Our People > Timur Serikuly

Contributor

Timur Serikuly is Editor-in-Chief at Open World Policy Lab, an independent policy research center based in Astana, Kazakhstan. He has professional experience in diplomatic and peacekeeping activities in the Middle East and previously led analytical units in government service. His areas of expertise include Central Asia, regional security, geopolitics, Afghanistan, and transport connectivity. He contributes analysis and policy-oriented commentary on political, economic, and security developments across Central Asia and the wider region.

Articles

Energy Security

Interview with Umud Shokri: Can Kazakhstan Reduce Its Dependence on Russian Oil Export Routes?

Kazakhstan sent more than four-fifths of its oil exports in 2025 through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which crosses Russia to the Black Sea. Repeated disruptions have exposed the risks of relying so heavily on a single route. While alternative shipments across the Caspian Sea are growing, volumes remain small. Falling water levels and higher transport costs complicate efforts to expand these alternative routes, while tensions around Iran pose risks to routes farther south. These challenges extend beyond Kazakhstan. The country is Central Asia’s largest oil producer, and its export decisions affect trade and energy infrastructure across the Caspian region, the South Caucasus and Europe. Meanwhile, plans to export renewable electricity across the Caspian could create new connections between Central Asia and European energy markets. To examine the region’s options, The Times of Central Asia spoke with Dr. Umud Shokri, a Washington-based energy strategist and Visiting Senior Fellow at George Mason University. He is the author of U.S. Energy Diplomacy in the Caspian Sea Basin (Springer, 2021) and is preparing two books: Hormuz and the Geopolitics of Eurasian Energy Infrastructure (Routledge) and Iran’s Energy Transition Under Constraint: War, Sanctions, and Systemic Vulnerability (Springer). TCA: How is Central Asia’s role in Eurasian energy security changing, and where does Kazakhstan fit into this shift? Umud Shokri: I think the biggest change is that Central Asian countries are looking beyond the routes they have relied on for decades. Oil and gas still move mainly through Russia and China, but governments are also exploring connections across the Caspian and south through Iran. They want more choices and greater control over how their resources reach markets. Kazakhstan is central to this shift. It is the region's largest oil producer, and its location gives it links to Russia, China, the Caspian and the South Caucasus. However, its heavy dependence on a single major oil export route remains a significant vulnerability. There is also a growing focus on electricity. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are working on plans for a green-energy corridor across the Caspian. Commissioning of the Central Asia–Azerbaijan link is planned to begin in 2032, while the separate Caspian–Black Sea–Europe corridor is expected to reach full capacity by 2040. These are long-term goals; neither corridor is operating yet. Kazakhstan is therefore both a major energy supplier and a country seeking to broaden its options. Its relationships with Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye and its neighbors all matter. But diplomacy alone is not enough. The region needs investment in pipelines, ports, power lines and domestic grids to turn diversification plans into reliable alternatives. TCA: Kazakhstan relies heavily on the CPC pipeline. Can the route through Azerbaijan and Türkiye become a substantial alternative? Umud Shokri: The CPC is still Kazakhstan's main oil export route. It carried 64.8 million metric tons of Kazakh oil in 2025, or about four-fifths of the country's exports. That volume cannot be shifted elsewhere quickly. But repeated disruptions have shown why Kazakhstan needs alternatives. The route through Azerbaijan and Türkiye is already operating. Kazakh oil...

