• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00198 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
05 December 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 41

Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal Raises Water Security Fears

Water has long been one of Central Asia’s most contested resources, shaping agriculture, energy policy, and diplomacy across the region. Recently, Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal project has emerged as a central point in this debate. Promoted by the Taliban as a vital step toward achieving food security and economic growth, the canal also raises alarm bells among downstream neighbors who heavily depend on the Amu Darya River. Now, according to Islamic Emirate spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid, the second phase of the project is expected to be completed within five months, raising further concerns among downstream countries about its potential impact on regional water security. Progress on the Ground In August, the Afghan authorities stated that 93% of the second phase had been completed. Videos show the canal lined with concrete and stone in some sections, alongside the construction of large and medium-sized bridges to link surrounding settlements. The project spans 128 kilometers from Dawlatabad district in Balkh province to Andkhoy district in Faryab province and involves over 60 contractors, making it one of Afghanistan’s largest infrastructure projects. Origins and International Support The canal’s roots trace back to earlier international efforts. While some sources attribute its conceptual origins to Soviet or British engineers in the 1960s, significant development began in 2018 under President Ashraf Ghani. The project was supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Indian engineering firms. According to the Scientific-Information Center of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (SIC ICWC), a $3.6 million feasibility study was launched in Kabul in December 2018, funded by USAID and conducted by AACS Consulting and BETS Consulting Services Ltd. The study was coordinated with several Afghan ministries, but has not been published. Following the Taliban’s takeover, the Islamic Emirate held an official inauguration ceremony on March 30, 2022. The full canal is designed to stretch 285 kilometers, measuring 100 meters wide and 8.5 meters deep, and is expected to divert an estimated six to ten cubic kilometers of water annually from the Amu Darya. Afghan media have quoted water management expert Najibullah Sadid, who projected the canal could generate between $470 million and $550 million in annual revenue. Regional Concerns and Environmental Risks The project has raised alarm in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, countries that depend heavily on the Amu Darya for irrigation. Experts at SIC ICWC point out that no environmental impact assessment was conducted for downstream states, nor were they formally notified of the construction, as required by international water conventions. In December 2022, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for practical dialogue with Afghanistan and the international community to strengthen regional water security. Adroit Associates estimates that the canal could eventually divert up to 13 billion cubic meters annually, nearly one-quarter of the Amu Darya’s average flow. Environmental risks are also mounting. Analysts warn that Uzbekistan, which relies heavily on the river for agriculture, could face soil degradation and declining crop yields. Turkmenistan, where agriculture accounts for 12% of GDP, may also suffer severe disruptions. Some studies suggest Uzbekistan and...

Opinion: Ex-U.S. Ambassador Warns Washington Has Ceded Information Space in Central Asia

Former U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Daniel Rosenblum, has warned that Washington has “surrendered” its influence in Central Asia’s information sphere, allowing Russia and China to dominate the narrative. His remarks were reported by the Yale Daily News following a lecture at Yale University on September 15. Rosenblum, who served as U.S. ambassador to Uzbekistan from 2019 to 2022 and to Kazakhstan from 2022 to 2025, delivered a speech titled “Battling the Firehose of Falsehood: Confronting Russian Disinformation in Central Asia.” He described how Russian disinformation campaigns frequently portrayed U.S. diplomats as destabilizing actors. In one example from 2023, Russian outlets falsely claimed a NATO base had opened in Kazakhstan. “While it is easy to joke about such an absurd idea,” Rosenblum said, “the intent behind such Russian information operations is deadly serious.” Rosenblum noted that U.S. embassies attempted to counteract these narratives by highlighting tangible achievements, including COVID-19 health initiatives, agricultural partnerships, and academic exchange programs. However, he argued that much of this work has unraveled since 2023, citing the dismissal of over 1,300 State Department personnel, the elimination of USAID programs in the region, and recent cuts to Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “Eight months into the second Trump administration, it seems clear that the information war is over in Central Asia, not because the Russians won. We have simply surrendered,” he said. Rosenblum also emphasized China’s expanding influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, observing that Beijing “was doing a pretty good job of winning friends and influencing people” via infrastructure investment and cultural outreach. In a post-lecture interview, Rosenblum underscored that the challenge is now largely domestic. “The biggest challenge today is ourselves,” he said. “We have to decide as a country, do we want to be engaged in the world or not? If we cut ourselves off from the world, we will ultimately be less secure and less prosperous.” This concern was echoed in earlier analysis for The Times of Central Asia by Arman Amini, a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and an Atlantic Council Millennium Fellow. “Over the past decade, China has steadily expanded its presence in Central Asia, not through military force, but by building roads, trade corridors, and digital infrastructure,” Amini noted. “As the United States scaled back its regional footprint following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Beijing moved quickly to fill the void. Today, China has positioned itself as the region’s dominant external power, while the U.S. risks being left on the sidelines.” The lecture was attended by approximately 80 people in person and online. It was organized by the Central Asia Initiative of the MacMillan Center, the Edward J. and Dorothy Clarke Memorial Fund, and Asian Crossroads, a student group dedicated to raising awareness of Central Asia.

