Infrastructure Development - The Times Of Central Asia

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China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway: What It Means for Central Asia

The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway (CKU railway), also known as the Kashgar–Andijan railway line, is more than an infrastructure project. It represents a geopolitical initiative that could significantly shape the future of Central Asia. In June 2024, Beijing, Bishkek, and Tashkent signed the intergovernmental agreement to move the project forward. The project’s financing—estimated at $4.7 billion—was finalized in December 2025, sparking optimism in all three nations about regional connectivity, trade, and economic growth. Once completed, the railway is expected to become a vital strategic asset in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From China’s perspective, the CKU project is a strategic line that diversifies its trade channels and strengthens overland access to Central Asia and beyond. Construction was ceremonially launched on 27 December 2024 in Kyrgyzstan, with major works progressing through 2025, including key tunnel works. For Uzbekistan, the railway could serve as a key link for commerce and transit. Tashkent aims to integrate the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan line with existing international transport networks, including connections through Iran and Turkey. But how important is the project for Kyrgyzstan, through which, according to recent reporting, 304 km of the line will pass? According to Nurbek Satarov, Presidential Envoy in the Naryn Region, the project is vital for Kyrgyzstan’s most mountainous region, as roughly 90% of the route through the country will run through Naryn. As he told The Times of Central Asia, construction is in full swing, and the railway is expected to be completed between 2028 and 2030, despite the challenging terrain and technical difficulties. The project includes the construction of 50 bridges and 29 tunnels, underscoring the significant engineering complexities involved. But while regional and national authorities anticipate direct economic benefits from the project, critics argue that Kyrgyzstan may end up serving primarily as a transit country, with limited gains for the local economy. They also question the financial sustainability of the project, noting that it is backed by a long-term loan package of approximately $2.3 billion from Chinese banks. The financing, structured over 35 years and to be repaid by the joint venture company implementing the railway, increases Kyrgyzstan’s exposure to China-linked debt and has raised concerns about future repayment obligations. [caption id="attachment_44216" align="aligncenter" width="1536"] Site visit at the road construction project in the Naryn Oblast; image: TCA, Nikola Mikovic[/caption] However, Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Prime Minister, claims that the CKU will have a positive impact on the country’s economic development. “This railroad will virtually transform Kyrgyzstan – and not just Kyrgyzstan, but the whole of Central Asia,” he told The Times of Central Asia. Baisalov believes that the CKU railway, once completed, will be part of a larger transcontinental railroad that will cut transit times by at least seven days compared to the northern routes of the Trans-Siberian Railway and maritime transport. The CKU line could indeed bypass the usual northern rail routes through Russia and Kazakhstan, taking a significant share of freight from those countries and reducing their transit revenue. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, hopes to see direct gains...

Infrastructure Development

Uzbekistan and Islamic Development Bank Sign $164 Million Agreements for Roads and Schools

Uzbekistan and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) have signed new financing agreements totaling $164 million to support major infrastructure and education initiatives, further deepening a partnership that plays a key role in the country’s long-term development strategy. The agreements were formalized on February 8 in AlUla, Saudi Arabia, during the Second AlUla Conference for Emerging Market Economies. Prior to the signing, both sides held bilateral talks focused on scaling up cooperation across transport, education, and other high-priority sectors. The discussions emphasized the importance of projects that strengthen regional connectivity and human capital. Road Infrastructure: 4R40 Project One agreement allocates $70 million under the IsDB’s broader $192 million commitment for the 4R40 road project. The funds will support the reconstruction of 143 kilometers of the Dashtabad-Zaamin-Bakhmal-Galyaaral highway, as well as the rehabilitation of 30 kilometers of local and rural roads in the Jizzakh region. The road upgrades are expected to ease transit bottlenecks, enhance safety, and improve access to markets and public services for approximately 200,000 residents. The project will also strengthen regional links to the M39 international transport corridor. Education Reform: SmartEd Project The second agreement covers $94.06 million, part of a total contribution of $160.25 million for the SmartEd project, a national initiative aimed at transforming Uzbekistan’s education system. Funds will be used to build and equip 58 new schools and expand existing institutions with an additional 2,431 classrooms. The initiative targets nearly 73,000 students annually, with provisions for specialized training for over 36,000 teachers and administrators. The project is designed to promote a competency-based, inclusive education system. A Broader Partnership These new agreements build on earlier commitments. At the first AlUla conference in February 2023, Uzbekistan and the IsDB signed $299 million in financing deals, laying the foundation for the infrastructure and education reforms now entering the implementation phase.