3 days ago

Aid Dependence

Emergency Aid to Afghanistan Is Not Enough, Humanitarian Expert Says

The return of millions of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan is placing fresh pressure on a country already struggling with declining international humanitarian assistance. Closer cooperation with Central Asian countries could help Afghanistan meet its immediate needs while reducing its long-term dependence on emergency aid. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Abdul Wahab Arash, who has more than 17 years of experience working for international humanitarian and development organizations, discusses the challenges facing Afghanistan and the role its Central Asian neighbors could play in the country's recovery. TCA: How have the needs of the Afghan population evolved, and which challenges concern you most today? Abdul Wahab Arash: Having worked in Afghanistan’s humanitarian sector for more than a decade, I have witnessed how conflict, displacement, poverty, economic instability and natural disasters have affected Afghan communities. While emergency needs have persisted, economic hardship, limited employment opportunities and recurring disasters have placed additional pressure on vulnerable families. One of my greatest concerns is the large-scale return of Afghan migrants from neighboring countries, particularly Iran and Pakistan, including people who have been deported or compelled to return. According to the International Organization for Migration, approximately 6.5 million Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan between mid-September 2023 and Aug. 31, 2026. These movements place additional pressure on Afghanistan’s already limited resources and public services. Many returnee families urgently need shelter, food, employment, healthcare, education and other essential services. Their reintegration requires not only emergency assistance but also sustainable livelihoods, housing support and access to basic services. Another major concern is the widening gap between humanitarian needs and available funding. Funding reductions mean fewer people may receive essential assistance, while humanitarian programs, local organizations and employment opportunities for qualified Afghan professionals are also affected. Economic hardship and limited livelihoods can drive dangerous and irregular migration as people seek safety, work and a more secure future. In my view, Afghanistan needs continued international solidarity alongside a stronger focus on resilience, livelihoods and investment in Afghan people. Emergency assistance remains essential, but wherever feasible it should also help families recover, protect their dignity and build more secure futures. TCA: What are the main obstacles to delivering effective international humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan? What changes would help produce more sustainable results? Arash: In my experience, one of the main obstacles is the growing gap between humanitarian needs and available resources. Other challenges include limited livelihood opportunities, difficulties in coordination, potential duplication across programs and the need to connect emergency assistance more effectively with longer-term recovery. Afghanistan needs assistance to address immediate suffering, but it also needs a humanitarian system that invests in Afghan professionals, strengthens local capacity, creates fair employment opportunities and uses limited resources effectively. International expertise remains essential, but it should complement and strengthen national capacity rather than unnecessarily replace it. International organizations could explore more cost-effective operating models, including leaner offices in Kabul and greater reliance on qualified Afghan organizations to implement activities and monitor assistance at the community level. This could reduce...

1 week ago

CICA

Kazakhstan Proposes a Preventive Diplomacy Mechanism for CICA

Kazakhstan’s proposal to establish a preventive diplomacy mechanism presents the Asian forum with a specific task: determining who, with whose consent, and through what procedures can help reduce tensions before they escalate into open conflict. On October 15, 2026, at the seventh summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Baku, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed launching a preventive diplomacy mechanism. The initiative came amid efforts to transform CICA into a full-fledged international organization and make its activities more practical. However, the proposed mechanism’s process for requesting assistance, powers, funding, and operating procedures were not detailed in the summit announcement. For Central Asia, crisis prevention has direct practical significance. Disagreements over water use, transit restrictions, or disruptions to cross-border infrastructure can affect several countries simultaneously. Even a technical problem can take on a political dimension if the parties lack agreed-upon information and have no way to discuss the situation quickly. Preventive diplomacy is useful at a stage when there is still room for agreement, but routine working contacts are no longer sufficient. CICA already has a foundation for such work. Its activities are based on sovereign equality, noninterference, and consensus-based decision-making. The Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures covers military-political, economic, environmental, and human issues, as well as new challenges and threats. Its agenda includes transport corridors, energy security, and cooperation in the digital sphere. Discussions on crisis prevention can therefore be linked to existing areas of cooperation. As Aigerim Bakhtiyarova, deputy director of the Institute of Applied Research and Analytics at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, noted in comments to The Times of Central Asia, differences in the foreign policy doctrines and geopolitical positions of CICA member states do not diminish their shared interest in regional security. “Today, strategic predictability has become a very rare but very important condition for multilateral partnership, essential for peace, stability, and development,” the expert said. In her assessment, even countries engaged in open rivalry have an interest in maintaining channels of communication that can prevent conflicts from spreading and limit the associated economic and humanitarian costs. However, a shared interest in preventing conflicts does not necessarily mean that states are prepared to grant additional powers to a multilateral mechanism. The principle of consensus creates conditions for trust while also setting limits on the future mechanism. When members’ interests diverge, agreeing on a collective position may take longer than the pace of a developing crisis allows. Therefore, in developing the initiative, it is important to determine which actions require a separate decision by all member states and which can be carried out under a previously agreed mandate, at the request and with the consent of the parties directly concerned. The following are possible approaches to implementing the proposal, rather than announced components of the mechanism. One realistic option could be a system of national contact points authorized to receive requests for urgent consultations. Their task would be to quickly connect the...

