Our People > Yevgeny Rakhimzhanov

Yevgeny Rakhimzhanov

Journalist

Yevgeny Rakhimzhanov is a journalist from Kazakhstan who lives in Almaty. He has worked in leading national media and headed several national media projects. His articles have appeared in many publications both at home and abroad.

Articles

religious freedom

Why Central Asian Governments Are Regulating Religious Life

Kyrgyzstan is requiring bloggers and other social media users who publicly preach religion online to obtain a special certificate. The website of the National Agency for Religious Affairs and Interethnic Relations includes an application form for registration as a “religious preacher.” Nurgazy Kyrgyzbaev, a chief specialist at the agency, announced the measure on local radio. He said the requirement stems from the country’s new religion law, which introduced the legal category of “religious preacher.” “People who want to publicly call others to religion must obtain a special certificate. Their religious education will be considered first and foremost. Recently, people have appeared online who call themselves bloggers and create religious content,” Kyrgyzbaev said, adding that their religious qualifications had previously gone unchecked. This, he argued, created a risk of inaccurate or misleading religious information being spread. Under the new system, applicants must have higher or secondary religious education and obtain the consent of the relevant central religious authority before registering with the agency. For Muslim applicants, this means approval from the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, or Muftiate. Kyrgyzbaev said Muftiate employees engaged in preaching are automatically treated as religious preachers. Kyrgyzstan has traditionally allowed greater religious diversity than most of its Central Asian neighbors, including a wider range of Islamic movements. It remains the only country in the region where Tablighi Jamaat and the Nurcular movement can operate legally. Tablighi Jamaat, for example, is banned as extremist in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Religious Freedom Concerns Across the Region Central Asia has long attracted criticism from international religious-freedom monitors. In its 2026 annual report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended that the U.S. State Department place Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on its Special Watch List for severe violations of religious freedom. It recommended that Tajikistan and Turkmenistan be designated Countries of Particular Concern, a higher category reserved under U.S. law for governments accused of particularly severe violations. According to USCIRF, Tajik authorities continued to use the country’s law on traditions and ceremonies to regulate religious life, including through fines and public campaigns. After amendments adopted in 2024 prohibited the import, sale, promotion, and wearing of clothing deemed “alien to national culture,” authorities also campaigned against what they described as foreign styles of dress. USCIRF and other religious-freedom monitors have reported even tighter state control in Turkmenistan, where religious activity outside officially approved structures remains heavily restricted. Reports have described pressure on religious leaders to provide information to the authorities about believers practicing outside state-sanctioned forms of Islam. USCIRF has argued that Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, like other Central Asian states, apply extremism laws to religious practices that involve neither violence nor incitement. Religion Moves Online in Kazakhstan In Kazakhstan, as in Kyrgyzstan, mosques are no longer necessarily the primary source of religious knowledge for younger people. At independence in 1991, Kazakhstan had only 68 mosques. The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan reported 2,945 functioning mosques at the beginning of 2026. The expansion reflects the extraordinary revival of...

2 days ago

Military Procurement

Why Central Asia Is Diversifying Its Arms Suppliers

India could become another supplier of major weapons to Central Asia. Indian Masterminds reported in July that Samir V. Kamat, former chairman of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), said India had exported Akash surface-to-air missile systems to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The reported deliveries remain unconfirmed by the recipient governments. Publicly available accounts give no contract values, quantities, or delivery schedules. DRDO says an initial Akash battery has been flagged off for export to friendly foreign countries, without naming the recipients. Akash is a mobile medium-range surface-to-air missile system designed to counter aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and drones. If the reported deliveries are confirmed, they would mark the first publicly known Akash exports to Central Asia following India’s deal with Armenia. The region’s armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-designed equipment, but governments are increasingly buying newer systems from other suppliers. Russia retains a strong position where countries need to maintain Soviet- and Russian-designed equipment already in service. Other suppliers are winning orders for drones and aircraft, extending their role in the region’s defense procurement. The figures illustrate the persistence of Russian influence. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms in 2021–25. These figures measure transfers of major weapons, rather than the full range of military supplies and support. Russia’s exports of major arms, however, fell by 64% in 2021–25 compared with the previous five-year period. Nearly three-quarters of its exports went to India, China, and Belarus. SIPRI attributes much of the fall to reduced deliveries to Algeria, China, and Egypt. The most visible shift has occurred in Uzbekistan. In late August, official footage showed Chinese-built J-10CE fighter jets carrying Uzbek markings. At least six aircraft could be seen. For three decades, Soviet-designed MiG-29s and Su-27s formed the backbone of Uzbekistan’s fighter fleet. Operating the J-10CE requires different training and maintenance arrangements, alongside compatible weapons and ground equipment. The transition moves a key component of the Uzbek Air Force outside its traditional supply chain. On September 25, Brazil’s Embraer delivered the first C-390 Millennium military transport aircraft to the Uzbek Air Force. The handover ceremony took place at the company’s facility in Gavião Peixoto, making Uzbekistan the first C-390 operator in Central Asia. The late-2024 contract includes training to operate the aircraft and covers its upkeep with technical support and spare parts. The aircraft can carry payloads of up to 26 metric tons and can be configured for troop and cargo transport, aerial refueling, medical evacuation, and search-and-rescue missions. Kazakhstan’s military has put Turkish Aerospace Industries’ ANKA drone into service after military trials. In its review of 2024, Kazakhstan’s Defense Ministry reported discussions with Baykar, another Turkish drone maker, on a roadmap for local production of tactical drones and loitering munitions. The latter can remain airborne while searching for a target before striking it. The same review said the Turkish side had offered to provide Bayraktar Kalkan and Bayraktar Mini reconnaissance drones, along with the...

