Armenia - The Times Of Central Asia

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CSTO

CSTO Faces Uncertain Future as Putin Champions Russian Arms

The session of the CSTO Collective Security Council on November 27 in Bishkek underscored a key reality: the bloc, once envisioned as the “Eurasian response to NATO,” now consists of just five active members. Armenia pointedly boycotted the summit, a gesture that spoke volumes about the alliance’s internal fractures. While the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan discussed “multipolarity” and “security,” Kyrgyz authorities erected a massive LED screen near the presidential residence, conveniently blocking the Ukrainian flag atop the Ukrainian embassy. Officials claimed the move was a “protocol requirement.” Moscow used the summit as a platform to outline its long-term strategic goals for the region, seizing the moment amid Armenia’s absence, growing debate over the CSTO’s purpose, and rising competition from other international security alliances in Eurasia. Yerevan’s decision to skip the gathering is a warning sign for fellow CSTO members. Armenia, having faced a real security crisis, evidently no longer views the alliance as a reliable guarantor. This casts doubt on the CSTO’s ability to adapt to a rapidly evolving regional security landscape, where flexibility, responsiveness, and tangible conflict support are increasingly in demand. In his report, CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov emphasized the bloc’s institutional development over the past three years, expanding collective forces, developing cyber capabilities, and establishing new international roadmaps. He also announced the creation of an Information and Analytical Department, signaling an effort to emulate more sophisticated military-political structures. Yet much of his address echoed the standard talking points delivered at previous summits. Tasmagambetov did address Armenia's absence, stating, “The CSTO respects Yerevan’s sovereign right.” Rather than defusing the issue, this acknowledgment only served to highlight the political rupture. Despite the tensions, CSTO leaders signed a broad set of documents, including a collective security strategy, an anti-drug initiative, and new military cooperation plans, reportedly one of the most comprehensive packages in recent years. Nonetheless, the summit’s spotlight belonged to Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko. The other leaders appeared relegated to the sidelines, affirming declarations to preserve a fragile collective consensus. Putin’s visit to Bishkek spanned two days, during which his pronouncements effectively became the summit’s agenda. He reiterated that the CSTO is a “guarantor of stability” and proposed equipping the bloc’s collective forces with Russian weapons “proven in combat conditions”, a clear reference to the war in Ukraine, though left deliberately vague. With Russia set to assume the CSTO chairmanship in 2026, the Kremlin appears to be steering the alliance toward deeper military-technical integration. Promoting its weapons to member states not only boosts Russia’s arms industry but also increases CSTO members’ reliance on Russian technologies and command systems. Some analysts suggest Moscow’s chairmanship priorities, from cybersecurity to aerospace defense, reflect an effort to position the CSTO as a counterweight to rival military-political blocs. President Lukashenko of Belarus added a European security dimension to the talks, citing NATO’s growing defense budgets and the military buildup in Poland, Germany, and the Baltic states as justification for reinforcing the CSTO. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the...