2 weeks ago

Middle Corridor

How the Shrinking Caspian Sea Affects the Middle Corridor’s Potential

Paradoxically, the Caspian Sea is becoming one of Eurasia’s most important transport hubs at a time when its falling water level is creating growing constraints on navigation. As sanctions disrupt traditional trade routes through Russia, countries are investing in the Middle Corridor as an alternative link between Asia and Europe. Yet the continuing decline in sea level is limiting shipping capacity and increasing the risks and costs associated with long-term infrastructure projects. The first Caspian Environmental Summit, held in Turkmenistan on October 9, 2026, drew attention to the scale of these changes. Between 2000 and 2025, the Caspian Sea shrank by more than 16,000 square kilometers, while in some areas the shoreline receded by tens of kilometers. How the Caspian’s Falling Water Level Affects Freight The Middle Corridor, linking China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe, is seen as a promising route for diversifying international trade. Its development can reduce shippers’ dependence on individual transport routes and improve economic ties among countries in the region. According to the World Bank’s latest study, more than $25 billion in investment in the corridor’s core physical infrastructure will be needed through 2040. An additional $30 billion could be required for enabling infrastructure and services. The bank estimates that if infrastructure investment is combined with institutional reforms, freight volumes along the corridor could quadruple and travel times could fall by about two-thirds by 2040. A study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes that insufficient depths are already preventing vessels from being fully loaded, reducing transport efficiency and increasing costs. Large-scale dredging was carried out at the Port of Kuryk in 2024. Over four months, around one million cubic meters of material were removed, and the depth of the operational port area was increased to 7–8 meters, according to the port operator. This made it possible to load vessels to full capacity. Meanwhile, major dredging work is underway at Aktau, where 1.3 million cubic meters of material are to be removed to increase water depths to 6–7 meters. The work is expected to be completed by the end of 2026. Dredging, however, can only maintain the operation of individual port facilities, while further declines in the sea level may require repeated work or the reconstruction of berths. Where draft restrictions prevent full loading, transport companies may need to make more voyages to carry the same volume of cargo, increasing spending on fuel, crews, maintenance, and port operations. Constraints on the maritime section can also lead to delays for railcars and containers and disrupt transshipment schedules. These disruptions reduce the predictability of deliveries along the entire route. Similar problems are emerging on the western coast of the Caspian. Falling water levels are reducing vessel cargo capacity at Azerbaijani ports and oil terminals and requiring additional dredging. Infrastructure for Decades Ahead According to the OECD study, which cites World Bank climate projections, under a high-emissions scenario in which the Caspian water level falls by about five meters between...

2 weeks ago

Water Governance

“Water Insecurity Is Not Experienced Equally”: Why Scarcity Is Also a Social Problem

A water crisis begins long before a river runs dry. Across Central and South Asia, retreating glaciers and the overuse of groundwater are putting supplies under growing pressure. Environmental sociologist Devendraraj Madhanagopal argues that the more revealing question is often who gets the water that remains. An assistant professor at XIM University’s School of Sustainability, Madhanagopal has studied climate adaptation among fishing communities on India’s southern coast. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, he draws on that research to discuss why water scarcity can deepen social inequalities in the Aral Sea region. Giving local people more responsibility for managing water without the resources or authority to act, he warns, can make matters worse. TCA: Glacier retreat and changes in snow cover are increasingly affecting water security in both Central and South Asia. However, these processes are often discussed mainly from environmental or hydrological perspectives. In your view, which social consequences are currently underestimated? How could changing water availability affect local communities, agriculture, employment, and migration? Dr. Madhanagopal: Before discussing the availability of water at the country, regional, or continental level, we also need to focus on the social and cultural dimensions of water and on how available water is distributed among different social groups. Communities have historically developed customary institutions, informal rules, practices and local leadership structures to share and distribute water resources. Many of these arrangements have gradually weakened over recent decades in Asia with the rise of resource-intensive development. At the same time, governments in India and Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, have increasingly recognized that water security requires the effective management of complex and interconnected systems. Institutions have been established, and governments increasingly seek support from think tanks, research organizations, and NGOs to address the socio-political and governance dimensions of water management. Nevertheless, significant knowledge and governance gaps remain. Glacier retreat and changes in snow cover are receiving increasing attention from scientists and policymakers. However, discussions about water governance still tend to focus on macro-level transboundary disputes, glacier retreat, and technocentric adaptation, including efficiency improvements and infrastructure. Much less attention is given to social inequalities, power, politics, and conflicts over access to water. This matters because water insecurity is not experienced equally. We need to ask who gets access to water, who bears the burden of scarcity, and how marginalized groups experience water insecurity. Lessons from previous water conflicts and governance failures have not always been adequately incorporated into planning and monitoring in India and many Central Asian countries. We also often view Central Asia primarily through geopolitical frameworks rather than environmental ones. Policy discussions should pay greater attention to interconnected river basins and the diverse environmental conditions across the region. Research and policymaking should examine how climate change and water insecurity affect agriculture, employment, and migration at both local and regional levels. Policymakers should also recognize that water insecurity can intensify local conflicts over shared resources and exacerbate existing inequalities, including gender inequality. These challenges ultimately require localized as well as regional responses. [caption...