5 days ago

Saida Mirziyoyeva

Opinion: Why Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration Was Given Sweeping Powers and Broad Immunity

Saida Mirziyoyeva, the 41-year-old daughter of Uzbekistan’s president who has headed his administration since 2025, is taking an increasingly active role on the international stage. She participated in the 15th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Abu Dhabi, and was received by UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. During the meeting, the two sides discussed further expansion of cooperation between Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates. Combined with the law on Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration adopted in August, Mirziyoyeva’s growing international profile raises a broader question: how far could her political influence extend? A New Legal Framework The Constitutional Law on the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, approved by the Senate on August 7 and signed by Shavkat Mirziyoyev a week later, on August 14, followed closely on the heels of a constitutional amendment establishing that the administration’s legal status and powers should be defined by law. Officially, the legislation was drafted to implement Article 109 of Uzbekistan’s Constitution. The article states that the president forms an administration and appoints its head to provide organizational, legal, and analytical support for the exercise of presidential powers. An amendment that took effect on July 25 added that the legal status, main tasks, organization, and powers of the Presidential Administration are to be determined by law. Saida Mirziyoyeva had been appointed head of her father’s administration in June 2025. When the bill, consisting of four chapters and 34 articles, was presented in the lower house of parliament, lawmakers said the experience of a number of countries had been studied. They included Turkmenistan and Taiwan, as well as Finland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Latvia, the United States, and Kazakhstan. Lawmakers cited these countries’ arrangements for regulating presidential administrations, offices, or chancelleries. The Uzbek law combines substantial administrative and coordinating authority with extensive immunity provisions for senior Presidential Administration personnel. Powers of a “Successor”? Under the new law, the head of Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration has the authority to: introduce or eliminate additional staff positions and create or abolish project offices responsible for developing individual sectors and industries; coordinate and oversee administrative reforms in national and local executive bodies and submit proposals to the president on improving public administration; facilitate the introduction of key performance indicator systems in government bodies; appoint and dismiss certain officials of government bodies and organizations; create or abolish compliance units in government agencies, as well as positions for deputy heads or advisers responsible for compliance and internal anti-corruption controls. The head of the administration may also hire independent advisers on a contractual basis. Under the law, the head of the Presidential Administration also becomes deputy chair of the Security Council under the president and organizes and coordinates the activities of its members. Some Uzbek opposition figures, most of whom live and work abroad, see Mirziyoyeva’s expanded powers as adding weight to speculation that the president may be preparing his daughter as a possible successor. “She was already de facto the No....

