China - The Times Of Central Asia

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China

Beyond the Belt and Road: China’s New Playbook in Central Asia

In the Kyzylorda Region, near the town of Shieli, the silos and conveyor belts of a Chinese-backed plant rise out of the fine brown dust that dominates the landscape. It is the kind of project the Belt and Road was supposed to deliver in Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a visible mark on the landscape. But it is also a reminder that China’s role in the region has become narrower, more contested, and less sweeping than the old rhetoric suggested. In photographs, the Gezhouba Cement Plant looks like a self-contained industrial island on the steppe. For nearby villagers, it became something else: a source of jobs and local prestige for some, but also of years of complaints about dust clouds and whether the state was quicker to defend a flagship Chinese-backed project than the people living beside it. Projects like the plant in Shieli also help explain why views of China across Central Asia remain mixed. Beijing is seen as a source of trade, investment, and technology, but that promise is tempered in some places by concerns over transparency, environmental costs, and who really benefits when a project arrives. China has become Central Asia’s dominant trading partner, but investment has not kept pace with the surge in commerce. The gap says a lot about how Beijing now works in the region: with a sharper focus on sectors that matter to its long-term influence. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year on year. Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia reached $35.1 billion. Trade has grown fast enough to reshape the region’s external balance, but long-term investment has been far more selective. Over 2005–2025, the five Central Asian states accounted for about 3% of China’s global overseas investment and construction total. The picture changes once direct investment is separated from trade and construction contracts. China’s FDI stock in the five Central Asian states stood at about $36 billion by mid-2025. Roughly 90% was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of that capital has also changed. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the portfolio, but manufacturing and energy together made up more than one third, and greenfield projects rose from 43% to 60%. China has not poured money into Central Asia on the scale once implied by early Belt and Road rhetoric. Instead, it has invested in sectors that strengthen its industrial position. Kazakhstan remains at the center of this relationship. It is China’s biggest commercial partner in Central Asia, and the main destination for Chinese capital in the region. Kazakhstan-China trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024. The country’s portfolio of projects with Chinese participation includes 224 ventures worth about $66.4 billion. Some are still at the planning stage, but the range of projects is telling. Recent developments have included a hydrogen energy technology innovation center in Almaty and a large wind farm with electricity storage. Kazakhstan still sells...

Hydrogen Energy

Kazakhstan and China Launch Hydrogen Energy Technology Innovation Center

Kazakhstan and China have expanded cooperation in clean energy with the launch of the China-Kazakhstan Hydrogen Energy Technology Innovation Center at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty on April 9. The center is part of Kazakhstan’s strategy to build a modern technological base linking science, education, and industry in support of the country’s transition to low-carbon energy. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov highlighted the importance of international partnerships in the development of the energy sector. “Hydrogen energy is one of the strategic priorities for the development of the energy sector. The Concept adopted in 2024 laid the legal and economic foundation for the creation of a new industry aimed at decarbonizing the economy. The new center should become a key platform for training next-generation engineers, conducting applied research, and rapidly introducing innovations into production,” Akkenzhenov said. As part of the ceremony, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and Energy China International Corporation signed a trilateral memorandum of understanding outlining the center’s operational framework. The agreement includes expanding scientific and technical cooperation, facilitating technology transfer, and promoting academic exchange. The partners also plan to conduct joint research, test hydrogen technologies, and launch pilot projects, with a particular focus on the commercialization of innovations and their integration into Kazakhstan’s industrial sector. The development of hydrogen energy is a key element of the global transition to cleaner energy systems. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy, the country has significant potential in this field due to its natural resource base and growing renewable energy capacity. Cooperation with Chinese technology partners is expected to strengthen Kazakhstan’s position in emerging energy markets and support industrial modernization. During the ceremony, Zhanseit Tuimebayev, chairman of the board and rector of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, highlighted the evolving role of universities as drivers of economic and technological development. “Universities today are not only centers for training specialists but also key drivers of economic growth, technological development, and national competitiveness. Al-Farabi National University has consistently pursued this mission, transforming itself into a new type of university, one that not only educates, but also develops technologies, shapes markets, and acts as a full-fledged partner to the state and industry,” Tuimebayev said.

