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Migration Policy

Kazakhstan Prepares QazETA Entry Authorization for Visa-Free Travelers

Kazakhstan is preparing to change entry rules for citizens of countries that enjoy visa-free travel: before their trip, they may be required to obtain an Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA). The system remains voluntary for now, but legislation already suggests that authorities are preparing for their phased mandatory introduction. The new rules will also affect Russians and citizens of other Eurasian Economic Union countries. An ETA is a form of pre-travel authorization used by a number of countries to screen visa-exempt travelers before arrival. QazETA is the digital platform through which Kazakhstan issues the authorization. It does not replace a visa or extend the permitted period of stay. Kazakhstan launched the platform in pilot mode earlier in 2026, with a new phase of implementation beginning on August 25. Citizens of visa-exempt countries are currently advised to apply through the mobile app no later than 72 hours before traveling. The authorization is valid for 180 days. For now, the absence of an ETA is not grounds for border authorities to deny entry. Kazakhstan’s Law on Migration already contains a separate article governing electronic travel authorization. It provides for a fee for obtaining an ETA, with the proceeds to be divided equally between financing the digital system and supporting tourism development. The government has not yet publicly set the amount of the fee. A detailed timetable reported from an earlier version of Serbia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs travel advisory indicated that the ETA could become mandatory for air travelers from November 1, then be extended to road crossings with China, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, followed later by the borders with Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and by mid-December to rail and maritime travel. However, the ministry’s current advisory no longer lists those dates. It says Kazakhstan will announce the dates for each stage, as well as the fee, separately. The same reports have also cited an indicative fee of around 3,900 tenge – approximately $9 – for a standard application and twice that amount for an application submitted directly at the border. In practical terms, the new system means that visa-free travel will remain in place, but travel itself will no longer be entirely free of advance formalities. Foreign nationals will still be able to enter without a visa, but they will likely have to register through QazETA and obtain an ETA before crossing the border. For Kazakhstan, the mechanism provides a way to obtain information about incoming travelers in advance and monitor migration flows more closely. Attracting Skilled Professionals At the same time, the government is seeking to make the country more attractive to skilled professionals and investors. In May, authorities presented a new migration model with separate arrangements for entrepreneurs, highly qualified workers, and other categories of foreign nationals. The new rules have attracted particular attention because of Russia. The two countries share a long land border, are members of the Eurasian Economic Union, and maintain visa-free travel. After Russia announced partial mobilization for the war in Ukraine in September 2022, Kazakhstan became one...

1 week ago

Central Asia - Afganistan

Afghanistan Critical Minerals: Can Central Asia Help Unlock Them?

Central Asia is increasingly being drawn into the global competition for critical minerals. To the south lies Afghanistan, where much of the country’s substantial mineral wealth remains undeveloped. Kabul is now trying to turn those resources into an economic and diplomatic asset. Amir Khan Muttaqi, foreign minister in the Taliban government, told the Financial Times that Afghanistan would “definitely” welcome U.S. investment in mining, infrastructure, agriculture, and trade. Relations between the two countries, he said, should be viewed through the opportunities for future cooperation rather than the lens of 20 years of war. At the same time, Muttaqi invited the United States to reopen its embassy in Kabul while ruling out a return of U.S. control over Bagram Air Base. This was not an isolated overture. In mid-August, Muttaqi told The New York Times that the United States could reopen its embassy and invest in Afghanistan’s mineral resources, dams, and roads. On August 30, he told Kyodo News that Kabul was seeking to normalize relations with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and shared interests, while formal recognition remained “a matter for the next stage.” Taken together, these statements amount to a consistent diplomatic approach. Mineral resources are becoming one of the enticements the Taliban is using to offer Washington a new basis for bilateral relations: economic interests could open the way to broader engagement. Kabul Offers Resources, Washington Rejects the Pitch The timing of the offer is no coincidence. The Trump administration has significantly increased its focus on critical minerals and the resilience of supply chains. On July 30, the White House described U.S. dependence on foreign sources of critical materials as a growing risk to national security and authorized the use of Defense Production Act powers to restrict exports of certain recoverable critical minerals and materials. Ten days earlier, Trump signed an executive order aimed at strengthening defense supply chains and increasing reliance on critical materials and components sourced domestically or from allied countries. Kabul is trying to make itself relevant to this debate by presenting Afghanistan as a potential source of minerals and a destination for U.S. investment. The U.S. response, however, immediately demonstrated the limits of that strategy. On September 2, the State Department said in a written response to Voice of America that it had no plans to engage with the Taliban on developing critical mineral resources. The department pointed to the Taliban’s sanctions status and said U.S. investment could increase the financial resources available to Afghanistan’s current authorities. For Washington, the attractiveness of Afghanistan’s mineral resources cannot, for now, be separated from the political status and policies of those who control them. "$1 Trillion in Mineral Wealth" In 2007, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), working with the Afghanistan Geological Survey, conducted a major assessment of the country’s mineral resources. Researchers compiled data on known deposits and assessed the potential for undiscovered resources, covering commodities including copper, iron, gold, lithium, and rare earth elements. In 2010, a Pentagon task force put the gross value of Afghanistan’s mineral...