6 days ago

Oil logistics

Kazakhstan’s Oil Logistics Trap: Higher Prices, Limited Gains

Escalation in the Middle East has pushed oil back above $100 a barrel. For Kazakhstan, whose budget remains heavily dependent on commodity exports, that should have been good news. But a high price matters only if the oil can reach buyers. For the world’s largest landlocked country, that is where the problem begins. European refiners are looking for alternatives to disrupted Saudi supplies, while problems along established routes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are increasing demand for crude from other regions. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, however, move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium system across Russian territory to a terminal near Novorossiysk. The Middle East crisis is pushing prices and global freight costs higher, while attacks around Russian infrastructure are increasing the risks to Kazakhstan’s main export route. Over the past decade, Kazakhstan has significantly increased its oil exports. According to the Bureau of National Statistics, volumes rose from 63.6 million metric tons in 2015 to a record 76.3 million tons in 2025, an increase of about 20%. Exports grew from 65.2 million tons in 2022 to 71 million in 2024 and 76.3 million tons in 2025. Expansion at the Tengiz field contributed to that growth. Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production reached 99.6 million tons in 2025. The government had planned for about 98 million tons in 2026, but export disruptions have already forced temporary output cuts. Revenue has not risen as steadily as volumes. “In monetary terms, growth over the past decade was considerably stronger, although the trend, as noted above, was also much more volatile. The value of exports increased from $26.8 billion in 2015 to $40 billion in 2025, or by 49.3%. The highest figure during this period was recorded in 2022, at $46.9 billion,” Ranking.kz said in its analysis. Physical volumes and export revenue have often moved in different directions. “This was particularly evident in 2025: Kazakhstan exported 7.4% more oil than a year earlier, but its value fell by 6.8%. The average estimated value of one exported metric ton declined from $604 in 2024 to $524 in 2025,” the analysts calculated. In the first half of 2026, Kazakhstan exported $40.3 billion worth of goods. Crude oil and petroleum products accounted for 46.5% of the total. Export statistics and transportation data measure different things. The Bureau of National Statistics records goods cleared for export, while the Energy Ministry and pipeline companies report volumes pumped, transshipped, and transported. The same cargo can pass through several sections of the system, so those figures cannot simply be added together. In March, Talgat Makuov, acting director of the Energy Ministry’s oil refining and transportation department, said 64.8 million tons of Kazakh oil had moved through CPC in 2025. Another 9.2 million tons went through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, while 1.1 million tons were shipped through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline toward China. Against those volumes, the Trans-Caspian route remains small. In 2025, 1.26 million tons were shipped across the Caspian toward the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The plan...

2 weeks ago

Central Asia-South Korea summit 2026

Central Asia’s First Korea Summit Produces Different Deals for Each Country

The first Central Asia-Republic of Korea Summit brought five countries to Seoul with very different records of working with Korean capital. Kazakhstan arrived with commercial agreements worth about $19 billion, while Uzbekistan is discussing multibillion-dollar financing through the state-owned Export-Import Bank of Korea. In Turkmenistan, Korean companies are expanding beyond their traditional role in the gas-chemical industry; Tajikistan is offering mineral resources; and Kyrgyzstan is establishing a dedicated government contact point to help attract Korean businesses. On September 16, the presidents of all five Central Asian states met South Korean President Lee Jae Myung together for the first time. Until now, the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum, established in 2007, had operated mainly at a ministerial level. A permanent secretariat was established in 2017, and in 2020 the meetings were elevated to the level of foreign ministers. The leaders adopted the Seoul Declaration, agreeing to hold summits every two years, with Kazakhstan set to host the next in 2028. Ministerial meetings in the intervening years will review implementation and prepare the next summit’s agenda. The declaration also envisages Korea Desks across the five Central Asian countries to help businesses address administrative obstacles. The leaders expressed interest in combining Central Asian minerals with Korean technology to build joint production networks, and agreed to pursue measures to reduce non-tariff barriers. Seoul also sees Central Asia as part of its own industrial strategy. South Korea, one of the world’s leading producers of automobiles, electronics, batteries, and ships, needs stable supplies of energy and raw materials. Opening the summit, Lee spoke of combining the region’s resources with Korean exploration and processing technologies. Critical minerals, energy, and supply-chain resilience were among the main issues at the meeting. In 2025, South Korea’s trade with the five countries reached $10 billion for the first time: Korean exports totaled $8.67 billion, while imports from Central Asia amounted to $1.39 billion. Cumulative Korean investment in the region reached $6.48 billion. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan continue to account for most of this trade and investment. The talks in Seoul showed how different the next step could look in each of the five countries. [caption id="attachment_56323" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: Akorda[/caption] Kazakhstan: $19 Billion in Agreements and Large-Scale Industry Kazakhstan arrived at the summit with the largest announced commercial package. On September 15, a day before the regional summit, Kazakhstan and South Korea signed around 80 agreements worth approximately $19 billion through the Kazakhstan-Korea Business Council in Seoul. About $11 billion is associated with projects involving Samruk-Kazyna, Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund, which controls major state assets in oil and gas, energy, transport, telecommunications, and uranium mining. The $19 billion figure represents the value of signed agreements and announced projects at different stages of development. Behind the headline figure are several major industrial projects. QazaqGaz and Hyundai Engineering agreed to implement a gas processing plant at Karachaganak with an annual capacity of 5 billion cubic meters. KazMunayGas and Samsung E&A signed an agreement on expanding the Pavlodar refinery’s capacity to 9 million metric tons a...