Energy Policy

Tokayev Calls Nuclear Power a Correction of Kazakhstan’s “Historical Absurdity”

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has described Kazakhstan’s push to build nuclear power plants as a correction of a “historical absurdity”, namely, that a nation which ranks among the world’s top producers and exporters of uranium has yet to harness this resource for domestic electricity generation. In October 2024, a nationwide referendum showed broad public support for the development of nuclear energy. Following the vote, Tokayev announced plans to construct at least two nuclear power plants, with a third to follow. In June 2025, Russian state corporation Rosatom was selected to build the country’s first nuclear power plant near the village of Ulken, on the western shore of Lake Balkhash, about 400 kilometers northwest of Almaty. Contracts for the second and third plants were later signed with the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). “The construction of several nuclear power plants is, on the one hand, a correction of the historical absurdity – to be a world leader in the production of uranium and not to build any nuclear power plants, on the other, it is the prestige of Kazakhstan,” Tokayev said in an interview with Turkistan newspaper, published on the official Akorda website. According to Tokayev, reliable electricity generation is essential for Kazakhstan’s transition to a new technological model of the economy. He emphasized that the development of supercomputers, data centers, and automated industrial systems requires substantial energy resources. “This is the reality of the new global technological order,” he stated. Tokayev has consistently argued that Kazakhstan must become a digital power, framing digitalization as a matter of national survival. He believes society is mentally prepared for innovation, citing the success of fintech companies and the expansion of digital government services. “We have good starting conditions and have made progress in the digitalization of public services, fintech, and several sectors of the economy. The ecosystem supporting IT startups is functioning effectively,” the president noted. He added that for continued progress, Kazakhstan requires stable, environmentally friendly, and high-capacity energy sources, needs best met by nuclear power. Tokayev also highlighted the importance of personnel in building a nuclear energy sector. He said the development of nuclear power will contribute to the emergence of a new class of technical intelligentsia, which could ultimately influence state policy. “Qualified specialists are needed to create modern energy sources. The head of NVIDIA, the world's largest company by market capitalization, predicts that in the near future, multimillionaires will include representatives of technical professions, the so-called ‘blue-collar workers’,” Tokayev said. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan plans to train nuclear energy specialists abroad through the Bolashak state program.

Geopolitics

Central Asia’s Road to the Southern Seas: A Search for Stability

India has confirmed that it received a six-month sanctions waiver from the United States for its involvement in developing Iran’s Chabahar port. According to The Times of India, the decision followed intensive diplomacy by New Delhi, which convinced Washington that Chabahar provides India’s only practical overland access to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. Through Chabahar, India is building a land-based counterpart to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, creating an alternative axis linking the Indian Ocean with Eurasia while bypassing Islamabad and Beijing. The exemption, valid until April 2026, gives India room to negotiate with Washington. For Central Asia, the episode reflects a broader challenge: choosing viable routes to the southern seas. Current debates about “Afghan transit” focus largely on the Trans-Afghan Railway and the so-called Kabul corridor connecting northern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s ports. Yet Afghanistan’s transport network is forming along multiple lines. Alongside the eastern route, a western corridor from Herat to Kandahar and Spin Boldak is also developing, offering access both to Pakistan and to Chabahar. The integration of western Afghanistan’s infrastructure with Iran’s transport network makes this corridor more reliable under today’s political and security conditions. It aligns with projects pursued by Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan and positions Herat as a major hub. It is also close to the North–South Transport Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli and Middle Corridors, and the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. The planned Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat line fits the logic of the Five Nations Railway Corridor, potentially giving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan access to Chabahar and, if stability improves, to Pakistan’s ports as well. By contrast, the eastern route will remain constrained by the unstable Afghan–Pakistani border and the volatile relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghanistan’s own priorities also differ from outside assumptions: the Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak line primarily serves as an internal transport spine linking the west and south. For Kabul, the route to Gwadar is more a political gesture than a practical goal. Some analysts note that developing the western corridor also helps rebalance the country’s economic geography toward its more diverse western regions. These dynamics strengthen the western route’s appeal. The Taliban leadership has even urged Afghan businesses to reduce reliance on Pakistani ports, signaling a structural shift in trade orientation. Both Chabahar and Gwadar face political risks. Pakistan’s transit routes pass through areas affected by insurgency, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the broader narcotics routes of the Golden Crescent. The greatest uncertainty remains the fluctuating relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Gwadar, while technologically superior, is undermined by chronic instability. Chabahar’s capacity is more modest, but its integration with Iran’s road and rail network provides reliability. The United States adds another layer of complexity. The waiver suggests Washington is balancing its Iran sanctions regime with its strategic partnership with India. The United States is not directly involved in regional infrastructure but retains enough influence to shift the balance between the western and eastern routes. Under certain conditions, Gwadar may appear less problematic for Washington than Chabahar. At the same time, selective sanctions exemptions...

Middle Powers

Which Central Asian States Qualify as Middle Powers in 2025?