1 month ago

Food Security

Interview: Berik Aryn on Kazakhstan’s Role in a Regional Food Reserve

Kazakhstan could anchor a Central Asian food reserve intended to help participating countries respond to shortages without giving up control of their national stocks. The proposal comes from the Astana-based Islamic Organization for Food Security (IOFS), an institution affiliated with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Rather than establish a single supranational stockpile, it would connect existing national reserves through agreed rules for monitoring supplies and releasing food during a crisis. Food security is closely tied to water in Central Asia, where irrigation depends on rivers shared across borders. The five states are already seeking an agreement on regional water management, while climate change is making supplies less predictable. IOFS Director General Berik Aryn, who has led the organization since April 2024, was previously Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia and permanent representative to the OIC. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, he explains what must happen before the reserve becomes operational, why Kazakhstan is central to the plan, and how international support for Afghanistan could move from emergency aid toward agricultural recovery. TCA: During periods of severe water scarcity, how should Central Asian states reconcile the competing demands of agriculture, energy, and ecosystems? Should food security guide interstate decisions on water allocation? Berik Aryn: Food security is a fundamental pillar of regional stability and human dignity, and IOFS firmly believes it must be recognized as a core criterion in interstate water allocation decisions, particularly during periods of acute scarcity. However, in the complex landscape of Central Asia, food security cannot be treated in isolation. It is part of an inseparable water-energy-food-ecosystem nexus. To reconcile these competing demands during severe droughts, regional mechanisms must move away from zero-sum competition over water volumes. Instead, the focus must shift toward mutual optimization, safeguarding basic human needs, protecting vital ecological flows, and honoring energy requirements through holistic, cross-sectoral cooperation. To achieve this reconciliation in practice, Central Asian states would benefit from a formal, data-driven regional drought management framework. IOFS advocates for a strategy in which water allocation during crises is guided by real-time hydrological data, transparent information exchange, and joint seasonal forecasting. Rather than asking nations to compromise on their development goals, the solution lies in maximizing water productivity. By investing in modern transboundary irrigation infrastructure, broadly deploying water-saving technologies, including drip irrigation, adopting digital precision agriculture, and transitioning to high-yield, drought-resistant crops, the region can significantly reduce water losses. Headquartered in Astana, IOFS stands ready to mobilize international green investment and facilitate technology transfers to help Central Asian states transform water challenges into a shared opportunity for long-term food security and climate resilience. TCA: IOFS has developed a model for regional food reserves and is considering a pilot involving Central Asian and other OIC states. How close is the initiative to implementation, and what obstacles remain? Aryn: The establishment of the OIC Regional Food Security Reserve represents a flagship institutional milestone for IOFS and is aimed at developing a more flexible and interconnected regional mechanism for responding to food crises....