3 weeks ago

State Asset Sales

Uzbekistan Privatization: Unsold State Assets Relisted With $85 Opening Bids

Uzbekistan has begun putting previously unsold state assets back on the market, with opening bids starting at 1 million Uzbek soums, or about $85. The first lots include stakes in small companies, a district laboratory, vacant buildings, and a former mineral fertilizer warehouse. That figure is the opening bid in an electronic auction, not a valuation of the property. The final price will be determined by bidding. The new rules took effect on September 8 and cover 84 previously unsold assets. They are part of a new privatization package approved by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on August 28. The government also plans to offer stakes in another 84 companies, 1,242 real estate properties, and about 8,000 hectares of land. The package also calls for 85 enterprises to be liquidated or reorganized. Among the first offerings is a 100% stake in Bukhsu Scientific Biotechnology, a limited liability company registered in Bukhara. Despite its name, the state registry lists its activity as auxiliary services in the field of education. Another lot is a 100% stake in Yangiyo‘l tuman laboratoriya, a district laboratory in Yangiyul District, Tashkent Region. The state had already tried to sell it, offering the stake for about $820 in May 2026, but no buyer emerged. Also for sale are a 100% stake in Iqtisod-Moliya and a 30% stake in Ferula Shifobaxsh. The latter is associated with agriculture and is currently listed in the state registry as inactive. The real estate lots include retail premises, vacant buildings, and a former warehouse used to store and distribute mineral fertilizers. In Samarkand Region, authorities separately announced the renewed sale of five properties in the Narpay, Kattakurgan, Pakhtachi, and Urgut districts. All of the assets have been offered for sale before without success. Uzbekistan has been selling state-owned companies, banks, real estate, and land for years. Large transactions attract international capital. Alongside them, however, is a less visible part of the state economy: small businesses and properties with no obvious buyer. The problem predates the latest decree. As of April 1, 2025, more than 3,600 state assets remained on sale with a combined starting value of about $1.4 billion. Prices had been reduced for 440 assets after they remained unsold for more than three months. In 153 cases, prices had been cut by 70–90%. In 2024, Mirziyoyev criticized slow sales and inflated valuations of some state property. A new privatization program at the time included stakes in hundreds of enterprises and more than 1,000 real estate properties. The latest decree accelerates the process. After three months without a buyer, the price of an asset can be reduced in stages. Some properties can also be sold through a hybrid auction, in which the price falls until a bidder emerges and then rises as participants compete. Payment terms are also changing. Buyers need to make an initial payment of only 15%, with the remainder payable in interest-free installments. If 35% is paid within the first three months, the balance can be spread over up to five...

3 weeks ago

Secularism

Kazakhstan Hijab Debate Exposes Divide Over Secularism

Kazakhstan’s long-running controversy over hijabs in schools has collided with a wider public argument about religion, exposing sharp differences among prominent public figures and institutions over the boundaries of the country’s secular model. The latest religious controversy in Kazakhstan’s social media space was triggered by two statements made within the span of a week. On September 3, well-known Kazakhstani film and entertainment producer and former television host Bayan Alaguzova wrote on Threads that she was “tired of religion and its propaganda.” “I’ll say this right away,” she added. “There’s no need to frighten me with hell – it doesn’t exist for me. Not a single person in the world can claim to have seen hell, or heaven for that matter. Now that is reliable information! The same goes for the 72 virgins thrown into the bargain.” She went on to sarcastically ask how a disembodied spirit was supposed to deprive the heavenly maidens of their virginity. The deliberately provocative tone used by the prominent film and entertainment figure stirred debate among social media users. Soon afterward, another Threads user posted a screenshot of an official complaint submitted through Kazakhstan’s eOtinish system against the producer, calling for Alaguzova’s posts to be examined for possible incitement of religious discord. There have so far been no official reports of further action on the complaint. Even so, Kazakhstanis on social media began joking about how the complainant intended to prove the existence of heaven and hell. Journalists and other users also spoke out in support of Alaguzova. On September 8, in response to the backlash, Alaguzova acknowledged on Instagram that her “words had hurt believers” and offered her “sincere apologies,” explaining that she respected “every person and every faith, as long as it does not harm others.” She then said her remarks had been misunderstood. “All those accusing me of ‘offending the feelings of believers,’ read carefully: I said that I am against the imposition of dogmas alien to our people, against radical and fanatical propaganda, not religion itself... Do you want girls to be married off at the age of nine? To be denied education or medical care? To be beaten supposedly ‘as a preventive measure against the influence of shaitan’? To be taken as wives without anyone assuming responsibility for them? To be easily abandoned simply by loudly saying ‘talaq’ three times? Do you want your daughter or sister not to be an individual in her own right, but simply an appendage to someone else? To be unable to appear in public or speak without permission? To be unable even to protect herself and her children? I am categorically against this!” the producer said. That same day, journalists at a government briefing asked Kazakhstan’s Education Minister Zhuldyz Suleimenova about reports that some private schools had allowed pupils to wear hijabs. Each new school year in Kazakhstan has brought renewed disputes over hijabs in schools. Some Muslim parents, particularly in western Kazakhstan, require their teenage daughters to wear hijabs to school. This conflicts...