As global power shifts toward multipolarity, Central Asia’s states are emerging as active regional players. This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. 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This article assesses which of the five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—qualify as middle powers in 2025, based on economic strength, diplomatic reach, strategic capacity, and governance. Kazakhstan stands as the region’s only consolidated middle power, balancing fiscal stability, institutional reform, and multi-vector diplomacy. Uzbekistan is a rising aspirant, propelled by reforms but still reliant on external financing and centralized authority. The remaining states remain constrained by dependence and limited institutional depth. Together, they reflect a region increasingly capable of shaping, rather than merely absorbing, global and regional change. A comparative analysis of five Central Asian republics shows how far each has advanced toward this status. Economic Power Economic autonomy is a defining attribute of middle-power capability, enabling states to project influence, sustain policy independence, and finance external engagement. In Central Asia, dependence on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and remittances often reflects constrained fiscal capacity and limited domestic capital formation, while diversified, resilient economies underpin strategic autonomy. Key indicators—GDP per capita, credit ratings, debt sustainability, and export diversification—illuminate the region’s economic hierarchy. Kazakhstan stands as Central Asia’s only consolidated economic middle power. Resource-backed growth, a prudent fiscal regime, and a sovereign wealth fund (the National Fund of Kazakhstan) have anchored macroeconomic stability. With a “BBB” credit rating or equivalent from major agencies, Kazakhstan demonstrates sound debt management and policy credibility. Ongoing diversification efforts under the new economic policies—from renewables to financial modernization—aim to reduce hydrocarbon dependence and deepen integration into global supply chains. Its role as a trans-Caspian logistics hub enhances both strategic and commercial influence. Uzbekistan, by contrast, is an emerging frontier market propelled by post-2017 reforms in currency liberalization, taxation, and state-enterprise restructuring. Rapid GDP growth and expanding private-sector activity mark its trajectory toward fiscal autonomy, though continued ODA inflows averaging around $1.1 billion to 1.3 billion annually, primarily from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and bilateral partners such as Japan, the United States, and the European Union, highlight its residual dependence on external concessional financing. To achieve genuine middle power status, Uzbekistan must roughly double its real economic output over the next decade, a scale of growth aligned with the shift...

Infrastructure Development

Manas Rising: Jalal-Abad Renaming Crowns Central Position in Kyrgyz Development Plans

On September 18, the President of Kyrgyzstan, Sadyr Japarov, signed into law the renaming of the country’s third-largest city, Jalal-Abad. From September 28, it will be known as Manas. This decision marks an escalation in the attention lavished on the city over the past half-decade, with a surge of infrastructure and construction projects. Indeed, rumors abound that the renaming may be just the beginning, perhaps laying the groundwork to shift the capital south. Rapid Development Jalal-Abad lies nestled in the Fergana Valley in Kyrgyzstan’s south, not far from the Uzbek border. Locals describe it as a politically active city and region, one that has nurtured many ambitious southern politicians. These include former President Kurmanbek Bakiev, perennial oppositionist Omurbek Tekebayev, now ambassador to Germany, and Kamchybek Tashiyev, the powerful head of the security services, widely known by their Russian acronym, the GKNB. It is the influence of Tashiyev that has led many to suspect Jalal-Abad has been the focus of special attention. Tashiyev hails from the village of Barpy, nearby in the Jalal-Abad region. In much the same way that Tajikistan’s president Emomali Rahmon has beautified his home village of Danghara, making it a provincial capital, and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev has steered investment such as the new BYD factory to his home region of Jizzakh, so too do Kyrgyz leaders seek to channel resources to their native provinces. “One thing you notice immediately is the amount of construction here,” a local resident, Saeed, told The Times of Central Asia. “You can see as you travel around the city, so much land is being prepared for new buildings.” In 2023, the city was singled out by President Sadyr Japarov as Kyrgyzstan’s future “second economic hub”. Two billion som ($22.9 million) were allocated to improve its infrastructure. One of the first steps was demolishing a large prison in the city center to make way for redevelopment. Other projects underway include a new regional airport, being built by China State Construction Engineering Corporation, around 20 kilometers from the city center. There has been an emphasis on public services, including a recently opened children’s hospital and a planned seven-storey, 280-bed medical facility. But Saeed is more excited about cultural projects. “We’ve also got a new Barcelona football academy here,” he said. “Even Bishkek doesn't have a Barcelona academy!” The city is also set to be one of the main hubs of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which will bring goods directly from China’s Xinjiang Province without passing through Kazakhstan. Another local commentator, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that the Chinese presence in the city has also grown markedly in recent years. “It’s not only construction workers. Before, we didn't have so many Chinese restaurants. Now, Jalal-Abad has genuinely popular Chinese restaurants. In the past, the Kyrgyz generally despised Chinese cuisine; it was too foreign. But nowadays, you see government workers and other businessmen visiting these restaurants alongside the Chinese and trying their food.” The grandest project of all has been the new city administration building....