Strategic Partnership

Kazakhstan and Armenia Forge Strategic Partnership in Landmark Summit

Kazakhstan and Armenia have upgraded their relations to a strategic partnership after high-level talks between President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Astana on 21 November. The decision was sealed in a joint statement and framed as the start of a new phase in cooperation between the two Eurasian partners. During the official visit, the two sides exchanged 15 intergovernmental and interagency documents. These cover the protection of classified information, land for diplomatic missions, a trade and economic roadmap for 2026–2030, and cooperation in industry, agriculture, healthcare, science, education, digitalization, and the peaceful use of atomic energy, as well as new links between national museums, libraries, and film institutions. A Kazakhstan–Armenia Business Council was also created to bring companies into the process. Tokayev underlined the political meaning of the upgrade, stating that an “open and trusting political dialogue has been established between Astana and Yerevan at all levels. Interstate ties are truly constructive, with significant potential for their comprehensive strengthening and expansion.” Pashinyan, meanwhile, stressed the human dimension, noting that “we respect the Kazakh people, and this respect is the foundation for the further development of bilateral relations.” Their meeting builds on Tokayev’s official visit to Yerevan in April 2024, when the two governments first drew a roadmap for closer ties. Symbolism played a significant role in the visit, with Tokayev awarding Pashinyan the Order of Altyn Qyran (Golden Eagle), Kazakhstan’s highest state honor, in recognition of his role in Armenia’s development, regional peace efforts, and bilateral relations. This year, Yerevan has hosted the Days of Kazakhstan Culture and opened a park named after the Kazakh poet, Abai, while Kazakhstan has promoted Armenia’s cultural presence at events and academic centers, helping anchor the relationship beyond government channels. [caption id="attachment_39747" align="aligncenter" width="900"] Image: Akorda.kz[/caption] The strategic label is the high point of more than three decades of diplomatic relations. Armenia and Kazakhstan first established ties in August 1992, and shortly opened embassies in each other’s capitals. A Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Astana in September 1999. Both are members of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which lends their interaction a dense multilateral framework. Now, trade and connectivity are catching up with political rhetoric, with both sides eyeing room to expand. According to Armenia’s economy minister, bilateral trade reached $104 million in 2023, up 2.4 times from 2020, with Armenian exports making up more than two-thirds of the total. Kazakh figures, meanwhile, show mutual trade rising but still at a modest $53.1 million by the end of 2023, partly due to the lack of rail links and past transit restrictions in the South Caucasus. Those obstacles, however, are beginning to ease. In October, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev lifted restrictions on transit to Armenia, which allowed the first shipment of 1,000 tons of Kazakh wheat to reach Armenian markets via Azerbaijani territory in November. Kazakhstan and Armenia also plan to launch direct air links and expand air cargo, a step Tokayev has called...

Peace Initiative

Opinion: Washington Meeting and the Shifting Geopolitics of the Caspian

The Washington meeting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hosted by President Donald Trump on August 8, 2025, may go down as a pivotal moment in the geopolitics of the Caspian and the wider Eurasian space. While on the surface the talks aimed to normalize relations between the two South Caucasus neighbors, the ripple effects extend far beyond bilateral reconciliation. For Azerbaijan, the meeting is not only about ending three decades of conflict with Armenia but also about positioning itself as a central bridge linking the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, and even Europe. The Caspian region has always been a security crossroads, where energy interests, military presence, and trade routes overlap. Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Iran-Israel conflict, and shifting Western engagement have made the region more volatile. In this context, a potential Armenia-Azerbaijan settlement offers a chance to stabilize the South Caucasus - the natural gateway between the Caspian and Europe. For Azerbaijan, peace with Armenia would solidify its position in the region where Baku has promoted several important transregional projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Southern Gas Corridor, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Azerbaijan is heavily investing in the development of the Caspian trade routes, energy infrastructure, and regional connectivity projects such as the Middle Corridor. Stability in the South Caucasus also makes it harder for external actors to exploit divisions - an especially significant factor given the previous attempt to exploit Armenia against Azerbaijan and Türkiye. That strategy brought no tangible results to Armenia, which remained regionally isolated and dependent on Russia. After the military defeats in 2020 and 2023, the Armenian leadership realized that peace and respect for the principle of territorial integrity is a much greater opportunity for the country rather than an irredentist project, which Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan dubbed “mythical.” At the same time, a peace framework reduces the risk of military escalation spilling into the Caspian region. Naval modernization efforts by Russia and Iran in recent years have heightened anxieties. In short, normalization indirectly enhances Azerbaijan’s capacity to act as a stabilizing actor within the Caspian basin. Increasingly, Iran has also spoken about peace and cooperation, especially with Azerbaijan. Relations were tense a few years ago, but the incumbent President, Masud Pezeshkian, questioned the strategy employed previously by the Iranian clerics regarding Azerbaijan, which failed to gain any benefits. Perhaps the most significant geopolitical dividend for Azerbaijan lies eastward, across the Caspian. The Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan - have long sought secure, diversified links to Europe. Russia’s war has made northern routes through its territory unreliable, while instability in the Red Sea undermines the traditional supply route. That leaves the Trans-Caspian link through Azerbaijan as promising. The Washington meeting, by promoting the peace agenda, reassures Central Asian partners that Baku is a reliable hub. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed an MOU about the transfer of alternative energy sources to Europe through another potential project – a Black Sea electricity cable from Georgia to Romania and Hungary. Azerbaijan...