1 week ago

Chess

Leaked Recording Stirs Controversy Ahead of FIDE Presidential Election in Samarkand

An audio recording attributed to Russian chess organizer Mark Glukhovsky has surfaced online ahead of the International Chess Federation (FIDE) presidential election in Samarkand. In the recording, the speaker makes derogatory remarks about Uzbeks and Uzbek officials and appears to discuss bribery as one of the tactics used during the 2018 FIDE election campaign. Glukhovsky has acknowledged that a private conversation was secretly recorded but maintains that the material released online was edited and partly reworked using artificial intelligence. The Ukrainian Chess Federation published the audio on its Facebook page. Its full context and authenticity, including whether it had been edited, could not be independently verified. In it, the speaker describes his involvement in Arkady Dvorkovich’s campaign for the FIDE presidency in 2018. Glukhovsky was Dvorkovich’s campaign manager at the time. According to the speaker, the team had to work with around 200 delegates from different countries. “You need to talk to some people, send the program to some, bribe some, and connect some in an alliance with someone else,” the speaker says in the recording. Dvorkovich, a former Russian deputy prime minister, won the election and became FIDE president in 2018. He was reelected in 2022. On July 23, 2026, the European Union added Dvorkovich to its Ukraine-related sanctions list. The same day, he said he considered the sanctions unlawful and intended to challenge them, but would voluntarily suspend the exercise of his powers as FIDE president for as long as the restrictions remained in force. His duties were assumed by FIDE Deputy President Viswanathan Anand, a former world champion, who became interim president. The recording then turns to Uzbekistan and Otabek Umarov, first vice president of the National Olympic Committee of Uzbekistan. The speaker questions why an Uzbek representative was part of Dvorkovich’s team and uses several offensive expressions to describe him. “Some Uzbek guy. Why the hell is this Uzbek even there?” the speaker says. He refers to Umarov’s position on the National Olympic Committee of Uzbekistan and appears at first to be unaware of his family connection to the president. The tone changes after the speaker says he searched for information about Umarov and learned that he is President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s son-in-law. “Then I googled him – the president’s son-in-law. That, I would say, changes things,” the speaker says in the recording. The speaker also refers to Uzbekistan’s prime minister, claiming that the official had previously assured Dvorkovich of his support. He then questions whether such a commitment would still carry weight with Umarov involved in Dvorkovich’s campaign. The recording also contains a dismissive assessment of Uzbekistan’s role in the FIDE election. “Uzbekistan’s vote by itself doesn’t matter at all,” the speaker says before making further offensive remarks about Uzbeks. The recording appeared less than a month before the FIDE presidential election. Voting will take place on September 26 during the organization’s General Assembly in Samarkand. Each member federation represented at the General Assembly is entitled to one vote. FIDE has approved three presidential tickets. Timur...

1 week ago

Central Asia Water Cooperation

Water in Central Asia: Can the Five States Reach an Agreement?