3 weeks ago

Central Asia - Iran Relations

Renewed U.S.-Iran Escalation: What It Means for Central Asia

The United States and Iran have exchanged their heaviest barrage since July, ending several weeks in which both sides had largely held their fire. Washington struck military targets along Iran’s southern coast, while Tehran responded with missile and drone attacks on U.S. assets in Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, and Iraq. For Central Asia, the renewed escalation creates risks on several fronts, from oil prices to transport corridors through the Persian Gulf. All five countries in the region are likely to feel the economic effects in one way or another, although for some, those effects may initially come wrapped in gift paper. Kazakhstan: Expensive Oil That Is Hard to Sell Brent crude was trading at about $97 a barrel on September 3. The oil market remains highly volatile, with further price movements likely to depend heavily on developments surrounding Iran and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In theory, Kazakhstan could benefit from higher oil prices. In practice, existing logistical constraints substantially limit that opportunity. Ukrainian attacks affecting the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) have contributed to production cuts, while Kazakhstan’s shipments through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline remain far too small to compensate for a major disruption to the CPC. In other words, Kazakhstan risks missing out on another oil price surge. At the same time, Iran is important to Kazakhstan’s transport strategy. On June 16, while a ceasefire between Washington and Tehran was still in effect, Kazakhstan moved to advance its transport and trade plans through Iran. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin met an Iranian delegation headed by Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. Kazakhstan-Iran trade increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million, with the two countries aiming eventually to raise bilateral trade to $3 billion. A central topic in the talks was the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), where freight volumes increased by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million tons. Rail freight between the two countries rose by 69%. The two sides agreed to modernize transport infrastructure with the goal of increasing the corridor’s capacity to 20 million tons annually. Iran also completed arrangements to allocate Kazakhstan a land plot at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas and confirmed its readiness to provide access to Chabahar Port, offering connections to markets in South and Southeast Asia. On June 28, Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization hosted a ceremony to sign a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreement allocating land at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas for the construction of a Kazakh transport and logistics terminal. Kazakhstan, in other words, tried to use the lull in the U.S.-Iran conflict to advance a route of its own that does not depend on Russia, China, or Turkey. Much of that effort, however, depends on an end to hostilities in the region. Tajikistan: Fuel That Is Hard to Buy On August 15, Tajikistan turned to Iran for assistance. At talks in Tehran with Farzaneh Sadegh, Iran’s minister of roads and urban development, Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim said more than 80%...

