more than half of the nation’s export revenues, high oil prices generally lead to a rise in Kazakhstan’s GDP. So far, so good. But high oil prices also carry risks. For one thing, they can strengthen the tenge and add to domestic demand, especially if higher revenues feed into faster government spending. Which is where Dutch disease comes in. As the stronger currency makes non-oil exports less competitive, capital and labor shift toward the energy...

Energy Security

Kazakhstan Targets 2027 Exit From Routine Russian Electricity Imports

Kazakhstan wants to stop buying electricity from Russia by 2027. The challenge is whether it can do so while keeping homes warm, mines running, and fast-growing regions supplied when demand peaks. The target is a test of whether the country can close a power deficit caused by years of underinvestment, rising demand, aging thermal plants, and uneven regional supply. The goal was restated this month by Deputy Energy Minister Sungat Yessimkhanov, who said Kazakhstan expects to reduce its electricity shortfall this year and bring it down to zero in 2027. The pledge builds on earlier government comments that Kazakhstan would cut imports as new domestic capacity comes online. In February 2025, Yessimkhanov told Kazinform that Kazakhstan planned to reduce electricity imports from Russia and could stop buying foreign electricity once planned capacity was commissioned in 2027. The gap is small on paper, but it carries political weight. Kazakhstan may be energy-rich, but its electricity system has been running short. The country produces coal, oil, gas, uranium, and growing volumes of renewable power, yet it still relies on imports from Russia to cover gaps between generation and consumption. In 2025, Kazakhstan generated 123.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity and consumed 124.6 billion kilowatt-hours, according to a January government meeting on new capacity. Installed capacity rose from 25.3 gigawatts to 26.7 gigawatts, but demand still exceeded domestic generation. Data from KEGOC, Kazakhstan’s national grid operator, shows how narrow the margin has become. In 2025, the gap between production and consumption was 1.4956 billion kilowatt-hours. KEGOC said the shortfall was covered by supplies from the Russian energy system. Kazakhstan received 4.6388 billion kilowatt-hours from Russia and sent 2.1595 billion kilowatt-hours back. That left a net power flow from Russia of 2.4793 billion kilowatt-hours, down from 3.4111 billion kilowatt-hours in 2024. The planned 2027 shift does not mean Kazakhstan will disconnect from Russia’s grid. The objective also fits a wider pattern in Astana’s energy policy: not breaking with Russia, but reducing the number of areas in which Russia is the default route, supplier, or emergency backstop. In oil and trade, Astana has been trying to expand alternatives to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route through Russia, including through the Middle Corridor. In electricity, the logic is narrower but similar. Ending Russian power imports would not make Kazakhstan energy-independent, but it would turn one more Russian-linked dependency from a structural need into a contingency option. Kazakh energy analyst Zhakyp Khairushev made this distinction in comments to LS, stating that Kazakhstan has a real chance to reach annual self-balance in 2027, but a stable surplus will be harder. The key issue is not only installed capacity, but available capacity during peak hours, winter demand spikes, and repair periods. A megawatt of wind or solar power does not play the same role as a megawatt of coal, gas, or flexible generation during a cold evening. Kazakhstan’s deficit is not only about total output; it is also about where electricity is produced, when it is available, and whether the grid...

Strategic Partnership

Britain Expands Central Asia Ties as Kazakhstan Ratifies Strategic Partnership Deal

Last week, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a law ratifying a strategic partnership and cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom. With that move, Central Asia’s largest economy added Britain to its growing list of strategic partners, reinforcing Astana’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy. For London, meanwhile, the agreement marked another milestone in what some analysts have framed as a renewed contest for influence in Central Asia, an area where Britain has sought to strengthen its position over the past five years. Kazakhstan already counts Russia, China, the United States, several European Union states including Italy, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, as well as Turkey, Azerbaijan and its Central Asian neighbors among its strategic partners. Britain has now joined that group as it seeks to revive its historical influence in the region. That broader contest is often described through the language of a “New Great Game,” a phrase that draws on an older imperial rivalry. The term “Great Game” emerged in the 19th century to describe the geopolitical rivalry between the British and Russian Empires across Central and South Asia. The phrase was popularized by British officer, spy, and diplomat Arthur Conolly, who compared the complex web of political intrigues to a vast strategic board game stretching across half a continent. Since 2022, observers say London has intensified its engagement in this geopolitical competition, aimed partly at limiting Russian and Chinese dominance in Central Asia. At stake are key sectors such as critical minerals, including rare earths, as well as logistics corridors, particularly the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor. In December 2023, the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee published a report titled Countries at the Crossroads: UK Engagement in Central Asia. The report criticized what it described as ineffective engagement by British ministers with the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. One of the report’s central recommendations was that London should more actively counter Russian influence in the region. In recent years, British embassies across Central Asia have established offices linked to the UK’s international development structures, expanding engagement with local civil society groups. Through the British Council, London has also expanded its soft power initiatives, financing programs such as Creative Central Asia and Creative Spark. More than 60 universities have joined these programs, with participation exceeding 65,000 people. Britain also continues to operate the Chevening scholarship program, under which young political and public sector figures from Central Asia study in the UK before often returning to influential positions in their home countries. For Kazakhstan’s ambitious younger generation, Britain’s appeal may also be reinforced by symbolic success stories. On May 8, the same day Tokayev signed the strategic partnership into law, Kazakhstan-born Sanjar Abishev was elected to Westminster City Council, representing London’s prestigious St James’s district. Abishev’s election drew attention in Kazakhstan as a symbolic example of the country’s growing diaspora presence in Britain. Little is publicly known about Abishev, though one detail stands out: he entered politics only in 2022 after previously running a...