Trump Reengages Central Asia Amid Tariffs and Rising Competition

In a bid that signals renewed U.S. interest in Central Asia, U.S. President Donald Trump on September 7, 2025, held what he described as a “great conversation” with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Earlier in the week, Trump also spoke over the phone with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, with both sides highlighting plans to expand their strategic partnership. Commentators have noted that Trump’s rhetoric and transactional approach to foreign policy in his second term create both challenges and opportunities for sustained U.S. engagement in the region. “Great Conversation” With Tokayev As he departed the White House for the U.S. Open men’s final, President Trump told reporters, “We had a great conversation,” though he offered no further details on the substance of the discussion. On Kazakhstan’s side, President Tokayev had reached out in July, expressing his openness to constructive trade talks following Trump’s imposition of 25% U.S. tariffs on Kazakh goods. In that July letter, Tokayev committed to “developing fair, predictable, and mutually beneficial trade relations.” He also emphasized his readiness for “constructive dialogue aimed at finding a rational solution.” The exchange reflects the broader importance of the U.S.–Kazakhstan relationship, which extends far beyond tariffs. Since 2017, the two nations have maintained an “enhanced strategic partnership,” covering trade, security, and energy cooperation. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and a leading supplier to U.S. nuclear power plants, while American firms such as Chevron and ExxonMobil are deeply invested in the country’s vast oil fields. Strategically located between Russia, China, and Europe, Kazakhstan offers Washington a critical partner in promoting regional stability and developing alternative trade corridors traditionally reliant on Russian land. By engaging closely with Astana, the U.S. strengthens its foothold in Central Asia while securing vital resources and supporting Kazakhstan’s multi-vector diplomacy. Strategic Outreach to Uzbekistan Earlier the same week, Trump and Uzbekistan’s Mirziyoyev agreed to broaden their strategic partnership across economic, security, and cultural domains, the Uzbekistan press office reported. According to the office, Trump praised Uzbekistan’s “irreversible reforms” aimed at modernizing its economy and improving living standards, while Mirziyoyev lauded what he termed the “impressive results of the domestic and foreign policy” of the U.S. administration. This extension of engagement to Tashkent comes against a backdrop of longstanding U.S. involvement in Uzbekistan, including trade under bilateral agreements since the mid-1990s and cooperation on border control and counter-terrorism programs. In late 2024, shortly before Trump’s second term began, Washington reaffirmed its support for Uzbekistan’s bid to join the World Trade Organization, with U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai announcing the completion of bilateral market-access negotiations. That same year, U.S. officials also underscored opportunities in critical minerals cooperation with Tashkent through the C5+1 diplomatic framework. Beyond trade and security, Uzbekistan is strategically important as Central Asia’s most populous nation and a key transit hub between China, Russia, and South Asia. Closer U.S.–Uzbek ties complement Washington’s regional engagement with Kazakhstan, creating overlapping partnerships that strengthen American influence, promote economic diversification, and reinforce stability across Central Asia. Why Now? Geopolitics, Tariffs, and Regional...