1 month ago

Kazakhstan's Parliament

Kazakhstan’s Kurultai Has Begun Work, but the Intrigue Remains

Kazakhstan’s new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, has held its first session and elected President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s nominee, Aibek Dadebay, as speaker. The choice of Dadebay, chairman of the recently created Adilet party, had been widely expected. Nevertheless, the arrangement differs markedly from the way political authority was organized under Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Under Nazarbayev, the ruling party – first Otan and later Nur Otan – was headed by the president himself, while its day-to-day work was managed by a first deputy chairman. The party’s parliamentary leadership was separate, while the Senate speaker was formally elected from a candidate nominated by the president. Under Tokayev, the model changed. Tokayev left the ruling party in 2022, shortly after Nur Otan was renamed Amanat, and the Constitution was amended to bar the president from party membership. Amanat later merged into the newly created Adilet party in June 2026. That Tokayev-era model has now carried over into the Kurultai: the chairman of the ruling party entered the new parliament and was elected speaker. The arrangement places responsibility for the party and its parliamentary majority more clearly in the same hands. Tokayev also spoke about the legislative responsibilities of deputies at the opening of the first session. “Laws must be fair, understandable to people, and progressive – that is, aligned with modern requirements. Since laws affect the fate and lives of citizens, every norm and every clause must be carefully considered and comprehensively discussed,” he said. Tokayev added that artificial intelligence could be used “to improve the quality of legislative activity and minimize corruption risks,” while stressing that “advanced technologies cannot replace professional legal expertise.” Yerlan Karin, first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, noted that 24 deputies have previous parliamentary experience, arguing that this would help preserve “institutional memory” in the new legislature. Karin himself is among the senior officials whose next role remains uncertain. Tokayev must still submit nominees for vice president and prime minister to the Kurultai. The current government relinquished its powers before the new parliament, in accordance with the Constitution, and the president will appoint members of the government after consultations with deputies. He will also make an appointment to the new position of deputy chairman of the Security Council. According to political analyst Talgat Kaliyev, political observers are discussing several possible candidates for vice president. One scenario cited by Kaliyev would see current Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov take the role, with Astana akim Zhenis Kassymbek replacing him as prime minister. “Others say that the current prime minister will retain his position, while Yerlan Karin will take the post of vice president,” Kaliyev said, arguing that Karin’s close involvement in Kazakhstan’s political reforms strengthens his case. Kaliyev said other possible candidates could include former Senate speaker Maulen Ashimbayev or former Mazhilis head Yerlan Koshanov, who is “also being tipped for the post of chairman of Kazakhstan Halyk Kenesi.” The appointments are expected to follow before Tokayev delivers his traditional annual Address, which he said would take place after...

1 month ago

fuel shortages

Kazakh Refinery Plans Fuel Exports to Russia Amid Petrol Shortages

A small refinery in western Kazakhstan is preparing to process Russian crude and send most of the resulting petrol and diesel back to Russia as Moscow struggles with fuel shortages. The arrangement was confirmed on August 25, the same day that separate incidents occurred at two of Kazakhstan’s three major refineries. On August 19, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said that, given the situation on the fuel market, the government was “keeping its finger on the pulse” and monitoring supplies daily with companies and regional authorities. According to Novak, Russia had already imposed export restrictions and begun importing petroleum products. Several refineries were also expected to return from repairs, increasing domestic supplies. Russia’s Fuel Shortage The pressure on Russia’s fuel market is illustrated by data published by the industry portal InfoTEK. According to its August 24 snapshot, AI-95 petrol, the widely used 95-octane grade, was available at only 5,620 of Russia’s 26,098 operating filling stations, or 22%. Even in Moscow, it could be found at 161 of 786 operating stations, about 20%. Russia has also temporarily relaxed restrictions on lower environmental grades of fuel, including Euro 4, Euro 3 and Euro 2, known in the Russian classification as K4, K3 and K2. Since 2016, only fuel meeting at least the Euro 5 standard had generally been permitted. Russian economist Boris Grozovsky estimates that, given the refining capacity knocked out by Ukrainian strikes and the number of plants undergoing repairs, Russia is currently short of roughly one-third of the petrol needed at peak demand. August is traditionally a high-demand month because of summer travel and agricultural work. “If it were November now, the situation would be a little easier for the Russian government. Russia is trying to bring in petrol from India, Morocco, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, but imports also have limitations. The petrol brought in from India turned out to be too expensive,” Grozovsky said. Kazakh Refinery Steps In Speaking at a government briefing on August 25, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said that the small Condensat refinery in Aksai, West Kazakhstan Region, would process Russian crude, with around 70% of the petrol and diesel it produces sent to Russia. Up to 30% will remain on the Kazakh market, while the refinery also retains the right to export products outside the Eurasian Economic Union. “Under the agreement we currently have, up to 30% of the petroleum products in demand, petrol and diesel, will remain in Kazakhstan, while the rest will be shipped to the Russian Federation,” the minister told reporters. Akkenzhenov said the arrangement reflected Condensat’s location close to the Russian border. The refinery is not connected by pipeline to either country’s main oil network, meaning both crude deliveries and fuel exports depend on rail capacity. Akkenzhenov also stressed that the refinery’s owner is not under sanctions and said the Energy Ministry did not see sanctions risks for the project. He said the arrangement would also bring investment and preserve jobs at a refinery that has struggled financially. Condensat’s Financial Troubles Condensat was established in...

1 month ago

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