Central Asia is entering a period of growing water stress, as climate change makes supplies less predictable while demand continues to rise. Populations are growing, economies require new energy and industrial capacity, glaciers are shrinking, and agriculture continues to consume most of the available water. The region’s two main rivers – the Amu Darya and Syr Darya – cross national borders, making it impossible for any one country to solve the problem on its own. After decades of disputes, Central Asian states are increasingly trying to manage water jointly. In 2026, that cooperation has produced further practical steps, from plans for automated water accounting in the Syr Darya basin to new proposals for reforming regional mechanisms. The question now is whether the five countries can agree on rules when their water needs remain different. Water and Energy: An Old Conflict The structural conflict is rooted in the region’s geography. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are upstream states and use water in part for hydropower generation, particularly in winter. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are downstream and need large volumes in summer during the irrigation season. During the Soviet period, a centralized exchange system was in place: upstream republics stored water in winter and released it in summer, receiving energy resources in return. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, that unified mechanism disappeared. Interstate agreements preserved a degree of coordination but did not eliminate the tension between upstream energy needs and downstream agricultural interests. Climate change is now adding another layer to the problem. Retreating glaciers in the Pamir and Tien Shan mountains are altering the timing and reliability of river flows, while populations and consumption are increasing. Countries across the region are planning new power plants, industrial facilities, mining projects, and data centers, while agriculture remains the largest consumer of water. From Seasonal Quotas to Joint Management The main formal mechanism for coordinating river allocations remains the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC), established in 1992. Through it, countries coordinate water withdrawal limits and reservoir operating regimes in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins. In late 2025, the countries agreed on water allocations for 2026: for the Amu Darya, the total withdrawal limit for the water-management year from October 2025 to October 2026 was around 55.4 billion cubic meters, while the Syr Darya allocation for the non-growing season was approximately 4.2 billion cubic meters. The five-state framework does not, however, cover every major user of the Amu Darya. Afghanistan is outside the regional allocation system, while its Qosh Tepa Canal, now under construction, has added another source of uncertainty over future downstream flows. Such agreements keep the shared system functioning, but many decisions are still made ahead of each new season. Climate change and rising demand require a longer-term model. In February of this year, Kazakhstan proposed developing a Central Asian Framework Convention on Water Use, while joint infrastructure projects, including Kyrgyzstan’s Kambarata-1 hydropower plant with the participation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are gradually adding shared economic interests...

1 week ago

Obituary

Sobir Ruziev, Soviet Fencer Who Elevated Uzbek Sport, Dies at 73

He was once described as Uzbekistan’s chief musketeer. Born in what was the Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan, Sobir Ruziev moved to Tashkent, was selected as a teen-ager by a fencing coach and rose to the top of the sport as a Soviet athlete, earning a silver medalist in the team foil category in the 1980 Moscow Olympics and coming fourth in the individual competition. He later helped to build sports institutions in an independent Uzbekistan. On August 22 of this year, Ruziev’s death was announced by the National Olympic Committee of Uzbekistan. The committee, which noted he was one of its former chairmen, didn’t mention the cause of death. Ruziev was 73 years old. The Asian Fencing Federation said Ruziev made an “outstanding contribution” to sport in Uzbekistan and promoted fencing across Asia, especially among young people. Today, athletes from Central Asia have established themselves at the highest international level in some sports. Kazakhstan’s Mikhail Shaidorov won Olympic figure skating gold at the Winter Olympics this year. Then there is Bakhodir Jalolov, the heavyweight boxer from Uzbekistan who won Olympic gold in Paris in 2024 and the Tokyo games in 2021. Ruziev was among elite competitors from Central Asia who excelled in international sports in decades past as well. That was when they were performing under the flag of the Soviet Union, whose collapse in 1991 opened the way to independence for the former Soviet republics. As a Soviet fencer, Ruziev was also a three-time world champion in the men’s team foil event, and individual foil champion in the Soviet Union in 1980. He received honorary state titles for his sporting achievements from both the Soviet Union and, later, Uzbekistan. In an interview several years ago, Ruziev talked about how hard it was to get onto the Soviet national fencing team because attention was focused on the central areas of the USSR, rather than on the more distant republics. He said in the interview with the Russian Fencing Federation in 2020 that Central Asia was considered peripheral and that you had to be in the top five in your sport out of the total Soviet population of roughly 300 million. Ruziev had hoped to compete in the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles, but the Soviet Union boycotted the games after the United States skipped the 1980 Olympics in Moscow because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Uzbek fencer was actually born in Kyrgyzstan, also a former Soviet republic, and took up fencing as a teen-ager in Tashkent. After the end of his competitive career, he returned to Tashkent to coach. So his career spanned two eras – representing the Soviet Union at the highest level, and helping to promote sports development in Uzbekistan. In an interview several years ago, Ruziev said he was originally interested in football but coaches didn’t admit him to their training groups. Eventually, Ksenia Arkadyevna Tadzhieva, a Russian fencing coach, selected him as a pupil, Ruziev told Olamsport, a sports news platform in...