Cuts to USAID Leave Central Asia Facing Development Challenges

When American President Donald Trump announced a freeze and overhaul of his country's foreign aid in early 2025, the move sparked concern across Central Asia. For more than three decades, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had been a key contributor to development in the region, supporting education, healthcare, agriculture, and environmental protection. Support for Weaker Economies USAID’s role was particularly critical in economically vulnerable countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its sudden withdrawal now leaves local governments scrambling to compensate with limited domestic resources. The cuts have not been uniform, but the overall impact has been profound. According to the Center for Global Development, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan lost 78 percent and 69 percent of their USAID-backed programs, respectively. In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, nearly all aid programs were discontinued. Foreign aid to the region has often reflected shifting geopolitical dynamics. In Uzbekistan, for example, support surged from $6 million to $40 million in 2016 following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power. Kyrgyzstan received $75 million in 2010 amid negotiations over the U.S. military base there. In contrast, aid to Turkmenistan fell to just $2.8 million by 2024. Limited Time to Adjust While Kazakhstan’s more robust economy allowed for a gradual reduction in U.S. assistance, American companies remain active in its vital oil sector. Yet the abrupt nature of the broader aid pullback has disrupted numerous projects with little warning. Health and education initiatives were halted, as were efforts to bolster trade and cross-border infrastructure, critical for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as they seek to deepen global economic ties. Environmental initiatives also suffered. With Central Asia especially vulnerable to climate change, USAID had funded resilience-building programs focused on water access and renewable energy. These efforts have largely ceased, raising concerns among farmers and local communities who had come to rely on them. Civil Society Under Strain Some governments in the region may quietly welcome the cuts, particularly those wary of foreign-backed NGOs. USAID frequently partnered with local civil society organizations and media outlets, entities that Central Asian authorities often view with suspicion. The loss of U.S. support has left these groups increasingly exposed to state pressure. Tajikistan offers a telling case. In 2020, USAID partnered with the Aga Khan Foundation during the COVID-19 pandemic. But two years later, following unrest in the country's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, the government launched a crackdown on the foundation. This underscores how some aid programs, especially those linked to civil society, are perceived as threats. Although USAID did not operate programs directly, its funding empowered local partners. With that backing gone, and less pressure from Washington, several Central Asian governments have tightened their control over independent organizations. Seeking Alternatives Replacing USAID’s role will not be easy. The European Union and countries such as France and Germany have long supported development in Central Asia, but their resources are stretched, especially with increased attention and funding directed toward Ukraine. Despite EU pledges of investment via the Global Gateway initiative, support for democracy, civil society, and human rights...

Cuts to USAID Leave Central Asia Facing Development Challenges

When American President Donald Trump announced a freeze and overhaul of his country's foreign aid in early 2025, the move sparked concern across Central Asia. For more than three decades, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had been a key contributor to development in the region, supporting education, healthcare, agriculture, and environmental protection. Support for Weaker Economies USAID’s role was particularly critical in economically vulnerable countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its sudden withdrawal now leaves local governments scrambling to compensate with limited domestic resources. The cuts have not been uniform, but the overall impact has been profound. According to the Center for Global Development, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan lost 78 percent and 69 percent of their USAID-backed programs, respectively. In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, nearly all aid programs were discontinued. Foreign aid to the region has often reflected shifting geopolitical dynamics. In Uzbekistan, for example, support surged from $6 million to $40 million in 2016 following President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power. Kyrgyzstan received $75 million in 2010 amid negotiations over the U.S. military base there. In contrast, aid to Turkmenistan fell to just $2.8 million by 2024. Limited Time to Adjust While Kazakhstan’s more robust economy allowed for a gradual reduction in U.S. assistance, American companies remain active in its vital oil sector. Yet the abrupt nature of the broader aid pullback has disrupted numerous projects with little warning. Health and education initiatives were halted, as were efforts to bolster trade and cross-border infrastructure, critical for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as they seek to deepen global economic ties. Environmental initiatives also suffered. With Central Asia especially vulnerable to climate change, USAID had funded resilience-building programs focused on water access and renewable energy. These efforts have largely ceased, raising concerns among farmers and local communities who had come to rely on them. Civil Society Under Strain Some governments in the region may quietly welcome the cuts, particularly those wary of foreign-backed NGOs. USAID frequently partnered with local civil society organizations and media outlets, entities that Central Asian authorities often view with suspicion. The loss of U.S. support has left these groups increasingly exposed to state pressure. Tajikistan offers a telling case. In 2020, USAID partnered with the Aga Khan Foundation during the COVID-19 pandemic. But two years later, following unrest in the country's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, the government launched a crackdown on the foundation. This underscores how some aid programs, especially those linked to civil society, are perceived as threats. Although USAID did not operate programs directly, its funding empowered local partners. With that backing gone, and less pressure from Washington, several Central Asian governments have tightened their control over independent organizations. Seeking Alternatives Replacing USAID’s role will not be easy. The European Union and countries such as France and Germany have long supported development in Central Asia, but their resources are stretched, especially with increased attention and funding directed toward Ukraine. Despite EU pledges of investment via the Global Gateway initiative, support for democracy, civil society, and human rights...