1 month ago

C5+South Korea

What Could Come Next in Kazakhstan-South Korea Relations

The first Central Asia-Republic of Korea Summit in Seoul on September 16 will elevate South Korea’s multilateral cooperation with the five countries of the region to heads-of-state level. The Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum has existed since 2007 but until now has remained primarily a ministerial mechanism. Seoul is now seeking to establish a sustainable multilateral framework at the leaders’ level. The summit’s agenda is broad, with a focus on innovation, prosperity, and connectivity. One of its main outcomes is expected to be the Seoul Declaration, setting out a medium- and long-term vision for cooperation in supply chains, emerging industries, and people-to-people exchanges. The economic agenda is already taking more concrete shape. South Korea wants to connect Central Asia’s mineral resources with its technologies for geological exploration and processing, while expanding cooperation in artificial intelligence, digital technologies, and science. Seoul also sees infrastructure, water resources, climate, and industry as potential areas for new projects. On September 16, about 500 representatives of government and business will gather alongside the five leaders. The business summit should offer the first indication of how much of the broad political agenda can be translated into investment, contracts, and joint production. Don’t Copy the Korean Miracle South Korea’s experience inevitably comes up in discussions about Central Asia’s development. But the economy that enabled Korea’s industrial breakthrough in the second half of the 20th century was built in a very different international and historical environment. Professor German Kim, director of the Institute for Asian Studies at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and one of the founders of Korean studies in Central Asia, told The Times of Central Asia that South Korea’s development experience should not be treated as a model that can simply be copied. “South Korea’s accelerated modernization took place under completely different historical and international conditions. Kazakhstan should therefore study not so much the Korean model of the past as today’s mechanisms for supporting talented young people, startups, venture capital, and technological entrepreneurship,” Kim said. From this perspective, the value of the Korean experience lies more in individual mechanisms that work – from financing technology businesses to linking universities, research, and industry. Critical Minerals and Joint Production Critical minerals have become one of the central elements of South Korea’s agenda in Central Asia. South Korean industry needs reliable supplies of raw materials, while the region holds significant reserves of metals used in electronics, batteries, energy, and other high-tech industries. Seoul is already discussing projects individually with countries in the region. In August, South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources held talks with Tajikistan on industrial cooperation and possible critical-mineral projects. The Korean side also proposed making meetings between the industry ministers of South Korea and the five Central Asian countries a regular mechanism. That proposal has since moved forward. On September 14, the six countries held their first C5+1 Industry Ministers’ Meeting in Seoul, agreeing to strengthen cooperation across critical-mineral supply chains. The plan explicitly extends beyond extraction to local refining and smelting, materials processing, and...

2 months ago

С5+Korea

What to Expect from the First Central Asia South Korea Summit

The first summit of Central Asian and Republic of Korea leaders will take place in Seoul on September 16-17. Behind the diplomatic novelty of the meeting is a highly practical agenda: South Korea is seeking more resilient sources of critical minerals and new manufacturing partnerships, while Central Asian countries are looking for technologies and investment to process raw materials within the region. The summit continues a trend that has taken shape in recent years. Central Asia is building relations with major external partners through regional formats while preserving national sovereignty and avoiding the creation of supranational institutions. This approach is already being used in relations with the European Union, China, the Gulf states, Japan, and India. Relations with Seoul have long developed along a similar model. The Central Asia – Republic of Korea Cooperation Forum has existed since 2007, but meetings have so far taken place below the level of heads of state. The September summit will elevate this mechanism to the presidential level for the first time. Preparations have been underway for several months. Meetings between representatives of the five Central Asian countries and the Republic of Korea have focused on industrial cooperation, supply chains, critical minerals, artificial intelligence, and digital manufacturing. South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources has also proposed establishing a regular C5+Korea Industry Ministers’ Meeting. A business summit is expected to take place in Seoul alongside the leaders’ summit. For South Korea, interest in the region is closely tied to the structure of its own economy. The country is a major producer of semiconductors, batteries, automobiles, and electronics, but depends on imports for many types of mineral resources. Central Asia has globally significant reserves and production of uranium, chromite, and antimony, as well as substantial copper resources. The Korean government already describes Central Asia as an important partner in strengthening strategic mineral supply chains. In December 2025, Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources identified critical minerals, energy, and industrial projects among the main areas for cooperation with the region. Preparations for the summit show that Seoul is looking for specific projects in individual countries. With Tajikistan, discussions focus on the country’s gold, silver, and antimony resources. The first Korea-Tajikistan Minerals Forum was held in Seoul in August. With Kyrgyzstan, Seoul is discussing cooperation on antimony and tungsten. With Uzbekistan, talks cover critical minerals, artificial intelligence, digital manufacturing, and industrial complexes. At a roundtable in June, Korean companies operating in Uzbekistan raised concerns with South Korean officials over investment conditions, permits and approvals, and infrastructure. For Kazakhstan, one of the central issues is also the shift from supplying raw materials toward processing them domestically. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Isagaliyev told The Times of Central Asia that digitalization and artificial intelligence, industrial cooperation, critical minerals, and green energy could become new drivers of cooperation. “We see significant potential in introducing advanced Korean technologies and digital solutions in industry, energy, transport, and urban management,” Isagaliyev said. According to him, cooperation on critical minerals should extend into deeper stages...