1 week ago

Jackson-Vanik Amendment

Kazakhstan Takes Center Stage in U.S. House Critical Minerals Hearing

Kazakhstan’s growing role in global critical-mineral supply chains came into sharp focus on Capitol Hill on September 2. During a nearly four-hour hearing of the full U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, lawmakers and expert witnesses repeatedly presented the country as a major resource producer, an established U.S. supplier and a strategically important partner in Central Asia. The hearing, titled "Strategic Partnerships to Secure Critical Resources and Supply Chains," covered a broad range of issues, including domestic mining, processing capacity, Africa and trade policy. Kazakhstan nevertheless emerged as one of the hearing’s most frequently cited country examples. Three of the five witnesses explicitly supported removing Jackson-Vanik Amendment restrictions from Kazakhstan and other qualifying Central Asian states, while another encouraged Congress to consider doing so. Their position was reinforced by members of both parties. The discussion followed a congressional delegation to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Mongolia led one week earlier by Committee Chairman Jason Smith. Opening the hearing, Smith said all three countries possess significant critical resources, operate amid a strong Chinese and Russian economic presence and are looking to the United States as a stronger trade and investment partner. Kazakhstan entered the debate as an existing and reliable contributor to U.S. supply chains. Smith noted that the country already provides more than a quarter of U.S. uranium imports. Uzbekistan was discussed largely in terms of its plans to nearly double uranium production by 2030, while Kazakhstan’s importance rested on current production, established commercial ties and its capacity to support immediate diversification of American supplies. Former U.S. Ambassador John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, described Kazakhstan as the world’s largest uranium producer, the holder of the second-largest manganese reserves and one of the leading producers of titanium. He also pointed to its substantial copper, lithium and tungsten resources. According to Herbst, the United States currently receives only about 2.1 percent of Central Asia’s mineral exports. That limited share, he argued, leaves considerable space for American companies to expand their presence in a region that is actively seeking investment, technology and alternatives to dependence on Russia and China. Kazakhstan’s significance was also linked to its position at the heart of the Trans-Caspian, or Middle Corridor. Participants described the route as an increasingly important connection between Central Asia and Western markets. Combined with new transport links through the South Caucasus, the corridor could give Kazakhstan greater access to global markets while strengthening the resilience of supply chains serving the United States and its allies. For Kazakhstan, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment became the hearing’s defining political issue. Smith said his recent meetings in Central Asia showed that regional partners regard the Soviet-era measure as an obstacle to deeper economic ties. Witnesses added that the continued application of Jackson-Vanik and the absence of permanent normal trade relations make the trade relationship less predictable and raise questions about the durability of Washington’s commitment. Herbst called for Congress to remove the remaining Jackson-Vanik restrictions on Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. He acknowledged that reforms...

2 weeks ago

Central Asia-U.S. Relations

How the U.S. Is Building a Critical Minerals Chain Across Central Asia

The United States is trying to turn its political dialogue with Central Asia into concrete projects for mining and processing critical minerals. American capital is already moving into Kazakhstan’s tungsten sector and has long been present in Tajikistan’s antimony industry, while Washington is looking more closely at the mineral potential of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. But access to deposits is only part of the challenge. China is already deeply embedded in the region’s mining, processing, and supply routes. A new round of talks took place during a visit by U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor and Senator Steve Daines. In Bishkek, the U.S. delegation met with regional leaders and discussed investment and resource projects. Daines represents Montana, one of the United States’ major mining states, and serves on the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. He has also advocated repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War-era provision that still applies to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The 1974 law was designed to pressure Soviet-bloc governments that restricted emigration and still prevents the four countries from receiving permanent normal trade relations with the United States. In Washington, its repeal is increasingly being linked to expanding trade and U.S. investment in the region. U.S. mineral diplomacy has already acquired a dedicated regional format. In June, Astana hosted the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue with representatives of all five Central Asian states. Discussions ranged from geological exploration and access to data to processing and getting raw materials to international markets. U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce David Fogel called for faster progress in turning those discussions into investment projects. More than 20 U.S. mining and related companies joined the delegation, while a Kazakhstan-U.S. roundtable focused on processing capacity and new supply chains. The question now is whether Washington can turn that diplomatic push into projects that not only extract Central Asia’s minerals, but process them in the region and move them to Western markets without relying on China. Kazakhstan: America’s Bet on Tungsten The most prominent U.S.-backed project is already taking shape in Kazakhstan. Cove Capital, through Cove Kaz Capital Group, is working with state-owned Tau-Ken Samruk to develop the Severny Katpar and Verkhneye Kairakty deposits in the Karaganda Region. The U.S. investor holds a 70% interest in the project, while its Kazakh partner has a 30% stake. Investment is estimated at around $1.1 billion. The project goes beyond mining: processing is also planned in Kazakhstan. At Severny Katpar, average annual production is projected at about 5,000 tons of tungsten trioxide. Mining is scheduled to begin in 2030. Tungsten is particularly important to the United States. It is used in aerospace, electronics, machinery, and defense, while the global market remains heavily dependent on China. Professor Younkyoo Kim of Hanyang University and his co-authors highlighted the middle of the production chain – smelting, refining, and separation – in a 2026 study. These processing capabilities are even more concentrated geographically than mining itself. Kazakhstan is trying to use competition among investors to keep more stages of...