Middle Corridor

How Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace Lowers Corridor Risk for Central Asia

The framework announced on 8 August 2025 in Washington for Armenia–Azerbaijan peace and development resets the security–economics equation in the South Caucasus and holds deep implications for Central Asia. At its core is the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, renunciation of force, and a transit arrangement under Armenian jurisdiction linking mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan across the Syunik province. For Central Asia, the immediate significance is the de-risking of the westbound Caspian–Caucasus–Anatolia artery centered on Azerbaijan’s Alat Port and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) rail route. As reported by Azerbaijan Railways, BTK’s operating capacity was lifted to 5 million tons/year (t/y) in May 2024 and has a path for expanding to 17 million tons in later phases. Alat currently lists 13 berths and dedicated ferry roll-on/roll-off (“ro-ro”) facilities. A dependable Armenian-jurisdiction link would create a second, legally unambiguous passage across the South Caucasus. Single-route dependence through Georgia would be reduced, as would the variance of end-to-end journey times. That reliability directly benefits Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, whose westbound flows move by rail-ferry from Aktau/Kuryk to Alat and from Turkmenbashi to Alat before continuing overland toward Türkiye. Peace Reframes the Middle Corridor These developments also strengthen the business case for incremental investments in ports, ferries, rail paths, and energy interconnectors tied to the Middle Corridor, including swap-based energy routing already practiced between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. At Alat, confirmed as the hinge of the Middle Corridor, political risk converts into bankable time, which prices into contracts, which later in turn finances small but decisive capacity steps; bankable time begets bankable trade. Conflict risk in the South Caucasus has been a priced variable since 2020. A durable peace narrows that risk band and yields three operational effects with country-specific salience. First, marine war-risk and cargo premiums in nearby high-risk theaters such as the Gulf, typically ranging from 0.2–0.3% of hull value, rose to 0.5% during recent tensions. This figure offers a benchmark for how underwriters re-price routes as perceived closure risk changes. Second, forwarders can trim buffer time, improving asset utilization for rail paths and ro-ro (roll on, roll off) rotations pairing the Caspian ports (Alat, Aktau/Kuryk, Turkmenbashi). Third, carriers gain confidence to publish regular rotations and pre-position equipment; the Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company notes 1–2-day intervals in favorable conditions and shows multiple departures on a given day (e.g., August 15 listed Alat–Kuryk, Alat–Turkmenbashi, etc.). Lower variance is not cosmetic; it is collateral for contracts. Banks recognize collateral. Insurers do, too. When variability falls, rate discovery improves; as a result, multi-month slots or rail-path agreements become financeable. This is precisely the mechanism exporters from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan need to secure predictable capacity into Azerbaijan and onward to Türkiye. Reliability also changes routing choices. At Alat, rail-ferry cargo arriving from Aktau/Kuryk or Turkmenbashi can be planned to run either via Georgia or via Syunik toward Kars, whichever route minimizes dwell time and schedule variance for the onward leg. Even where pure distance savings are modest, gains in reliability reduce movements of empty containers. They also...

Middle Corridor

How Could the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Accord Benefit Central Asia?