2 months ago

Central Asia - Iran Relations

Opinion: Why Central Asia Cannot Afford to Abandon the Iranian Route

Kazakhstan had barely secured a foothold in Iran’s largest commercial port when renewed military escalation made the southern route risky again. The problem for Central Asia is that Iran is more than a trading partner. For a region without direct access to the open sea, it provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. On June 28, Kazakhstan and Iran signed a 27-year build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement for a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas. The agreement allocates two years for construction and the following 25 for operation. Astana expects the terminal to provide more direct access to markets in the Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. The project almost immediately found itself in a different reality. In July, U.S. strikes hit Iranian railway and coastal infrastructure. The Aq Taqeh Khan bridge on a rail route connecting Iran with Turkmenistan and, further north, with Kazakhstan, was damaged. There was no confirmed halt to Central Asian freight traffic, but military risk was no longer an abstract concern for carriers. That risk has now been compounded by a new U.S. sanctions campaign. On August 24, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent launched what Washington calls Operation Economic Outcast, combining direct sanctions with pressure on Iran’s foreign economic partners. The United States said it would set timelines for other countries to shut down economic activity with Iran, while the scope of secondary sanctions was expanded to cover five areas: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping. Nearly 60 Iran-linked individuals, entities, and vessels were also sanctioned. The United States has not publicly identified which countries could face penalties first. War and sanctions can make the Iranian route more expensive, slower, and more dangerous. They cannot change geography. Iran gives Central Asia overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. From Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, cargo can move onward toward India, the Gulf states, and East Africa. Iran also provides a western overland route toward Turkey. This is one of the fundamental differences between the Iranian route and the Middle Corridor, which crosses the Caspian Sea before continuing through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor requires cargo to move between rail and maritime transport. Iran offers the possibility of a continuous overland chain while also providing access to ports connected to the Indian Ocean. For Kazakhstan, the southern route is already more than a plan. Trade with Iran increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor reached 3.5 million tons, while rail traffic between Kazakhstan and Iran increased by 69%. It is this expanding transport network that is now exposed to greater military and sanctions risks. There is another factor. A free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, entered into force on May 15, 2025. It significantly reduced tariff barriers to trade in goods between the two sides. Uzbekistan offers...

2 months ago

Conflict Resolution

Kazakhstan Peace Talks: Basel Al-Haj Jassem on Syria and the South Caucasus

Basel Al-Haj Jassem, a Syrian political adviser and analyst, has worked on the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia for many years, with a particular focus on peace processes. He is the author of the Arabic-language book Kazakhstan and the Syrian Astana, which examines Kazakhstan’s role in the Astana Process on Syria. While Al-Haj Jassem was in Kazakhstan as an observer of the first elections to the country’s new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, The Times of Central Asia spoke with him about Kazakhstan’s international standing and the country’s possible role as a mediator in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. He described the elections as well organized and “a new stage in the development of Kazakhstan’s political system,” although he added that “in a year it will already be possible to give a more concrete assessment of the Kurultai’s work.” TCA: You have known Kazakhstan for many years and have observed the country from different professional perspectives. In your view, how have Kazakhstan’s role and international standing changed over the past two decades? Al-Haj Jassem: I think the changes that have taken place in Kazakhstan over the past two decades go far beyond economic growth or the expansion of foreign relations. The country has gradually moved from being an important Central Asian state to one whose political and diplomatic presence extends beyond its immediate geographical surroundings. Several factors have contributed to this: its geographical position, balanced relations with Russia, China, the West, and the Islamic world, as well as its ability to avoid becoming rigidly aligned with opposing political blocs. But what I consider most important is that Kazakhstan has built a reputation as a state capable of maintaining dialogue with different parties, including those that are sometimes opposed to one another. TCA: One of your books is devoted to Kazakhstan and the Astana Process on Syria. That experience demonstrated Kazakhstan’s potential as a venue for negotiations. What further role could the country play in the Middle East? Al-Haj Jassem: The experience of the Astana Process on Syria was important because it showed that a state that is not itself a direct party to a conflict can provide space for dialogue that cannot be achieved elsewhere. Kazakhstan, of course, was not a party determining decisions on the Syrian issue, but it created a political and diplomatic environment that helped maintain channels of communication between participants who found it difficult to sit at the same table. I think this experience can be developed further, but it is not necessarily a matter of literally reproducing the Astana Process model. Today, the Middle East needs different forms of mediation, including quiet diplomacy, humanitarian initiatives, and support for dialogue between religious and cultural communities. Kazakhstan’s advantage is that it carries no colonial legacy in the region and is not part of traditional intra-Arab rivalries. At the same time, the country maintains good relations with various Arab and Islamic states. This gives Kazakhstan a certain freedom of action, particularly in situations where a settlement requires, above...

2 months ago

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