Despite USAID Funding Cuts, Kyrgyzstan Plans to Reintroduce Goitered Gazelle at Issyk-Kul

Kyrgyzstan has launched an ambitious project to restore the population and natural habitat of the goitered gazelle on the southern shore of Lake Issyk-Kul, a region once home to these graceful creatures. Led by the Argali Public Fund, Ilbirs Fund, and the Gulistan farm, the reintroduction effort marks a significant step toward reversing the species' decline and restoring balance to the local ecosystem. Reviving a Lost Species The goitered gazelle, an elegant herbivore from the bovid family, was once abundant in the Issyk-Kul region. However, its population collapsed after the 1930s due to widespread poaching and the conversion of natural landscapes for agricultural and economic development. Today, the species is listed in Kyrgyzstan's Red Book of endangered species, making their conservation an urgent priority. Found across Central Asia — from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Iran and beyond — the gazelle is integral to maintaining the balance of steppe and desert ecosystems. On the southern shore of Issyk-Kul, conditions remain favorable for the return of the goitered gazelle. However, decades of human activity and habitat loss have driven them away, leaving reintroduction as the most viable path to restoration. The project employs a “soft release” approach, starting with a semi-free adaptation phase. Animals are first acclimatized and allowed to breed in a controlled environment before being released back into the wild. This method reduces the risks associated with sudden release and ensures a higher survival rate. The Project in Action Currently, the Gulistan farm houses a herd of 43 gazelles. By the end of the year, the number is expected to grow to 60, with the first batch of 25 animals scheduled for release in 2025. Organizers aim to release an additional 15-20 gazelles annually, slowly building a self-sustaining wild population. If conservation measures, particularly anti-poaching efforts, prove successful, the gazelle population in Issyk-Kul could reach 500 within the next decade. Gazelles play an essential role in their environments, feeding on thorny and toxic plants that other species avoid. This behavior helps control invasive vegetation and supports the overall health of the ecosystem. Their presence also benefits predators such as wolves and snow leopards, creating a natural chain of biodiversity. Broader Impact on Biodiversity and Ecotourism The reintroduction of the goitered gazelle represents more than just species preservation; it is a step toward restoring the ecological integrity of the Issyk-Kul landscape. A thriving population of gazelles can boost biodiversity by fostering healthier, more balanced ecosystems. Their grazing patterns promote plant regeneration, which in turn supports a variety of other species, from insects to birds of prey. Furthermore, the project has significant potential to bolster Kyrgyzstan's ecotourism sector. Issyk-Kul is already a popular destination for outdoor enthusiasts, and the presence of rare and protected wildlife like the goitered gazelle could attract even more visitors. Eco-friendly tourism initiatives could offer guided safaris to observe the gazelles in their natural habitat, providing educational opportunities while generating revenue for local communities. President Japarov has underscored the importance of halting illegal hunting, urging communities to see...