2 weeks ago

Central Asia - Afghanistan Relations

Five Years Without Recognition: How Central Asia Is Building Relations with Afghanistan

Five years of Taliban rule have shown that international relations with an unrecognized government can go much further than many imagined after the fall of Kabul in August 2021. Russia remains the only country to have formally recognized Afghanistan’s current authorities, yet the complete isolation some expected has not materialized. Afghanistan receives foreign diplomats and participates in regional talks, while neighboring states pursue trade and infrastructure projects with Kabul. Over the past five years, the Taliban have signed mining agreements worth billions of dollars, including projects involving Chinese and Iranian capital. This diplomatic arrangement has become possible because international approaches toward Afghanistan have diverged. Restrictions on the rights of women and girls continue to block broader international legitimization of the Taliban. In August, the UN described the situation facing Afghan women as the world’s most severe women’s rights crisis. At the same time, neighboring states have practical issues to address involving trade, security, water, energy, and transportation. Central Asia has gone particularly far in developing practical engagement. Afghanistan is gradually being integrated into regional economic ties without any formal change in its international status. Engagement Without Recognition On April 5, 2026, Kabul hosted the first dedicated Central Asia-Afghanistan Consultative Dialogue, attended by representatives of all five Central Asian states. The participants discussed economic ties and regional connectivity. The format itself was presented as a multilateral political mechanism for regular engagement between Afghanistan and Central Asia. This is already more than a collection of separate contacts with Kabul. The region is gradually developing its own model for dealing with the Taliban, driven by issues that cannot simply be left unresolved. Trade and transportation continue regardless of diplomatic status. In the first quarter of 2026 alone, rail freight between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan reached 1 million tons, up 77% year over year. Tajikistan, which long maintained the toughest stance toward the Taliban among Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors, has also expanded working contacts with Kabul, although border security remains a serious concern. Tajik officials say five Chinese citizens were killed in two attacks launched from Afghan territory in late 2025, while Dushanbe has long warned about militant groups operating in Afghanistan, including Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). So far, this model has allowed political recognition to remain separate from practical cooperation. But the region is gradually moving beyond trade and diplomatic contacts toward proposed infrastructure projects with multibillion-dollar price tags. From Trade to Long-Term Bets Afghanistan’s economy is growing, but it remains too weak to finance major infrastructure projects on its own. The World Bank estimated real GDP growth at 4.8% in 2025, but the return of around 3.7 million Afghans and rapid population growth contributed to a 5.6% decline in GDP per capita. Investment remains weak, while businesses have limited access to financing. The financial system also maintains connections with the outside world through narrow channels. The World Bank has noted limited correspondent banking relationships, a lack of direct access to accounts in the United States, and the significant role of the informal hawala...