Automotive Industry

Kyrgyzstan Seeks to Increase Automobile Imports from China

On April 8, the National Investment Agency of Kyrgyzstan and A-CAR (Chuan Yi LLC) signed a memorandum on investment cooperation in the automotive industry, including the supply and sale of new Chinese cars in Kyrgyzstan and the development of service infrastructure. The Chinese company plans to establish a dealer network and open an official representative office for Central Asia. A-CAR supplies vehicles from leading Chinese and international brands and provides a full range of services, including technical maintenance, vehicle registration, and insurance. A significant portion of vehicles imported from China to Kyrgyzstan are re-exported to Russia rather than remaining in the local market. The duty-free regime for electric vehicles in Kyrgyzstan has significantly boosted imports of Chinese electric cars. As a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Kyrgyzstan benefits from an annual quota allowing the duty-free import of up to 15,000 electric vehicles. Sergey Tselikov, director of Russian automotive analytics agency Autostat, wrote on his Telegram channel that Kyrgyzstan remains the second-largest import channel for new passenger cars into Russia after China. He said 84% of the new passenger cars imported through Kyrgyzstan were manufactured in China, including Chinese, European, and Japanese brands. According to Autostat, Kyrgyzstan is the largest supplier of new passenger cars to Russia among EAEU member countries. In 2025, 53,600 new passenger cars were imported to Russia from Kyrgyzstan, followed by 17,100 cars from Belarus, 11,000 from Kazakhstan, and 344 from Armenia. Kyrgyzstan is also seeking to collaborate with Chinese companies to develop electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. In late March, Energy Minister Taalaibek Ibrayev visited China, where he held a series of meetings with energy and technology companies involved in EV infrastructure development. Negotiations focused on cooperation in energy infrastructure, including the development of EV charging stations and energy storage systems in Kyrgyzstan. These initiatives align with government efforts to promote environmentally friendly transport and reduce air pollution in Bishkek and other major cities. The number of EVs in Kyrgyzstan has been rising steadily, with more than 200 electric vehicles imported into the country daily under a value-added tax (VAT) exemption scheme, according to official figures. Despite this growth, EVs still account for a small share of the country’s total vehicle fleet, about 0.8%, or approximately 15,200 vehicles, according to the Ministry of Natural Resources, Ecology, and Technical Supervision.

Oil and Gas

Kazakhstan Gains Weight in China’s Energy System

The newly extended U.S. waiver for Russian oil transit through Kazakhstan and the reported giant onshore hydrocarbon discovery in western Kazakhstan point in different directions, yet they belong in the same analytical frame. One concerns an existing flow that already reaches China through working infrastructure, while the other concerns a possible future source that has not yet reached the stage of commercially proven reserves. Together, they mark a change in Kazakhstan’s position. The country is increasingly important to China both as a corridor and as a possible larger upstream partner. The U.S. waiver now runs until March 19, 2027. Kazakhstan is not a giant direct oil supplier to China in the way that Russia or Saudi Arabia is; China’s import structure is broader. But Kazakh-origin oil shipments, Russian transit oil, and adjacent energy links now constitute a single, more complex relationship. According to official Chinese sources, oil imported from Kazakhstan enters mainly through the China-Kazakhstan crude pipeline. More Than Kazakhstan’s Own Barrels Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP reported that in 2024, the Atasu-Alashankou route carried 1.2 million tons of oil and 9.989 million tons of transit oil, against a design capacity of 20 million tons a year. Official Chinese figures sharpen the point. By the end of 2024, total cumulative throughput on the pipeline had reached 280 million tons, including 19.139 million tons in 2024, while cumulative crude imported from Kazakhstan was lower. Kazakhstan’s significance to China is therefore larger than Kazakhstan’s own volumes would suggest, because the route carries more than Kazakhstan’s own oil. A glance at Europe keeps that proportion straight. Eurostat reports that Kazakhstan supplied 12.7% of the European Union’s petroleum oil imports in 2025. The European External Action Service said that Kazakhstan accounted for 10.9% of EU oil imports in the first quarter of 2024. This made it the bloc’s third-largest supplier in that period, and a more important direct oil supplier to Europe than to China. The significance of Kazakhstan’s geographic proximity to China becomes clearer when one looks beyond crude oil. Kazakhstan is not only a direct oil supplier, but also a transit corridor for multiple China-bound energy flows. The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline is one of China’s major import routes. At the same time, while Kazakhstan’s own gas exports to China remain limited due to rising domestic demand, gas from Turkmenistan and Russia both pass through its territory. Oil and gas do not form a single operational system, but together they show that China’s energy connection with Kazakhstan extends beyond one commodity and beyond Kazakhstan’s own barrels. The Source Side May Be Growing In this context, the reported discovery on the Zhylyoi carbonate platform makes a difference because it widens the source side of the relationship without changing present flows. According to public statements by KazMunayGas officials, the Karaton, Kazhygali, and Zhylyoi formation has resource potential of 4.7 billion metric tons of hydrocarbons, and the broader Zhylyoi carbonate reservoir may hold as much as 20 billion metric tons of oil equivalent. The field is onshore in...

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

Smart Electricity

Kyrgyzstan to Install 300,000 Smart Electricity Meters Purchased from China

Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy has signed a contract with Shenzhen Kaifa Technology for the purchase of 300,000 smart electricity meters for the National Electric Network in 2026, according to the ministry. Negotiations are also underway for an additional 90,000 units. The National Electric Network of Kyrgyzstan has introduced an automated electricity control and metering system that has helped strengthen financial discipline in the energy sector. As of the end of 2025, 500,100 smart meters had been installed across the country, bringing the total number of installed meters to more than 923,000. This has improved metering accuracy and reduced electricity losses from 11.7% to 10.6%. Smart meters offer several advantages. They enable automatic data transmission, with readings sent to a central server in real time, eliminating the need for manual inspections. They also allow for remote control: electricity supply can be automatically suspended in cases of non-payment and restored once payment is made. In addition, smart meters help protect against overloads, support voltage stability in the grid, and reduce human error by minimising manual data entry. This also contributes to lowering electricity theft. The rollout is part of the Kyrgyz Energy Modernization and Sustainability Project, supported by the World Bank. The project aims to modernise the energy sector, improve the accuracy of electricity metering, and reduce power losses. Smart metering is particularly important for Kyrgyzstan, which continues to face electricity shortages and relies on imports to meet growing demand from industry and households.