On August 8, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace accord in Washington and committed to the construction of the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity, a trade route that bisects Armenia, connecting the two parts of Azerbaijan. The deal may have far-reaching repercussions on the other side of the Caspian, potentially diversifying the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor by allowing travel from Azerbaijan, through Armenia, and onwards to Turkey. The upbeat mood music may be premature, however. There remain numerous political hurdles to be jumped before any construction can commence, and the entry of the United States into a region where Russia, Iran, and Turkey all have interests could have unintended consequences. “It’s certainly an opportunity, but there are risks,” said Azerbaijani political analyst and non-resident fellow at the China-Global South Project, Yunis Sharifli. “The United States can be a stabilizing force, but it could go in the opposite direction. It can also create a spoiler.” The Problem Armenia and Azerbaijan have maintained ice-cold relations for almost their entire existence as independent states. For over three decades, they tussled over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, a land which lies in the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan, but was, upon independence, populated mainly by Armenians. As well as costing thousands of lives and leading to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, the enmity has also led to shuttered frontiers, which have choked trade across the South Caucasus. Armenia’s borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed since 1993. While Armenia has been cut off from two of its four neighbors, Azerbaijan has also been severed in two, with the exclave of Nakhchivan, which borders Turkey, separated from the rest of the country by a sliver of Armenian territory, just 20 miles wide at its narrowest point. Conflicts in 2016, 2020, and 2023 saw Azerbaijan push Armenian troops from the region, with hundreds of thousands of Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh in fear of Azerbaijani reprisals. Since then, Baku has used its vast military superiority and geopolitical advantage to try to strongarm Armenia into accepting the construction of a corridor across its territory, threatening to use force on numerous occasions if Yerevan did not agree to its demands. The Solution Starting early this year, the United States began facilitating secretive negotiations between the pair, stepping into the vacuum left by Russia. The Kremlin has been sidelined from the process amid its deteriorating relations with both sides – many Armenians view Moscow as having betrayed them in the conflicts of 2020 and 2023, while Azeri-Russian relations have frayed significantly since the shooting down of Azerbaijan Airways Flight 8243 to Grozny earlier this year. The timing of the signing ceremony, on the anniversary of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, was perhaps designed to reflect this shift in geopolitical alignment in the South Caucasus. Baku and Yerevan have signed up to a project which will see the construction of the corridor run by a U.S. private company, but under the laws of the Republic of Armenia. The...

Peace Initiative

Central Asia Sees Armenia-Azerbaijan Deal as a Step Forward

Central Asian countries have welcomed an agreement signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House, saying it is an important step toward peace in the South Caucasus and sets the stage for trade growth in the wider region. “We highly appreciate the efforts of all parties aimed at overcoming the long-standing conflict,” Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Saturday. “We are confident that the establishment of long-term peace and stability in the South Caucasus will pave the way for the launch of large transport and infrastructure projects for the benefit of all peoples of the vast region.” The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the deal in a ceremony overseen by U.S. President Donald Trump on Friday, building on extensive dialogue between the two sides, though falling short of a comprehensive peace pact that would formally end decades of conflict. One of the terms of the Trump-backed deal is the opening of a South Caucasus trade corridor that would provide Azerbaijan – and Central Asian economies – with increased access to Turkey and Europe. Kazakhstan also praised the agreement and Trump’s role in making it happen, saying it “ended the long-standing military conflict between the two states and paved the way for establishing diplomatic relations and developing cooperation between them based on lasting peace,” presidential adviser Ruslan Zheldibay said on Telegram. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev noted that Kazakhstan played a role in the rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Armenia because it hosted ministerial-level peace talks between the two sides in Almaty, according to Zheldibay. Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said “the prompt legal consolidation” of the agreement signed in Washington will be a big step toward the full normalization of ties between the longtime adversaries and will contribute to regional stability and development. Kyrgyzstan has similarly expressed support for peace, offering earlier this year to host the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkmenistan, which pursues a stated policy of neutrality in foreign affairs, faces Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea and is eager to develop trade routes.