2 weeks ago

Turkmenistan gas

Turkmenistan Gas Expansion in Caspian Advances with Petronas

Turkmenistan is expanding offshore gas development in the Caspian Sea, while increasing production at existing fields and seeking new markets for its gas. Malaysia’s state-owned Petronas has secured two new offshore blocks after nearly 30 years in the country, while UAE-based XRG has joined it in the existing Block I project. Petronas Expands in the Caspian Petronas reported in late August that it had signed agreements covering offshore Blocks 19 and 20 in the Turkmen sector of the Caspian Sea. The agreements themselves were signed in June. Turkmenistan also plans geological surveys at four additional blocks — 11, 12, 13, and 14. The size of their reserves, future investment, and potential production timelines have not been disclosed. Petronas is Malaysia’s national oil and gas company and one of the largest foreign investors in Turkmenistan’s energy sector. It entered the country in 1996 and has since developed a group of offshore fields known as Block I. Over three decades, five offshore platforms have been built and around 40 exploration, appraisal, and production wells drilled in the area. According to Turkmenistan’s state oil company Türkmennebit, operations have produced more than 44 billion cubic meters of gas and 16 million tons of liquid hydrocarbons. In 2025, XRG joined the project. The international energy investment company was established by ADNOC, the state-owned oil and gas group of Abu Dhabi. Petronas retained operatorship and a 57% interest, XRG acquired 38%, and the remaining 5% is held by Turkmenistan’s state-owned Hazarnebit. The gas produced by the project is sold to state-owned Türkmengaz, which controls the country’s gas sector. The offshore fields currently produce around 11.3 million cubic meters of gas per day, while their resource base is estimated at around 200 billion cubic meters. A new well began producing at the Magtymguly field in August. The well produced more than 1.3 million cubic meters of gas and around 130 tons of gas condensate per day. Galkynysh and China The Caspian projects account for only part of Turkmenistan’s gas industry. Much larger volumes are produced in the east of the country, home to Galkynysh, one of the world’s largest natural gas fields. In April, Turkmenistan launched another stage of the field’s development with CNPC, China’s state-owned oil and gas company. The project, worth around $5.1 billion, is expected to add another 10 billion cubic meters a year to Galkynysh’s production capacity. The two projects reflect different strands of Turkmenistan’s gas strategy. China remains the main buyer of Turkmen gas, receiving around 30 billion cubic meters annually through the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. In the Caspian Sea, meanwhile, Turkmenistan is attracting capital and technology from Malaysian and Emirati companies. Seeking New Export Routes As production expands, Ashgabat is also trying to diversify its export markets. Most of the country’s gas export infrastructure is currently oriented toward China, prompting Turkmenistan to spend years exploring alternative routes. One is TAPI, the planned gas pipeline running through Afghanistan toward Pakistan and India. In recent months, work has advanced most actively on...

2 weeks ago

Tazy dogs

From Steppe Hunting to the World Dog Show: Kazakhstan Marks First Tazy and Tobet Day

Kazakhstan is marking Tazy and Tobet Day for the first time on September 3, celebrating two indigenous dog breeds that performed very different roles on the nomadic steppe for centuries. The swift Tazy accompanied hunters, while the large Tobet guarded livestock and encampments. Kazakhstan is now seeking greater international recognition for both: the Tazy has already received provisional recognition from the Fédération Cynologique Internationale (FCI) and made its debut at the World Dog Show, while geneticists are studying the origins of the Tobet. The new commemorative date was established in 2026 and will be observed annually on September 3. The date coincides with the anniversary of the FCI’s decision to provisionally recognize the Kazakh Tazy. On September 3, 2024, the organization accepted the breed on a provisional basis, published its official standard, and designated Kazakhstan as its country of origin. The FCI is a Belgium-based international federation of national canine organizations whose standards are used at major international dog shows. For Kazakhstan, its decision was also significant because it formally identified Kazakhstan as the Tazy’s country of origin. Provisional recognition does not yet amount to definitive recognition. The Tazy is listed in the FCI nomenclature under number 372 and belongs to Group 10, Sighthounds. The breed can already compete at international FCI shows and is eligible for World and Section Winner titles, but Certificat d’Aptitude au Championnat International de Beauté (CACIB) awards, which are required for the International Beauty Champion title, will become available only after definitive recognition. The Tazy is a light hunting sighthound adapted to Central Asia’s vast open spaces and sharp temperature fluctuations. On the steppe, it was used to hunt hares, foxes, and other game, often alongside horses and birds of prey. The value of a good hunting dog extended far beyond its practical role. The Tazy is associated with the Kazakh concept of Zheti Qazyna, or the “Seven Treasures,” a traditional idea encompassing some of a person’s most important companions and possessions. There is no single historically fixed list of the seven, but a hunting dog appears in many of its commonly cited versions. A year after receiving provisional recognition, the breed reached one of the world’s biggest international stages. In August 2025, eight Tazy dogs from Kazakhstan traveled to Helsinki for the World Dog Show, the FCI’s flagship international gathering. Held on August 8-10, the event marked the Kazakh Tazy’s first official presentation at the World Dog Show following its new international status. The Tobet represents a different side of life on the steppe. It is a large livestock guardian dog, adapted to living alongside herds and protecting them from predators. The work demanded endurance, independence, and the ability to operate across great distances in extreme heat and cold. Unlike the Tazy, the Tobet does not yet have separate recognition as an FCI breed. In recent years, however, its origins have become the subject of genetic research. In 2024, an international group of scientists studied 107 Tobet dogs from Kazakhstan and Mongolia. The research,...

2 weeks ago

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